A sociosemantic analysis of adolescents' self-perception patterns in four secondary schools in Spain. by Díaz Martínez, Capitolina.
A SOCIOSEMANTIC ANALYSIS 
of adolescents' self-perception patterns 
in four secondary schools in Spain. 
Capitolina Diaz Martinez 
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
University of London 
Institute of Education 
1994 





Acknowlegments 	 2 
List of Tables. 	 VI 
List of Figures. 	 VI 
Introduction 	 3 
Chapter 1. Socio-Educational Motivation as an Alternative between 
Compensatory Philosophy and Cultural Determinism. 
	 9 
1.1. Universal education 	
 10 
1.2. The 'cultural deprivation' approach 
	
 12 
1.3. The relativistic and 'reproduction' approaches. 	
 16 
1.4. The risk of cultural fatalism 	
 19 
1.5. Culture and the individual. 	 21 
1.6. The cultural self-development approach. 	 23  
1.7. The concept of socio-educational motivation 
	 74 
Notes to Chapter 1. 	 16 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background of the Research. 	  29 
2.0. Introduction 
	  
2.1. The concept of system 
	 30 
2.1.1. The concept of system in social sciences 
	 ... 31 
2.1.2. Advantages and disadvantages of the use of systemic 
concepts in social sciences. 
	 32 
2.1.3. New departures in systemic social thinking. 
	 33 
2.1.4. Natural and artificial systems 
	 35 
2.1.5. A revised, provisional definition of system, adequate to 
the study of social entities 	 36 
2.2. Classical and non classical systems. 	 37 
2.3. Organizationally closed systems 
	 43 
II 
2.4 Action systems as organizationally closed systems. 
	 48 
2.5. Meaning in organizationally closed systems. 
	 52 
2.6. Informationally open systems. 	 54 
2.7. Reflectivity 	 61 
2.8. Communication. 	 63 
2.9. Complexity. 	 66 
2.10. Parts and totalities. 
	 69 
Notes to Chapter 2. 	 73 
Capter 3. The Concept of Self-Perception Systems 
	 85 
3.0. Introduction 	 85 
3.1. Some Concepts Related to the Idea of Self-Perception 
System. 	 86 
3.2. The notion of self-perception system 
	 93 
3.3. Self-perception systems as non-trivial machines. 
	
 100 
3.4. Human consciousness. 
	
 104 
3.5. Social Individuals as Social Systems. 
	
 105 
3.6. Social Individuals as Autonomous Social Systems 
	 110 
3.7. Self-Perception Systems and Norms. 
	 113 
3.8. Social Individuals as Producers of Social Novelty and Change.116 
3.9. Self-Perception Patterns. 
	 118 
3.10. Self-Expression as a Way of Access to Self-Perception. 
	
 120 
Notes to Chapter 3. 	  122 
Chapter 4. Description of the Empirical Part of the Research. 
	 126 
4.1. The subjects of the research: Adolescents in a decisive period. 126 
4.2. The research stages. 
	
 129 
4.3. The subjects and the data of the research 
	 129 
4.4. The use of essays as an instrument of research. 
	
 130 
4.4.1. The use of essays to elicit information. 
	  130 




4.5. Conceptual and Attitudinal Content Analysis. 	  136 
4.6. Epistemological problems posed by the essays technique. 	  138 
4.6.1 Content Analysis and Intuitive Analysis. 	  138 
4.6.2. The Problem of Homogeneity. 	  139 
4.6.3 The Problem of Relevance. 	  141 
4.6.4. The Problem of Reliability. 	  142 
4.6.5. Open and Synergetic, versus closed and analytic 
meaning. 	  143 
4.7. Methodological problems of the Essays Technique. 	  143 
4.7.1. Linguistic and Conceptual Approaches. 	  144 
4.7.2. The Reading of the Texts. 	  146 
4.7.3. From Expressions to Concepts. 	  147 
4.7.3.1. Identification of Conceptual Expressions. 
	
 148 
4.7.3.2. Identification of significant words. 	 149 
4.7.3.3 Identification of significant clauses 
	
. 151 
4.7.3.4. The relationship between Concepts and 
Attitudes 	  151 
4.7.3.5. Constructing a list of concepts from a list of 
clauses 	  152 
4.7.4. From concepts to categories. 	  153 
4.8. Examples of conceptual homologation. 	  157 
4.9. Reduction and Assimilation 	  174 
Notes to Chapter 4. 	  179 
Chapter S. Sociosemantic Analysis of the Data. 	  182 
5.1. The Concept of Sociosemantic Analysis 	  182 
5.2. Mathematical processing of the data 	 192 
5.3. Interpretation of the sociosemantic plots. 	  197 
5.3.1 Interpretation of the configurations generated through 
ALSCAL 	 198 
5.3.1.1 The patterning of the configuration 	 200 
5.3.1.2. Interpretation of the main axes. 	 202 
5.3.1.2.1. The horizontal axis 	 204 
5.3.1.2.2. The vertical axis. 	 207 
IV 
5.3.1.3. Sociosemantic distances in the plot 
	 209 
5.3.1.4. Self-perception patterns in the category plot 
	 212 
5.3.2. Interpretation of the plot of individuals. 
	 217 
5.3.2.1 The patterning of the configuration of the 
individuals' plot 
	 219 
5.3.2.2. Interpretation of the configuration 
according to the individuals' list of concepts. 
	 220 
5.3.2.3 Interpretation of the configuration 
according to backgrounds of the students. 
	 227 
5.3.2.4. Gender in the plot. 
	 232 
5.3.2.5. Distribution of self-perception patterns in 
the plot 	 234 
5.4. Social-class in the category plot. 
	 237 
5.4.1. Self-perception Patterns and Social Backgrounds. 238 
5.4.2. Students' social background. 
	 243 
5.4.3. Parental occupations 
	 244 
Notes to Chapter 5. 	 249 
Chapter 6. Interpretive Analysis. 
	 251 
6.1. A General view of the three Self-perception Patterns. 
	 252 
6.2. A Comparative Analysis of Several Related Studies. 
	 258 
6.3. The hermeneutic circle: concrete and abstract levels of 
interpretation. 	 259 
6.4. The Professional Pattern 
	 264 
6.4.1 Towards profession through academic achievement. 
	 265 
6.4.2. The invisibility of the family. 
	 266 
6.4.3. Yuppie Subpattern. 
	 267 
6.4.4. Progressive Subpattern. 
	 268 
6.4.5. Friends, marriage and divorce. 
	 270 
6.4.6. Money and consumerism. 
	 272 
6.4.7. Free time and hobbies. 
	 272 
6.4.8. Positive and active old age. 
	 274 
6.4.9 Control of action by goals. 
	 275 
6.5. The Family Pattern 
	 277 
V 
6.5.1. Belonging to a Family. 	 277 
6.5.2. Being a housewife 	 279 
6.5.3. Marriage is boring but I'll marry 	 280 
6.5.4. School, leaving or staying? 	 281 
6.5.5. Money by gambling and making own's will 	 282 
6.5.6. Free Time. 	 283 
6.5.7. Negative and passive old age 	 284 
6.5.8. Control of action by maxims. 	 285 
6.6. The Dual or Conflictive Pattern 	 287 
6.6.1. Solution of the conflict by compromise. 	 289 
6.6.2. Solution of the conflict by postponement. 	 290 
6.6.3. The inconsistent solution 	 291 
6.6.4. No boys in a dual position 	 292 
6.6.5. The dual pattern as a pattern between two extremes. 	 293 
Notes to Chapter 6. 	 295 
Conclusions. 	 297 
0. Introduction 	 297 
1. The Problem 	 298 
2. The conceptual framework. 	 300 
3. The heuristic model 	 301 
4. The methodology. 	 302 
5. Patterns of self-perception 	 304 
5.1 The profession oriented pattern. 	 305 
5.2. The family oriented pattern. 	 306 
5.3. The dual pattern. 	 307 
5.4. The two basic sociosemantic dimensions. 	 308 
6. Gender and self-perception patterns. 	 308 
7. Self-perception patterns and social class 	 309 
8. Final reflections and suggestions for further research. 	 310 
Bibliography 	 313 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table I. 	 244 
Table II. 	 245 
Table III. 	 246 
Table IV. 	 247 
Table V 	 248 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. 	  199 
Figure 2. 	 20 1 
Figure 3. 	 203 
Figure 4. 	 210 
Figure 5. 	 213 
Figure 6. 	 215 
Figure 7. 	 218 
Figure 8. 	 221 
Figure 9. 	 228 
Figure 10 	 231 
Figure 11 	 233 
VI 
1 
The research focuses on the analysis of the self-perception patterns 
present among Spanish adolescents. The investigation of this topic is carried 
out by means of the development of a methodology adequate to deal with the 
shortcomings of existing approaches. The theoretic approach consists in the 
consideration of those adolescents —thirteen and fourteen years old 
students— as autonomous social agents who define their own personal 
strategies in a dynamic of interactions with their environment. 
This view of students as autonomous social agents is refined through 
the concept of a self-perception system which draws on some basic notions of 
systems thinking and cybernetics. Some self-perception systems show 
similarities which indicate the presence of distinct self-perception patterns. 
The detection and characterization of those patterns is the main aim of this 
research. 
The empirical basis of the research is provided by essays written by 
116 students belonging to four state schools in Madrid. Those schools are 
located in four different socio-economic areas of that city. The common topic 
of the essays was "How do you see your life as a youngster, as a middle age 
person and as an elderly person?". The analysis of the conceptual content of 
those essays produces the specific concepts used by each individual. These 
data are then processed by means of a methodology called socio-semantic 
analysis, which combines Q-analysis and Multidimensional Scaling. The 
outcome of this methodology is a set of socio-semantic maps in which 
concepts and individuals appear located according to their socio-semantic 
distances. The interpretation of those maps allows for abstract different 
patterns of self-perception in the sample: profession centred pattern, a family 
centred pattern and a dual or conflictive pattern, which is characteristic of 
some girls. 
The sociological significance of the notion of self-perception patterns 
stems from the fact that the considerations of the specific patterns that are at 
work in a given social environment —in this case an educational 
environment— may be instrumental in explaining the behaviour of the agents 
acting within those environments. 
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Many social scientists concerned with making educational systems and 
practices more effective have argued for a considerable period of time that 
making the school more efficient means that it must correspond more to what 
and how pupils think (from John Dewey and Paulo Freire to Edwards and 
Mercer or Jimeno Sacristan). They have largely focussed their attention on 
social class then subsequently ethnic and gender differences as important 
elements in explaining the area of educational success and failure. One of the 
underlying assumptions of the above mentioned line of research has been that 
such differences result in distinct types of attitudes among students towards 
the school in particular and educational processes in general. It can be argued 
that the presence of those different types of attitudes among students is an 
important component to be considered when dealing with the improvement of 
the effectiveness of education. However, attitudes have tended to be defined in 
a narrow sense which does not include, as more recent writers like Gambetta 
(1987) have pointed out, pupil intentions. 
In part, my starting point is to suggest that we must look at students as 
what I will call autonomous social agents who define their strategies towards 
the educational process according to their personal expectations. But before 
looking at the students relationship to the educational process, and in order to 
clarify that relationship, we must understand more thoroughly their own sef-
perceptions. 
Students only become personaly involved in the education process 
inasmuch as they feel themselves self-referenced in that process: in so far as 
they are able to make sense out of such a process by relating it to their own 
personal worlds of meanings. These personal worlds of meanings make up 
complex systems of conceptual and attitudinal contents, which I call self-
perception systems. A self-perception system constitutes the horizon of 
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personal relevance which allow individuals to organize their action as 
autonomous social agents'. I will argue that self-perception systems are not 
merely psychological realities; they are intrinsically psycho-social in nature, 
and define both the social world and the self presupposed by the actions of the 
individual. 
Different types of self-perception systems among the students entail 
different ways of relating to the education process. The study of those specific 
kinds of self-perception systems, which I call self-perception patterns, may 
shed light upon the real environment of education, allowing a more discerning 
insight into many of the problems that our educational systems should confront 
nowadays. In fact, the investigation of the forms of self-perception through 
which the students connect to the education process might be at the basis of 
specific educational policies designed to improve and enhance the potential of 
modern education systems. 
There has been much research related to this topic, both in sociology 
(Coleman, 1966; Bernstein, 1971, 1977; Holsey, 1973; Shipman, 1980; 
Tomlinson, 1984; Doyle and Paludi, 1991; and psychology (Havighurst 
1953,1956,1972; Erickson,1968 Allport, 1955,1964; McGuire, 1984,1987; 
Simmons, 1987; Turner, 1987; Bern, 1967,1972; McCarthy,1988, etc.). My 
initial concern about the issue of self-perception patterns grew from empirical, 
conceptual and methodological problems. 
1. The empirical background of this thesis goes back to 1983, when I 
carried out a small research (C.Diaz Martinez, 1983: 127-139) on the personal 
views of a group of 31 students aged 11 to 14, from Ponferrada (Leon 
province, Spain). The aim of the research was to find out the expectations of 
those adolescents, focussing on their work expectations and family life. 
2. The conceptual issues faced by this thesis were prompted by a 
feeling of dissatisfaction regarding the way in which social sciences deal with 
the intentional dynamics of individual social actors. In the first and second 
chapters I briefly review the work that social scientists have undertaken 
concerning the area that for the moment I will call intentionality. I must point 
out that my purpose is not to present a harsh critique of their work, since it 
5 
represents only one area of their concerns. Only to take those elements of 
sometimes innovative and important theories which have led to the 
constitution of the social sciences and, indeed, allowed me and others to 
express our concerns, and to use them as stepping stones in the construction of 
a theory which can help us more adequately to deal with the problems I faund 
in the light of my investigations in Spain. I will of course return to look at 
these theories in the light of my own empirical research in the conclusions, 
where I hope to again offer alternatives. I must however, insist that the social 
sciences, like the natural sciences, can only progress by dealing with problems 
and not with approaches. I hope that my contribution will be taken in that way 
and not, as is too often the case, a critique which throws the baby out with the 
bathwater. 
3. The methodological problems grew from the need to find a bridge 
between the conceptual and empirical levels. Specifically I have tried to 
develop a methodology ('Sociosemantic Analysis') adequate to locate self-
perception systems and reveal self-perception patterns in the data provided 
by empirical research. The implementation of that methodology has taken up a 
substantial part of my research effort. 
In the course of this work I have been led to develop a number of 
concepts. Although these concepts will be explained fully through my 
description of my itinerary and as part of the development of my ideas I will 
offer their final definitions now as a guide to the reader: 
Self-perception system: The coherent domain of cognitive and 
motivational schemata2 through which individuals perceive themselves and the 
world, and act in that perceived world. Each individual develops a specific 
self-perception system. 
Self-perception patterns: Ideal types of self-perception systems, which 
have a characteristic scheme of coherence, congruous arrangements of 
elements, which entail each other. Similar individual self-perception systems 
can be viewed as concrete realizations of a shared self-perception pattern. 
Sociosemantic analysis: A technique to establish both the semantic 
connectivities (through shared concepts) between the individuals of a group, 
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and the social connectivities between those concepts (through the individuals 
who use them). The connectivities between individuals (through concepts) are 
interpreted as measures of the semantic similarity between those individuals, 
and the connectivities between concepts (through individuals) are interpreted 
as measures of the social similarity between those concepts. 
The first chapter of this thesis considers the basic problem that faces 
modern education: the mismatch between the aims envisaged by current 
policies of universal education and the actual results of such policies, which 
clearly do not live up to those aims. Universal education, a well established 
reality in today's developed countries, is not working as the intended 
mechanism of social integration and improvement for a substantial portion of 
society. Underprivileged social groups seem unable to benefit efficiently from 
the educational resources offered to them, and even those policies designed to 
increase their access to such resources have only achieved a limited success. 
The causes of this state of affairs are many-sided. But one of these causes is 
the lack of a clear understanding of the ways in which different social groups 
relate their expectations and actions to the education process. The education 
system's inability to take into account the real subjective demands of those 
groups is one of the factors that hinders their performance in the educational 
environment. Thus, the study of those subjective demands, which arise from 
the characteristic self-perception systems of different groups of students, is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the design of education policies adequate to the 
complexity of our societies. 
Chapter 2 provides the basic theoretic underpinnings of this thesis. It 
presents some general concepts, originated in some recent trends of systems 
thinking and cybernetics, which will be essential in order to substantiate the 
notion of 'self-perception system'. Concepts such as 'organizational closure', 
informational openness', 'reflectivity', etc., will allow a definite 
characterization of those psycho-social realities, both coherent and dynamic, 
that I call self-perception systems. 
Chapter 3 builds on those theories. The concept of 'self-perception 
system' is measured against other related notions ('self-concept', 'self-
reference', 'self-esteem', etc.), which are viewed as particular aspects of the 
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total self-perception system. Autonomy is an essential feature of self-
perception systems, which, as individual human beings, are able to adapt 
—indeed they must— to their environment without loss of their coherence. 
Meaning is produced and reproduced by those systems through their history of 
interactions with other similar systems, which are also human beings. They are 
action systems as well as systems of meanings, and they mutually define their 
horizon of expectations as social subjects. 
These three chapters make up the conceptual basis of the empirical 
research on which the specific sociological analysis of this thesis rests. This 
research, carried out on 13 year old students from four schools of Madrid, is 
described in Chapter 4. The initial data of the research were more that one 
hundred essays written by those students. The content of these essays was 
analyzed through a process also described in Chapter 4, in order to determine 
the concepts used by each student. Those individual sets of concepts are 
viewed as representing their specific self-perception systems. 
The content analysis of the essays, as described in Chapter 4, provides 
a collection of data sets —the lists of the concepts used by each individual, 
and the lists of the individuals who use each concept—; these data sets are 
then processed through a technique which I call 'sociosemantic analysis'. 
Chapter 5 presents this technique and shows the results of its application to the 
data. By processing these data through the sociosemantic technique, they are 
reconstructed in the form of sociosemantic maps of concepts and individuals. 
The interpretation of such maps allows us to detect the presence of several 
'patterns of self-perception' among the individuals of the sample. Three of 
these patterns become apparent: the 'family centred pattern', the 'profession 
centred pattern' and the 'dual patterns', which is typical of girls and combines 
features of the previous two. 
Chapter 6, drawing on the insights provided by that previous 
sociosemantic analysis, presents a detailed interpretive analysis of the essays, 
in order to elaborate the characteristics of the three self-perception patterns, as 
well as their sociological implications. Finally, the short Chapter 7 highlights 
some of the consequences that the presence of those distinct self-perception 
models among students entail for education policies and practice. 
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NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 
1 "How a child sees himself and others makes all the difference in the world to what he 
actually is and may become" P.S: Wilson 1973: 160. 
2 A mental model of the self and the world. 
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Chapter 1 
Sodo-Educational Motivation as an 
Alternative between Compensatory 
Philosophy and, Cultural Determinism:  
To precis this chapter, it can be said that "what underlies the complex 
of attitudes favourable to educational and social mobility" (Bernstein 1971: 
23) has been the aim of many researches in sociology of education. Very often 
educational achievement has been related to social class, especially from 1960 
onwards. Although, as Meighan (1986) pointed out, social class is a highly 
ambiguous concept, significant relations between educational attainment and 
social class have been established in research studies both in the United 
Kingdom and Spain —just to mention the two countries of reference of this 
research— (Lawton 1968, 1975; Davies et al. 1972; Fogelman 1975, 1983; 
Rutter and Madge 1976; Halsey et a/.1980; Motimore and Blackstone 1982; 
and Alcock 1987 among the British; Castillejo et a/. 1985; Perez Serrano 
1981; and Muiloz-Repiso et a/. 1992 among the Spanish). Subsequently 
looked at other groups and/or cohorts, gender, race, etc., neglecting the 
individual and her' motivation and what I will call their self-perception 
systems. 
Many of the studies about the influence of social class, gender, race, 
type of family, type of school, peer groups, etc., have been non-conclusive 
and/or controversial, as a consequence when the output of formal education is 
not as high as expected each part involved in the education process (parents, 
teachers, students, education authorities, etc.) usually put the blame on the 
others as responsible for the poor results rather than questioning the model 
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implicit in their judgements (J.Simon 1974; Sharp and Green 1975; Whitty 
1976). 
Given the almost universal concentration on groups or cohorts it 
appeared to me a sensible idea to look closely at the theoretical model of the 
individual that most education studies have taken for granted, or avoided, and 
to look at it in relation to individuals' socio-educational motivation. In that 
respect the scrutiny of the self-perception systems of the students can be 
important. In order to do that I start with a critical review of the relevant 
literature on socio-educational motivation. 
1.1. Universal education. 
The idea of universal education or mass schooling, from its 
beginnings, has been a contradictory ideal. It was conceived of by the 
Enlightenment, as a fundamental part of its emancipatory dreamt, and it has 
been tentatively implemented over the last two centuries by capitalist and then 
by socialist societies —first in Europe and America, then in almost all other 
countries (Ramirez and Boli, 1987; Meyer et al. 1992). However, from the 
outset a characteristic form of doublethink has bedevilled the history of the 
relationship between the ideals and practices of universal education. In terms 
of its ideals it was envisaged as an instrument of social cohesion (Durkheim, 
Mauss, Dewey, Parsons,...)— even of social equality (the socialist thinkers 
and educationalists like Freinet, etc.). In terms of its practices, universal 
education, according to many researchers, has been used to reproduce 
inequality (Bourdieu, Bernstein, Bowles and Gintis3, Apple...). Hence it would 
mirror the main structural basis of social conflict in modern societies. In fact, 
it can be argued that universal education seems to play an essential role in 
generating the stratification of these societies which, although undergoing 
fundamental technological and social transformations, have remained deeply 
unequal and conflict-prone (M.F.D. Young 1971; B. Bernstein 1971). 
Currently there is a mounting feeling of dissatisfaction provoked by 
the fact that universal education, as a generic ideal, does not seem to fulfill in 
an effective way the emancipatory role assigned to it by the Enlightenment's 
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great design (Adorn°, Habermas4). The deficiencies of modern education 
systems in that respect have become increasingly clear. Universal education, 
seen as 'compulsory and free education', is a well established reality in today's 
developed societies; several generations of citizens in the main industrialized 
countries have already benefitted from some system of universal educations. 
And yet divisions and conflicts along class, gender, and ethnic lines, in both 
central and peripheral societies, persist and seem to be extraordinarily resistant 
to their treatment by educational means. 
On the one hand, universal education arguably is the main instrument 
of social mobility and change in modem societies: for instance the substantial 
changes in the roles and status of women over this century would be 
inconceivable without referring to the phenomenon of feminine mass 
schooling (Ramirez and Cha 1990; Bradley and Ramirez 1991). 
On the other hand, modem educational systems have revealed over the 
last decades their shortcomings as efficient instruments of the integration of 
underprivileged social groups into the mainstream of society —not to speak of 
effective equalization—. The increasing awareness of that fact, which became 
progressively clear during the long period of economic expansion that 
followed World War II, was a disturbing finding (Floud, 1956; Coleman, 
1969; Halsey 1980). A worrying outcome of such fmding was that the implicit 
doublethink underpinning the enlightened attitude towards education suffered 
a crisis that provoked a reappraisal of some of its theoretical assumptions. The 
modem sociology of education, as compared to the liberal, positivistic, 
optimistic educational thinking (Dewey and his followers), looks like another 
'dismal science'6: its main preoccupation would consist in trying to explain 
why things do not seem to happen quite as expected by the reformers writing 
between 1950 and 1980. 
Over the last decades many authors have considered the factors 
preventing specific social groups from achieving the normal rates of school 
enrollment and success (and hence from supposedly obtaining equal 
opportunities at the starting point of their social lives)7. Experience shows that 
the mere presence of a generalized offer of free education does not guarantee 
the automatic and effective integration within that offer of the underprivileged 
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sectors of society. Could there be a sort of inertia which hampers the social 
progress of those sectors through the substantial educational resources at their 
disposal? The diagnosis of the nature and causes provoking that social inertia 
led to a succession of theories and policies which have competed within the 
field of sociology of the education since the late fifties until this day (Coleman 
Report, 1967; Jenks 1973; Carabaila, 1983; Swann Report, 1985; just to 
mention a few at a macro-level and the New Sociology of Education and its 
followers at a micro-level). A detailed account of those theories is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However a few remarks on some of them will be 
convenient in order to focus on the subject of this research. For this purpose 
the theories trying to explain the relative failure of universal education as an 
instrument of equal opportunities may be clustered into three families: 'cultural 
deprivation theories', 'reproduction theories', and 'cultural relativism theories'. 
1.2. The 'cultural deprivation' approach 
The first attempts to come to terms with the social shortcomings of 
mass education as established in industrialized countries led to theories that 
sought to examine the failure of the educational system in achieving its 
postulated objectives of cultural and economic integration as the result of 
certain "deficiencies" on the part of the underprivileged groups showing a low 
level of school achievement (Craft 1970). Programmes of compensatory 
education were established in order to deal with, correct or compensate for 
these 'deficiencies'8. According to this point of view the educational system 
could not accomplish its goals with respect to those sectors of the population 
because of a double deficiency: a lack of adequate teaching resources, both 
material and human, in the centres of education, and a lack of adequate 
cultural resources on the part of the social sectors in question. The theory of 
'cultural deprivation' was a typical formulation of that point of view, as 
Bernstein (1970, 1971), Craft (1970) and Keddie (1973) have argued. The 
responsibility for the failure of the education system was placed, on the one 
hand, on that very system —ill-prepared to face its task, but which nature was 
not questioned-9 and, on the other hand, on the familiar background and the 
general social environment of the allegedly "culturally deprived" children 
(Keddie, 1973). 
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Once the problem had been interpreted within that frame of reference, 
the remedy for the deficiencies of the education system as an instrument to 
achieve equal opportunities for all was apparently easy to implement: it would 
simply consist of transferring the adequate resources that were lacking, first 
from public funds to the educational institutions, and then —converted into 
cultural resources— from those institutions to the deprived groups. That is, in 
a nutshell, the concept of 'compensatory education' which was the basic idea 
behind specific policies implemented during the sixties in the USA and in 
Britain, and designed to redress the social imbalance ingrained in the 
education systems. However the rather poor results of those policies showed 
the inadequacy (Coleman, 1969), not only of that concept of compensatory 
education, but also of some assumptions underlying it, such as the theory of 
cultural deprivation. 
The notion of cultural deprivation defined the lack of success of the 
educational system with respect to certain social groups in terms which were 
predominantly quantitative in nature (Bernstein 1971), as if the problem were 
one of cultural malnutrition that might be overcome just by increasing the 
intake of cultural calories. This outlook was too simple, though, and not 
surprisingly, its capacity to cope with the problem showed to be very limited. 
As Williams pointed out 
"it is difficult to feel that... the problem is merely one of distributing it 
(education) more widely" (Williams, R. 1975: 72). 
Cultural deprivation theorists assumed that only one culture, namely 
the hegemonic one, was a suitable cultural and social vehicle. Consequently, 
that point of view conceived the other cultures existing in society in a negative 
way; their differences with respect to the dominant culture were visualized 
either as cultural deficiencies (Plowden Report) or as pathological deviations. 
That point of view overlooked the functional role of those subordinate cultures 
among the social groups that assume them, a role allowing these groups, and 
the individuals belonging to them, some sort of social coherence (Keddie 
1973). 
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In contradistinction to these views, it can be argued that a culture, 
from the point of view that will be developed in this thesis, is first of all an 
environment and a means of social (collective/individual) survival. Individuals 
are structurally coupledm to their own distinct cultures (Maturana, H. 1980: 
69), and cannot merely replace these cultures as if they were something 
external to them. Cultures are not disposable devices; in fact any cultural 
change can be described as an organic process", occurring in the minds of 
specific individuals, a process which involves autonomous subjects and can 
only take place on condition that the social coherence of those subjects is 
preserved. 
It can be argued that a basic flaw in the theory of cultural deprivation 
was that this theory mirrored to a considerable extent an attitude still too 
common in sociological thinking: the attitude of directly imposing the 
observer's categories onto the observed reality, hence producing a definition of 
that reality which ignores its 'internal coherence' (von Foerster, 1981). In the 
light of a body of research, I will argue that social groups would have 
representations of themselves and of other social groups with which they keep 
some sort of contact (Cole & Scribner 1974); but usually the images that they 
generate about themselves would be substantially different from the images 
that they provoke in the other groups (Mead, M. 1942; Goldthorpe J.H. and 
Lockood D. 1963; Giddens, 1984, 1987). The images that a group generates 
about itself would be self-images, and those produced by that group but 
referring to some other groups would be other-images (Berger and Luckman, 
1967). This difference is essential, and should always be taken into account in 
social research. As Young suggests, we must be aware of 
"... treating 'what we know' as problematic, in order that it becomes the 
object of inquiry, rather than as given" (Young, M.D.F., 1971). 
Certainly, a specific group may assimilate an image of itself which has 
been produced by another (generally, a more powerful and prestigious group). 
But although in such cases the content of the respective self- and other-images 
representing the first group may be quite similar —and the similitude is liable 
to be more illusory than real— the difference between those two kinds of 
images still would persist, and should be carefully detected. Social research is 
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done, as a professional activity, by a specific people, sociologists 12. And, in 
general, social scientists are, almost by definition, middle class people 
embedded into the hegemonic culture. For that reason, sociologists as a 
specific group are constantly at risk of imposing their 'spontaneous' categories 
and images onto the realities that they study, specially that of other groups 
with a substantially different cultural background (Levi-Strauss, 1952). Thus 
social scientists would frequently generate other-perceptions of those groups 
which may be quite different from their own self-perceptions of them (in that 
sense, there is no difference between social scientists and any other social 
group). And the point is that such self-perceptions would play an important 
part in explaining the social behaviour of the social groups in question (Cole & 
Scrivener, op.cit.: 197-201). 
The theory of cultural deprivation was a typical instance of an 
other-defined image, generated by one social group (of social scientists and 
policy makers) about other social groups (just the ones defined by the 
application of the theory: i.e. the alleged culturally deprived sectors of 
society)u. The problem is that social theories not only describe social reality, 
but constitute and modify that reality. That is why the making and diffusion of 
social theories has a direct political effect (Young 1971). It can be argued that 
(self- or other-) define a social group amounts to creating that group as a social 
entity -this definition makes that group socially 'visible' and this fact would 
determine the action of that group and that of the others in regard to it. 
I will argue that a social theory should not be considered 
independently of the effect that it is going to have on the 'social objectivity' 
which it tries to portray. Whereas every group has, in principle, the right to 
self-define itself as it pleases, Social scientists must be very careful regarding 
their own other-definitions. Because those other-definitions may be enforced 
upon the corresponding groups against the self-perceptions of the people 
included willy-nilly, by the definitional diktat of others, in those groups. And 
this circumstance could be a source of alienation and unnecessary suffering for 
those people (Beauchamp 1982). 
The concept of cultural deprivation is an example of a strongly 
reductionist 'other-definition' —the more extreme form of 'other-definition'. In 
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short, one can consider any view according to which every existent thing exists 
in the terms of some privileged reality as reductionist (Vytgotsky 1960; Mayr 
1970). The idea of cultural deprivation was reductionist in the sense that it 
reduced the social relevance of the diverse cultures present in a society to their 
degree of conformity with the pattern of one of those cultures which happens 
to be dominant. This hegemonic culture was viewed in absolute terms, as The 
Culture, and its institutions and features were contemplated as neutral with 
respect to their social repercussions (Baratz and Baratz 1970). The initial 
policies of compensatory education shared, generally in an implicit manner, 
those theoretical assumptions, and when the results of these policies fell short 
of the expectations which had encouraged them, those assumptions began to be 
revised (Bernstein 1970; Baratz and Baratz 1970). 
1.3. The relativistic and 'reproduction' approaches. 
During the late 1960's and early 1970's the notion of cultural 
deprivation was criticized, on the one hand, along lines similar to those that 
have been expressed in the previous paragraphs'4, and on the other hand, from 
neo-Marxist positions expressed in a structuralist idiom (Baudelot and Stablet, 
1971; Williams 1973; Bowles and Gintis 1976), and the libertarian movements 
and the deschoolers (Illich, 1971; Reimer, 1972). The former criticisms 
originated theories such as those that stressed the importance of alternative 
communication 'codes', and the 'resistance' of subordinate cultural groups 
(Willis, Apple, Giroux) whereas the latter criticisms gave rise to the 
'reproduction'(Bourdieu and Passeron) and 'correspondence' theories (Bowles 
and Gintis). In fact, the cultural reductionism underlying the notion of cultural 
deprivation was not only theoretically unsound, but pragmatically ineffectual. 
The compensatory policies inspired in a more or less explicit manner by a 
reductionist approach did not fulfil the expectations of their designersI5. 
Things turned out to be more complex than initially thought; the 
problem was not, as early compensatory philosophy had supposed, simply one 
of cultural resources to be properly allocated. There was also a problem of 
communication; cultural communication or better —as soon would be 
realized— trans-cultural communication. The relationships between dominant 
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and non-dominant cultures were not merely quantitative (the differences 
between them being conceived as due to different levels of 'cultural intake'), 
but qualitative. Some authors discovered that the problem was not one of 
cultural deficiency (on the part of the non dominant cultures), but one of 
relative incompatibility and social inequality (between cultures and their 
respective communicational and social strategies) (Baratz, Bersntein, Vulliamy 
...). The relationships between cultures, which were previously thought of 
unilaterally, began to be conceived of in symmetrical terms; and the range of 
groups that occupied the attention of the researchers increased. A great deal of 
educational research shifted from the study of social class differences and 
interactions to the investigation of race and gender issues (McRobbie, 1978; 
Kelly, 1981; Arnot, 1981; CCCS 1982; Barton and Walker 1983 just to 
mention a few). Tyack and Strober (1981) resume this change of emphasis in a 
sentence: 
"... gender is one of the fundamental principles in society, as important a 
category for analysis as class or race or age". 
The understanding of the problem as one of trans-cultural 
(in)communication was behind a reassessment of the methods at work in the 
education process (and more specifically in the policies of 'compensatory' 
education implemented until then). Before that moment, the responsibility was 
laid heavily not only on the 'cultural deficit' of the unpriviledged groups, but 
also on the teachers and the lack of resources of the educational environment 
—Joan Simon (1974) calls the phenomenology studies in classrooms "the 
blame the teacher school of sociology". But the 'coirminicational approach' 
unveiled the different personality and autonomy (in the form of 'codes', 
'contexts', 'cultural capital', etc.) of non-dominant cultures, and the reductionist 
cultural absolutism behind most of the theory and the practice of compensatory 
education had to be revised. Once cultures are considered in symmetrical terms 
(Midwinter, E.; Jackson, B.), reductionist cultural absolutism loses its 
nurturing ground. Consequently the formulation of the problem of 
communication between cultures led to the questioning of the social position 
and the social value of those cultures; and as a natural development, this 
questioning prompted the reconsideration of the entire system of assumptions, 
methods and goals that characterizes the education process as a whole. 
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Once that point of view was adopted, the final responsibility for the 
inability of education to live up to its proclaimed social aims would lie not 
simply on the familiar background, nor on the teachers' prejudices and working 
habits, but the on educational system as such: its general goals and its social 
function. As the social function of education depends upon the organization of 
society as a whole this was seen to bear ultimate responsibility. This is 
something that had been argued by neo-Marxist theorists from diverse but 
often related perspectives, i.e.: theories of reproduction, correspondence, 
resistance, etc. From that point of view education is conceived of as a 
fundamental instrument for reproducing the dynamic and the kind of society 
which makes this type of education possible. A society, it is argued, that 
intrinsically generates social differentiation and inequality, inevitably produces 
an education system subservient to this goal (Baudelot and Establet, 1971; 
Bourdieu and Passeron, 1976; Bowles and Gintis, 1976, etc.) 
The recognition of diverse cultures coexisting within society from a 
pluralistic perspective —on an equal footing, in principle at least—, is a point 
of view that may be called 'cultural relativism' (Lawton, 1975: 28-29). When 
applied to the social analysis of education systems, this perspective reveals and 
stresses the cultural characteristics of the social groups which are prone to 
underachieve within those systems. The culture of such groups, this point of 
view argues, would generate their specific systems of meanings, which would 
have a coherence of their own, and may not be compatible with the dominant 
systems of meanings, embodied as official cultural institutions and practices 
(and specifically as education institutions). The 'cultural specific approach', 
that draws on the findings of the 'communicational approach', has provided 
deep insights into the nature of the problems posed by the educational 
underachievement of non-dominant social groups. In the first place, that 
approach has pointed to what it labels as the blindness of the dominant culture 
—which is enshrined in the education system— regarding the other cultures 
present in our societies. Secondly, it has shown that in these societies there is a 
strong correspondence between class, gender, race divisions on the one hand, 
and cultural divisions on the other hand. Finally, these approaches have made a 
cogent critique of the naive assumptions underlying the philosophy of 
compensatory education as formulated in the early 1960's. Whiny states that 
"... it is only possible to say that the rising concern with those issues 
(gender and race) has helped to make the cruder forms of neo-Marxist 
theory inadequate to an understanding of contemporary social relations" 
(Whiny, G.,1985: 55). 
1.4. The risk of cultural fatalism. 
However, the cultural specific approach would face a basic problem: 
the cultural characteristics of underprivileged social groups may be a source of 
identity, but can it also be a source of marginalization. Therefore, to give some 
sort of status and to further those characteristics may contribute in some ways, 
through the consolidation of that identity, to the de facto perpetuation of that 
discrimination (Lawton, 1975: 28). 
It can be argued that an approach derived from cultural relativism 
would bring into question not only the methods and contents, but also the 
established goals of education in a culturally diverse class society (Gramsci, A. 
1971). Its adherents have been unable to propose a credible set of alternative 
goals. The crux of the matter is that cultural relativism is in a sense 
incompatible with the Enlightenment's emancipatory idea of education, as well 
as with its liberal and socialist outgrowths for a number of reasons. If 
according to that idea education has to play a fundamental role in overcoming 
the limitations which constrain people's possibilities of development in society, 
a radical cultural relativism would attach those people to the very reality which 
enshrines those limitations, namely their own cultural background (Baratz & 
Baratz 1970). That is why cultural relativism, if taken at face value, would 
represent a stage at which the evolution of Western culture, as it is generally 
understood, would ultimately be self-defeating. If all cultures were 
symmetrical by right, then no one could claim that its own cultural goals were 
in any way 'better'. Therefore, the educational system should not try to 
assimilate all the different cultures to any of them in particular, but further the 
autonomous development of everyone framed within whatever culture or 
cultures are available. Considering human beings as active sense-makers 
(Roche, M.; Bernstein R.J.; Maturana, H.) the bet for an autonomous and, at 
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the same time, collective production of knowledge is supported by authors of 
diverse traditions as Young16; P.S. Wilson and G. Pask. 
But that would not only mean the abandonment of an essential aspect 
of the ideal of universal and compulsory education —the idea that such an 
education ought to be a common education. It can be argued that those 
different cultures would be, at the same time, a product and a fundamental 
reproducing factor of the class, gender and race divisions of society. 
Consequently, to promote their autonomous reproduction may well mean to 
contribute to the perpetuation of those social divisions. In fact, from a radically 
relativistic point of view, why should not working-class children stick to their 
cultural traditions, and why should not the educational system merely help 
them to reproduce those traditions —in other words, to smoothly reproduce 
their social condition? This way of reasoning would easily lead from cultural 
relativism to a sort of cultural fatalism which political implications would be 
de facto deeply conservative, as Gramsci has argued (1971). 
Within the cultural relativism approach, the positions of some 
feminists and black sociologists17 criticizing the current discriminatory 
education for women, ethnic minorities and working-class people, submitted to 
an ethnocentric, patriarchal and class-biased curriculum and to a marginalizing 
educational structure, framed the debate on education in new more complex 
terms. On the one hand, they have shought to show the inadequacy of what 
they saw as mechanistic forms of neo-Marxism to deal with modern social 
complexity which led to the pessimism of early reproduction and 
correspondence theories (Demaine 1980). On the other hand, at the moment, 
there is no comprehensive proposal on offer to overcome the current unjust 
situation. From this fact, the risk would arise of reducing the old universal goal 
of education to a bid for cultural particularism (Stone, M. 1980). 
The dilemma posed by the relativism underlying the 'cultural specific 
approach' may be worded in these terms: if the goals and contents of education 
are those of the dominant culture/class, groups which belong to other 
cultures/classes are likely to fail in reaching the standards of that imposed 
culture. If the goals and contents of education are those of every specific 
culture/class in society, everybody is perhaps more likely to succeed in 
21 
becoming integrated —but also trapped— within their cultural background, 
class or gender. Culture would be a double-edged reality: it would be a 
necessary instrument for people's self-realization, but it would also act as 
cutting off people from alternative ways of self-realization foreign to their 
specific culture 18 . 
1.5. Culture and the individual. 
It is possible to get the impression that there should be some way out 
of that dilemma and/or it is a false one. Because, as I will argue in this thesis, 
cultures would only exist through individuals, and individuals would 
constantly reinterpret those cultures. It would be an individual/culture dialectic 
within which change —and change in a direction enabling the fulfillment of 
new potentialities for self-realization— would be possible. I will argue that we 
need not throw away the emancipatory goal attached by the Enlightenment to 
universal education, but only to reshape it in new, less absolutist, more 
complex terms (Varela J. and Alvarez Uria, F. 1991, 1993). 
Cultural absolutism tends to ignore the existence of other cultures, 
asserting only one; in that sense, it would be an unconscious kind of 
'culturalism'. Cultural relativism tends to hyposthesise every culture; it would 
be a conscious sort of 'culturalism'. Both assume the primacy of the culture 
over the individual. Both of them would be inclined to ascribe individuals to 
cultures, and not cultures to individuals. This cultural relativist outlook is a 
theoretic point of view which would hypostatize cultures as something above 
the individuals who 'belong' to them. Culturalism, like behaviourism and 
environmental determinism, would represent a viewpoint according to which 
things are determined from the outside. Now, such a viewpoint attempts, by 
nature, to reduce the explanation of the activity of a system to the action of 
external factors impinging on it. In a way, that is still the received "episteme", 
but over the last decades it has been increasingly challenged in many theoretic 
fields, from linguistics to biology19 (in fact, Darwinism was perhaps the first 
consistent departure from the 'external' episteme, represented in biology by 
Lamarck). 
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In the case of cultural relativism we face a sort of reductionism which 
is different from that of cultural absolutism, but almost as dangerous: not a 
reductionism of (non-dominant) cultures to (dominant) culture, but a 
reductionism of individuals to their cultural background. From that point of 
view, individuals would be a mere product of their culture, instead of being 
considered as productive cultural agents capable of modifying step by step and 
developing that culture in idiosyncratic and highly unpredictable ways. That 
reductionist concept, to which cultural relativism is prone, is frequently at the 
basis of what has been called here 'cultural fatalism'. The theories sharing the 
cultural relativist outlook are specially at risk of incurring in, or being used de 
facto in the promotion of, diverse degrees of that fatalism. 
It would be misleading to reduce —even implicitly— the variety of 
cultural potentialities present in the individuals, to that of the hypothetical 
cultural background which those individuals are deemed to belong to. It would 
be unrealistic —particularly in periods of rapid social change— to see the 
relationships between the individuals and their alleged cultural background in 
terms of a mere reproduction of the- latter by the former. 
Certainly, to assume that students come from different cultural 
backgrounds, and that the education process must not reduce those diverse 
backgrounds to the values of the dominant culture would be a fair and sensible 
position. But people involved in education must also understand that the 
relationships of individuals with their own cultural background is not 
mechanically determined. From the perspective postulated in this thesis, it can 
be argued that this is a dialectical relation through which an individual may 
transcend —and in some sense does transcend— the constraints of that initial 
background. Instead of contemplating the relationships between individual and 
cultural background in terms of simple reproduction, such relationships should 
be understood in terms of production (to some extent, no doubt, reproductive 
production, but also novelty creating production)20. I would argue that this is a 
way to explain the pervasive phenomenon of social change, which cannot be 
denied, and yet most sociological theories find so difficult to explain. 
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1.6. The cultural self-development approach. 
It can be argued that cultural relativism usually leads to cultural 
fatalism when researchers look at cultural systems as reified entities (that is to 
say, as things). But cultural systems may be viewed in other way: as 
individualized realities. This will be my approach in this thesis. I will argue 
that individuals are cultural systems in themselves; but they are living cultural 
systems, not reified ones. Certainly, those systems would interact with each 
other, and that interaction would produce as a result the 'parallel evolution' of 
such systems. The culture of a group is just the outcome of the parallel 
evolution —generated by processes of 'structural coupling'— undergone by 
individuals under conditions of interaction. That inter-individual culture would 
exist only in those individuals and as a result of their interaction, it would not 
be a Platonic reality of which such individuals would only be particular 
instances. On the contrary, usually social agents need to fight in order to 
intervene to introduce changes. It can be said that only individuals' intervention 
on the already established culture, would make culture, and consequently only 
individuals would make and change cultures. 
It can be argued that individuals are at the same time (systems) 
culturally autonomous and socially constrained (by their cultural background). 
There is no contradiction in that: living beings are also autonomous21 (they 
produce themselves "from the inside", through the internal logic of their 
genetic message), and yet they are constrained by their environment. 
Individuals, to borrow an expression from existentialist philosophy, are 
"thrown into existence"22, where they have to realize themselves as coherent 
systems of action in a constrained environment. 
From this point of view, individuals can be conceived of, not as 
instances of a given culture, but as potentials for cultural innovation. The 
concept of cultural self-development of the individual fits into this theoretic 
frame and tries to encompass the idea of individuals as cultural potentials. 
From this point of view, a relevant social analysis should not try primarily to 
focus on the constraints acting upon the individuals, conceived of in a static 
way, but to trace the potentialities of coherent development of those 
individuals as cultural systems. Because any constraint would not exist in an 
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absolute sense, but only with reference to the systems of action (the 
individuals) which face them and may change them in specific ways. 
As I will explain further on (see 114-119), individuals, as 
cultural/social systems, would be systems of cultural/social self-perception (in 
short, self-perception systems). These systems would be intrinsically coherent, 
because they would be the fundamental mechanism of a corresponding 
individual action system, and action is only possible if it responds to a certain 
coherence (if it 'makes sense'; for an action system to lose that inner coherence 
means to lose its very capability for acting). This perspective has significant 
consequences when applied to the study of socio-educational problems. 
1. 7. The concept of socio-educational motivation. 
The concept of cultural (individual) self-development echoes the 
original insight into the essence of education. "Educare" literally means "to 
lead out", that is to say, to lead the process of development of an individual 
from the inside to the outside (Lerena 1985). In a broad sense and referring 
both to family and formal education, the main aim of education is to further the 
potential inside an individual in the process of becoming an adult person23. 
Now that process, as I said before, is at the same time autonomous and 
constrained. It is not an easy process, because there is not a spontaneous fit 
between one aspect and the other. 
It can be argued that individuals would always try to change their 
relationship to their cultural background, they would always try to find new 
ways of dealing with the social milieu. They would do so, because this milieu 
is changing, and cultures are essentially conservative in nature, and only 
individuals can explore new ways of cultural realization. That is why 
individuals, in the process of becoming persons, would run into conflict with 
the social constraints of their cultural background. The result of that conflict 
would be (individual, and then, social) cultural innovation. Consequently, to 
steer that conflict would be necessary for the education process to achieve its 
goal, enabling the individual to resolve such conflict through viable 
innovations. 
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But in order to further this conflictive process of cultural innovation it 
would be necessary to understand the realities which underlie it; and these are 
the realities of the individuals as self-perception systems dynamically self-
constructing themselves. The analysis of those self-perception systems in the 
case of Spanish students belonging to the last year of their compulsory 
education is the specific subject of this thesis. The wider aim of this analysis, 
however, is to point to the educational means through which that 
cultural/social potential of self-realization and innovation of students in 
general may be developed. 
I refer to those means with the concept of socio-educational 
motivation. This thesis is not going to elaborate on how socio-educational 
motivation may be implemented. But it is going to put forward a theoretic 
framework (the concept of self-perception systems), a method of analysis 
(sociosemantics) and a background knowledge (the patterns of self-perception 
resulting from my research), which may help in that implementation. 
NOTES TO CHAFFER 1 
1 
 In this thesis, when referring to both sexes I will use 'she' and 'her' inestead of the most 
commonly used 'he' and 'his'. 
2 "Universal education is the power which is destined to overthrow every species of hierarchy. 
It is destined to remove all artificial inequality and leave the natural inequalities to find their 
true level. With the artificial inequalities of caste, rank, title, blood, birth, race, colour, sex, 
etc., will fall nearly all the oppression, abuse, prejudice, enmity, and injustice, that humanity is 
now subject to." Lester Frank Wards, Education c. 1872, quoted by Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 
26-27. 
3 In Bowles and Gintis words: "The failure of educational reforms stems from the 
contradictory nature of expanded reproduction, equality of oportunity and self-development 
in a society whose economic life is governed by institutions of corporate capitalism" quoted in 
G, Whitty, 1985: 25. 
4 The development of the concept of 'emancipation' by Adomo and Habermas is treated by 
Ferrater Mora, J., 1979: 912. 
5 In Meyer and Ramirez's view, a group of advanced countries (what they call 'the old core') 
"were already approaching universal mass education by 1870. Thereafter, mass educational 
systems appeared at a rather steady rate around the world until World War II, with a sharp 
increase in the rate at that point" (1992: 145-146). 
6 The "dismal science" was a name coined for Economics by Thomas Carlyle. 
7 From Kenneth Lindsay in the twenties to most recently Hope (1972); Ridge (1974); 
Goldthorpe (1974, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1980/87); Halsey (1975, 1977, 1978, 1980); 
Carabaiia (1983); F. Enguita (1990), etc. 
8 "Compensatory education emerged in the form of massive pre-school programs like Project 
Headstart (see Ruth Adam, New Society, 30 October 1969), large-scale research programs 
such as those of Deusch in the early 1960s and a plethora of small scale 'intervention' or 
'enrichment' programs for pre-school children or children in the first years of compulsory 
education." B. Berstein, 1970: 344. See also B. Bernstein, 1971: Chapter 10. 
9 This perceived failure of education is reflected by Whitty's comment: "clearly the 
organizational structure of schooling did itself come under scrutiny, and indeed underwent 
successive changes, but these were generally designed to increase the penetration of an 
education, the nature of which continued to be taken for granted". Whitty, G. 1985: 10. 
10 See definition of the concept 'structural coupling' in Chapter 2. 
11 
 By 'organic process' I mean 'organizationally closed process', a concept which will be 
explained in the next chapter. 
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12 See P. Bourdieu, J.C. Chamboredon and J.C. Passeron (1973) Le metier de Sociologue, 
especially the 'Conclusions' and the 'Illustrative texts' mainly those of Levi—Strauss and 
Mauss. 
13 Nell Keddie in the introduction of Tinker, Tailor..., refers to Wax and Wax study about 
Indian reservation schools. One of the educational administrators says about the Indian child 
"his home has no books, no magazines, radio, television, newspapers: it's empty!....we have to 
teach him everything... when he encounters words like 'elevator' or 'escalator' in his reading he 
has no idea what they mean". Keddie, 1973:12. In my personal experience as a primary school 
teacher in Spain, I could refer to similar comments made by urban teachers about rural 
students. 
14 Baratz S.S and Baratz J.0 in their analysis of researches about culturally related 
behavioural differences find this type of cultural hegemony: "research on the Negro has been 
guided by an ethnocentric liberal ideology which denies cultural differences and thus acts 
against the best interest of the people it wishes to understand and eventually help" Harvard 
Educational Review, 1970,40 (1): 29. See also Whitty, 1985: 7-21. 
15 "It was only with the failure of those policies ... when a broader movement for curriculum 
change had already developed, that the nature of what working—class pupils were failing at 
began to be given serious attention by sociologists of education" G. Whiny, 1985:11. 
16 M.F.D. Young (1975) "The basic premise of a view of 'curriculum as practice' is not a 
structure of knowledge, but how men collectively attempt to order their world and in the 
process produce knowledge" (my italics). 
17 Stone, 1980; Mullard 1981; Ccs 1982; Mcrobie 1984; Harding 1986; Arnot 1987; 
Cockburn 1987; Acker 1989, etc. 
18"There is also the point that if an environment is an extremely limiting one, then to base the 
whole curriculum on 'relevance' to it may be to 'sell the children short' in a dangerous way". 
Lawton, 1975:28. 
19 See in linguistics the work of Chomsky and Searle; in psycho—linguistics Aitchinson and 
Curtiss; Labov and Trudgill in sociolinguistics. 
20 In the line of culture production see Willis, P. 1990. 
21  Although there are other positions in biology, here we follow the ideas coming from H. 
Maturana and F. Varela who have developed a new line of thought in biology based on the 
principles of the autonomy of living beings: "A system is autonomous if the relations that 
characterize it as a unity involve only the system itself, and not other systems...since autonomy 
is not necessarily a feature exclusive to living systems, any attempt to explain the organization 
of living systems must show how they are autonomous and how all the phenomena proper to 
them arise as a result of their autonomy. It is in this context that I maintain that the notion of 
autopoiesis fully characterizes living systems as autonomous entities in physical space." 
Maturana, H., 1981:21. 
28 
22"Dasein id Being —possible which has been delivered over itself— thrown possibility 
through and through." Heidegger, M.1962: 183. 
23 In this time of mass schooling, more or less centrally designed by the corresponding 
authorities, the definition of the appropriate type or types of adult person depends on a 
complex network of factors and competitive forces. The analysis of those factors and forces 
although of extreme interest is outside the limits of this thesis. 
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Theoretical Background of the Researc 
2.0. Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a series of concepts that, are 
vital to lay the basis for reaching an adequate understanding of the notion of 
'self-perception system', which is at the basis of my research and will be 
explained in detail in the following chapter. 
In this chapter I shall start by considering, 1) the concept of system; 2) 
the use of that concept in social sciences; 3) the advantages and disadvantages 
of that use; 4) new departures from that use which may enhance the role of the 
notion of system in social sciences; 5) some differences between natural and 
artificial systems; 6) finally, I shall put forward a revised, provisional 
definition of system. 
These concepts are presented, as heuristic notions, they are just one 
theoretic interpretation of some kinds of realities, not the only possible 
interpretation of these. Consequently, those concepts should be understood as 
hypothetical, heuristic tools. In a process of research heuristic hypotheses play 
a role which is very different from that of empirical ones. The latter must be 
referred and corroborated by a concrete specific set of empirical data. On the 
contrary, the former do not directly refer to concrete empirical evidence; they 
do not constitute an attempt to establish how things are, but how things may be 
viewed (in order to generate at a subsequent stage of the research, specific 
empirical hypothesis). 
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The concepts which I am going to put forward in this chapter should 
be understood from this epistemological point of view: as elements of a 
hypothetical framework, postulated with a heuristic purpose. This heuristic 
character of those concepts, becomes clearer when one considers the theoretic 
framework to which most of them belong: the field of systems theory and 
cybernetics. 
Systemic concepts, in general, have an essentially heuristic character. 
They make up abstract models which should not be confused with empirical 
reality and yet they may allow the researcher to view (to ask) specific realities 
from the outlook provided by those models. 
A full explanation of this last definition, however, will require the 
introduction and adaption of several basic concepts which, as indicated, have 
been developed in the field of systems thinking and cybernetics: concepts such 
as 'classical' and 'nonclassical system', 'organizationally closed system', 'action 
system', 'informationally open system', 'reflectivity', 'communication' and 
'complexity'. 
Those definitions, however abstract they may seem, will be 
instrumental in making clear the presuppositions of the heuristic model which 
I am going to develop in these pages. 
2.1. The concept of system. 
In this research I shall use Buckley's definition of 'system', as a starting 
point: 
"We define a system in general as a complex of elements or components 
directly or indirectly related in a causal network, such that at least some of 
the components are related to some others in a more or less stable way at 
any one time" (Buckley 1974: 493). 
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2.1.1. The concept of system in social sciences. 
The concept of system has been in use in sociological thinking for 
quite a long time'. In 1967, Buckley already referred to the generalized use of 
the notion of 'social system', he argues: 
"The modem systems view, which flowered during World War Two 
(though building on principles in the wind much earlier) has already borne 
its first fruits, and is in danger of a superficial acceptance into the corpus 
of sociology, by way of incorporation of a part of its now common 
vocabulary" (Buckley, 1967: vii). 
The danger, in Buckley's view, of that assimilation of systemic 
concepts by sociological thought, would stem from the fact that, 
"... the now standard use of the notion of "social system" —derived 
principally from equilibrium and organismic models— is deluding us into 
believing that we have been using modern systems theory for some time" 
(ibid: vii). 
If that belief is misleading, it is, in Buckley's opinion, due to the fact 
that 
"... current dominant (sociological) theory is built on mechanical and 
organic (more exactly, organismic), system models laid down during 
previous centuries which are quite inappropriate in dealing with the type of 
system represented by the sociocultural realm" (ibid: 1). 
The use of a systemic vocabulary in the influential works of theorists 
such as Pareto, Parsons and Homans, would be exposed to this sort of 
criticism, according to Buckley's interpretation. As a result, 
"The greater part of current discussion of systems in sociology is 
embarrassingly naive and out of date in the light of modem systems 
research in other disciplines... the underlaying conceptions show little 
advance over the mechanical equilibrium model of earlier centuries ... 
These advances should have alerted as to the possibility that the 
sociocultural level of systems is structurally and dynamically unique and 
not fundamentally comparable to these other types of systems, despite 
some point of similarity" ibid: 7). 
Since the 1960's, however, as I shall explain in the following sections 
of this chapter, the development of the systems approach in sociological 
thought has tried to overcome those shortcomings, in the search for a new, 
more adequate systemic paradigm (Geyer and Zouwen 1978). 
2.1.2. Advantages and disadvantages of the use of systemic concepts in 
social sciences. 
The notion of society as a system has played a fundamental role in the 
process of portraying social entities as functioning wholes: 
"A social system (the total social structure of a society...) has some sort 
of unity which we may call functional unity. We can define it as a situation 
in which all the parts of the social system work together with a sufficient 
degree of harmony or internal coherence" Radcliffe-Brown, quoted by 
Merton 1968: 99. 
This point of view has established new standards of scientific 
acceptability in social theories. The systemic approach in sociology, as 
understood by some of the representatives of the structural-functionalist 
outlook2, has made possible the visualization of aspects of society as 
structured totalities. 
However, the tendency to rely on mechanistic and organic analogies3  
might have acted as an obstacle to the proper comprehension of the more 
specific traits of social entities. As Buckley argues: 
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"In dealing with a sociocultural system ... we jump to a new system level 
and need a new term to expressr not only the structure-maintaining 
feature, but also the structure-elaborating and changing feature of the 
inherently unstable system, i.e., a concept of morphogenesis". Buckley 
1967: 14-15. 
It is this concept of morphogenesis that is difficult to conceptualize in 
the systemic outlook of traditional functionalist analysis, such as Radcliffe-
Brown's4. 
Through the second half of the century, however, the systemic 
approach has been elaborating a conceptual framework which might provide 
the tools necessary to overcome that limitation. In the opinion of some authors 
it would not be unwise for the social scientist to consider that framework 
seriously as a source of theoretical inspiration (Lewin, 1947; Mackay, 1974; 
Buckley 5.). It can be argued that, by doing so, social scientists would be able 
to compare and contrast their theoretic problems with well developed and 
clear-cut concepts. These concepts while originated in other fields and perhaps 
not totally suitable to the analysis of social entities, might further the search for 
new, more adequate and rigorously defined ideas, which may be at the basis of 
a renewed social theory. My work is part of that quest. 
2.1.3. New departures in systemic social thinking. 
The notion of morphogenesis, as suggested, seems crucial in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of mechanistic and organic systemic models as 
applied to the field of social theory. 
"The mechanical equilibrium model and the organismic homeostasis 
models of society that have underlaid most modern sociological theory 
have outlived their usefulness. A more viable model, one much more 
faithful to the kind of system that society is more and more recognized to 
be, is in process of developing out of, or is in keeping with, the modern 
systems perspective (which we use loosely here to refer to general systems 
research, cybernetics, information and communication theory, and related 
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fields). Society or the sociocultural system, is not, then, principally an 
equilibrium system or a homeostatic system, but what we shall simply 
refer to as a complex adaptive system". Buckley, 1974: 490. 
Systemic and cybernetic concepts have been developed over the last 
four or five decades, in several different disciplines have adopted diverse 
theoretical points of view: communication and information theory, general 
systems theory, cybernetics and control theory, computer sciences, artificial 
intelligence, cognitive sciences, neuroscience, theoretical biology, etc. New 
fields, such as artificial life6, are still emerging within this many-sided 
tradition. 
The first generation of systemic concepts (von Bertalanffy, Wiener, 
Ashby) considered the systems which they intended to portray mainly in an 
'objectivistic' manner7: systems were understood as entities 'out there', and the 
subject who defines/controls those systems would be conceived of as being 
outside them. Arguably, this objectivistic point of view can entail a drastic 
epistemological limitation which makes those concepts basically inadequate to 
reach a proper understanding of social entities. Referring to the theoretical 
frame which is characteristic of that first generation of systemic thinking, 
Pattee says: 
"As they now stand, general systems theories are not simply too restrictive 
in their formal methodologies, but exclude the epistemological basis both 
of physics and life. The unique and characteristic behaviour of living 
systems —which includes measurement, decision-making, proscription, 
and construction— cannot be adequately understood without realizing the 
epistemological duality of this behaviour and the necessity of 
complementary models of description to represent it". Pattee, 1977: 514. 
The shortcomings that Pattee attributes to classical systems theory in 
its attempt to understand physical and biological systems seem to be even more 
incapacitating when the classical systemic frame is applied to social sciences. 
In fact, some the attempts to apply that theoretic framework mechanically to 
the analysis of social entities, seem to have shown that the basic concepts of 
classical (first generation) systems theory and cybernetics are essentially 
34 
35 
inadequate to describe the most genuine features of social life, as was argued 
above. 
But there is a second generation of systemic/ cybernetic concepts, 
which seems particularly apt to reach a better understanding of social entities 
(of social systems). This second wave of cybernetic thinking, so-called 'second 
order cybernetics' or 'nonclassical systems theory'8, intends to deal with 
systems which are not merely objective; they would incorporate the subject. 
From this point of view, the controlling subject would not be seen as an entity 
outside the system under consideration but as a fundamental part of it. 
Some of the theories that are characteristic of this second wave of 
cybernetic thinking (von Foerster 1981d: 102-105) are now in the process of 
being assimilated by social theory9. Concepts such as those of 'autopoiesis', 
'autonomous system', 'organizational closure', 'informational openness', 
'structural coupling', 'information transfer', 'synchronous system', 'transition to 
chaos/order', etc., which belong to the new generation of cybernetic theories, 
have originally appeared outside the context of social research, mainly in 
natural sciences, such as biology and physics. It can be argued that those 
notions, if properly applied, might offer the prospect of a better understanding 
of many basic sociological phenomena, such as the emergence of social norms, 
the dynamics of social order/disorder, change and conflict (Buckley, 1974; 
Pask, 1975; von Foerster, 1981; Lukhmann, 1987; Atlan, 1972, 1979, Morin, 
1981, etc.). 
2.1.4. Natural and artificial systems 
There is a fundamental difference between artificial (man-made) and 
natural systems. Although the former —for example a clock— have some sort 
of organization embodied in a given structure, they do not organize themselves 
(they are not self-organizing systems). Many natural systems, on the contrary, 
have self-organizing capabilities: they generate their own characteristic 
organization. 
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11 ... systems on the philogenetic, higher psychological, and sociocultural 
levels, are characterized primarily by their morphogenetic properties. That 
is, these latter are distinguished precisely by the fact that, rather than 
minimize organization, or preserving a given fixed structure, they create, 
elaborate or change structure as a prerequisite to remain viable, as ongoing 
systems" (Buckley, 1967: 4-5). 
Following Lazlo's (1972a, 1972b) typification of social systems 
(human societies) as a joint function, as 'social natural systems', it can be said 
that societies, like human individuals, basically are natural systems. Of course, 
societies, like individuals, produce artificial systems —such as laws, political 
and economic institutions, etc—; but at a fundamental level they are natural 
realities10. This is why they, like other natural systems, show self-
organizing'', morphogenetic properties12. According to this analysis, the 
consideration of societies as complex adaptive systems, characterized by self-
organizing, morphogenetic, capabilities (Buckley, 1974), can offer new 
insights to the social sciences (as examples, Pask's conversations theory; 
Lukhmann's complexity analysis; Nowakowska's social change theory, 
Boumgartner's actor-oriented system analysis, Shubik's game theory, etc.). 
2.1.5. A revised, provisional definition of system, adequate to the study of 
social entities. 
In the light of the previous consideration of the notion of system, it 
appears that a too wide concept of that notion (such as the Buckley definition 
used at the beginning of Section 2.1) which does not specify, at least, some of 
the basic features of social entities, is not likely to provide an adequate basis 
for any social analysis undertaken on systemic grounds. A definition of system 
suitable for the analysis of social entities would require a greater specification 
of the specific characteristics of such realities, in order to avoid their 
assimilation into simpler types of entities (for example, artificial mechanical 
systems). 
That is why, as a first step, I shall define the specific concept of 
system which I shall use when talking about 'self-perception systems'. In line 
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with the ideas elaborated over the last two decades by the new cybemetics13 
(also called 'second order cybernetics'), I shall propose a provisional definition 
of the sort of systems which I am interested in: a system would be a 
functioning whole, which has some sort of internal coherence between its 
components allowing it to produce and reproduce itself in potentially new 
ways, without loss of that internal coherence. 
2.2. Classical and non classical systems. 
The idea of 'system' has been used as a tool of theoretical analysis 
with very different meanings, and in many fields. Initially, a system was 
understood as a complete coherent construct, often of a philosophical kind (for 
instance, the Hegelian system). Afterwards the notion of system, in the sense 
of a total, plural but interconnected, reality, was used to explain the 
constitution of the scientific object to be considered (Durkheim, 1912, 
Chap.3). Each particular science, from linguistics (Saussure, 1916) to 
economy (Walras, 195414), tried to see its characteristic objects as totalities 
composed by related, interacting elements's. 
The relevance of the concept of 'system' to social theory has been 
stressed especially by Talcott Parsons, in his influential work The Social 
System (1952). On the first page of this book he says: 
"The interaction of individual actors, takes place, under such conditions 
that it is possible to treat such a process of interaction as a system in the 
scientific sense and subject it to the same order of theoretical analysis 
which has been successfully applied to other types of systems in other 
sciences". 
Parsons' view, which has inspired one of the most important traditions 
of sociological thinking —which has been called structural functionalism—, 
apparently relies on some strong epistemological assumptions. First, the 
assumption that social entities ("the interaction of individual actors") are 
susceptible to scientific treatment, and that this treatment should be 
implemented through the consideration of those realities as systems. Second, 
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the assumption that "social entities may be subject to the same order of 
theoretical analysis which has been successfully applied to other types of 
systems in other sciences" (see Parsons' quotation above). Whereas the first 
assumption may reasonably be accepted, at least as a working hypothesis 
which would appear necessary to sustain any attempt to reach a scientific 
understanding of social entities, the second assumption appears today as 
highly questionable16. 
Which 'other successful sciences', in Parsons view, would provide a 
suitable epistemic model for social theory, and would inspire an adequate type 
of theoretical analysis for social theory? Arguably, classical physics would not 
appear as an adequate model in this respect —although it is a very 'successful 
science' (Kuhn 1962; Popper 1968). The frequent attempts to portray social 
processes through a theoretical structure similar to that of classical, Newtonian 
physics, have shown obvious limitations, as was already argued quite a long 
time ago by Sorokin in his presentation of the 'mechanistic school' (Sorokin 
1928: chap.1), later on by Buckley (1964) and more recently by Heylighen 
(1987, 1991). 
To elaborate the reasons why this theoretical structure is not powerful 
enough to give a good account of the complexity and flexibility of social 
dynamics, would require a long, detailed analysis which lies outside the scope 
of this work. Nevertheless those reasons could be summarized in a single 
proposition: Newtonian physics —and all analogous theories—describes 
distinctionally17 closed18 systems; that is to say, systems whose elements, and 
interactions between those elements, are strictly defined beforehand. Neither 
new kinds of elements, nor new kinds of interactions between them, can 
appear within any such system. On the contrary, social entities appear to have 
as one of their most genuine features the ability to reproduce themselves in 
new forms (social change). Social systems and social processes are realities in 
which novelty is created, newness emerges (Buckley 196719; Simon 1962; 
Forsyte, 1988). 
It can be argued that any epistemic framework assuming the principle 
of 'distinctional closure'20 would be basically inappropriate to represent this 
fundamental characteristic of social reality. Of course, one can impose a 
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distinctionally closed theoretical model on any given social process; but at the 
cost of 'freezing' that process, by denying its potentialities for change over 
time. From this point of view, social entities would appear as 'eternal' —in a 
way similar to mathematical truths21. These realities would change, but only in 
a prefixed manner. According to this outlook, some times assumed by the 
structural functionalist school, social processes would occur outside history22. 
From this standpoint, society would be explained at the cost of ignoring 
history23, that is why within this theoretic framework the explanation of social 
change seems to be a particularly intractable problem. 
As Levi-Strauss, among others, has argued, social theory, could 
borrow theoretical inspiration from other sciences, mainly, in his view, 
linguistics. However classical, structural linguistics, also views language from 
a distinctionally closed point of view, and it does so in a completely static 
way: 
"What appears as surprising in the first place when the facts of language 
are investigated, is that for the speaker the language succession in time is 
nonexistent: the speaker faces an state thus the linguist who wants to 
understand that state has to disregard every thing that has produced it and 
ignore dyachrony". (Saussure 1916:149) 
Whereas Newtonian physics represents reality from a distinctionally 
closed, but dynamic point of view (Heylighen, 1989) structural linguistics 
portrays the reality of language from a strictly synchronic static standpoint. 
Linguists such as Saussure24 or Jakobson25 view language as an objective 
system of given components which define each other through a network of 
relationships of mutual dependence, and which compose a coherent totality. 
That sort of theoretical outlook appears to be adequate to represent only the 
aspects of social reality that can be contemplated —within a given and 
generally short temporal frame of reference— as strictly static. As Heylighen 
argues: 
"All phenomena where something qualitatively new emerges, e.g. 
thermodynamical self-organization, biological evolution, most cognitive 
processes, socio-cultural evolutions..., can be characterized by differentia- 
tion, i.e. the creation of new distinctions. Such phenomena simply cannot 
be represented within a classical theory". (1991:46). 
It can be argued that classical epistemic models are not only 
distinctionally closed, but also 'objectivistic'. In general those models assume 
that in a system both the components and the set of relations and interactions 
between them are 'objective' in the sense of existing 'out there', independently 
from the observer (Navarro 1991: 89). 
From that point of view, a system would have an objective reality, 
which is given to the observer. This observer would relate to such a reality 
'from the outside', and the relationships between the components of the system 
would be objective as well. Those two conditions of objectivity —between the 
system and the observer and between the elements of the system— would 
depend on each other. Observers can claim that they deal with the system from 
an external, objective position only if the relations between the elements of the 
systems are somehow objective. For example, Durkheim concept of 'social 
fact' apparently binds together those two postulates of objectivity: the 
sociologists would be able to investigate objectively social entities, they would 
be capable of viewing those realities as existing 'out there', externally to them, 
because those realities would also be 'objective', external to the very social 
subjects who inhabit them. It can be argued that notions such as that of 'social 
norm' would supply the relations between the elements of the system with the 
sort of intrinsic, ontological objectivity which seems to be required for preserv-
ing the epistemological objectivity of the relationship between that system and 
the observer (von Foerster, 1981:274-85). 
This interplay between ontological and epistemological objectivity 
appears to be present in many contexts of sociological research. For instance, 
the selection of a given set of social indicators would impose an 'objective' 
framework both on the relationships between the individuals who are the sub-
ject of the analysis and on the relationship between the researcher and those 
subjects. Bernstein referring to the framing of knowledge argues: 
"... there is not an 'objective' frame: ... the form this code (educational 
knowledge code) takes depends upon social principles which regulate the 
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classification and framing of knowledge made public in educational insti-
tutions. Both Durkheim and Marx have shown us that the structure of 
society's classification and frames reveals both the distribution of power 
and the principles of social control". 1971:4748. 
Arguably, this outlook can entail a peculiar form of problem: once the 
selection of that objective framework has frozen the social reality on which 
such a framework has been imposed, researchers could claim that they are 
merely depicting that reality, as external observers, and that they merely are 
dealing with homogeneous values that can be unequivocally distributed among 
the population. 
This would be a classical way of conceiving social systems. It may be 
useful, especially when applied to restricted contexts of research, for example, 
a survey to know the voting intention prior to elections (Ibanez 1986: 57). 
However even in those appropriate fields of application, the power of 
resolution of that classical view would be limited, because it can be maintained 
that the 'objectivistic' point of view in sociology, as the objectivity of 
Newtonian physics, breaks down at some level of analysis. In physics this level 
is that of quantum phenomena (Feyman, 1985); in sociology it appears to be 
the level of the individual actor. In so far as social macrophenomena are 
determined, in the last analysis, by microphenomena occurring at the indi-
vidual actor level, the 'objectivistic', classical, point of view could only give a 
coarse, superficial and often, at some critical points, clearly inadequate ac-
count of the real dynamics of social processes (Ibanez 1991). 
In contrast to this point of view which can be termed as classical, 
Anthony Wilden considers that, 
"... a system behaviour, be it informational or energetic, organic or 
inorganic, depends on the way in which the participant observer has punc-
tuated it" (Wilden 1972a). Going further Steir says: "The 'same self may 
be different as a result of its own selfpoisiting" (Steir, 1991: 2). 
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In reality, the observer somehow constitutes in Kant's sense the object. 
This constitutive role of the subject would be even clearer when the object that 
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this subject considers is a social reality, which necessarily involves other sub-
jects. As Buckley argues, 
"...the social system embraces the interrelations of component individuals 
who, themselves complex systems, do not simply react to one another in a 
mechanical, billiardball fashion, but rather actively contribute to the 
genesis of social structure and process by way of interpretation of the 
situation and the making of subsequent decisions or choices of action". 
Buckley 1974: 386. 
Following Buckley's postulate about the fundamental role that social 
subjects' interpretations and decisions play in the dynamics of social entities, I 
start from the bases of the epistemological hypothesis according to which 
social entities are not merely 'given' either to the supposedly neutral observer 
nor indeed to any other subjective element in those systems (to any individual 
agent acting within them). I shall argue that, on the contrary, those realities are 
constructed by both those individual actors and the observer. This point of 
view, which is perhaps held by a minority of social researchers26, has found a 
modern formulation through some concepts developed by the second 
generation of cybernetic thinking, to which I referred previously27. R. Felix 
Geyer and Johannes van der Zouwen, in their introduction to the two volumes 
of the book Sociocybernetics, present the main features of this new, 
nonobjectivistic outlook, when applied to the analysis of social entities: 
"... (Sociocybernetics) stresses and gives an epistemological foundation for 
science as an observer-dependent activity. The feed back and feed for-
ward loops characterizing the 'circular' form of systems thinking are not 
only constructed between the objects observed but between them and the 
observer. The subjective character of knowledge is emphasized by this 
approach: information is neither seen as inherently 'out there' in the 
observer's environment, nor is it entirely viewed as a figment of his own 
imagination or a result of his own cognitive processes. Information is 
constructed and continually reconstructed by the individual in open 
interaction with his environment" (1978: 1). 
Thus, social systems, when viewed from this perspective as subject-
dependent, non classical systems would be, in a way, non-objective systems. 
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But they would not be 'subjective' in the sense of being illusory. They would 
be nonobjective systems because they would not be given once and for all, but 
would be constructed, defined and redefined by their constitutive (subjective) 
elements and their relationships. In other words, they would be distinctionally 
open systems, by necessity, because they would be constituted by autonomous 
subjects. Arguably, where the phenomenon of subjectivity is present, a distin-
tionally open system would also appear. This relationship between subjectivity 
and distinctional openness appears in the biological domain. 
Living beings as biological subjects are distinctionally open entities; 
they produce and reproduce themselves in new forms through the process of 
evolution. This distinctional openness would implement the subject's 
autonomy: the capability for an entity to constitute a world of its own (Varela, 
1979). 
In the case of social systems, as I shall explain in Section 2.7 and later 
in Chapter 3, the characteristic nonobjectivity of these systems, would stem 
from the phenomenon of reflectivity. It will be argued that social systems are 
reflective systems: each of their elements would generate an 'objectivity' of its 
own, and the whole system would be constituted by the reflection between 
those 'subjective objectivities'. Social systems, when their most peculiar 
characteristics are considered, would be nonclassical in that precise sense. 
They would be non objective systems, constituted by processes of reflection 
between the 'objective' images of several subjects28. In order to explain ade-
quately that idea of reflectivity, I shall first present some concepts which will 
be instrumental in the proper formulation of this idea. 
2.3. Organizationally closed systems. 
At the beginning of this chapter I wrote of selforganizing systems. In 
general a system capable of creating new distinctions (Spencer-Brown)29 by 
itself and within itself, would be a self-organizing" system (Morin 1981: 
133). There is one kind of self-organizing systems which have specially 
powerful capabilities to produce new distinctions: those systems that posses 
the property of organizational closure31: 
"A particular (circular) organization of processes that recursively depend 
on each other for their maintenance and realization; they form a recursive 
closure", Zeleny, 1981: 5. 
There are some systems (for example, living beings) which have the 
capability of producing and reproducing themselves as individual entities. It 
can be argued that they can do so because the elements and relations defining 
them at any given time, would generate other elements and relations which in 
turn, would produce those in the first place. Those hypothetical systems, 
whose elements and relations would produce each other in a recurrent way are 
called organizationally closed systems. Living beings may be viewed as a 
particular kind of organizationally closed systems; they would be autopoietic 
(self-producing) systems in the sense given to that word by Maturana and 
Varela (Autopoiesis is a concept coined by these authors; it means literally 
"self-production")32-33. 
In relation to the use of the concept of autopoiesis in social sciences 
Geyer and var der Zouwen say: 
"It should not be forgotten that the concept of autopoiesis was developed 
while studying living systems. When one tries to generalize the usages of 
this concept to make it also truly applicable to social systems, the biology 
based theory of autopoiesis should therefore be expanded into a more 
general theory of self-referential autopoietic systems. It should be realized 
that social and psychic systems are based upon another type of autopoietic 
organization than living systems: namely on communication and 
consciousness, respectively, as modes of meaningbased reproduction" 
(1990:7). 
Beyond the limits of biology, autopoietic systems can also be 
conceived of as entities realized, not just in physical space and through a 
network of biochemical components, but in any sort of space and through a 
network of components of any kind. From this point of view, the topological 
boundary individualizing the autopoietic system is not necessarily of a physical 
nature. Zeleny assumes this outlook when he defines autopoiesis as, 
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"... a unity realized through a closed organization processes of production 
such that (a) the same organization of processes is generated through the 
interaction of their own products (components), and (b) a topological 
boundary emerges as a result of the same constitutive processes" (Zeleny, 
1981: 6). 
When this point of viewed is assumed, the notion of autopoiesis 
becomes assimilated with that of organizational closure. Organizationally 
closed systems would not only produce and reproduce themselves; they would 
also be able to self-organize themselves34. That is to say, they would be 
capable of producing new distinctions as new features of their own organiza-
tion35. Therefore, they would not be strictly self-replicating systems; they 
would be able to change to some extent their organization without losing their 
individual identity. Hence, the organizational closure of a system would not be 
defined by the absolute invariability of that organization, but by the mainte-
nance of the self-reproducing capabilities of the system as a unity. This 
maintenance may and even should allow changes in the structure of the 
system's organization. 
From this perspective, it may be argued that organisms are not the only 
kind of organizationally closed, autopoietic systems in Zeleny's sense of the 
term autopoietic. There would be other kinds of organizationally closed sys-
tems which would be of special interest for social researchers. For instance, 
mental processes may be viewed as a particular type of organizationally closed 
systems (G. Pask 1975) and in a similar way, social actors may also be con-
sidered as organizationally closed systems which would produce and can 
thereby also reproduce their own closed organization as agents in the course of 
their social interactions. Arguably, the factor that underlies the regularities of 
those interactions (and consequently the 'social order') that they generate, 
would be the organizational closure of the individual agents who interact36, 
rather than any 'objective' social norm. 
In the light of this concept which I put forward in order to explore its 
heuristic potential as a working hypothesis, organizationally closed systems 
would be essentially autonomous, which means that they have and follow their 
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own laws37. Those systems would maintain their own organization, which 
would be generated by them and would identify them. Hence, they would 
maintain their own identity by their own means. An organizationally closed 
system, as defined, would not be a 'closed system' in the sense that physics 
gives to that expression. The closed systems that are the typical object of the 
study of classical physics (e.g. a pendulum, the temperature of a room, etc.), 
would be closed with respect to matter and energy, not with respect to 
organization. In general they have no internal capability of producing and 
reproducing their own dynamics. Therefore those systems have no internal 
organization in the sense that is being assumed, because they do not produce 
and reproduce their own constitutive elements recurrently. Any sort of 
organization that they may have would tend to disappear because, being closed 
systems with respect to matter and energy, their entropy should increase in 
time. This is why they must be viewed as organizationally open systems 
(Prigogine, 1984). 
Consequently, although it may sound paradoxical, physically closed 
systems would be organizationally open, and organizationally closed systems 
would be physically open. A physically closed system cannot have self-orga-
nizing capabilities because of the second law of thermodynamics (see von 
Foerster quotation above). Only physically open systems would have a self-
organizing potential because they can decrease their own entropy by increasing 
the entropy of their environment. An organizationally closed system would be 
a particular kind of self-organizing system because at least, it must maintain its 
organization, preventing any increase in its total internal entropy. In order to 
accomplish that, an organizationally closed system must exchange matter and 
energy with its environment, that is to say, it must be a physically open system. 
Thus typical organizationally closed systems such as living beings can 
be seen as open systems regarding matter and energy flows (H. Maturana 
1980:54). Because of that, they cannot only maintain but decrease their inter-
nal entropy. In other words, they can increase their level of organization38. 
They would be open systems with respect to the matter and energy flows 
which preserve their identity and potentially increase their level of complexity 
by maintaining a condition of organizational closure: they would organize 
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themselves in such a way that the dynamics of that organization would produce 
and reproduce itself, possibly in new, more complex forms. 
As is argued in the field of autopoiesis (Varela, Maturana) that 
according to Darwin and the standard theory of evolution, living beings evolve 
through a process of structural coupling39 (coupling through the changing 
structure40 which embodies the organism's organization) between their internal 
organization and the changing conditions of their environment. This environ-
ment would not determine the path of such evolution. The environment merely 
constrains the potential for change of the organism's internal organization 
(Watzlawick, 1981: 328-330). In this respect, Winograd and Flores point out 
that, 
"A plastic, structuraldetermined system (i.e., one whose structure can 
change over time while its identity remains) that is autopoietic will by 
necessity evolve in such a way that its activities are properly coupled to its 
medium. Its structure must change so that it generates appropriate changes 
of state triggered by specific perturbing changes in its medium; otherwise 
it will disintegrate" (1986:45). 
This notion that views change as an outcome of processes of structural 
coupling between the internal organization of autonomous systems and 
variable environments, could be of value for social theory as a new insight into 
the relationships between the individual and society. It is an new insight which 
would preserve both the autonomy of the individual and the power of the 
social environment which constrains the former. At the same time, this view 
seems to allow for explanation in a unified, consistent way, both of the phe-
nomenon of social change and that of social order (Buckley 1967: 26). 
Among the sociologists, Blumer was one of the first to argue against 
the supposedly rigid constraints." of social structures upon individuals, 
stressing the essential autonomy of these: 
"The human being is not swept as a neutral and indifferent unity by the 
operation of a system. As an organism capable of self-interaction he forges 
his actions out of a process of definition involving choice, appraisal, and 
decision... Cultural norms, status positions and role relationships are only 
frameworks inside of which that process (of formative transaction) goes 
on." (Blumer, 1953:199-201). 
The notion of organizational closure would also lend a new meaning to 
the idea of purpose. Within this conceptual framework, a system would have 
purpose when it is organizationally closed and its operations are intended to 
produce and reproduce that condition, so that the system maintains itself as a 
self-producing unity. In a system of that kind, the immediate aim or purpose of 
each operation would be to make possible some other specific operations, 
because all of them are required to produce and reproduce the whole system 
(Buckley 1967: 52-58; Locker 1981: 219-221). Consequently, each specific 
operation would have not only an immediate aim (to make possible as its 
outcome other specific operations), but also a general aim which would be to 
reproduce the organizational closure of the system. In this sense, Varela 
proposes 'the autonomy hypothesis' according to which every autonomous 
system (capable of establishing their own goals and aims) would be organiza-
tionally closed. 
As a working hypothesis I shall also assume that any system showing 
some sort of complex purposeful activity42, should have an underlying form of 
organizational closure which would give sense to that activity. 
2.4 Action systems43 as organizationally closed systems. 
In the light of my heuristic hypothesis, social entities could also be 
seen as organizationally closed systems. These systems would be made of a 
fabric that is very different from the fabric constituting living beings in 
general: the elements which make up the organizational closure of living 
beings in general would be (in the last analysis) molecules that compose a self-
producing network; whereas the elements which would constitute the organiza-
tional closure of (human) societies would be (in the last analysis) actions 




This social network can reproduce itself because its constitutive 
actions show some 'regularity': actors would consistently perform a specific 
sort of action in a given situation, and they would expect that the other actors 
involved in that situation would do the same (Mead G.H. 1934: 65-129). Now, 
according to my working hypothesis, which I am defining as a heuristic tool, 
the fundamental basis for that mutual congruency between the actions of 
different agents would be the interplay of reciprocal expectations. Certainly, 
these reciprocal expectations may not have a real basis (agents may be 
mistaken about such reciprocal expectations): others can have different 
expectations from those that we attribute to them, and vice versa, we can have 
different expectations from those that the others attribute to us. In this case, the 
process of interaction frequently breaks down. However, this process is not 
only able to survive such breakdowns but it can also produce and reproduce 
itself through them, by means of the generation of renewed interpretations, by 
the actors involved, of their own reciprocal expectations (Mead G.H. 1934: 70-
71). 
How would the consistency between those expectations, and the 
resulting regularities in actions that make up the fabric of social life, occur? 
This consistency would be possible because individual actors are assumed to 
be organizationally closed systems which, as I shall argue in Section 7 of this 
Chapter, can represent images of other organizationally closed systems, the 
other agents with whom they interact (von Foerster, 1991). In this respect it 
seems possible to draw an analogy between multicellular organisms and societ-
ies. A multicellular organism would be an organizationally closed system 
composed of units (the cells) which would also be an organizationally closed 
systems. As Maturana points out, 
"Animals, as multicellular organisms, are autopoietic systems of the 
second order, integrated by the first order autopoietic systems (cells)". 
(1988:5253). 
The general organizational closure of the multicellular organism would 
be achieved by means of the organizational closure of the cells. Each cell 
would cooperate with the others in the task of generating an internal envi-
ronment adequate for the preservation of its own closure, of its viability as a 
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living cell. This realization of the organizational closure of each cell would 
contribute to the realization of the organizational closure of the organism, and 
the latter would reproduce the conditions for the former. 
Hence, according to this view, societies could be seen as orga-
nizationally closed systems of actions made up of units, each social indi-
vidual" who would also be organizationally closed systems. If societies can be 
considered as organizationally closed systems, constituted by a self-producing 
and self-reproducing network of actions, it would be because social individuals 
can be viewed as organizationally closed systems which reflectively45 repre-
sent each other and hence generate a tentative network of mutual expectations. 
This tentative network of expectations would always be conjectural and would 
strive to be realized through effective interaction. 
From this point of view and more specifically, social individuals can 
be considered as organizationally closed action systems, which would be 
constituted by a self-producing and self-reproducing network of concepts, 
intentions, decisions, volitions, motives, etc. This complex network would 
generate the actions that those individuals perform (G. Pask; H. von Foerster, 
Steir. Apparently, social individuals act purposefully in order to achieve 
specific aims (Nowakoska, 1977; 1978). But this specific purposefulness 
would 'make sense' within and (because of) their general condition as 
organizationally closed systems of a peculiar psychosocial kind. Individual 
actors would be organizationally closed systems of a psychosociological 
nature, and they would need to produce and reproduce themselves in that 
condition. Arguably, human beings act purposefully because they need to 
produce and reproduce their own stability as psychosocial systems, and that 
stability would adopt the form of an organizationally closed individual action 
system basically composed of concepts (what can we do?) and intentions (why 
should we do it?) (Searle 1983, 1984). 
According to this view, individuals would have to interact in order to 
maintain stability (Mead 1934: 250; Goffinan 1959, 1963, 1975; Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). Such interaction would be a fundamental aspect of their 
organizational closure and an essential requisite for the maintenance of it, as 
feeding is an essential requisite for the maintenance of the stability (the 
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condition of organizational closure) of living beings (Maturana, 1980a, 1980c, 
1984; Varela, 1979, 1980, 1984; Guiloff, 1981). As development psychologists 
have shown (McGurk, H. 1992) human beings could not became viable 
individual action systems without interacting with other agents. In fact, 
apparently, human beings generate their own image as agents through the 
image of other agents46, and they produce those images through interaction 
(Mead, 1934; Berger and Luclunann, 1967; Astington, Harris and Olson, 1988; 
Bennet, 1993; Baron-Cohen, H., Tager-Flisberg, H. and Cohen, D. J., 1993). 
In the light of the conceptual framework which is being used as a 
heuristic instrument, interaction would only be possible if the actors involved 
achieve a condition of structural coupling." between their respective individual 
organizational closures as psychosocial systems. That means that actors would 
accomplish the realization of their own organizational closure by means of the 
realization of the organizational closure of the other actors involved (in a 
manner analogous to the way in which any cell, in a multicellular organism, 
would accomplish the realization of its organizational closure by means of the 
cooperative realization of the organizational closure of the other cells making 
up this organism). 
Through social interaction actors would achieve their own aims by 
taking into account the aims of the others, and by acting accordingly 
(Goffinan, 1959:13-28; Berger and Lukmann 1967: 44-55). It is a process of 
mutual adaptation". In that way the individuals would generate the organi-
zational closure of society in so far as they realize their individual closure as a 
psychosocial systems. And they do both things spontaneously, not as a result 
of a deliberate attitude: human beings cannot produce cannot be themselves 
without, at the same time, 'producing society' through their interactions (Berger 
and Lukmann, 1967). This mutual dependency between the production of the 
individual as a social agent and the production of social relationships with 
other individuals, would be particularly clear when one considers the process 
from an ontogenic point of view (Piaget 1932; McGurk, H. 1992). The notions 
of organizational closure and structural coupling seems to fit nicely into a 
general constructivist view such as that developed by Piaget (1975, 1980) in 
the field of psychology , which stresses the roles of both the individual and the 
environment in the production of social agency and social entities. 
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2.5. Meaning in organizationally closed systems. 
The elements that, according to my heuristic model, would 
dynamically constitute an organizationally closed system, would 
	 have 
	 a 
characteristic property: they would possess a meaning. In general terms, the 
notion of 'meaning' can arguably be related to the idea of being an element that 
belongs to a closed organization (Pattee 1977). The situation would be quite 
the opposite when we consider organizationally open systems: their elements 
would have no meaning, they would exist merely on their own; they would not 
refer to each other because they would not belong to a self-producing network, 
within which they would play a specific organizational role. On the contrary 
the elements constituting an organizationally closed system would not exist 
merely on their own; they would refer to each other, because they would 
produce and reproduce each other in a cooperative network (Pattee 1977). That 
is why they seem to have a meaning, which would consist in the relationships 
that they would maintain with each other in that network. For example, a 
molecule of any of the four bases that constitute DNA is not 'just' a molecule 
with such and such inherent characteristics. As well as those characteristics, it 
has a meaning due to the fact that it belongs to a coding system which plays a 
central role in the organizational (molecular) closure of the living cell (Matu-
rana 1973, 1975, 1980; Varela 1973, 1975, 1981; Pask, 1981). 
From this point of view, one can put forward the hypothesis that all the 
functional elements of organizationally closed systems have some kind of 
meaning, in addition to possessing purely individual (physical, biological, neu-
ral, etc.,) characteristics. Therefore, according to that outlook, where there is 
meaning, there would be some organizational closure underlying it, although 
frequently that closure is not explicit. 
For example, computer programs undoubtedly have a meaning, but 
cannot be considered as organizationally closed systems in themselves: they do 
not produce and reproduce themselves, neither do they function by themselves. 
They need to be written/used by human beings. The organizational closure 
which gives them their meaning is provided precisely by the program-
mer/operator who works with them (computer programs have a meaning only 
because human beings use them, although these human beings, as users, tend 
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to ignore that fact)49. It can be argued that no computer program would have 
meaning in the absence of a mind capable of understanding and using it. That 
is why human beings cannot 'communicate' with computers in the proper, 
human sense of that word. As G. Pask says, 
"People talk through computers, using them to communicate with other 
people or commune with themselves. But they do not talk to computers. 
Nor do computers talk to them, if we mean by 'computer' a machine 
programmed in a conventional way and by 'talk' a conversation between 
individuals or between different aspects of the self' (Pask and Curran, 
1982:91). 
Most sociologist would agree that social entities are defined by some 
kind of meaning, relevant at least for the agents involved in them; 
consequently, according to the view that has just been outlined, there should be 
some form of organizational closure underlying that meaning. Now, arguably 
that organizational closure can only be provided, in the last analysis, by the 
mind of the individual subjects who give life to those realities. Unless we opt 
for hypostatizing5° those meanings (for considering them as a separate 
substance, in which individuals would merely 'participate'), the meaning of 
social entities appears to lie in the mind of those subjects, and nowhere else. If 
"The environment as we perceive it is our invention" (von Foerster 1981: 
288), 
then our social environment as we perceive it, would also be an 
invention (a construction) of our minds as social agents. 
"... social meanings (which direct human behaviour) do not inhere in 
activities, institutions or social objects themselves. Rather, meanings are 
conferred upon social events by interacting individuals, who must first 
interpret what is going on from the social context in which these events 
occur. This emerging gestalt (the 'definition of the situation') is seen to 
result from the interplay of biography, situation, nonverbal 
communication, and linguistic exchange that characterizes all social 
interaction". (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979: 9). 
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According to this view, social meanings would be produced and repro-
duced in the process of the actualization of the individual, psychosocial, 
organizational closure of social agents. Only this closure would guarantee the 
maintenance of such individuals as viable agents, hence as social subjects, that 
is why that closure may also be termed as agential closure.51  
The hypothesis that for individual social subjects, preserving their 
condition of (psychosocial) organizational closure of intentions and meanings 
(concepts), would be a fundamental requirement for their very survival as 
agents can be considered as plausible. When the agent loses the capability of 
guiding action through meanings and reproducing those meanings through 
action, her very existence as an agent as such would become endangered; 
anomie would set in. 
As organizationally closed agential systems, social individuals would 
need to navigate the perturbations (influences of any kind)52 coming from the 
environment, without losing the condition of organizational closure (without 
disintegrating as a selfproducing and self-reproducing systems). This need 
would be at the base of the permanent regeneration of meanings that social 
subjects would have to undertake in order to maintain their viability as agents 
(G. Pask and G. de Zeeuw, 1991). 
It is in this light that, in the following chapter, I shall put forward the 
concept of 'self-perception system' to refer to the form of psychosocial 
organizational closure which supports the production and reproduction of the 
individual's social meanings. 
2.6. Informationally open systems53. 
According to the argument so far, an organizationally closed system 
which is embedded in a perturbing environment54, must assimilate the 
environment's perturbations through a change of its structure, if it wants to 
avoid disintegration. In other words, organizationally closed systems sur-
rounded by a perturbing environment, and that in practice means all real 
organizationally closed systems, because all of them relate to some 
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environment, capable of perturbing them to some extent, must change their 
structure in order to preserve their organization, which defines them as closed 
systems. As indicated in Section 2.3, the structure of an organizationally 
closed system is the material realization of that system's organization. In all 
kinds of organizationally closed systems, and specifically in those of an 
agential kind, very different structures can play the same organizational role. 
For instance, verbal language obviously plays an essential role in human 
communication; but the sign language used by deaf mute people would also 
play an analogous fundamental role in human communication. Although it is 
quite different from verbal language, considering its structural characteristics, 
its organizational role would be equivalent (Sacks, 1989). 
The possibility of realizing the same basic organization, by means of 
different structural embodiments, would be at the base of the phenomenon of 
structural plasticity. And this phenomenon, as already indicated in Section 2.3, 
would entail the potential for adaptation, and hence evolution, of those 
systems. From this point of view, organizationally closed systems should have 
some kind of plasticity, some ability to change their structure, maintaining 
their general organization, in order to survive through adaptation and perhaps 
evolution, amidst the changing perturbations coming from their environment55. 
But this capability would be equivalent to those systems' ability to inform56 
themselves, in the original sense of this word, that is to say, to adopt new 
forms, as a result of their plastic relationship (through structural coupling) with 
the environment. It can be argued that organizationally closed systems that can 
change their structure according to changes in their environment, are also 
informationally open systems (systems which inform themselves, adopt new 
forms of organization along the process of structural coupling with their 
environment). 
Arguably, the notion of information has several meanings. Those 
meanings depend on the kind of system to which that notion refers. Different 
kinds of systems entail different types of information. For example, a coin 
flipping system would be a system which merely selects one of two possible 
configurations: heads or tails. The information that the system produces would 
be the selection between two a priori possibilities (the measure of that 
information is just one bit). However, the concept of information as based on 
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the simple idea of selection among preestablished configurations, would not be 
powerful enough to mirror the informational complexity of organizationally 
closed systems such as living beings57. It would be even less adequate to 
represent human informational capabilities. As I have suggested previously, the 
elements of those systems have a meaning; they carry meaningful information. 
The outcome of flipping a coin does not in itself carry any meaning (although, 
of course we, from the outside, can interpret that outcome, imposing a meaning 
on it). On the contrary, the outcome of a decision taken by a living being 
would carry a meaning (survival or death, for example). 
It can be argued that the meaningful information which is 
characteristic of organizationally closed systems, and that makes itself explicit 
in the 'decisions' of those systems, can either remain always the same or 
change from time to time. In other words, the self-producing relationships 
between the elements can be fixed once and for all, or it can be redefined, thus 
generating other forms of organizational closure. Biological evolution provides 
an imposing example of the way in which organizationally closed systems can 
change their internal information without losing their organizational closure. 
On the contrary, they refine and enhance the complexity of it58. According to 
the heuristic model which I am proposing, individual agents would also show 
that capability. For instance, consider some individual who drastically changes 
his environment (say, Marco Polo in the court of the Mongol Khan). In that 
situation, the individual subject, as an organizationally closed action system, 
would have to be able to cope with the new circumstances, first in a rather 
inefficient manner: he could only be able to interact at the most basic level. 
Progressively the subject would refine his abilities, as an organizationally 
closed system of interaction, in that environment. Of course, the process is 
interrupted if the subject makes a fatal decision (provoking the Khan's wrath at 
the cost of his head) that annihilate his very condition of survival in such a 
situation. 
Classical cybernetic systems were defmed as informationally closed; 
they had a given, closed, informational specification: Ashby, perhaps the most 
influential author in that field, defmed cybernetics as "the science that studies 
systems open to matter and energy, and closed to information" (1956: 15). 
Non-classical cybernetics, on the contrary, contemplates systems which are not 
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only open with respect to matter and energy, but also with respect to informa-
tion (Pask, G., 1982)59, even though they remain as organizationally closed 
systems: they would be systems that change their organization without losing 
their viability as organized systems (their specific form of organization would 
change, but such systems would still be capable of maintaining their identity as 
organized totalities): 
"... the typical response of open systems to environmental intrusions is 
elaboration or change of their structure to a or more complex higher 
level... This is true whether the system is the lowliest biological organism 
or a complex sociocultural system." (Buckley, 1967: 50-51). 
Within those systems information would not only circulate but would 
also be created and destroyed60. The idea of informationally closed/open 
systems may be clarified by means of a couple of examples: a game such as 
chess is an informationally closed system —the players just follow given rules, 
and they cannot change them at all. On the contrary, the kind of system that we 
call a natural language6i, not only has rules, but also the capability for 
changing these rules in time. In this sense, a natural language would be an 
informationally open system. Similarly, in non-traditional game theory the 
players are allowed to negotiate game transformation processes in which they 
create new meanings and rules (Buckley et al., 1974: 277-297 and Buckley 
1977: 44); these games would also be instances of informationally open 
systems. 
The ability of a system to be in a permanent process of change, 
maintaining at the same time its identity an ability which seems to be a 
characteristic of living systems, would be based on the interaction between 
those two properties of organizational closure and informational openness 
(Pask 1981); this interaction would not only be an essential requirement for the 
preservation of the organizational closure of many systems, but would also be 
responsible for the increase in complexity that those systems appear to display 
over time. 
It can be argued that, although the notion of organizational closure has 
been mainly developed in the field of biology through the concept of 
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autopoiesis, and cybernetics through this concept of P-Individual (Pask, 1975: 
302-304; 1976), social entities, in the light can also be conceived of as systems 
which are organizationally closed but informationally open, —or least, 
potentially open. This quality of openness would allow human social systems 
to be not only self-reproductive, but also self-productive, that is to say: capable 
of creating new meanings, and thereby, new relationships, structures, etc. 
(Morin, E., 1977, 1980, 1986). 
According to the synthetic theory of evolution currently accepted, the 
overwhelming variety of forms that living beings take through the process of 
evolution, might be understood as a consequence of the self-productive 
potential (the potential for spontaneous variation) of those living beings, 
potential which is steered by, but not produced nor determined by their 
environment. Nobel Prize winner F. Jacob conceives of evolution as a process 
of "bricolage", through which organisms "make do" with their potential for 
spontaneous variation in order to face new environmental challenges (See 
Jacob, 1981, Chapter 2; also Jacob 1970; Barnet, 1962; Querner, 1971; Ruse, 
1973; Piel et al, 1978). 
In an analogous manner, the overwhelming variety of forms that 
human societies have taken through history, might be understood as a conse-
quence of the self-productive potential of human social systems and, in the last 
analysis, of human social beings. 
It can be argued that human societies cannot be properly conceived of 
as informationally closed systems. These systems would be incapable, by 
definition (see Ashby's definition above), of creating new meaning. At best, 
they would work as merely reproductive systems; novelty could not emerge 
within them and hence they would be incapable of evolution. 
According to this conceptual framework, an organizationally closed 
system of a natural kind (generated without human intervention), which were 
devoid of informational openness, would be extremely fragile. Any substantial 
change in the environment would be fatal for the maintenance of the system's 
closure condition. Natural organizationally closed systems are 'robust' to the 
extent that they possess informational openness. The source of the outstanding 
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capabilities for informational openness which are characteristic of human 
societies, would lie in the informational openness of the actors who would be 
the basic components of those societies. These actors would be, as stated 
before, organizationally closed systems of a psychosocial nature. Their organi-
zational closure as action systems would make them purposeful systems; and, 
as that organizational closure would be informationally open, this openness 
would make them purposefully open systems as well (Powel, Roice, and 
Voorhess, 1982). 
Thus, it can be argued that the property of informational openness 
would enable social individuals to be not only purposeful systems, but also 
open, creative purposeful systems: 
"Groupings of individuals seeking material and social goals in a physical 
and sociocultural environment generate meanings, interaction patterns, and 
ecological arrangements that are more or less temporary adjustments 
always open to redefinition and rearrangement". Buckley, 1967: 205. 
Social actors would not merely follow a previously written script 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986: 82 passim) when they behave as agents: 
"Human intelligence by means of the physiological mechanism of the 
human central nervous system, deliberately selects one from among the 
several alternative responses which are possible in the given problematic 
environmental situation ... is this entrance of the alternative possibilities of 
future response... which decisively contrasts intelligent conduct or 
behaviour with reflex, instinctive, and habitual conduct or behaviour 
delayed reaction with immediate reaction" (Mead, G.H. 1934: 65). 
It can be said that, in a way, human beings author their own parts. 
Even the most passive, conservative, unimaginative individuals seem to enact 
their roles in a personal way: 
"The human being is not swept along as a neutral and indifferent unit by 
the operation of a system. As an organism capable of self-interaction he 
forges his actions out of a process of definition involving choice, appraisal, 
and decision... Cultural norms, status positions and role relationships 
are only the frameworks inside of which that process of formative 
transaction goes on" Blumer, H. 1953: 199201. 
It could hardly be otherwise if they are, as assumed, autonomous, 
organizationally closed systems. No person would be able to act for another, 
because there would be no action without a meaning, and meaning, according 
to the proposed view, would be an intrinsically personal creation of the indivi-
dual's organizational closure. In line with the arguments already developed, 
meanings can be conceived of as individual products62. Certainly, individuals 
can communicate meanings; but from the heuristic point of view which is 
being assumed, this communication would be just a recreation of one's own 
meanings by the influence (through structural, behavioural coupling) of the 
meanings of others63. Neither meanings would exist 'out there' nor could they 
be directly transferred from one mind to another64. 
This would be the reason why new (individual) meanings can and do 
arise in the course of interaction, and these new meanings could be the basis of 
social change. Consequently, the person in the sense of that organizationally 
closed system of a psychosocial nature which I have been referring to, would 
be the source of social creativity. The creation of new meanings and rules by 
the actors would modify the content of the specific communicative structure in 
which they are located, and it would reshape that very structure. As a result, 
the network of interactions between individuals would also change its features. 
This emergence of novelty is explain by Buckley (1967: 99): 
"... the human individual not only controls but creates and recreates much 
of his effective environment. His ensemble of symbols represents mappings 
of possible behavioral relations with its environment, relations which are 
otherwise not given in nature but which may be continually created by the 





It is convenient now to address another notion essential to the 
conceptual framework which is being put forward in these pages. This notion 
is the idea of reflectivity, another concept characteristic of second order cyber-
netics. A system is reflective when the actions of its constitutive elements 
depend on the way in which those elements mirror the actions of the other ele-
ments (Astington, J. Harris, P. and Olson, D. 1988). Of course, in a way the 
actions of the elements constituting all kinds of systemic realities would 
depend on each other. For example, the change in direction of a billiard ball 
which collides with another depends on the direction, etc., of that second ball. 
But the mutual dependence between the elements that make up reflective sys-
tems would be of another kind; it would not be determined 'mechanically' by 
the independent characteristics of each element, but by the way in which each 
elements 'sees' (reflects) the characteristics of the other. This mutual depen-
dence results from the images, distributed among those elements, of such 
characteristics. The elements in a reflective system would 'know', to some ex-
tent, each other, and therefore they be abe to act according to this knowledge. 
Already some purely biological systems can be considered as reflective in that 
way. For instance, biologists have realized for years that the immune system 
apparently works on the basis of its ability to recognize its 'self components 
from the 'other' components, which are systematically searched for and de-
stroyed: 
"... the immune system distinguishes between 'self and 'other', between that 
genetically identical to the rest of the body, and that genetically alien". 
(von Boehmer and Kisielow, 1991. See also Cohen, I.R. 1988; Varela, F. 
1979: 211236). 
A reflective system would be composed of elements which have some 
kind of knowledge about themselves and about the other elements, which 
would possess 'self-images' and 'otherimages'66. This knowledge would allow 
those elements to mutually tune their reciprocal actions, which as a result of 
this, would not be purely mechanical, not a deterministic outcome of their 
independent characteristics67. Giddens has argued that human beings, as social 
individuals, have images of themselves and images of the other social individ- 
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uals whom they interact with (Giddens, A. 1987: 151-156; 1984. XXXII-
XXXVI). Consequently they would be reflective systems in that double sense 
(they are self-reflective68 and other-reflective systems). 
From a systemic point of view, Buckley, Morin, Baumgartner et al. 
had proposed that we consider social individuals (social actors) as 
self-reflective and purposeful beings: 
"In addition to addressing itself to systems properties and dynamics, social 
system modeling and analysis should, in our view, entail concepts and 
methodology which enable specification of what actors, as purposeful, 
self-reflective beings, are all about, their decision-making and strategic 
capabilities, and their relation to systems dynamics and stability." 
(Baumgartner et al. 1978: 28). 
However, it can be argued that this self-reflective capability of actors 
should be understood in the double dimension already pointed out: as both 
self-reflective, and other-reflective. In fact, it appears that our own self-
reflection ability depends on our capabilities of reflecting the others, and vice 
versa (Baron Cohen et al. 1993). 
From this point of view, we would all be reflective elements in the 
social reflective system to which we belong. 
"Society is a hyperreflective system, a reflective system made up of 
reflective elements (the individuals)", J. lbafiez, 1991: 17.69  
This would mean that sociologists are inevitably elements of the very 
systems that they study. According to this perspective, when sociologists want 
to face genuine social phenomene° they should relinquish their traditionally 
granted role as external, neutral observers in order to understand the specifici-
ty of the social system under scrutiny. Social systems would be a creation of 
their constituent actors, and sociologists who are social actors themselves, 
would be unable to avoid contributing to this creation with their research: 
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"The social researcher belongs to the same domain of reality that he 
investigates: 'the observer himself is a part of his observation' (Levi-
Strauss). This situation which seems to be an epistemological obstacle 
founds the possibility of his knowledge and extends the field of observation 
to his very subjectivity", J. lbariez 1979: 34. 
A process of social research would be an act of self-reflection, which 
would be done by the social milieu in which that process takes place. (Of 
course, not only the activity of sociologists, but any activity of understanding 
social reality by any social actor, would be a self-reflective process occurring 
within that reality) (Lamo de Espinosa, 1990). Modern social systems would 
be also reflective in that sense. 
When this perspective is adopted, it can be argued that social theory 
has to recognize explicitly its reflective role (Garfinkel, 1967: 79), accepting 
that from a sociological point of view the only claim to "objectivity" that it can 
make stems from the fact that our societies confer on the sociologists' social 
actions as professionals -the elaboration of sociological knowledge- a 
privileged authority. But then that conferred authority, and the 'objectivity' 
arising from it, is in itself, a reflection of the kind of social subjectivity which 
is characteristic of modern societies. In a nutshell: social scientists, should feel 
committed, qua scientist, to the kind of 'objective knowledge' revealed by 
their research; but qua social they should understand that knowledge is a 
subjective self-reflection of the social milieu in which such knowledge 
arises71. 
2.8. Communication. 
As argued in the previous section, reflective systems would be better 
able to communicate through the reciprocal images that they generate. Too 
frequently, however, the phenomenon of communication is viewed by means 
of the 'traffic metaphor': communication is seen as something like the 
movement of a spectral entity (information) from one place (the sender) to 
another (the receiver) using a specific channel, by means of coding and 
decoding processes, etc. (C. Shannon 1949; Hund 1972). 
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Now, although that metaphor may be adequate to portray some of the 
external features of the phenomenon of communication, it can be argued that it 
does not properly represent the most basic features of that phenomenon. 
According to the conceptual framework developed so far, human communica-
tion would be a reflective process, through which the subjects produce and 
reproduce their own images of other subjects72. Human beings do not directly 
communicate with the others; they communicate with their images of the 
others (G.H. Mead 1934; Watzlawich 1967). From the point of view of the 
heuristic model which I am putting forward, communication would be, in 
essence, a process of structural coupling (by means of overt behaviour) 
through which each of the communicating agents would develop their images 
of the other agents and, along this process, their own self-images. That is the 
reason why communication frequently seems to break down, not at the level of 
its implementation (because of problems of transmission, of coding, decoding, 
etc.), but at a more basic level: because of a fundamental misunderstanding 
which would consist in a serious inadequacy between our images of the others 
and the others' self-images. 
Usually we think that when we communicate we exchange 
information, as if that information were a sort of commodity (Pask 1975) 
which would change hands73. In a way this is true, or at least it can be 
conceived of as an effect of the phenomenon that might be termed 'the 
fetichism of information'74. From this point of view information would be 
transmitted through messages and these messages would be viewed as objec-
tive entities which would carry an inherent meaning. However, as von Foerster 
remarks 
"It is not I, but the listener, who determines the meaning of my utterance" 
(von Foerster 1991: 65). 
From this outlook, very different from the one which is usually as-
sumed, meaning would be either in the sender (as intended meaning) or in the 
receiver (as interpreted meaning), but never in the message as an 'objective' 
entity. 
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What is called here 'the fetichism of information' is called by others 
'the illusion of communication' E. von Glasersfeld. He argues that: 
"If the constructivist movement has done anything at all, it has dismantled 
the image of language as a means of transferring thoughts, meanings, 
knowledge, or 'information' from one speaker to another. The interpre-
tation of a piece of language is always in terms of concepts and conceptual 
structures which the interpreter has formed out of elements from his or her 
own subjective field of experience. Of course, these concepts and 
conceptual structures had to be modified and adapted through the in-
teraction with other speakers of the language. But adaptation merely 
eliminates those discrepancies that create difficulties in actual interactive 
situations adaptation ceases when there seems to be a fit. And fit in any 
given situation is not indication of match. To find a fit, simply means not 
to notice any discrepancies". (Steier, 1991:23). 
Gordon Pask, in his 'conversation theory' (1972, 1976, 1988), has 
developed a concept of information which would avoid the fetishist reification 
of this notion. From his outlook, meaning, as I have argued previously, would 
be a production of the individual's organizational closure; it would always 
belong to, and would be located in, an individual. From this perspective, 
communication would be the process of changing (of productively 
reproducing) the particular meanings of several individuals through interac-
tions between those individuals. This would be something that good teachers 
intuitively know: a teacher cannot just input new, alien meanings, within a 
pupil's head. A skilled teacher must rather help their pupils to develop their 
own stock of meanings in a way that makes it possible for those pupils to ac-
quire the intended new meanings. This development would be guided by a 
subtle and complex process of interaction between teacher and pupil. 
The units of meaning may be called concepts, in the sense given to 
this term by Pask75. However, it can be argued that in order to make a concept 
meaningful, relevant to the subject who uses it, this concept must be the object 
of some intention of that subject. The hypothesis behind that proposition 
would be that we can only interconnect concepts through intentions (giving a 
rather broad meaning to the word 'intention', as Searle, 1983 does: 'to like', 'to 
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hate', 'to want', 'to wish', but also 'to know', 'to doubt', etc.). For example, 
suppose a person has the concept 'rambling'; it would be difficult to see how 
this person would have this concept without relating intentionally to it in some 
way, say, 'I love rambling', or 'I don't like rambling', or at least 'I know some 
people who love rambling', or, even, simply 'I know what rambling is'. All 
these would be different intentional ways of relating to the concept of 
rambling. 
There is a tradition which views the process of communication as a 
purposeful and goalseeking activity (G.H. Mead, 1934; McIver, 1942). This 
goalseeking feature of communication can also be described in cybernetic 
terms, by applying the notion of organizational closure and structural coupling, 
already presented. From this point of view, it can be argued that concepts and 
intentions would relate to each other in a productive and reproductive way 
inside the universe of meanings of each individual: people would produce their 
concepts according to their intentions, and would apply their intentions to the 
concepts they produce, trying to maintain the organizational closure of their 
universes of meanings (that is to say, the coherence of these universes, Varela 
1979: 12). Subsequently, communication between individuals would be a 
process of structural coupling (Buckley, 1967: 94) between such idiosyncratic 
universes of meanings: when people communicate with other people, they 
would change their individual universes of meanings by producing and repro-
ducing images of the others which would force them to restructure their 
respective universes. As F. Varela argues: 
"... meaning and understanding is relative to the recursive process of inter-
pretation within the conversational unit" (Varela 1979: 269). 
2.9. Complexity. 
Social entities, as defined by the concepts outlined above, appear as 
systems which would be very different in their characteristic features and 
behaviour from classical systems such as (classical) mechanical systems 
(Buckley, 1967, Chapter 2). Edgar Morin's summarizes those specific features 
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which would make social reality so different from more simple kinds of 
systems: 
"Society is all that forming ... complex unity, open, self-productive, 
reproductive of its constituents and of its forms, self-organizing, that is to 
say self-echoorganizing" (E. Morin 1984: 106). 
Morin's recapitulation in Sociologie (1984: 429-430) gives us a 
summary of the typical traits of what he calls complex and hypercomplex 
systems: 
a) In a complex system 
"The entanglement of (its) interactions is such that it is impossible ... to 
conceive of them analytically. Consequently, if one wants to understand 
the whole of a system or even of a complex subsystem, it makes no sense 
to proceed by isolating variables". 
Morin points to the fact that the interactions between the system's 
components are so complex that it is impossible to understand them by means 
of non-holistic or point-by-point analysis. And, for some purposes, it would be 
nonsensical trying to isolate some variables and analyzing them separately, 
because any relevant component of the system derives its meaning from its 
relation to the whole system. As a consequence of that, when researches try to 
grasp a complex system (for instance, a social system) analyzing it by means 
of a set of variables, they may be destroying what can be called 'context 
dependent meaning' of the system's elements. But these 'context dependent 
meanings' would define the system as such, they would constitute its very 
essence. The 'context dependent meaning' of the system's elements is made up 
of meaningful relations between meaningful units of that system, and neither 
those relations nor those units may be analytically broken down without loss 
of their corresponding meaning. To approach those systems from a 
non-holistic point of view would be equivalent to considering a text merely as 
a collection of letters (which would be its 'variables', each of them having a 
certain probability value). Therefore, I shall argue that one must use a holistic 
standpoint when dealing with social entities, and a comprehensive 
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methodology -along the lines advocated by Morin-, throughout the process of 
research. 
b) "Constraints and emergences appear and disappear in multistatic 
systems, that is to say they proceed by internal qualitative jumps, defying 
classical analyses". 
This idea that complex systems work by what Morin calls qualitative 
jumps, implies that they do not work following classical continuous patterns. 
Systems possessing meanings are essentially discontinuous, because meaning 
requires contrast (with other meanings). The analysis of those discontinuous 
jumps which are characteristic of complex processes have been studied, in a 
mathematical context, by Rene Thom, in his Catastrophe Theory (1977a, 
1977b)76. 
c) "Complex systems work with a part of uncertainty (noise), whereas 
'noise' perturbs machines". 
As von Negurnann remarked, living systems (contrary to mechanical 
ones) have a degree of reliability that is higher than that of each of their 
components. This is be possible because those systems (and human beings to 
the utmost degree) have the advantage of being able to use uncertainty, 
chance, risk, even conflict and breakdown, in a productive way77. They would 
be capable of this ability and would need to be to survive in an extremely 
complex environment. Needless to say this productive use of uncertainty, etc., 
seems to be a central characteristic of social entities. 
Morin (1984: 431) considers animal and traditional or archaic 
societies as complex systems because in his view they have a strong hierarchy 
and their components have a strong and rigid specialization. In Bernstein's 
terms they would be systems with a strong classification and framing (1971a). 
Those systems would sieve any information coming from outside the system in 
such a way that they would reject as 'noise' the information incompatible with 
the system's fixed program. They would be systems in which the individuals 
usually understand their own behaviour in terms of fixed rules whose 
existence they tend to accept as given, without questioning. 
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On the other hand, Morin considers the human brain and —in some 
aspects— modern societies, as partially hypercomplex systems. Those systems 
would utilize randomness to enhance their informational structure. 
Hypercomplex systems would use chance, noise, uncertainty, conflict, as 
sources of (new) information, evolution and self-transformation. It would be 
unwise to try and establish clear cut boundaries for such systems, or to predict 
their behaviour as a consequence of their past. Hypercomplexity is imprecise 
(a problem that 'fuzzy set theory' is trying to face, L. Zadeh, 1971), partially 
disorganized, and constantly furthers change. 
Morin's ideas seem to imply that the possibilities of changes in the 
Weltanschauung of human individuals —including the self-perception of them 
as social agents— would be expanded in a hypercomplex society. As a result 
changes occurring in social structures would have the opportunity to be 
visualized in different ways, and hence those structures would be much less 
stable than in the case of strongly framed systems (more exactly: they would 
develop a more complex, dynamic form of stability). Arguably, to understand 
hypercomplexity we would have to stretch Bernstein's notions of weak/strong 
classification/frame to its limits. The specific characteristic of today's 
hypercomplex societies appears to be the existence of contexts which, 
although strong, are at the same time dynamic. In modern societies change, at 
least some sort of change, economic development for instance, would be 
strongly framed. 
2.10. Parts and totalities. 
"The nature of the parts or components of a mechanical system are 
typically, relatively simple in their own structure, stable and not appre-
ciably or permanently affected by being part of the system. By contrast, as 
we proceed up through the organic and sociocultural levels the components 
that are interrelated become more complex in their own organization, more 
and more unstable (more easily subject to change by small forces), and 
more fundamentally alterable by the working of the system of which they 
are a part. These features, of course, are all prerequisite to the very 
development of higher levels of organization" (Buckley, 1967: 46). 
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Luhmann like Buckley, Morin and others, has tried to apply the idea 
of complexity to the field of social theory. He proposes the following defini-
tion of complex systems: 
"Systems can be designated as complex when they are so large that they 
cannot anymore link every element with every other one" (Luhmann 1981: 
97). 
However, as I have tried to show, complexity is not simply a question 
of systems composed of a large number of elements78. Luhmann himself, 
points to other factors underlying the phenomenon of complexity (N. Luhmann 
1984: 107). 
The crux of the argument is that the relations between the elements of 
a complex system are not mechanical, they are not merely a result of the 
intrinsic, independent properties of those elements. Hence according to the 
line of argument I have built up, a complex system cannot be comprehended 
by means of an atomistic approach looking at the elements one by one. 
Besides, as Atlan (1981: 186) suggests, 
"... a system appears complex when we do not know how to specify it 
completely although we know enough about it to call it a system". 
When we face a complex system 'we feel' its systemic reality although 
we cannot pinpoint the particular processes through which that reality is 
actualized79. The system as a whole would not reducible to the sum of the 
parts we can visualize (Heylighen 1991). 
According to the conceptual framework so far put forward, in many 
complex systems —among them living beings and social entities— the 
complexity of the system would arise from the phenomenon of reflectivity. 
Consider a multicellular organism: it would have a reflective structure, in the 
sense that each of its basic components (each cell) mirrors, in a way, the whole 
organism to which it belongs, because each cell possesses the genome which 
represents the blueprint capable of guiding the building of that whole 
organism. As a consequence, multicellular living beings many plants and some 
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animals can reproduce themselves as totalities from their parts: a cutting of a 
plant can generate the whole plant. In this sense, it could be argued that 
multicellular organisms are holographic realities". They would be reflective 
systems constituted by the interplay between units (the cells) which have 
'images' of the systems as a whole, and which could concurrently produce such 
systems through those images. 
Social entities, as argued, would also be reflective systems. In this 
case the basic units (the individuals) consciously reflect, in an idiosyncratic 
way, (a version of) the whole system to which they belong, and would 
concurrently constitute that system through (inter)actions performed on the 
basis of their individual images of it. 
The impossibility of attempting to apply an analytical approach to 
those systems would not originate in the fact that they are very 'complicated' 
(because of the number of elements, or the complication of their relations 
(Lofgren, L. 1977), but in the fact that they would embody a more intractable 
form of complexity: the reflective organization that would be characteristic of 
those systems. 
Human societies could be complex systems in that definite sense; they 
would be social systems which, as argued, would be constituted by other 
social systems: the individuals making up those societies. From the point of 
view assumed as a working hypothesis in these pages, and which will be 
developed in the next Chapter (see Section 3.5), social individuals would be 
social systems; they would be social systems that would mirror the social 
system which includes them. Of course they are a part of that system; but each 
of them would reflect in a peculiar way, that whole system. It can even be 
argued that such a system would only exist as the collection of all its 
individual reflections (P. Navarro 1991). When we view society from that 
perspective, it appears as a holographic domain: each element belonging to 
the totality would mirror and constitute that totality through its reflection of it 
(Morin, 1986: 101-108). As a consequence any such totality would have no 
clear cut limits: each individual would determine those limits in an idio-
syncratic way. It would be this fuzzy condition of social entities which is the 
factor that would enhances their outstanding plasticity. 
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When assuming this outlook, it can be argued that the evolution of a 
social totality would depend on the concurrent evolution of its mirroring parts 
(basically, the individuals composing it). Each social actor would struggle to 
impose her own perspective about what social reality is, and this struggle in 
which all social agents are involved, would determine the shape of that reality, 
which in turn, as suggested, would be the collection of all those individual per-
spectives. In that sense, it could be argued that the basic and most important 
kind of social phenomena are social individuals81. To understand the 
psychosocial organization of social individuals would mean to understand the 
society which they make up, because that society would be a reality emerging 
from the concurrence between those individual organizations. If this outlook 
would be shown as correct and if the parts could be effectively viewed as 
reflecting the totality, and this could be consistently conceived of as emerging 
from the concurrent activity of those parts, then social theory would be in a 
position to bridge the gap between the micro and the macro levels of analysis. 
R.F. Geyer and J. van der Zouwen (1978: 2) focus on that issue, arguing that: 
"Modern cybernetics makes it possible to bridge what one might call the 
'micromacro gap' the gap in social science thinking between the individual 
and society, between freedom and determinism, between 'anaskopic' 
explanations of society, departing from the activities of individuals 
conceived as goalseeking, 	 regulating systems and 'kataskopic' 
explanations, which view society 'from the top down' and see individuals 
as subservient to system level criteria for system stability." 
The consideration of social individuals as organizationally closed, 
informationally open (productive, not only reproductive), purposefully open, 
and other/reflective systems, will constitute the hypothetical conceptual frame-
work upon which I shall formulate the basic notion of a self-perception 
system. This heuristic notion will provide the theoretic basis of this disserta-
tion. Because of its fundamental role in it, I shall elaborate the concept of self-
perception system' at length in the following chapter. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
Zeleny (1980: 31-39) outlines a historical review of the use of the notion of system in social 
sciences from the XVIII century to the first quarter of this century. 
Buckley (1967: 8-36) also reviews the use of the concept of system from the XVII century 
on, considering the mechanical, organic and process models of system. 
2 R. K. Merton (1968, chap. 3) has outlined the fundamental postulates of the functionalist 
approach in relation to the understanding society as a functioning unity. 
3 Organic or organismic analogies would not be the same as biological analogies in general. 
An organic analogy is just one kind of biological analogy, the one that would assume the 
model of the living being typical of nineteen century biology (Taton Historia Natural de las 
Ciencias, Vol. 3: 546-549) Contemporary biology views the living being not just as a set of 
interconnected organs, but in a much more complex, deep way (molecular biology, 
neuroscience, etc., see H. Atlan, 1979). 
4 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown realizes that morphogenesis —what he calls 'development'— poses a 
problem, but he refers that problem to what he calls 'historical explanation', which would be 
distinct, although complementary, to the 'functional explanation'. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, 
1952: chap. 9. 
"regrettably small number of social scientists have approached the sociocultural system 
from the moderns systems perspective to any serious extent" Buckley 1974: 383. 
6 In fact the public introduction of Artificial Life took place in a first conference in 1987. 
Langthon, Ch. (ed.) (1989) Artificial Life I. Proceedings of the First Conference on Artificial 
Life. Los Alamos, September, 1987. Addison-Wesley. 
7 The objectivistic view would be based on the principle of objectivity as stated by von 
Foerster: 
"Objectivity: the properties of the observer shall not enter in the description of his 
observations. 
Post-objectivity: the description of observations shall reveal the properties of the 
observer" 1981: xvi. 
This objectivistic point of view is called by G. Pask 'classical' and he defines it as: 
"Most scientific writing, even in behavioural science, takes it for granted that an 
observer can, in principle, act as a numinous and unbiassed entity called an external observer. 
This point of view is embeded in part but not all of system theory. 
An external observer may make measurements, to determine the state of an observed 
system for example. Should he partition the system (for instance, into a 'black box' (Ashby, 
1964c) called an organism and other 'black box' called its environment) he comes, by dint of 
observation or auxiliary data, to entertain detailed hypotheses... 
The detailed hypothesis ultimately arrived at are causal. The organism and the 
environment are conceived as certain kinds of machine. The observer believes, with certainty 




Moreover, the external observer is causally related to the system under observation; 
he necessarily conceives it impersonally and refers and refers to it as it. One useful 
consequence of this fact is that he can consistently entertain the notion that the system has, in 
principle, a state and that one, and only one, state occurs at once. The state transitions are 
ordered, and this order is interpreted as temporal ordering and can be determined by an 
observational clock. Its internal clock may be synchronised with this clock in principle at 
least, in the following sense: any process serially executed or not is equivalent to a serial 
model within this frame of reference. 
As part and parcel of the same issue, only the external observer is allowed to make 
distinctions and to engage in certain other operations which are noted below. The distinction 
between organism and environment, for example, is of his making; the •organism is deemed 
incapable of such an activity. If an event of this kind occurred in would either remain 
unobserved or be blamed upon a chance process" 1975: 81-82. 
8 The 'relativistic' and 'reflective' paradigms of non-classical cybernetics is developed by G. 
Pask as follows: 
"In a reflective theory, the external observer's special position is lost; with minor 
caveats he becomes a participant. Further, any reflective theory is prone to paradoxical 
situations engendered by the possibility of self reference. In general, such a theory does not 
tally with a classical theory; though in special but important cases it does so. 
A relativistic theory/model/experimental method is necessary in so far as the 
organism (more plausibly, the subject) engages in activities such as exploration, attention 
direction or non-trivial learning in which he exerts control over his environment and 
consequently changes the universe (either real or modelled) in which he operates... If the 
subject is designated to act in this manner and it is desired to study the phenomena (learning 
or exploration) that cause the trouble, then a classical model is inapplicable. In order to 
achieve closure at all, the subject's excursions must be compensates and founded within a 
(larger) universe...Under these circumstrances, the constancy required for any kind of external 
observation is maintained by a compensating regulator and the 'constant condition' is a 
dynamic but stable interaction between the subject and the regulator.... 
Instead of regarding the subject as a system (such as a system in classical physics), 
with input and output it would be possible to regard him (now him quite seriously though) as 
a unit of interpretation, a symbolic structure... 
Whenever the external observer's position is abraded, the theory and the methods and 
models associated with it, becomes reflective. G. Pask, 1975: 83-96. 
9 See Luhmann [1984] (1990); Izuzquiza (1990); Dupuy (1983, 1986, 1990, 1991). 
10 See Morin's notion of the social system as a natural generatif/phinomenal system which 
evolves from basic genostructures to culture and even to the formation of a nation (Morin 
1984:101-118 and 129-138). From a different perspective see Luhmann's analysis of social 
differentiation and his study of what he calls social subsystems: economy, law, politics, 
science, religion, education, etc. (Izuzquiza, 1990: 281-309). 
11  Von Foerster (1981:4) defines a self-organizing system as the system which "is in close 
contact with an environment, which possesses available energy and order, and with which 
our system is in a state of perpetual interaction, such that it somehow manages to 'live' on the 
expenses of this environment". 
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12In his paper "Society as a complex adaptive system" (1974:497) Buckley argues: "The unit 
of dynamic analysis thus becomes the matrix of interacting, goal-seeking, deciding individuals 
and subgroups... seen in this light society becomes a continuous morphogenic process, 
through which we must come to understand in an unified conceptual manner the development 
of structures, their maintenance and their change". 
13 "The word 'Cybernetics' was first used by Ampere as the title of a sociological study. It is 
derived from the Greek word for steersman". Pask 1981: 15. 
14 Walras considered that the consumption activities, business and factories cannot be 
understood isolated one from the others, neither can be contemplated apart from the whole 
economic activity. Barber, 1974: 186-191. 
15 Many authors who do not belong to the systemic tradition, can be interpreted in a systemic 
light. For instance, G.H. Mead. Although this author did not formulate his own work in a 
systemic framework, Buckley refers to him in the following terms: "For Mead and his 
associates, the entity 'society' come to be seen clearly as an open, ongoing transactional system 
of interacting, interpreting and deciding individuals. Such a position... is congenial to the 
modern systems view". (Buckley, 1974: 384). 
16 In this respect Parsons seems to be under the influence, as Almaraz (1981:417-430) points 
out, of the unifying outlook of Bertalanffy's 'General Systems Theory'. 
17 "The relation between presence and absence of a feature, as experienced by the actor, may 
be called a distinction between the two situations... The difference between a closed, hence 
invariant, distinction and a variable distinction may be illustrated in the following way: 
consider a wall on the surface of the earth. Standing near the wall there seems to be a clear 
distinction between "this side" and "the other side" of the wall. However, if you follow the wall 
until the place were it ends, you will be able to walk to the other side without having to cross 
it. Hence the distinction is only local, relative or subjective, depending on the position from 
were you look at the wall. On the other hand, if the wall form an uninterrupted, closed figure, 
e.g. a square or a circle, it would not have an ending, and you would follow the wall 
indefinitely without finding an opening to the other side. In this case the distinction between 
"this side" and "the other side" would be absolute or invariant. Hence "closing" a system can 
be seen as filling the gaps by adding the "missing elements". Heylighen 1991: 43, 50-51. See 
also Spencer Brown G. (1969): Goguen, J.A. and Varela, F.J. (1979). 
18 "The closure of a system can be defined as the internal invariance of a distinction (or 
distinction system) defining the system... Internal invariance means that the distinction is 
mapped upon itself during the application of transformations inherent in the system. Such a 
"transformation" is merely a different word for a subsystem, since each (sub)system can be 
viewed as a relation transforming input into output... The closure of an assembly of 
subsystems then signifies that the subsystems are connected (through their input and output) in 
such a way that some overall order structure or organization may be distinguished, which is 
invariant under the dynamical processes by the interaction between the subsystems. Un 
example of such an organization is that of an algebraic group... Whatever the dynamics of the 
system activating one transformation after another one, the resulting changes will always 
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remain "within the system''. A so-called second order change (cfr. Watzlawick et al.,1974), 
"jumping out of the system'", is only possible if the group structure is broken up". Heylighen 
F. 1991:49. "Classical representation may thus be characterized as maximally invariant 
distinction systems. This entalils all the typical features of classical mechanistic theories: 
determinism, reversibility, causality, absolute space and time, Boolean logic, perfect 
rationality... Al phenomena were something qualitatively new emerges, e.g. thermodynamical 
self-organization, biological evolution, most cognitive processes, socio-cultural evolutions... , 
can be characterized by differenciation, i.e. the creation of new distinctions. Such phenomena 
simply cannot be represented within a classical theory". Ibid.:45-46. According to Heylighen, 
classical mechanics, for example, would assume a classical, distinctionally closed, descriptive 
framework. 
The idea of a system as distinctionally closed/open, should not be confused with the notion 
of a system as closed/open. The first idea considers the system from an epistemological point 
of view. It refers to the constitution of the (conceptual) elements composing the system. The 
second notion refers to the way in which the system relates to its environment: 
"Most organic systems are open, meaning that they exchange materials, energies, or 
information with their environments. A system is closed if there is not import or export of 
energies in any of its forms such as information, heat, physical materials, etc., and therefore 
no change of components. Mackay, 1967. 
19 " we are dealing with a system of interlinked components that can only be defined in 
terms of the interrelations of each of them in an ongoing developmental process that generates 
emergent phenomena —including those we refer to as institutional structure." Buckley, 1967: 
125 
20 From G. Spencer-Brown's seminal notion of distinction (see section 2.3 below), the notion 
of distinitionally closed system has been developed by H. Maturana 1981: 31-32, H. Von 
Foerster (1981); G. Pask (1976) and F. Heylighen, among others. 
21  The origin of this type of fixed, instrumental truth is described by Popper in Conjectures 
and Refutations, Chap.3 (1968). 
22 As Buckley (1974: 497) argues: "Much of modem sociology has analyzed society in terms 
of largely structural concepts: institutions, culture, norms, roles, groups, etc. These are often 
reified, and make for a rather static, overly deterministic, and elliptical view of societal 
workings". 
23 The 'structural functionalist outlook' (from Durkheim, 1895, to Levi-Strauss, 1957, 
including names such as Radcliff-Brawn, 1952, and Malinosky, 1927) originated and 
developed mainly in the context of the study of primitive cultures. These cultures, in general, 
appear to the anthropologist as nonhistoric, and are usually analyzed from a strictly 
synchronic point of view.  
24 When he refers to what he calls "synchronic linguistics", see Sausure 1916, Chapter III. 
25 This author also views language as a functional system, but stresses the relationship 
between the dyachromc and synchronic aspects of such a system: "The conception of language 
as a functional system must also take into account the study of the past states of language... It 
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is not possible to establish impervious barriers between the synchronic and diachronic 
methods, as the school of Geneva has tried to do". Quoted by G. Mounin, 1972, Spanish 
version, 1976: 151. 
26 See Buckley (1974:383) above. 
27 Von Foerster, 1980: 102-105; 1991:65; G. Pask, 1975, 1976, 1981; Maturana and Varela 
1980:107-111; Winograd and Flores, 1987;...) 
28 Geyer and van der Zouwen (1990:7) explaining the notion of self-referencing say: "One of 
the main characteristics of social systems, distinguishing it from many other systems, is their 
potential for self-referentiality. This means that the knowledge accumulated by the system 
itself about itself, in turn affects the structure and operation of that system". 
About society as a reflective system see also Chapter 5 of Lamo de Espinosa's La sociedad 
reflexiva. 
29"... a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with separate sides so that a point on 
one side cannot reach the other without crossing the boundary. For example, in a plane space 
a circle draws a distinction...There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no 
motive unless contents are seen to differ in value." Spencer Brown, 1969: 1. 
30 "I propose to continue the use of the term "self-organizing system", whilst being aware of 
the fact that this term becomes meaningless, unless the system is in close contact with an 
environment, which posseses available energy and order, and with which our system is in a 
state of perpetual interaction, such that it somehow manages to "live" on the expenses of this 
environment" Von Foerster, 1981: 4. 
31  "The notion of organizationally closed and autopoietic systems has been invented more or 
less independently and in various context, though the term itself and its careful application to 
living systems is due to Maturana and Varela. For example, much of von Newmann's work on 
reproductive automata and the content of the early Macey Foundation meetings on cybernetics 
refer to similar constructs. So, on serious examination, does von Foerster's first enunciation of 
"Self Organization" in 1958, as does McCulloch's notion, "Redundancy of Potential Com-
mand". Much the same is true of work in other disciplines, including that of Wiener and Svob-
oda in mathematical cybernetics, Herbs in logic, Bateson and Mead in social anthropology, 
Waddington, Tyler Bonner, and others in embryology and genetics, Wynne Edwards in 
ethology, Ackoff and Beer in operational research, and numerous cosmologists and theoretical 
physicists. The list is enormous, because this quite basic reappraisal of what systems are and 
what stability is reflects a very fundamental change in thinking. Only in recent years, however, 
has there been either the language required to express the pertinent notions or a sufficiently 
large body of shared concepts to render these notions communicable and generally 
intelligible." G.Pask 1981: 265. 
32 "In 1973 Francisco Varela and I proposed that this organization of living systems is one of 
strict self-reproduction,... and, after making it fully explicit, we called it the autopoietic 
organization, choosing a word without history so that it could be used exclusively to refer to 
the definitory organization of living systems. 
Autopoiesis (autos = self; and poiein = to produce)". Maturana, (1980: 52). 
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Varela (1979: 13) proposes a more detailed definition of an autopoietic living 
machine: 
"An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components that produce the components that: 
(1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the 
network of processes (relations) that produces them; and (2) constitute it (the machine) as a 
concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its 
realization as such a network". 
33 "The idea of permanent autoreorganization as presented by Atlan (1972) is central in 
clearing the way for the idea of autoorganization and the idea of autopoiesis" Morin, 1981: 
129. 
34 See von Foerster definition of 'self-organizing system' in note 11 of this Chapter. 
35 In other words they would be capable of organizational adaptation. We consider here 
'adaptation' in Maturana's terms: "adaptation is a universal phenomenon that takes places 
whenever a composite unity undergoes recurrent interactions with structural change but 
without loss of organization". H. Maturana, 1981: 29. 
Maturana and Varela (1980: 137-138) define the concepts of organization and structure as 
follows: 
Organization: the relations that define a system as a unity, and determine the dynamics of 
interaction and transformations which it may undergo as such a unity, constitute the 
organization of the system. 
Structure: the actual relations which hold between the components which integrate a 
concrete machine in a given space. 
Zeleny's definitions of these two concepts are perhaps clearer: 
Organization. A complex of relationships among components and component-producing 
processes that must remain invariant in order to constitute a unity distinguishable within its 
unity class. 
Structure. A particular spatiotemporal arrangement of particular components through the 
underlying organization is realized in a given space and at a given point in time. Zeleny, 1981: 
5. 
36 "These systems which generate their own causality cannot be causally explained any 
longer... they presuppose themselves as production of their self-production". N. Luhmann 
(1984) 1990: 107. Apparently Luhmann means that these systems cannot be explained by any 
sort of external, deterministic causation. 
37 The Greek word 'autonomous' literally means self-law, in the sense of living under one's 
own laws. See Luhmann's quotation above. 
38 SchrOdinger (1945) understands that closed systems tend to increase in entropy; whereas 
open systems are 'negentropic' (tending to decrease in entropy) or to elaborate a structure. 
39 'Structural coupling' in the sense given to that expression by Maturana and Varela. In 
Autopoiesis and Cognition, they give a short definition: 
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"Coupling (of unities): whenever the conduct of two or more unities is such that the conduct 
of each one is a function of the conduct of the others." pp. 136. 
In "Autopoiesis: Reproduction, Heredity and Evolution", Maturana develops the concept of 
'structural coupling' in more detail: 
"In fact, phylogenic adaptation is not the result of selection in a phylogeny, but, on the con-
trary, every particular lineage in a phylogeny is the result of selection in a field of adaptations 
recursively produced through the sequential generation of historically coupled unities. This 
condition of phylogenic adaptations I prefer to call phylogenic structural coupling. This 
expression makes a direct reference to the phenomenon of operational structural 
complementarity with the medium. This fact determines whether a particular unity participates 
or not in the continuation of a genetic lineage, as well as the resulting recurrent selection of 
such a structural complementarity that a phylogeny entails. Viewed in this historic perspec-
tive, a genetic lineage appears to an observer as a succession of unities of the same class that 
exhibit sequentially changing structures with respect to some original reference, under the 
conditions of invariant structural coupling with the medium in which they were successively 
realized as sources for the next generation. This process of historical structural change 
through continuous structural coupling with a medium is, I think, the essence of the 
phenomenon of evolution" H. Maturana, 1980: 69. 
40 See the notion of'structural plasticity' in note 30. 
41  Here 'rigid constrains' means 'instructive constrain', in the sense given to that expression by 
Varela. 
42 There are simple forms of apparent 'purposeful activity' (activity guided by an aim) that 
are characteristic of organizationally open systems. For example, the 'aim' of a pendulum 
would be finally to stop in a vertical position. The 'aim' of those systems would be just the 
stabilization of their dynamics. I am referring to purposeful activities of a more complex kind 
which would not end in an ultimate fixed state, but would allow the system to continue their 
own dynamics, perhaps in a new form. See Gleik, J. (1987). 
43 The words 'action' and 'agent' will be used exclusively to refer to human action and to 
human agency. Animals are also, in a way, 'action systems' but they are not agents in the 
proper human sense, and their 'actions' are very different from human actions. 
44 Luhmann, holds the view that the ultimate elements of social systems are actions (1978: 
100). Although he also argues that "It is generally accepted that only the actor can constitute 
the unity of an action" (1978: 109). 
45 The concept of reflectivity will be explained later in section 2.7 of this Chapter. 
46 "Evidence provided by Wimmer and Hartl, 1991, and Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner, 1988, 
(shows) that children do not find it easier to attribute mental states to themselves than to oth-
ers", Leekam, S., 1993: 32. 
47 See the concept of'structural coupling in note 38 of this Chapter. 
48 'Adaptation', in the sense given to this term in note 35 of this Chapter. 
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49 "Is a program part of the computer or part of the operator? Today computer users tend to 
act as if the program were part of the computer, not least because virtually all modem 
computers have some sets of instructions (including language compilers) built into them...The 
program -the software causes the computer to carry out the programmer's instructions in a set 
sequence. The writer of the program may not be aware in what order the machine will actually 
implement his or her instructions... Nevertheless the computer can only act according to the 
rules spelled out by the programmer, whether or not the programmer can predict how the 
program will run". G. Pask, & S. Curran 1982:13-14. 
50 This substantializing outlook was explicitly adopted by Durkheim. Among today's social 
theorists, Luhmann has formulated this view: "Society is composed of communications... 
Obviously society presupposes men and human actions, but they are not part of society... men 
never are a part of society, they belong to its environment". I. Izuzquiza, 1990:12. 
51  "A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in 
which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the 
actual (inductive) acting of behaving in this domain" Maturana, H. 1970: 13. 
The peculiar domain of interactions of human beings is made up by other human 
beings with whom they have to coordinate their actions through meaningful exchanges. 
"If one person's utterance is not intelligible to others, or if its interpretation by the 
listener is not consistent with the actions the speaker anticipates, there will be a break down. 
This break down... results in the loss of mutual trust in commitment... The need for continued 
mutual recognition of commitment plays the role analogous to the demands of autopoiesis in 
selecting among possible sequences of behaviour". Winograd, T. and Flores, F. 1987: 62-63. 
52 "A 'perturbation' is simply what changes, moves a system from a state to another" Ashby, 
1956: 110 (page number of the Spanish 1976 edition). 
53 The notion of 'informationally open systems' is used here in Petri's sense. See Reisig W. 
(1982); Rozenberg G.(ed) (1982). Gordon Pask (1990: 5), explains the meaning of this notion 
when describing the characteristics of what he calls 'organizationally closed and 
informationally open systems': "(I am) using the term 'information' in, roughly, the sense of 
Carl Adam Petri, to mean the becoming of a coupling between otherwise independent systems, 
or equisignificantly, the becoming of a synchronization between hitherto asynchronous 
systems". 
54 Any environment —unless it is an absolute vacuum, which would not be properly speaking 
an environment—, influences the system which it surrounds. This influence has the form of 
some kind of mater/energy flow impinging upon that system and perturbing it. 
.5  R. Thom argues that a subject is an 'octant' who remains (survives) identical after passing 
through a catastrophe (1977: 295). 
56 "To use the word information in its more original etymological sense of in-formare, to 
form within... We can define in-formation as the admissible symbolic descriptions of the 
cognitive domains of an autonomous system. F. Varela, 1979: 266. 
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57 Because they would be, as argued in Section 2.2, distinctionally open systems. 
58 "The maintenance of identity and the invariance of defining relations in the living unities 
are at the base of all possible ontogenic and evolutionary transformation in biological 
systems". Varela, 1979:5. 
59 "The order-from-noise principle (von Foerster) and its later development as a principle of 
information or complexity from noise (Atlan) have helped us to understand in the language of 
and without contradicting the Shannon theory how information can be created. It has further 
been used as a basis for a theory of self-organization". Atlan, H. 1981: 185. 
60 "We shall treat (define) information as that kind of resource wich is used to resolve 
conflicts." Petri, C., 1980: 9. 
61  "Languages can be divided in natural (called sometimes ordinary) and artificial. Natural 
languages are the ones produced in the course of psychological and historical evolution; 
samples of such languages are Coptic, Greek, Spanish. Artificial languages are the ones built 
following some formal rules; samples of such languages are logic and mathematics." Ferrater 
Mora, 1979, Vol. 3: 1941. 
For a more detailed definition of 'natural language' see also Dunlop E.M. and Fetzer, 
J.H. 1993: 88-89. 
62 In 1956 B. Bernstein realized an experiment looking for the structure of latent meanings in 
a conversation or in a piece of writing and he concluded that "The space between lines was the 
listener or the reader's space out of which he created a unique, unspoken, personal meaning" 
(1971) 1974: 6. 
63  G. Pask argues that meaning supposes an agreement between two or more participants to 
share an understanding: "The participants who agree have been able to interpret a relation... in 
some world... and they agree that these interpretations (of the relation) are the same, or are 
within tolerance" (1976: 150). 
64 "To perceive or recognize a book (or anything else) is to find something in one's 
experimental field that fits one's concept of 'book'. It does not mean that a 'real' or 'ontic' 
object that is a book has to be there before one has seen it as a book". Von Glaserfeld 1991: 
17-18. 
65"Notions of reflexivity and self-reference that turn on themselves, that need themselves to 
come to into being, that preserve the tie between observer and observed, speaker and speech, 
and partners in dialogue are now at the core of at least five branches of science and 
philosophy. They are in biology 'autopoiesis' (Varela et al., 1974); in mathematics 'Eigen-
values', Eigen-behaviour' (von Foerster, 1976) and 'attractors' (Abraham and Show, 1981); in 
logic a 'calculus of self-reference' (Varela, 1975); in linguistics 'performance utterances' 
(Austin, 1961); in epistemology 'reality as (social) construct' (Watzlawick, 1984)" H. von 
Foerster 1991: 66. 
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66 Many animal societies establish their boundary as such societies by means of that ability to 
recognize 'self and 'other'. For instance, the rats belonging to a colony can detect, foreign rats 
to which they attack, through smell. 
67  F. Steir applying this idea of mutually constructed images (self-image or others-image) to 
social research calls the subjects of his researches 'reciprocators': "to call those who 
participate with me reciprocators, for it is only by hearing me and answering me that a 'me' 
can emerge as an I who does research" (Steir, 1991: 165). 
68  "Auto-reflection, that is, the ability to split the being in two, to consider oneself subject and 
object at the same time". E. Morin 1981: 135. 
69 See also Lamo de Espinosa, 1991. 
70 By 'genuine social phenomena' I understand those which involve some aspects of the 
subjectivity of a specific human group. For instance the distribution of blood groups among a 
given population would not be a genuine social phenomenon in that sense, whereas the 
attitudes as consumers of the individuals belonging to that population would be a genuine 
social phenomenon. 
71  "The first cut, the most elementary distinction we can make, maybe the intuitively 
satisfactory cut between oneself qua experiencing subject on the one side, and one's 
experience on the other. But this cut can under no circumstances be a cut between oneself and 
an independently existing world of objective objects." Varela, 1979: 275. 
72"The new, demanding requirements of coordination, anticipation, expectation and the like 
within an increasingly complex social environment of interacting and interdependent others 
—where the genetic mappings were absent or inadequate— prompted the fairly rapid 
elaboration of relatively new features in the social system. These include, of course: 1) the 
ever-greater conventionalizing of gestures into true symbols; 2) the development of a "self', 
self-awareness, or self-consciousness out of the symbolically mediated, continuous mirroring 
and mapping of each person's own behaviours and gestures in those ever-present others (a 
process well described by John Dewey, G.H. Mead, Cooley, and others); and 3) the resulting 
ability to deal in the present with the predicted future as well as the past and hence to manifest 
conscious goal seeking, evaluating, self-other relating, norm referring behaviour." Buckley, 
1967: 65. 
73 "Information in its most general sense is seen, not as a thing that can be transported, but 
as a selective interrelation or mapping between two or more subsets of constrained variety 
selected from large ensembles". W. Buckley, 1974:509. 
74  Marx wrote about the fetishism of the merchandise, which is somewhat analogous to that 
fetishism of information. El Capital, Libro I,: 36-48 (Spanish edition, Mexico, F.C.E, 1971). 
75 "A concept is an abstract or general idea that we use to organize our thoughts and 
experiences... but there are other aspects of a concept that are worth stressing. First, a concept 
is possessed by an individual. The words we use to designate concepts are common to many 
individuals but the content of each person's concept is unique. Our concept of a factory will 
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not be the same as your concept of a factory, though our concepts have enough in common to 
make it possible for us to discuss factories without confusion. Second, most of our concepts 
are in flux, we develop and adapt them as we go along. We try to form them into a reasonable 
ordered hierarchy of ideas and experiences, and in general we adopt a pragmatic attitude to 
overlaps. Third, we build elaborate concepts out of simple concepts, although not necessarily 
by the same route. 'Factory' to you might primarily mean 'building', 'product', 'process' and 
'manager', while to us it might conjure up 'product', 'assemble line', manager' and 'building'. 
We both arrive at the same concept by different route, and use slightly different building 
blocks." G. Pask, 1982: 72. 
76 See also Woodcock A. & M. Davies, 1978. 
77 Gordon Pask stresses the importance of conflict and conflict-resolution in the self-
organizing processes that are characteristic of complex systems: "What do we mean by con-
flict? Basically that two or more time sequences of computation which may have been 
proceeding in parallel interact. Instead of remaining parallel and (by the definition of parallel) 
separate, they converge in a head-on collision from which there is no logical-deductive 
retreat... One way of considering the human mind is to say that it works in a way that opens 
up the possibility both of conflict and conflict resolution... What do we need in order to 
resolve the conflict between two interacting patterns? A model of the two patterns and their 
behaviour, an external perspective on their interaction... Independent computers are capable of 
creating and to some extent resolving conflict when they are arrange so that they interact with 
each other... A population of computers would be self-organizing in a way that increased both 
the amount of conflict and the amount of conflict resolution. And to continue to be self-
organizing the population would have to generate or capture additional units equipped with 
different, conflict-promoting programs." G. Pask, 1984: 62 and passim. 
78 "The notion of systems complexity does not only mean that the system relates an extremely 
large number of unities", E. Morin, 1984: 429. 
79 "... as we move towards the human and society level a curious thing happens: the fact that 
we have, as it were, an inside track, and that we ourselves are the systems which we are 
studying, enables us to utilize systems we do not really understand", Boulding, 1974: 9. 
80n-he generalized holographic principle that we are going to formulate here... is perhaps a 
key cosmological principle. Anyway, it concerns the complexity of living organization, the 
complexity of brain organization and socio-anthropological complexity. It may be worded like 
this: the whole is, in a way, included (engrammed) within the part, which is included 
within the whole. The complex organization of the whole requires the inscription (engram) of 
the whole (hologram) in each of the its singular parts; thus, the complexity of the organization 
of the whole requires the organizational complexity of the parts, and this recursively requires 
the organizational complexity of the whole. The parts have each one their singularity, but they 
are not, as a result, mere elements or fragments of the whole; they are, at the same time virtual 
micro-wholes". E. Morin, 1986: 101-102 (my own translation). 
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 This is in a nutshell the essence of autopoiesis when applied to social understanding. As 
Zeleny synthesizes: "Autopoiesis is... a paradigm in the process of becoming. Many of its 
implications are still difficult to grasp, some of its assertions are still tentative and possibly 
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incorrect. Much theoretical and experimental work remains to be done. But even if ultimately 
proves incorrect, the alternative paradigms can only strengthen their own acceptability and can 
only benefit from the challenging encounters with autopoiesis. If proven even partially correct, 
our view of the world, of living systems and societies will never be the same". Zeleny, 1980: - 
39. 
Chapter 3 
The Concept of Self-Perception Systems 
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3.0. Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present, as a working hypothesis 
which will be used to interpret the empirical data of this research, the notion of 
the self-perception system. This notion is used to play a heuristic role in order 
to illuminate the referred data, it is based on, and built upon, the concepts put 
forward in the previous chapter. 
First (3.1., 'Some concepts related to the idea of self-perception 
system'), I shall consider a battery of related concepts (Bern's concept of 'self-
perception'; P.R. McCarthy and R.R Schmeck concepts of 'self-concept' and 
'self-esteem', T.B. Rogers, N.A. Kuiper, and W.S. Kirker concept of 'self-
reference', Hazel Markus concept of 'self-schemata' and M. Gecas's idea of 
'self-concept') which deal with different aspects of a person's self-
representation. Then, I shall compare my conceptual model of self-perception 
with other similar concepts, mostly originated in the field of social-
psychology. 
Section 3.2. ('The notion of a self-perception system') will present the 
main features of the concept of 'self-perception system', as it is going to be 
postulated in this research. In section 3.3. ('Self-perception systems as non-
trivial machines') I will try to connect explicitly the notion of self-perception 
system with some cybernetic concepts put forward in the previous chapter. 
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Section 3.4. ('Human consciousness') will characterize self-perception 
systems as conscious sytems. Section 3.5. ('Social individuals as social 
systems') will explain and argue how social individuals can be considered as 
social systems in their own right. Section 3.6. ('Social individuals as 
autonomous social systems') will characterize the autonomous condition of 
social individuals as agents. In section 3.7 ('Self-perception systems and 
norms') I shall discuss the relations between self-perception systems and social 
norms, developing the idea that the latter are not merely internalized, but 
interactively produced by the former. Section 3.8. ('Social individuals as 
producers of novelty and change') will stress, as a consequence of the previous 
conceptual elaboration, the essential creativity of social individuals, which is 
at the base of their social potential for change. 
Sections 3.9. and 3.10. elaborate, on the basis of the notion of self-
perception system previously discussed, some concepts which, in my view, 
appear as necessary in order to apply that notion to empirical research. Section 
3.9. ('Self-perception patterns') defines the idea of the self-perception pattern 
as a concept produced by abstraction from similar individual self-perception 
systems. Section 3.10. ('Self-expression as a way of access to self-perception') 
deals with the problem of how to make self-perception systems empirically 
accessible to the researcher. Specific techniques of 'self-expression' will be the 
answer to this problem. 
3.1. Some concepts related to the idea of self-perception system. 
Notions similar to that of 'self-perception system' abound in psycho-
sociological literature. For instance G.H. Mead's concept of 'the self which has 
already been mentioned. Other defmitions close to the concept of 'self-
perceptioned mention, are Bem's concept of 'self-perceptiong; P.R. McCarthy 
and R.R Schmeck concepts of 'self-concept' and self-esteem'; M. Gecas's own 
notion of 'self-concept'; T.B. Rogers, N.A. Kuiper, and W.S. Kirker concept of 
'self-reference'; and Hazel Markus concept of 'self-schemata'. 
The similarities between the concept of a self-perception system and 
these other notions can be summarized by three important points: (a) the 
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consideration of self-perception (or the other related notions, respectively, 
self-concept, self-reference, self-schemata) as a personal cognitive structure. 
(b) the view that this cognitive structure represents a model which guides the 
person's perception of herself. (c) the contemplation of the self-
perception/concept/reference/ schemata as a specific structure involved in the 
processing, interpretation, evaluation and memory of personal information 
(information about ego as a person). 
G.H. Mead's conception of the 'self is related to the notion of 'the 
generalized other'. Mead is mainly interested in the process of generation of 
the self, and views this process as an outcome of social interaction. Along the 
course of interaction, the form of the self would be shaped by the social 
environment of the individual. 
"the unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure 
of the social. process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of 
which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various 
aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated... the structure 
of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process... the 
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his 
unity of self may be called 'the generalized other" (G.H. Mead, 1934: 
220). 
Mead's notion of the self appears to be conceived as a reality, 
somewhat isomorphic with respect to the individual's social environment (the 
critical word regarding this point would be the term 'reflection', which can be 
interpreted in different ways). Although it seems a rather plausible concept, 
this notion of the self as shaped by its social milieu entails some deep 
problems. On the one hand, a perfect shaping of the self by its social 
environment would imply a perfect match between that self and such an 
environment. But this circumstance would arguably make it impossible for the 
individual to question and change that environment. On the other hand, an 
'imperfect shaping' of the self by the social milieu —and a corresponding 
'imperfect match' of the former with the latter—, would certainly make some 
sort of change possible. But it would also require a careful explanation of the 
sense of such 'imperfection' and the way it works. Would it not be better to 
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substitute, in this respect, the notion of 'match' by that of 'fit' as von Glasersfel 
has suggested? (See von Glasersfeld's note in Chapter 2). From this point of 
view, the relationship between the self and the social milieu would be a 
relationship of 'fit', and not one of 'match', and this milieu would not 'shape', 
but constrain, the internal, self-organizing evolution of the self. 
The concept of self-perception was first used by Daryl J. Bem2 as an 
alternative interpretation of Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1964). 
"Self-perception, an individual's ability to respond differently to his own 
behaviour and its controlling variables, is a product of social interaction". 
Bern, 1967: 184. 
Bern conceives the concept of self-perception in a radically 
behaviourist, experimentalist frame: in his view, self-perception would refer to 
the subjects' capabilities for discriminating their emotional and bodily states. 
Bern stresses the role of 'external clues' in the subjects' interpretation of those 
states. From the point of view that is being taken in these pages, Bem's notion 
of self-perception is far too restricted. Each of us, as a person, perceives 
herself not only through corporal sensations (as having 'butterflies in the 
stomach' —one of Bem's examples), but in a much more complex manner. 
P.R. McCarthy and R.R. Schmeck have recently proposed their 
notions of 'self-concept' and 'self-esteem' in the following terms: 
"the self-concept is the most significant cognitive structure 
organizing an individual's experience, while self-esteem is the most 
influential, affective evaluator of this experience. The self-concept 
organizes all that we think we are, what we think we can do, and how best 
we think we can do it, while self-esteem is the extent to which we are 
pleased by that concept, or feel worthy. (Hamachek, 1978; Wylie, 1974) 
Together, they comprise the self-theory, or model of experience that 
helps us explain our past behavior and predict our future behaviour" 
(McCarthy and Schmeck 1988:131). 
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I shall anticipate that the postulated idea of 'self-perception system' 
would include both the self-concept (cognitive structure) and the self-esteem 
(affective evaluator) components. That is the reason why I use the term 
'perception' (in a wide sense) instead of the more restricted term 'concept'. 
From this point of view, the 'cognitive' (conceptual) network of an individual 
would be organizationally closed through her attitudes, and these attitudes 
would be realized through that cognitive network. Both would be aspects of a 
single organizational closure. This point of view seems plausible when one 
considers some facts of personal experience: concepts appear to develop links 
between them by means of attitudes, and those attitudes usually express 
themselves attached to concepts. For example, a person's concept of a dog 
generally becomes more or less developed (that person can differentiate a 
certain number of breeds, knows the habits of these animals, etc.) depending 
on her attitude towards dogs. If some one loves dogs, most likely her 
knowledge about them will be rather detailed; on the contrary, if she does not 
like them her information about dogs is likely to be pretty shallow. In that way 
any of a person's high level perceptions would include both a cognitive and an 
attitudinal component which translates her affective/emotional link with that 
cognitive component. This linkage can be conceived of as produced and 
reproduced by/within the psycho-social organizational closure of the 
individual as a person, and that underlying organizational closure would 
precisely be what gives sense to a self-perception system and defines its 
characteristics. 
T.B. Rogers et al. (1977;1979), in their presentation of the notion of 
'self-reference', understand the self as: 
"a large and complex prototype that imparts a bias in processing personal 
information... The self is an extremely active and powerful agent in the 
organization of the person's world... the central aspect of self-reference is 
that the self acts as a background or setting against which incoming data 
are interpreted or coded. From this point of view, self-reference is a rich 
and powerful encoding process". (Rogers 1977: 677). 
This outlook is quite close to the postulated idea of 'self-perception 
system'. But the previous still raises some debatable points. First, although the 
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self may be conceived of as 'a large complex prototype', it can be questioned if 
it just 'impart a bias in processing personal information', which is understood 
as information of a person about herself. It can be argued that the self would 
'impart a bias' in processing any kind of high level 'information'. 
(Inter)personal experience seems to indicate that the personality of an 
individual biases practically all her high level representations. For instance, it 
would be difficult to deny that the kind of literature that a person prefers is 
biased by her personality3. 
Markus's (1977) notion of 'self-schemata' seems very similar to 
Rogers' idea of self-reference: 
"Self-schemata are cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from 
past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related 
information contained in an individual's social experience". Markus, 1977: 
63. 
The interesting point seems to be what can be considered as 'self-
related information'. This concept can be interpreted in a restricted sense 
(directly self-related information) or in a broad sense (directly and indirectly 
self-related information). Markus' point of view appears to favour the first 
alternative. 
Gecas discusses the idea of 'self-concept' from the point of view of 
social psychology. In his words, 
"The self-concept is composed by the various attitudes, believes, values 
and experiences, along with their valuative and affective components (such 
as self-evaluation or self-esteem), in terms of which individuals define 
themselves... the self-concept is both a product of social forces, and to a 
large extent, an agent of its own creation. The self-concept is 'a source of 
motivation'. (Gecas, 1985:739-741). 
Gecas distinguishes three kinds of self-motives, put forward in the 
literature of social psychology: (1) Self-enhancement or self-esteem motive; 
(2) Self-efficacy motive; and (3) self-consistency motive. In my view, an 
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important question is the relation between these three kinds of self-motives. It 
can be argued that self-consistency has not only a cognitive character, but it 
would also have an affective, emotional content. In the model of self-
perception systems that I am proposing, the person's organizational closure 
would intertwine cognitive and emotional contents. Self-esteem would be a 
general outcome of that intertwining. 
The relationship between the idea of self-efficacy and the other two 
kinds of motives can also be argued. In Gecas view, 
"the self-efficacy motive refers to the importance of experiencing the self 
as a causal agent, that is, to the motivation to perceive and experience 
oneself as being efficacious, competent and consequential" (V. Gecas, 
1985 :740). 
Hence, on the basis of Gecas argument, a further interpretation of the 
notion of self-efficacy is possible: a person can only act as an agent if she 
believes in her efficacy as an agent. The use in this context of the notion of 
autopiesis (see Chap. 2.3 above) or self-production, can help to clarify the 
idea: an agent can only self-produce her role as such an agent if she believes in 
the efficacy of her action (Varela and Maturana, 1980). 
The differences between the concept of self-perception system which I 
use and those other notions, chiefly arise from the rather restrictive way in 
which all of them conceive of the self. To make possible a proper 
understanding of the social character that, as Mead argues, the self intrinsically 
has possible, it seems necessary to widen this concept considerably. 
In order to make this point clear, I shall introduce a distinction which 
draws on an earlier one introduced in social analysis by Ibanez (1969:168 
passim). This author differentiates between the 'subject of the sentence', and 
the 'subject of the statement': when a person, say Ann, says 'John is wrong', 
Ann is the subject of the statement, but not the subject of the sentence (the 
subject of the sentence is John). On the contrary, when Ann says 'I am wrong', 
Ann is the subject of the sentence as well as the subject of the statement. So 
human beings, as speakers, are subjects in (at least) two senses: as subjects of 
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sentences (as an 'I') and as subjects of statements. When I use the idea of self 
in the first sense, I shall write 'Self (with a capital letter); and when I use the 
idea of self in the second sense I shall write 'self. The Self is an aspect of the 
self: the former refers to one's condition as a person who thinks of herself as of 
an individual person (who takes just herself as the object of her thinking). The 
self is a wider reality: it is one's condition as a person who thinks of any 
reality (who takes any reality as the object of her thinking, including her Self). 
When Ann says 'John is wrong', Ann is expressing her self, but she is 
not expressing her Self. According to this view, the totality of her 
representations as a person (that is to say, as an agent) would belong to her 
self. Whereas the totality of her representations as a person about herself as a 
person, would belong to her Self. Not all of Ann's representations would be 
personal in the latter sense. For instance, Ann's representations about the 
policies of the government would not belong to Ann's Self. But they would 
belong to Ann's personality, to Ann's self (it would be difficult to deny that 
people's representations about policies, moral principles, etc., belong to a part 
of their personalities). 
What is the point in making that distinction between self and Self? 
Such a distinction seems somewhat necessary because self and Self arguably 
define each other; more exactly, in the light of the concept of self-perception 
system which is being postulated, the Self and the (remaining part of the) self 
would produce and reproduce each other as elements of the organizationally 
closed, psycho-social system constituting the individual's personality. In 
simpler, more intuitive terms: the way in which a person understands other 
realities (including other people) determines, in a certain manner, the way in 
which that person understands her Self; and vice versa, the way in which a 
person understand her Self determines, in some way, her understanding of 
other realities (including other people). From this point of view, the 
conceptions of a person about the others and the world at large, belong to her 
personality (they define her quality as a person) as much as her conceptions 
about her Self; it can be argued that one aspect can hardly be understood 
disregarding the other. For example, someone who believes that the world is 
inhabited by countless spirits will attribute many of her actions to the 
irresistible influence of those spirits4. On the contrary, someone who views 
93 
reality in strictly materialist terms will probably detect the influence of 
material (physiological, social, etc.) causes in her actions. 
This conception of the self/Self as a dynamic duality is clearly related 
to Mead's conception of 'the self and 'the generalized other' (G. H. Mead, 
1934). What Mead calls 'the complete self (see G. H. Mead, 1934: 220) would 
be constituted, from the perspective postulated here, by a conflictive process, 
steered by the referred duality self/Self. 
This duality could also help to explain the relationship between Gecas 
three levels of self-motives. The intertwining between those three levels (self-
esteem, self-efficacy, and self-consistency) would not only include a person's 
images of her Self, but also the images of that person's self about the others. 
People's self-esteem seems to be an outcome of the relationship between these 
people's Self-images and their images of the others. For instance an individual, 
say John would probably consider himself rich or poor depending on how 
rich/poor he thinks the others are (those other people to whom he compares). 
In the following section I shall present my conceptual model of the 
notion of a self-perception system. This model, as said before, has a heuristic 
value: it is not the only possible model, but one whose relevance can be tested 
in the light of its interpretive power regarding the empirical data of my 
research. 
3.2. The notion of a self-perception system. 
It can be argued that social individuals have a characteristic outlook 
with which they regard themselves as well as the social reality with which they 
interact. However in the social sciences, as Bernstein among others have 
argued, we do not usually pay much attention to the deep underlying structure 
of that typical individual outlook. 
A key concept to understanding our view of ourselves is the concept 
of 'self (see the quotations of Mead, McCarthy and Shmeck, Markus, and 
Gecas in the previous section). The notion of 'self which has been already 
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presented in several versions, has acquired new dimensions among some other 
recent writers, mainly in the field of cybernetics, as the concept of self-
organization (G. Pask and H. von Foerster) and/or auto-organization (E. Morin 
and J-P. Dupuy) has developed. Using these sources, I am going to argue, as a 
working hypothesis, that the individual's conceptions of the self and of reality 
in general (especially those of the immediate social reality in which the 
individuals act) are coherent structures, produced and reproduced by those 
individuals through their social interactions. "It is impossible to conceive of a 
self arising outside social experience" (G. H. Mead, 1934: 217). But any 
action or interaction of the individual must also have a coherence of its own: 
there is no action without a meaning attached to it (Searle 1983:197-230), but 
any meaning can be conceived of as entailing an underlying, coherent structure 
from which that meaning derives its senses. 
In the previous chapter I suggested that such a coherent structure could 
be conceived of as defined by a condition of organizational closure. In this 
chapter and taking into account the set of concepts presented in Chapter 2, I 
shall put forward, as a working hypothesis worthy to be considered and judged 
in the light of its heuristic value, a conception of social individuals as 
autonomous, self-coherent systems, which have a characteristic inner logic 
because they are organizationally closed systems of a psychosocial, 
conceptual/intentional kind. This hypothetical conception has, as stated 
before, a heuristic content. Heuristic hypothesis and models are not intended 
to be proven, as empirical thesis are. They do not directly relate to empirical 
data. In that sense, and strictly speaking, they are not true or false, but useful 
or useless: they are useful when they further the development of new ways to 
access empirical reality, and the production of specific empirical thesis (which 
are the only ones testable against empirical data). Consequently the usefulness 
of the heuristic model which I am going to develop would have to be judged in 
view of the specific analyses and thesis that I am going to put forward in the 
empirical part of this research. 
However, although a heuristic thesis cannot be proven (unless it is 
converted into an empirical thesis, or a set of them), its plausibility can be 
buttressed. In the following pages I am going to develop my heuristic model 
(the notion of self-perception systems) with this purpose. 
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I shall define a self-perception system as: 
(a) the organizationally closed domain made up of the cognitive and 
motivational schemata6 through which the individual perceives herself and the 
world, and acts in that perceived world. 
These schemata provide the individuals with the instruments by means 
of which they can interpret reality (their own reality and that of the world, 
including the others) in specific situations. However if such schemata were 
independent entities, —something like the memory cells in a computer— the 
individual could possibly act in each specific situation, but arguably they 
would not be able to relate meaningfully their actions in different situations: 
they would not be able to relate those actions between them, nor to themselves 
(Piaget, 1971). Besides, if schemata were independent realities they would not 
interact, and consequently they could hardly be able to produce new schemata 
through that interaction (and individuals apparently produce new schemata all 
through their lives). This is why, from this perspective, schemata must 
constitute and, at the same time, be the products and the producers of an 
organizationally closed network of relationships between them. This self-
productive, self-reproductive, informationally open network, would constitute 
an organizationally closed system, which would provide a condition of 
agential closure for the individuals. This condition would allow them, 
according to the postulated model, to make sense of their actions, coordinating 
them in a complex relation of intertwined purposes. As it was put forward as a 
plausible hypothesis in Chapter 2, the condition of agential closure would 
prevent individuals from getting lost in the middle of their action dynamics; it 
would provide a frame of connected meanings that would make sense of the 
individual's actions. Within this theoretical, heuristic framework, it can be 
argued that we are agents in so far as we can relate any of our actions to a 
wider purpose, and in that way we can make sense of that action (Searle 
1983). But this capability of linking any particular action to other actions and 
ultimately to our basic aims and motives as actors, would be the proof of the 
underlying condition of closure, that would enable us to act as viable agents. 
(b) From the point of view of the model of self-perception systems 
that I am presenting, each individual agent would be an individual self- 
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perception system in the indicated sense. No individual would be able to 
function properly as an agent possessing two completely separate self-
perception systems. A severe lack of integration of the self would imply the 
disorganization of that self (and what is called psychosis)7. Allegedly, an 
individual can have a dissociation of the personality, although this concept has 
been questioned by contemporary psychiatry8. 
The personality of people who are considered to be sane usually has 
different aspects or levels, but these would not function as separate, closed 
systems: they would communicate in some way —for instance, through the 
unconscious— and make up a single agential system. This communication, as 
suggested, can remain unconscious for the individuals' self, and would include 
(and solve) tensions and conflicts. For example, suppose John badly needs to 
behave aggressively, but on the other hand he also needs to be accepted in 
'normal' social life. Then, John can adopt soccer hooliganism as a way of 
reconciling those two aspects of his personality: he behaves aggressively at 
specific places and times, and lives a normal life outside those circumstances. 
Of course, the person's agential closure —and the underlying organizational 
closure of meaning— would always be threaten by incoherences and even 
breakdowns; this is why the person would be permanently engaged in the task 
of reconstructing it. This task cannot stop, and would produce as an outcome, 
the evolution of that agential closure. 
In the proposed model, the self-perception system of each individual 
would be unique at a given point in time (in her biography). Besides, no two 
self-perception systems, corresponding to two different individuals, would be 
identical. Self-perception systems are conceived of as a very complex kind of 
system. They would be produced through a long experience in which the 
subject has been interacting with an extremely complex environment (of a 
socio-cultural kind). That is way to find two identical self-perception systems 
would be even more improbable than finding two identical human bodies. 
(c) In the postulated model, an individual's self-perception system 
would be constituted as a self-coherent and dynamic network made up of 
concepts, evaluations, aims, expectations, attitudes, wishes, etc. It should be 
stressed that it would be composed of both 'objective' (cognitive, conceptual) 
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and 'subjective' (attitudes, volitions, etc.) elements. As a matter of fact, both 
kind of elements seem very difficult to separate in real life. For instance, if a 
person loves opera, she should know, on the one hand, what such a thing is 
(she should possess some personal version of the concept 'opera'). On the other 
hand, she attaches a specific attitude to that concept (Vygotsky)9. The use of 
the word 'perception' to formulate the idea of self-perception systems, seeks to 
capture the double dimension, objective and subjective, of this notion. Other 
alternative terms such as 'cognition' (the use of the expression 'self-cognition 
systems' could be an alternative) tend to evoke only the 'objective', conceptual 
aspect of the phenomenon in question. 
(d) What I call a self-perception system would not only refer to the 
individuals' perceptions of themselves; it would also include those individuals' 
perceptions of the world around them. All that a person knows, wishes, feels, 
etc. would make up the inner world of this person and in that sense would 
constitute this person's self. From this point of view, a persons's knowledge 
and attitudes towards other subjects (other individuals or social groups) would 
belong to this person's self, just as much as this person's knowledge and 
attitudes towards herself. A self-perception system would be a structure 
shaping the individual's personal images of 'herself-in-the-world'. The prefix 
'self-' indicates, on the one hand, the autonomous, self-coherent quality of 
those systems. On the other hand, it suggests a basic hypothesis, namely that a 
person's perception of the world, or any part of it, would be something which 
cannot be properly conceived of independently from that person's other 
perceptions (including her own perceptions as a Self). For a person to perceive 
the external world would be to perceive her image of it, and hence indirectly 
to perceive herself through that image10. 
(e) Hence, according to the model, a self-perception system would 
comprise all the knowledge/attitudes of an individual about reality. Any 
knowledge that a person has, would be a part of her identity as a self. This 
means that a person's self-perception system would include all aspects of 
social and natural reality as they are perceived by this person. From this point 
of view, a self-perception system would be, by necessity, a social self-
perception system. It would not be just an individual self-image of the person, 
but a social self-image of that person in her relationships with all the other 
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individuals of whom she is aware. The person's self-perception would always 
be directly or indirectly social. When a person perceives herself, she would do 
so socially (E.Morin, 1986: 194). The understanding of oneself would be an 
essential social phenomenon, because human beings would only be able to 
understand themselves (their selves) as social actors in a social milieu. The 
same would occur regarding the person's understanding of the world in 
general. The person's understanding of the 'nonsocial' world would also be 
social in its original nature. For example, when in our culture a person believes 
that the Earth is round and not flat, this is the result of accepting a set of 
opinions received through social interaction. A person accepts those opinions 
in a given social frame —the primary school, the family, etc.— and in 
interaction with specific social agents —teachers, parents, mates, etc. One 
does not understand things (even things that are assumed to belong to the 
'natural world') in a social vacuum (Mead, 1934; Garfinkel 1967; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1970). 
(f) Therefore, it can be argued from the stand point that the model 
posits, that an individual's self-perception system is neither a uniquely 
'psychological', nor a purely 'sociological' reality, in the traditional sense of 
both terms. It would not be merely 'psychological' because such a system is 
intrinsically a social construct (the individual's purely psychological 
characteristics, such as her temperament, would only provide a dispositional 
basis for the social construction of her personality)". And it is not purely 
'sociological' because a self-perception system would include aspects which 
are not explicitly social —the individual's views on 'nonsocial' realities. For 
instance, not only beliefs about the 'natural world', but also purely individual 
representations, 'private meanings' that are not shared with other subjects, and 
which, in a way, express the 'psychological' specificity of the individual. 
Gadamer holds a similar view on this combination of the social and the 
psychological aspects of the individual's personality, stressing the fact that 
self-awareness is part and product of the individual's historical life: 
"Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-
examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, 
society and state in which we live...The self-awareness of the individual is 
only a flickering in their closed circuits of historical life (H.G. Gadamer, 
1975: 245). 
Notice however that, from the perspective that is being postulated, 
self-awareness would only be a part of a person's self. As already indicated, 
this self, as a whole, would be constituted as a self-perception system that, 
would include all self-representations about reality. 
According to the interpretation just outlined, it would be more 
accurate, strictly speaking, to talk about psycho-social self-perception systems. 
Nevertheless, once the fact that a self-perception system is an intrinsically 
psycho-social reality, has been considered as a plausible working hypothesis 
—and this would mean that there are no self-perception systems which are 
'nonsocial', because individuals would only be able to perceive themselves and 
the world from their condition of being social actors—, it is no longer 
necessary to insist on that qualification. Consequently, instead of talking about 
'pshycho-social self-perception systems' I shall henceforth, for the sake of 
brevity, speak simply of 'self-perception systems'. 
(g) As argued before, the images of 'one-self-in-the-(social) world', 
which make up a self-perception system, would be of a conceptual, but also of 
a volitional and emotional nature. A self-perception system would not only be 
made up of the concepts or ideas about oneself and the external world, but it 
would be constituted by a complex intertwining of attitudes and wishes, which 
would form the motivational basis for the individual's schemata of volitions. 
This volitional level, rooted in a certain self-perception system, would 
produce the decisions which determines the individuals' action, and 
specifically, their social action. The concepts that an individual possesses 
would always be interpreted by this individual through her attitude to it. One 
would not be able to have/use a concept, without generating an attitude 
attached to it. Arguably, if one had a concept to which one could not apply an 
attitude, one could not relate to it in any effective way: it would be 
meaningless for oneself as an agent. (Of course, one can have concepts which 
are completely irrelevant for oneself; but 'to be completely irrelevant' is 
already a personal attitude that one attaches to those concepts). 
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(h) A self-perception system, as postulated, cannot be properly 
conceived of as being merely the result of the individual's emotional 
internalization of a set of social norms. This concept would split what is an 
unitary, organizationally closed system into two components: one coming from 
the outside, the 'social norms', and the other coming from the inside, the 
emotional, purely psychological, attachment to those norms. Within the trend 
of sociological thinking that goes from Durkheim's The Rules of Sociological 
Method to modern structural-functionalism (Parsons 1937, 1951), the idea of a 
'social norm' implies something external, 'objective', which is imposed on the 
individual from the outside (A. Giddens, 1981: 88-97). On the contrary, in the 
light of the postulated model, a self-perception system would be a reality 
produced from the individual's interior, 'from the inside to the outside', not 
only in its psychological (attitudinal, affective, emotional) components, but 
also in its conceptual elements. It would be an autonomous system, in the 
original meaning of the word 'autonomous': something which gives itself its 
own norm. According to the heuristic model that is being proposed, each self-
perception system would generate its own set of norms, although those norms 
would be (must be) structurally coupled with (the set of norms of) the (also 
autonomous) systems with which it interacts12. 
3.3. Self-perception systems as non-trivial machines. 
In the light of the model that has been proposed, it can be argued that 
individuals are personally and socially defined by their respective self-
perception system. Another question is the problem of how those individuals 
acquire their specific self-perception systems (their peculiar psycho-social 
organizational closure). I am not going to deal with this genetic problem 
through a specific analysis. It is a problem which deserves a careful 
investigation, and this would go beyond the scope of this thesis. As I suggested 
in the previous chapter, the analysis of the functional structure of a system 
may be attempted independently from the consideration of the history through 
which that system became constituted as such. Thereby I shall work with the 
hypothesis that the history of interactions of a self-perception system would 
constrain —through a process of structural coupling, a concept already 
presented in Chapter 2—its development; but it would not determine that 
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development —if only because the history of interactions is not predetermined 
but a contingent outcome of the very history. 
A self-perception system, as already defined, would not be a "trivial 
machine" in the sense given to this expression by H. von Foerster (198 lb:201- 
204; 1991:67-73): 
"... a trivial machine is characterized by a one-to-one relationship between 
its 'input' (stimulus, cause) and its 'output' (response, effect). This 
invariable relationship is 'the machine'. Since this relationship is 
determined once and for all, this is a deterministic system; and since one 
output once observed for a given input will be the same for the same input 
given latter, this is also a predictable system" (H. von Foerster 
198 1 b: 201). 
It would be difficult to deny that human individuals function as non-
trivial machines almost under any circumstances: 
"... non-trivial machines, however, are quite different creatures. Their 
input-output relationship is not invariant, but is determined by the 
machines previous output. In other words, its previous steps determine is 
present reactions. While these machines are again deterministic systems, 
for all practical reasons they are unpredictable, an output once observed 
for a given input will most likely be not the same for the same input given 
later" (H. von Foerster 198lb:201). 
I shall put forward, as a part of my working hypothesis, the idea that 
human beings are not deterministic trivial machines. Apparently, the 
input/output which they accept as meaningful is determined as such by their 
own internal organization (and this has been constituted, at least in part, by the 
previous history of interactions). In general, living beings might be considered 
non-trivial machines of a complex kind. They cannot be understood as 
environmentally determined systems. Quite the opposite: 
"Instead of searching for mechanisms in the environment that turn 
organisms into trivial machines, we have to find the mechanisms within the 
organisms that enable them to turn their environment into a trivial 
machine. In this formulation of the problem it seems to be clear that in 
order to manipulate its environment an organism has to construct 
—somehow— an internal representation of whatever environmental 
regularities it can get hold of (H. von Foerster 1981c: 171). 
From this perspective, characteristic of the new cybernetics, as well as 
of the last developments of cognitive science (Winograd and Flores, 1987), 
this construction of an internal, idiosyncratic representation of environmental 
regularities, would constitute the phenomenon of cognition: 
"At the cognitive level, the extension of the evolutionist paradigm demands 
the rejection of the classic cybernetic schema 'input-output'. A diversity 
generator permanently and blindly produces variable representation 
outlines or 'pre-representations', which the organism accepts or rejects 
depending on their fit to the external world" (J-P. Changeux, 1992: 720-
721). 
The necessity of constructing elaborate representations of their 
environment, in order to control it, would be even clearer for human beings 
than it is in the case of organisms in general. From the point of view that is 
being argued, social individuals, as autonomous systems, would have to 
navigate their way through the social environment in which they must produce 
their own lives. That process would require, in Piaget's terms, both 
'assimilation'13 and 'accommodation' on the part of the individual. Individuals 
would assimilate their social experience to their autonomous self-perception 
system; and they would accommodate (fit) that system to the requirements of 
the social environment in the course of that experience. The outcome of the 
interplay between accommodation and assimilation would be adaptation 
(Piaget, 1971). In the light of both, evolutionist theory (Barnett, 1962; Jacob, 
1970, 1981; Ruse, 1973), and second order cyberneticsI4, it can be argued that 
this adaptation must not be understood as a passive compliance with the 
characteristics of that environment. Adaptation would be a creative and 
dynamic process; it would be adaptation (search for fit, not match —von 
Glasersfeld 1991) to, but also adaptation of the environment; one way to adapt 
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to the environment is to change that environment— if only, by the simple 
procedure of migrating to a new environment. 
Therefore, from the point of view that has been argued, it would not 
be possible to establish, strictly speaking, a deterministic relationship between 
causes in the social environment and behaviour of the social individuals —it 
would only be possible to detect constraints which act in a non-deterministic 
way. On the basis of this insight, I have focused this research, not with the aim 
of trying to find the social causes leading to the configuration of different 
types of self-perception systems, but rather to the exploration of the diverse 
perspectives which such systems furnish to the present and future actions of 
the individuals whom I study. 
As has already been indicated, the conceptual framework of this 
research is chiefly derived from the viewpoint put forward by systems 
theory/cybernetics and specifically by nonclassical systems theory or 
nonclassical cybernetics, as it is defined by von Foerster, Gordon Pask and 
Maturana among others. This viewpoint, outlined in the previous chapter, has 
strong, although often not explicit, affinities with some other theoretic 
perspectives, which have a more recognizable profile in social theory. I am 
speaking mainly of hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975, 1976; Ricoeur, 1981), 
symbolic interactionism (G.H. Mead 1934; Berger and Luckmann, 1966 etc.), 
cognitive science (Lakoff, 1980; Minsky 1986, etc.) and constructivism (Steier 
1991; von Glasersfeld, 1991; Gergen, 1991, etc.). Arguably, some of the 
insights of these approaches may be given a crisper formulation by means of 
nonclassical cybernetic concepts (Heylighen, 1987; Zeleny, 1980). 
Of course, notions such as organizational closure, informationally 
open systems, etc., are very abstract, and should be specified and implemented 
by means of concepts more concretely applicable to social realities. In this 
sense, the empirical part of this research will be an attempt to apply some of 
those concepts to a specific social reality. In that part of the thesis, I will try to 
develop a theoretical outlook that seeks to implement cybernetic concepts 
—and more specifically, non classical cybernetic concepts— in the study of 
social realities. But in order to bridge the conceptual gap that exists between 
those abstract concepts and the more concrete notions that should be applied to 
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specific social analyses, I shall elaborate further the idea of self-perception 
systems, so far presented in general terms, in the following sections of this 
chapter. This further elaboration should be instrumental in achieving the 
objective of this dissertation, which is twofold: first, to develop the concept of 
self-perception systems, as outlined in the previous paragraphs; and second to 
prove its relevance as an instrument of sociological analysis, in a study of 
several groups of students. 
3.4. Human consciousness. 
According to the heuristic hypothesis that guides this research, human 
consciousness would be the specific domain of the organizational closure that 
constitutes social individuals. That closure would be realized through the 
domain of the unconscious as well. But this domain is defined —at least in 
Freud's view15 — in relation to consciousness. 
Human consciousness has the specific quality of being the 
consciousness of an T16. In this respect it would differ from other forms of 
consciousness, probably present in some nonhuman animals (Premack, 1983; 
Griffin, 1984). The organizational closure defining the human being as a social 
individual, (as a person) would be realized in the domain of human 
consciousness, and this would radically differentiate that closure from that of 
any other autonomous system. Human consciousness is conceptual and 
intentional; it generates specific kinds of 'images', concepts, and applies its 
intentions to them. In this sense, it would be conceptually intentional (Searle, 
1983; Riviere, 1991; Frith, 1989; Mehler & Dupoux, 1990). 
Hence, the peculiar kind of autonomy that is characteristic of human 
beings, would be the autonomy of their consciousness, of its conceptual/ 
intentional imaginary domain (Castoriadis, 1987). This autonomy may be 
conceived of as the base of human social behaviour, and as the instrument 
through which human individuals can participate, as social agents, in human 
society. The autonomy of consciousness —of that conceptual/intentional 
imaginary domain— would find a paradigmatic expression in the phenomenon 
of conversation. A social individual, in conversation with other individuals or 
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with herself, would produce and incidentally reproduce the contents, the 
structure, and the organizational closure of her peculiar imaginary domain (G. 
Pask, 1975; 1978; 1981...). 
3.5. Social Individuals as Social Systems. 
Within the framework of the heuristic model postulated, it can be 
argued that social individuals do not simply belong to social systems; they 
would be social systems in their own right, because each of them would 
possess a personal, idiosyncratic representation of the social system in which 
they live and interact". Humphrey (1986) has suggested that we, human 
beings, are 'natural psychologists', that our brain seems tailor-made to 
understand the mental processes of people. By the same token, it can be 
argued that we are 'natural sociologists' as well: our brain seems purpose-built 
to understanding the actions of the others, and the interactions with and 
between those others. In order to reach this understanding, we would need to 
build the internal representation of .a society of agents. We would need to do 
so just to become a competent agent. 
"All human beings continuously monitor the circumstances of their 
activities as a feature of doing what they do" (Giddens, 1991: 35). 
This process starts very early in life. Consider the role of fairy tales in 
this respect (B. Bettelheim, 1975 and 1979). These stories enshrine a minimal 
society of archetypal agents (the lost children, the witch, the friendly fairy, 
etc.) whose interactions would be easily understandable by children who are 
developing their own competence as agents through that understanding. It can 
be argued that the maturation of an individual as a social agent would consist 
in the development of that 'internal society' through which that agent would 
represent social life. 
We would be autonomous social systems as a result of being by 
necessity action systems. Action presupposes purpose, meaning. Hence, from 
the point of view of the postulated model, organizational closure 
—autonomy—, because only that closure would 'make sense', and action has 
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to have some sense to be effective. A very simple example of an action system, 
presupposing an underlying organizational closure, is TOTE, a cybernetic 
model proposed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960: 37 passim) to explain 
purposeful action. TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) indicates the presence of an 
action/evaluation loop, which is cyclically applied until the moment when the 
action system evaluates that its intended goal has been accomplished. TOTE is 
not an organizationally closed action system, because there is an access to and 
an exit from the system. But suppose that there is a system composed of TOTE 
units any of which act on the products of other units and produces the input to 
other units. That whole action system would be organizationally closed. 
Arguably, human beings, as action systems, would be a closed 
network of specific actions. There would be no exit from our condition as 
agents. When a person achieves a goal, she looks for other goals, perhaps 
facilitated by the first one; and when she accomplishes those goals, she looks 
again for further goals among which there could be the one in the first place. 
For instance, suppose that Mary moonlights to get extra money, and she does 
so in order to buy some holidays. She goes on holidays, expends more money 
than she had expected, and then she has to moonlight again. 
Now, within the framework of the proposed model, human beings are 
not only action systems but also interaction systems. But to be capable of 
interaction individuals would need to represent themselves as subjects, and 
they would need to represent other subjects as well. So, they would have to 
represent a tailor-made 'internal society', adequate to their interaction 
requirements: this is the reason why they would be social systems in their own 
right. Human beings would not be able to interact in society if they did not 
have an internal representation of that society. This internal society would be 
produced by each individual, it would be a an idiosyncratic construct, because 
it would have to guide each individual's actions as a personal agent, not 
somebody else's actions. It would be a personal construct (Kelly, 1955; 1967), 
although one which must be somehow structurally coupled to the 'external 
society' with which the individual interacts. 
From an analogous point of view, G.H. Mead (1934) considers an 
individual (the self) as being both an object and a subject. An object because 
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human beings can observe themselves (self-reflexion) and a subject because 
they recognize themselves as agents of social action. Besides, a person can 
recognize the other as a 'self and therefore can put her or himself in the 
position of the other. This capability of seening (constructing) the other's 
perspective is what allows the self to predict and anticipate the other's 
response and hence to act accordingly. 
Certainly, although social individuals are autonomous social systems 
in their own right, they cannot be considered in isolation because they are, at 
the same time and by necessity, a part of the more complex social system 
constituted by the society with which they interact. The social systems that 
individuals are cannot be thought of outside society; but at the same time those 
social systems —the individuals— are the basic constituents of society: as a 
matter of fact, society is the emergent effect of those individuals' interaction. 
As Morin argues: 
"The social phenomenon emerges when the interactions between 
individuals of the second type (multicellular beings) produce a whole 
which is not reducible to the individuals and act back upon them, that is to 
say, when a system is constituted... Society is not superimposed to the 
interactions between individuals-subjects because it is made up by those 
interactions. However it is something different from the sum of those 
interactions, because those interactions produce a social system, that is to 
say, an organizing whole which acts back upon its constituents"18. 
The individuals, as has already been suggested, are psycho-socially 
autonomous systems in the sense that they are defined by the organizational 
closure of their conceptions and intentions. They are self-organizing entities 
stabilized by more or less elaborate forms of what I shall call 'self-coherence'. 
Accordingly the social representations that individuals produce and reproduce 
(the 'internal societies' that constitute their imaginary environment as agents, 
and which are the basic constituents of society) have those characteristics of 
self-organization and self-coherence as well. For instance, suppose a person 
has strong views on politics; she/he will interpret any political question in such 
a way that those views (on the behaviour of her/his archetypal political actors) 
are validated by that interpretation. Sentences as: "of course, conservatives 
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would do that, wouldn't they?" would be quite predictable in those 
circumstances. 
If society shows self-organizing and coherence maintaining 
capabilities, it is because their basic constituents (human beings) intrinsically 
possess those features, which are also characteristics of the 'internal societies' 
that those individuals constantly produce and reproduce in the course of their 
social lives. 
That psycho-social self-coherence, stemming from the organizational 
closure of meaning (conceptual and intentional meaning), is the basic feature 
of what I call a self-perception system; as previously indicated, this type of 
system includes the individuals' self-perception of the world (both social and 
'nonsocial') and their self-perception of themselves. From this point of view, 
socialization may be defined as the social individual's construction of a 
self-perception system adequate to the social world in which that individual 
exists and acts. Therefore, socialization must not be viewed as a process of 
passive seeping in of 'social norms', but as an active process of self-
construction (of a person as a self-perception system) through action, process 
which certainly occurs in a specific space of interactions (a specific social 
environment). Mead's view on socialization is somewhat similar to the outlook 
adopted here. Socialization is an interactive, endless process through which the 
self responds to society by 'reflective intelligence'. By using reflective thinking 
human beings actively create, reshape, and choose their responses to their 
environment, and at the same time this specific process of knowledge 
construction (re)produces society through interaction (G.H. Mead, op. 
cit.:143). Maturana also insists in this double process that creates both the self 
and the society. His conception of human beings as autopoietic systems 
implies that those systems, just to keep alive (to maintain their identity as self-
organizing, organizationally closed systems) must create a system of 
interactions that becomes the adequate environment in which they realize their 
autopoiesis. In other words human beings (re)produce society and at the same 
time they (re)produce themselves as social individuals (H. Maturana, 1980: 
11-32). 
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What would appear to some social scientists, called 'naturalists' by 
Giddens, as the 'objective' social system is the outcome of the individuals' 
interaction, as dynamic social systems. Just as a cell —in a multicellular living 
being— is not only a part of an organism, but somewhat an organism on its 
own (an organized, self-maintaining totality), social individuals are not only a 
part of a social system, but also social systems in themselves. Those systems 
relate through action. Now, the condition that makes such relation possible is 
reflectivity, that is to say the ability of at least one of those systems to mirror 
the other systems with which it interacts (to have a representation of them). 
When several individuals interact in a situation, each of them must possess an 
image of the conceptions and intentions of the other individuals in that 
situation, hence any of the individuals has to elaborate and postulate a set of 
representations of her/himself and the others (representation of the 'self and of 
the 'generalized other' in Mead's terms). On the basis of that set of 
representations each individual must reckon the possible actions that can be 
acceptable to the individuals involved (Berger and Luckmann). Therefore in 
the course of interaction, social individuals spontaneously construct dynamic 
social systems which grow and become more and more complex as interaction 
progresses. Each of those individually represented social systems are 
permanently kept functional, 'in working order', by a sort of internal 
coherence: were this not the case, individuals would lose their competence as 
social subjects. As social individuals constantly produce and reproduce those 
coherent sets of social representations, they are, by necessity, not only systems 
of social behaviour but also, in a way, systems of 'social theory'. This view of 
individuals as producers of both social behaviour and 'social theory' (more 
exactly, as producers of social behaviour through their production of 
spontaneous social theory) is close to the view put forward by Mead, Garfinkel 
and others, who consider that sociologists and the people whom they are 
observing follow the same basic epistemic procedure: 'reflective/reflexive 
knowledge'. Reflexive knowledge is the specific form of knowledge that 
produces society as well as sociology19. 
Social 'objectivity' emerges when several of those individual social 
systems meet and interact, each one with the informational requirements 
demanded by her peculiar self-perception system. In the course of interaction 
they mutually interpret those requirements, contrast their perspectives, 
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agree/disagree, etc. Through that process they produce new information (they 
redefine their own individual self-perception system). It is a process that can 
be described —in terms of Piaget's theory, to which I have referred already—
as a dynamics of 'assimilation' and 'equilibration'20. Consensus, a fundamental 
feature of social relations, is produced and reproduced in that conjuncture of 
social interaction, and it is necessarily related to the creation of new 
information. Consensus is not primarily a reduction of the independent views 
of several individuals to an a priori 'social norm', but the 'invention', through a 
conflictive process, of an effectual convergence of those independent views 
(and it is the stabilization and social spread of that convergence which a 
posteriori appears as a 'norm'). According to the view proposed by Symbolic 
Interactionism21 this convergence, that eventually generates consensus, is 
considered as the effect that the multiple responses (self and other-responses) 
produced in the course of interaction have in the long run. Over time this 
responses become anonymous, abstracted from their specific authors, and part 
and parcel of a 'generalized community of attitudes'. 
The peculiar complexity of any human society stems from the fact of 
being a system of systems each of which mirrors the whole system. This sort 
of complexity allows human societies enormous possibilities for change: any 
of the individual systems making up the social totality is —at least 
potentially— a source of change as well as a source of stability. 
3.6. Social Individuals as Autonomous Social Systems. 
According to the viewpoint presented in the previous section, 
individuals can be considered as social systems, in the sense of social self-
perception systems, because they need to be (inter)action systems. The 
individual's action —even when it is a solitary action— always presupposes a 
background of social interactions (interactions with other individuals and/or 
with collective agents). Consequently, if that action were not organized by a 
self-perception system possessing a social dimension, it would be socially 
ineffectual (there could not be real social interaction through that system, and 
hence it would fail as an action system). This is the case, for instance, with 
autistic individuals. One fundamental trait of autism (Frith, 1989) is, the 
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incapacity to develop a self-perception (system) of an intrinsically social 
nature, that is to say, a self-perception through which the person can perceive 
herself always in (at least) potential interaction with the other). 
Now, the hypothetical assumption that individuals are social (self-
perception) systems because they need to behave as action systems, would 
explain some of the more characteristic features of those systems. Summing up 
the previous analysis, and drawing on the concepts presented in Chapter 2, 
they would not be passive, externally determined, 'instructively defined 
systems' (in Varela's sense). They would be organizationally closed and 
informationally open, self-coherent, self-organizing systems (G. Pask, 1975, 
1981). In a word, they are autonomous systems. Such systems would have an 
identity. Certainly, this identity would be understood in a dynamic sense. 
Individual social systems, people, would maintain their identity through a 
permanent process of change22. This process, capable of maintaining the 
identity of individuals through change would be, at its highest, specific human 
level, purposeful action23. In reality, according to this standpoint, action would 
be an essential mechanism in stabilizing that identity through change. Human 
beings act for many particular, individual, reasons, but they also act for a more 
basic and general reason: in order to continue being themselves (although in 
that process they have to change their own selves to some extent). Identity 
would not mean, in this context —nor in any biological one—, 
unchangeability. The human brain, for instance, is biochemically modified by 
each of its operations. But, at the same time it keeps an organization which 
would allow the maintenance of the personal identity of the individual 
possessing that brain. Only when it suffers severe damage which destroys its 
organization, does this individual lose that personal identity. In an analogous 
way, the changes in an individual's self-perception system, could arguably be 
considered as preserving that individual's basic personal identity. Certainly the 
self-perception system of an individual, can undergo dramatic changes. Then 
we speak of a personal crisis24. The point is that such crises would 
substantially transform the individual's personality (and, certainly her self-
perception system which constitute an essential part of that personality)25, but 
without loss of the personal identity of that individual. As I shall indicate 
further, adolescence is a period in which such crises are likely to occur, as a 
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result of the fact that is in this period when the individuals construct their adult 
outlook, their adult personality. 
From the perspective of the postulated model, it can be argued that an 
action system is a purposeful system. Now, the notion of purpose can arguably 
be understood in two ways, when it refers to action. On the one hand, 'purpose' 
would mean the concrete, conscious aim of each particular action. Human 
beings actors are aware of that purpose26. On the other hand, 'purpose' would 
refer to aims, implicit in action, of which the actors are not generally aware. In 
this latter sense the more general purpose of action, would consist in 
productively reproducing their autonomy, the organizational closure which 
allows them to maintain their identity. This type has been recognized long ago 
as essential to the maintenance of a system's stability. Functionalist analysis, 
for example, views this kind of purpose as explaining a substantial part —if 
not most— of social activity (Merton, 1957: Chapter 3). This "unconscious" 
and general type of purpose would maintain the intrinsic organization of the 
system which it defines, its structure and basic properties. A recent and 
polemic version of this sort of purpose has been sustained by Lovelock in his 
Gaia Theory; he argues that the Earth as a living organism, has as a main 
purpose its own preservation (J. Gribbin, 1986). In a similar way, the 
preservation of each human agent as a psychosocial action system would also 
be the general purpose underlying each of this agent's conscious actions. 
These two hypothetical types of purpose can be illustrated by means 
of an example. A person, say Mary Smith, may apply for a job in order to 
forward her professional career and improve her standards of living (she is 
aware of that purpose, she knows that the supposed improvement is what 
moved her to send in the application). But Mary would also apply for that job 
in order to enhance her general self-esteem, her self-image (which may be 
eroded, say by a recent divorce). Keeping this self-image high would be 
essential for maintaining her identity, her personal organizational closure, and 
hence her viability as a social agent (but Mary would not be aware of the 
majority of these purposes involved in her application for a new job, as in 
general, agents would not be aware of the need for maintaining and 
reproducing their own personal organization). 
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The meaning of 'purpose' when it is understood in that general sense, 
would point to the very organization of the individual as an acting person. In 
other words, it would point to the agential closure of that individual. In the 
light of the heuristic model postulated, an organizationally closed system 
would productively reproduce its own organization. If it would not reproduce 
that organization in a closed way, the system would disintegrate. From this 
perspective, a person would be an organizationally closed action system, 
which would need to produce and reproduce that specific kind of closure, by 
acting and interacting with other analogous systems (persons). This would be 
the meaning of autonomy when this term refers to social human individuals. 
Autonomy is a phenomenon which can be detected —in Chomsky's 
terms (1957)— at the level of 'performance' (external activity). For instance, in 
their interactions, agents can become aware of the fact that the other agents 
interpret the situation according to their own personal meanings, which may 
differ from theirs. In this context, agents become aware of the fact that the 
other is an autonomous reality. By contrast, organizational closure arguably 
would be detected at the level of —again in Chomsky's terms— 'competence' 
(internal activity): agents would not directly 'see' the others agential closure 
when interacting with them. 
3.7. Self-Perception systems and norms. 
At the end of section 3.2, I argued that, within the conceptual model 
that I am presenting, a self- perception system, should not be conceived of as 
being merely the result of the individual's emotional internalization of a set of 
social norms. In fact, any such concept would contradict the hypothetically 
assumed autonomy of that system. 
Drawing on the conceptual frame put forward by the theorists of 
autopoiesis (Varela, 1980, 1981, 1984; Maturana, 1980, 1984; Zeleny, 1980, 
1981), it can be argued that, in a social context, any alleged 'external objective 
norm' would be just an epiphenomenal effect of the structural coupling (see the 
concept in Chapter 2.: 85) between the interacting social agents present in that 
social context. Such an effect would be visualized as 'objective' by an external 
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observer who would postulate the existence of the alleged objective norm, in 
order to explain the structural coupling between the individuals whose 
interaction she observes (S. Braten, 1984; von Foerster, 1981). This notion of 
structural coupling may be explained further by means of one example. When 
I use my computer, my mind actualizes a chain of meanings which originate a 
series of physical actions on my part —my typing— into the computer. Then 
the computer 'answers' to my typing with some physical changes (with some 
physical 'actions'). I tend to interpret the computer's 'answers' as a result of its 
'understanding' of my own meanings, which are in the origin of my physical 
actions (my typing). Nevertheless, there is no such understanding on the part 
of the computer. In fact, the computer does not handle any meaning: it is a 
mindless machine. The process is one of structural coupling (through my 
physical actions) between my mind and a mechanical device. 
When one interacts with another person, one is convinced that such a 
person has a mind, and understands meanings just as one does oneself, and this 
makes a great difference with respect to the case of the computer. But the 
meanings of that person and one's own meanings do not relate directly, but 
only through the structural coupling enabled by our interaction (mainly 
linguistic performances). Searle has shown that two conscious agents can 
effectively interact through structural coupling, without having any meaning in 
common27. 
According to that interpretation what appears as an 'external', 
'objective', set of norms, can only be 'internalized' through its assimilation 
by/in a self-perception system which would be a fundamentally autonomous 
reality (in Husserl's terms, the social norms need to be 'worked' by the subject 
'consciousness'). From this point of view, it seems plausible to postulate that 
an allegedly objective social norm can only be effectively used if it is 
'metabolized' by the individual. The 'metabolic pathway' would depend on the 
characteristics of the self-perception system by/in which it takes place. 
Hence, the same 'objective' social norm can be explained in different 
ways and can play diverse functions in different self-perception systems. For 
instance, the reasons why a person pays for underground tickets (moral 
standards, social responsibility, fear of scandal, to avoid the fine, etc.) or, 
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alternatively, tries to shirk that payment (social protest, saving money, 
boasting in front of the lads, etc.), can be very varied. Each particular type of 
self-perception system, and in the last analysis each person, can and must 
'make sense' of specific actions in a personal way. This would be due to the 
fact that, along the conceptual lines already defined, a self-perception system 
would possess a condition of organizational closure which would support the 
production and reproduction of the individuals' social meanings. Those 
meanings would only have sense within that closure. 
In the light of what has been said, it can be considered as a plausible 
hypothesis that each self-perception system (each personal outlook) has been 
generated in a process of structural coupling with other self-perception 
systems (the individuals whom the first self-perception system has interacted 
with along her biography). In Maturana's words: 
"... as a result of the structural coupling that takes place along such a 
history, history becomes embodied both in the structure of the living 
system and the structures of the medium even though both systems 
necessarily, as structure determined systems, always operate in the present 
through locally determined processes" H. Maturana, 1978:39. 
However, although each self-perception system is generated along 
these processes of structural coupling, it can be argued that the study of self-
perception systems can be undertaken, for some purposes, independently from 
the consideration of the specific histories of social influences which 
undoubtedly play a role in the configuration of those systems. As many 
authors belonging to the structuralist tradition have argued since Saussure28, a 
system, once it is constituted as a coherent totality, can become an 
autonomous reality with respect to the process that led to its generation. The 
system would embody its history, but it would function through its present 
organization which, although generated through that history of structural 
coupling with its environment, would have a synchronic coherence of its own. 
In the case of self-perception systems, to study that organization on its 
own may be heuristically fruitful; in order to determine the internal coherence 
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of such an organization, the examination of the historical/biographical 
processes which led to its constitution would not be necessary. Meaning in 
organizationally closed systems would always function in real time, no matter 
how the structural basis of that meaning was initially introduced within the 
system. To give an example: Apparently, the British norm prescribing left-
hand drive, originated in the horsemen's custom of slightly turning aside to the 
left when they crossed each other on the roads, so that they could politely 
shake their right hands. Nowadays few people remember that original meaning 
of the norm, and nobody tries to shake hands with the car drivers coming in 
the opposite direction. However, the old norm has acquired a new functional 
meaning in our motorized society: to make dense, high speed traffic, safe. 
3.8. Social individuals as producers of social novelty and change. 
According to the conceptual framework which is being postulated, 
social individuals would be autonomous systems exhibiting those 
self-organizing (novelty-producing and yet self-coherency-preserving) 
characteristics that are essential features of organizationally closed systems 
(see these concepts in Chapter 2). The individuals' self-perception of the world 
and of themselves, would inevitably change through their experience of 
actions and interactions; but the organization of that self-perception would 
basically maintain its own identity and coherence throughout that process. It 
can be argued that individuals keep on being themselves through change, 
although, as stated in section 3.6, there are critical moments in which 
fundamental reorganizations of their self-perception systems would occur. 
Those are moments in which an identity crisis would take place; in those 
moments the very survival of the individual would be at stake. However, under 
normal circumstances, the process of change would be controlled by the 
organization of the system, although at the same time that change would 
modify this organization. Thus, change would be assimilated by the system's 
organizational gestalt, and that gestalt in turn would evolve towards new forms 
of equilibrium, as a result of change (Piaget 1975). 
That process creates information, in a definite sense: 'external 
information' would provoke changes in the 'internal information' of the system. 
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That is, in the characteristics of its organizational closure. The individual 
would be informationally open just in that sense: 'external information', which 
initially would not assimilable by the individual (would in fact be 'noise' for 
that individual), would become assimilable when it internally 'informs' the 
individual (changes the form of organizational closure of such an individual). 
On the bases of von Foerster's principle of 'order-from-noise' (1980), it can be 
argued that individuals' self-perception systems would develop their own 
'internal order' (their organizational closure) by means of external information 
which is initially noise for those systems. 
From this point of view, the informational openness of human self-
perception systems would be basic to the variability of human behaviour and 
of human societies. If human beings were input/output systems, externally 
controllable entities, they would be 'trivial machines' (von Foerster, 1981c) 
—their behaviour would be utterly predictable. But in all probability they are 
'machines' which develop their own internal 'mechanisms'. According to this 
view, they would become sensitive to inputs which were initially irrelevant, 
and they would be able to disregard an input which was initially acceptable. 
Following these ideas, a hypothesis• worth considering would be to postulate 
that, it is in this dynamics of informational openness, that to a substantial 
degree, the origin of the cultural diversity among human beings can be found, 
the source of new meanings and new forms of action, and hence the basis of 
social change29. 
The consideration of social individuals as autonomous systems, would 
be the exact opposite of the idea of the individual as an 'input-output' machine, 
which is the fundamental paradigm of the classic 'episteme' be at the base of 
some theoretical approaches such as behaviourism. As some authors30 have 
pointed out, this approach was prevalent about the middle of this century, and 
has had a strong influence —frequently in an unconscious form— on 
sociological thinking (structuralism, functionalism or structural-
functionalism31). From the alternative perspective which is being postulated 
here, it can be argued that individuals as living beings are not simple 'input-
output devices', black boxes of which, once we know their social background, 
gender, age... we can predict what we are going to find as their output (H. von 
Foerster 1981 c). 
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3.9. Self-Perception patterns. 
These two last sections will deal with some concepts which play an 
instrumental role in building a bridge between the heuristic outlook just 
presented, and the empirical part of this research. 
Although it is possible to detect similarities between different 
individual self-perception systems, it can be said that, due to the different 
biographical contingencies defining each individual, each self-perception 
system is unique, like our fingerprints. There are not two people who are 
biologically identical (Gouyon et al., 1993: 256) nor, arguably, are there two 
individuals who have precisely the same socio/historic experience. But even if 
two people shared the same 'external' experience (according to the view of an 
external observer), each of them would have generated a different view of that 
experience: 
"each person says what he says or hear what he hears depending on his 
own structural determination" (H. Maturana and F. Varela, 1984:130). 
Strictly speaking, it can be argued that if two individuals had the same 
self-perception system they would be indistinguishable as two distinct persons. 
They would be real doppelgangers. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to detect similarities between individual 
self-perception systems. Those similarities would allow the researcher to 
group analogous self-perception systems into different patterns of self-
perception. Therefore, in this sense, a pattern of self-perception can be 
conceived of as an abstract form of self-perception system, which is typical 
of a collection of individual, concrete, self-perception systems. Those 
patterns would characterize the analogous way in which a specific set of 
individuals, belonging to a given social group, view themselves and the reality 
around them. This analogous form of perception usually appears in contrast to 
the peculiar self-perception patterns of other individuals of that social group. 
In other words, the patterns would reveal themselves through their mutual 
differences. This last remark is important: the existence of distinct patterns 
would be revealed through the differences between the individual self- 
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perception systems of the group that makes up the sample. Therefore, those 
abstract patterns hypothetically postulated in this research, would not exist in 
an absolute sense; their coalescence would depend on the social sample which 
has been considered. In this respect meaning means contrast (Saussure, 
1916). For instance, let us suppose the sample is composed of a group of 
Americans and a group of Amazonian tribesmen. In this case, the researcher 
will probably find, almost automatically, two main self-perception patterns 
(corresponding to those two groups), in the first instance. If the sample 
includes the referred group of Americans and (just) other Americans, the 
researcher will detect other self-perception patterns, even among the same 
individuals (the initial group of Americans) who were previously assimilated 
within a single pattern. 
To view an individual self-perception system as a particular instance 
of a specific self-perception pattern, would mean to abstract some general 
features of that individual system, and consequently to disregard its peculiarly 
individual characteristics. This abstraction can be legitimately done in many 
ways (that is why an individual can be classified, without inconsistency, in 
different self-perception patterns, depending on the research context). As I said 
before, self-perception systems would organize themselves by means of a 
characteristic 'inner logic', which should basically be the same in the individual 
systems belonging to a particular self-perception pattern. That 'inner logic' 
would be located at a level deeper than those of its concrete realizations 
through specific concepts and intentions. Although the individual self-
perception system would realize that logic by means of its peculiar 
concepts/intentions, the way in which these are interconnected would be 
similar in all the systems pertaining to a given self-perception pattern. For 
instance, a person can associate the notion of 'success in life' to the idea of 
being a famous fashion model; another person can associate the same notion to 
the idea of being a famous football player. The particular conceptual content is 
different, but the inner logic of the aspirations of both people may be 
understood as analogous at a higher level of abstraction: immediate success 
(still being a youngster) through physical talents and skills as well as a great 
deal of luck. The evidence for the commonality of this basic attitude is to be 
found in the other notions which they express (for instance their respective 
attitudes towards their academic future). 
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In the proposed model, self-perception patterns would play a double, 
descriptive/ explanatory, role. They would play a descriptive role because they 
would try to portray the 'deep structure' underlying individual self-perception 
systems. And they would be explanatory because that deep structure, on the 
one hand, would explain the surface structure of those systems and, on the 
other hand, would explain 'itself by showing its characteristic form of 
organizational closure. In a nutshell, self-perception patterns would allow the 
understanding of individual self-perception systems. 'Understanding' can be 
conceived of as a way of explaining by describing and vice versa. 
3.10. Self-expression as a way of access to Self-Perception. 
The techniques used to obtain the empirical information on which a 
research is based, necessarily condition the content of that information. 
Although it may seem tautological, in any research project the method must be 
compatible with the theoretical framework which is being assumed32. The 
bridge between the theoretical, heuristic framework of this research, and the 
method and techniques that I am going to use in it, is the concept of self-
expression. Self-perception systems, as presented in these pages, are also self-
expression systems. There can hardly be personal self-perception without self-
expression (to oneself or to others). This self-expressive capability of social 
individuals, offers the researcher the only consistent way of accessing the self-
perception systems of those individuals. 
Social individuals are permanently self-expressing themselves. But 
their self-expressions occur in different contexts or frames (Bernstein 1971a). 
Some of those frames would favour better than others the self-expression by 
those individuals of the characteristic inner logic underlying their specific self-
perception systems. In general, the more externally constrained a frame is, the 
less likely it is that an individual self-expressing herself in that frame can 
substantially reveal that inner logic. On the contrary, weakly constrained 
frames (or frames constrained internally, not from the outside, but by the very 
individual who is the subject whose self-expression is being studied), 
generally allow a more 'authentic' self-expression. For instance, a personal 
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diary is likely to be more self-expressing in this sense, than the filling of a 
bureaucratic form. 
That is why I used wealdy framed (non obtrusive) techniques in this 
research. These are often more difficult to manipulate (for instance, 
statistically) than strongly framed techniques (such as closed questionnaires), 
but they can provide the sort of 'innerly structured' information for which I am 
looking. In addition, the use of those wealdy framed and less developed 
techniques, is a methodological challenge, and I will propose some ways of 
implementing them, that may be of interest from a purely methodological point 
of view, in the next chapter. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
I Bem D. (1972): Self-Perception Theory. 
2 
 "Self-perception, an individual's ability to respond differently to his own behaviour and its 
controlling variables, is a product of social interaction". Bern, 1967: 184. 
3 
 The notion of a bias in the 'processing of information' is a debatable one. It could be 
interpreted as a typical of expression the objectivistic informational outlook which is 
characteristic of traditional systems thinking, and specifically of the 'information processing 
paradigm' (Varela, 1979). From a less traditional point of view, there would be no 'bias', 
because there would not be 'objective information' out there which could be biased. From this 
point of view (von Glasersfel 1991), the self does not bias (external, objective meaning); it 
produces and reproduces meaning. 
4 This attribution is common in many primitive cultures. See Levy- Bruhl, 1927. 
5 
 The concept of 'meaning' outlined in the previous chapter not only includes the Weberian 
double sense of 'comprehensibility' and 'purpose', but also Searle's sense of 'intentionality' and 
'internal coherence' (Searle 1983: Chapters 6 and 8). Both insights provide the concept of 
'meaning' with a rich theoretical framework in which it can be properly understood from a 
systemic perspective. 
6 
 The notion of 'schema' or 'schemata' has been in use, in psychological literature, for quite a 
long time. From the schemata of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (1787); through Craiks 
definition: 'internal model of the world' (1934); to Piaget's definition of the schemata of action 
as the structure of "the generalizable characteristics of this action, that is, those which allow 
the repetition of the same action or its application to a new context" (Beth and Piaget, 1966: 
235). In general, schemata is understood as a mental model of aspects of the world or of the 
self that is structured in such a way as to facilitate the process of cognition and perception. 
7 "In contemporary psychiatric terminology, 'psychosis' is a classificatory and descriptive 
term, referring to a specific range of illnesses and symptoms, the illnesses being those in which 
the patient's basic competence as a person is called in question ... A psychosis is, therefore, 
any mental illness which is liable to render its victim non compos mentis, and unfit to plead 
in a court of law". Rycroft, Ch., 1987a: 657. 
8 
 "Contemporary textbooks of psychiatry are notably cautious and uncertain in their approach 
to dissociation of personality and to hysterical dissociations in general... Hysterical 
dissociation states, including dissociation of the personality, seem indeed have more to do with 
the psychology of deception and self-deception than with any innate or acquired incapacity of 
integration... Contemporary psychoanalysis and psychiatry tends to take the opposite view: 
that the self is a pristine unit but uses defense mechanisms, notably repression, which make it 
unconscious of much of its total activity". Rycroft, Ch., 1987b: 198. 
9 "Every idea contains a transmuted affective attitude toward the bit of reality to which it 
refers". L. Vygotsky [1934] (1986): 10. 
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10 the self we come to know and the world we come to know are both assembled out of 
elements of our very own experience" E. von Glaserfeld, 1991: 19. 
11 Many sociologists, since Durkheim have stressed that the social reality of the person is not 
reducible to purely psychological factors, although those factors provide some dispositions to 
act socially in a specific way: "Suicide has been presented as an outcome of a given 
temperament, as an episode of neurasthenia under the rule of its same factors. But we have not 
discover any immediate and regular relationship between neurasthenia and the social process 
of suicide... (Although) the neuropath can show under certain conditions some disposition to 
suicide" Durkheim, 1897 (my own translation from the 1976 Spanish edition: 325). 
12 See in Chapter 2 the reference to von Glaserfeld relative to The Illusion of Communication. 
13 Assimilation in Piaget's theory does not mean assimilation of the individual to the 
environment, but just the opposite of the environment to/by the individual. Piaget, 1971. 
14 "Adaptive systems". Many natural systems, especially living ones, show a quality usually 
called adaptation. That is they possess the ability to react to their environments in a way that 
is favorable, in some sense, to the continued operation of the system. It is as though systems of 
this type have some prearranged 'end' and the behavior of the system is such that it is led to 
this 'end' despite unfavorable environmental conditions. The 'end' might be mere survival; 
evolutionary theory is based heavily on the notion of adaptation to environment." Hall and 
Fagen, 1974: 87. See also the definition of adaptation in note 35, Chapter 2. 
15 "According to Sigmund Freud a large part of the mind is unconscious —though—
essentially similar to the conscious mind in having wishes and fears and so on". Gregory, 
1987: 785. See also Freud, 1948 (1981). 
16 The 'I' or 'self surely has a complex neural basis, but frontal lobes seem to play a decisive 
role in its constitution. "Damage to the frontal area results in a lost of self knowing identity, 
what w'are doing. It these lobes are disturbed we become incapable of planning, carrying out, 
or comprehending a complex action or idea...People seem to loose 'themselves' in a most 
terrifying and disheartening way when something in the frontal lobes is destroyed. they seem 
able to deal well with situation in which they have experience, but have difficulty knowing 
what to do in new circumstances. They loose the ability to monitor how they are behaving and 
how their actions relate to their intention. They often don't know why they are doing 
something. Their direction, their self, is largely gone... they were desouled of the self, and 
there was nothing left to oversee the sources of voluntary action". Ornstein, R. 1991: 153-154. 
17 "If the gorillas I had been watching were spending most of their time worrying about their 
social relationships, and if the gorilla's brain had evolved largely for the purpose of doing that 
worrying, then might that not be what my brain —and other people's brains— were for as 
well?... Nowhere on earth can human beings survive outside society. And consequently 
nowhere on earth can human beings survive without a deep sensitivity to and understanding of 
their fellow creatures" N. Humphrey 1986:39-40). 
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18 Morin,  E. 
 (1980): 279. (the page number corresponds to the Spanish version; the 
translation is mine). 
19 As already mention, Mead speaks of 'reflective intelligence'. For his part "Garfinkel has 
emphasized the principle of reflexivity. This states that descriptions about some aspects of the 
social world are simultaneously within (part of) the very world that they describe" H. 
Schwartz and J. Jacobs, 1979: 51. 
Reflexivity is a result and a specific form of reflectivity: We are subjects capable to reflect 
the images of subjects. When we reflect our own image as a subject we enter in a reflexive 
(self-reflective) relationship with ourselves. Otherwise (when we reflect other subjectivities) 
we keep a merely reflective relation, which is not directly reflexive. 
20 J. Piaget, 1975: 5-47. (The pages number corresponds to the Spanish edition —1978—). 
21 
 "From this perspective (symbolic interactionism), social meanings (which direct human 
behavior) do not inhere in activities, institutions or social objects themselves. Rather, 
meanings are conferred upon social events by interacting individuals, who must first interpret 
what is going on from the social context in which this events occur. This emerging gestalt (the 
'definition of the situation') is seen to result from the interplay of biography, situation, 
nonverbal communication, and linguistic exchange that characterizes all social interaction". H. 
Schwartz and J. Jacobs, 1979:8.  
22 "It is possible that the interaction between organisms acquire along their ontogeny a 
recurrent character and, therefore, a structural coupling, which allows the maintenance of the 
individuality of both individuals along the lengthy evolution of their interactions, is 
established". H. Maturana and F. Varela, 1984:121. 
23 For a deeper study of the concept of 'purpose' attempting to make it 'scientifically 
respectable and analytically useful' —in Buckley's words (1974: 219)--, see in Cybernetics 
and Purpose (Buckley (ed) 1974: 219-296) the following papers: Rosenblueth, R. et al. 
"Behavior, Purpose and Teleology": 221-225; Taylor, R. "Comments on a Mechanistic 
Conception of Purposefulness": 226-231; Rosenblueth R. and Winer, N. "Purposeful and 
Non-Purposeful Behavior": 232-237; Taylor, R. "Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior: 
A rejoinder": 238-242; Churchman C. W. and Ackoff, R.L. "Purposive Behavior and 
Cybernetics": 243-249; and Moore O.K. and Donald, J.L. "Purpose and Learning Theory": 
250-255. 
24 See in note 55 in Chapter 2. 
25 A self-perception system could be conceive of as the conceptual/ attitudinal/intentional 
aspect of one individual's personality. The personality would include some other aspects, less 
directly connected to conscious action. For instance, if a person dislikes curry sauce, this 
would be, in a way, a part of her personality, but not a part of her self-perception system 
(although her knowledge of the existence of that sauce, and her avoidance of it, would belong 
to that system). 
26 This type of purpose is viewed under different angles in cybernetics. For a close look see 
W. Buckley 1976:221-250, and F. Varela, 1980:63-69. 
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27 1 am referring to Searle's 'thought experiment' of the 'Chinese room'.[1984] (1990): 37-39. 
28 Saussure uses an analogy to show the independence of a language, as a system, from its 
past evolution: "In a chess game any position to be considered has as a peculiar property the 
fact of being free from its antecedents; the fact that such position has been reached via one 
path or another, is irrelevant. Anyone who has follow along the whole game has no advantage 
whatsoever over the casual onlooker who comes to see the state of the game at the critical 
moment; in order to describe the position, it is perfectly useless to remember what happened 
just ten seconds before. All this may be applied the same to the language, and upholds the 
radical distinction between dvachronic and synchronic phenomena" Saussure, 1916 (my own 
translation from the 1976 Spanish edition: 159-160). 
29 For a review of Mead. Dupuy and Atlan in relation to the ideas of novelty and emergence 
see Baert 1987a and 1987b. 
30 For instance Kurt Lewin, who criticizes the paradigm S—R, typical of behaviourism, as 
follows: "...the relationship S—R ... is a triggering relation, a not a causal relation. However, 
curiously enough, most of current scientific research in the field of psychology deals 
exclusively with triggering conditions and relationships. It especially calls for attention the 
fact that a distinction as fundamental as that between triggering and causation has remained 
completely ignored in psychology even at a conceptual level". Lewin, 1991: 118 (my own 
translation from the Spanish edition). 
31  A central point of contact between the behaviourist approach and social theory has been 
the concept of socialization. See, for instance, the following account of the socialization 
process: "Step by step, through punishments and rewards —very often by means of signals of 
disapproval and non violent reproaches— the first group to which the child belongs, starts to 
mould his personality according to their values and to their image of the world". Giner, 1969: 
77. 
32 This constructionist view has being assumed explicitly by Margaret Mead (1975) and most 
recently by Frederick Steir 1991: 163-185 . 
126 
Chapter 4 
Description of the Empirica Part of th 
Re arch 
4.1. The subjects of the research: Adolescents in a decisive period 
A. Elliot (1992:1) points out that 
"human beings create a self-identity, developing a sense of self that is 
sustained, consolidated and refashioned across time". 
This creation of a self-identity occurs through a process in which "the 
psyche and the social field interlace" (ibid). According to the hypothetical 
model presented in Chapters 2 and 3, a personal self-perception system may be 
considered as a reality which produces and reproduces itself in an adaptive 
way through the individual's actions and interactions in a given social 
environment. 
In this development of the self there are some stages in which the 
adaptation process of an individual's self-perception, undergoes basic changes' 
that are going to determine the whole future of such evolution. Adolescence, 
mainly in Western cultures (M. Mead, 1928), is one of those stages. It is in 
adolescence when in parallel with the physiological transformations 
characteristic of that period, the transition to an adult scheme of perception of 
reality occurs (B. Inhelder & J. Piaget, 1958; E.D. Niemark, 1975; J. C. 
Coleman & L. Hendry, 1990; J. Coger & A. Peterson, 1984, etc.). 
There are other studies that investigate the capability of individuals 
—specifically during adolescence— for the self-generation of goals and plans 
(Powell, 1982) in consonance with the presuppositions of the present research 
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about human reality. In any case, the importance of decisions made in 
adolescence has been studied by sociologists and psychologists long ago. 
Many of the researches are interested in determining the influence of peers and 
parents in the educational and occupational decisions of the adolescents 
(Coleman, 1961; Haller, 1960; Brittain, 1963; Kandel, 1969...). 
In those analyses adolescence is viewed as an important inflexion 
point in the individuals' perception of the 'self and of the world. All of them 
also stress the relevance of this period for the educational and occupational 
future of adolescents. Powell argues: 
"There is an increasing capability for the self-generation of goals among 
individuals. Individuals plan life styles and careers that extend over the 
whole of their life span, and can plan for the kind of persons they will 
become in the future. The choices an individual makes through the life 
span determine the course of development and the role that cultural and 
genetic programs may play in the process... For example, many individuals 
make careers choices early in adolescence, or even in childhood, which 
influence the rest of their lives, including how their inherited abilities are 
developed, how their abilities interact with the environment, and the range 
of choices they will be able to make later in life". A.Powel et al. 1982: 
371. 
The Spanish teenagers who are the subject of this research are about 
thirteen years old. They are in the last year of compulsory education (EGB). 
At the end of that year the ones who fail, can only continue their studies in the 
vocational branch of secondary education. The ones who succeed can choose 
between academic or vocational paths. Therefore, these adolescents are placed 
at the beginning of that critical period of personal development in which they 
are going to take some fundamental decisions. These decisions, as Powell has 
argued, would most probably shape their way of integration as adults in 
society. 
The study of the self-perception systems of these students can provide 
an image of the initial phase of their personal evolution. The individuals' self- 
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perception systems, as I argued in Chapter 3, would be the reality which 
constitute the basis for their decision making and hence for their social action. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesised that the educational behaviour of the 
individuals who are being studied, would fundamentally depend on their 
personal self-perception systems. The performance of these individuals in the 
education process would certainly be constrained by many factors, but the 
specific mechanism through which those factors influence the actions of the 
individual can only be the self-perception system of that individual2. For 
instance, suppose an individual is not very bright and has a tendency to 
underachieve academically; this tendency, however which, is based on some 
psychological features of that individual, only influences the actions of such 
an individual through her peculiar self-perception system. If this self-
perception system strongly motivates the individual towards academic 
achievement, she may overcome her difficulties, at least to some extent. 
Due to the central role that self-perception systems play in the 
students' attitudes towards education, any educational supply would only 
achieve its objectives in an efficient manner when it is adequately geared to 
the subjective educational demand of the individuals at whom it is targeted. 
And the self-perception systems of those individuals would be precisely, the 
realities which generate that demand. 
As was outlined above, in the Spanish educational system, at least 
until the current reform3, the outcome of the final year of the compulsory 
period has been decisive in determining the further relationship of the students 
with the educational system and as a consequence with the labour market and 
with adult society in general. It is at the end of the compulsory period —at 
14— when students confront a stark choice ("bachillerato" —academic 
secondary education—, "formacion profesional" —vocational education— or 
else dropping out of the educational system altogether.) This choice would 
have decisive personal and social consequences for them in the future. This is 
the reason why this research has, as its area of study, the examination of the 
subjective factors at work at this critical stage of personal evolution which 
coincides with the main bifurcation in the educational process. 
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4.2. The research stages. 
I shall give a general outline of the process of empirical research that I 
have carried out before presenting, in the following sections of this chapter 
and in subsequent chapters, a more detailed account of each of these stages. 
To give a whole picture of the research process in brief will be convenient 
because this research develops through three different stages, whose 
relationship should be taken into account from the beginning. 
The first of these stages is the content analysis of information 
provided (as written essays) by the subjects of this study. 
The second stage will be the sociosemantic analysis of the data 
generated by the previous content analysis. This second stage will be dealt 
with in the Chapter 5. 
Finally the third stage will be the full interpretive analysis of all the 
information gathered by the researcher (including the result of the previous 
content and sociosemantic analyses). I shall elaborate this third stage in 
Chapter 6. 
4.3. The subjects and the data of the research. 
In this research I use two kinds of data about the students. First, what I 
shall call background data. These data (information about age, gender, 
school, etc.) play a subsidiary role in this investigation. The main data are 
supplied by the students through written essays. Those essays, to which I shall 
refer as 'the texts', contain the information elicited by the students in a weakly 
framed self-expression process prompted by the researcher. I call the data 
provided by the texts textual data. 
In order to obtain the texts I asked 116 students of the eighth (and last) 
year of EGB —compulsory education—belonging to four state schools in 
Madrid, to write an essay on the following topic "How do you see yourself as 
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a youngster, as a middle age person and as an elderly person?". They had 
one hour to do this task. 
Those four schools are located in four areas of different 
socioeconomic level (from the lowest to the highest level: Fuenlabrada, 
Hortaleza, Virgen del Cortijo y Ciudad de los Periodistas). 
4.4. The use of essays as an instrument of research. 
4.4.1. The use of essays to elicit information. 
One important aspect in any research is the choice of adequate 
techniques in order to obtain the information that the specific kind of 
investigation requires. I shall follow a constructionist point of view here in the 
sense that I consider that observers (sociologists, for instance) merely actualize 
one of the potential 'readings' of reality. Although they cannot sensibly impose 
any sort of reading on a given reality4. This constructionist insight is added to 
a partial subjectivism5 and relativism, due to the fact of being part and parcel 
of the reality to study, society. As Levi-Strauss has pointed out: "The observer 
himself is a part of his observation" (1960:11; 1971:25). J. Ibanez takes Levi-
Strauss' perspective further: 
"The observer must assume this limitation (being part of his observation), 
he must admit that he cannot build a universally compatible knowledge, 
that the communication between the ones who know about society, 
sociologists, retains, as a specific noise, a vector of a dual confrontation. It 
does not exist a unitary and exhaustive scientific knowledge, the 
sociologist's activity includes a non-reducible, ideological element; the 
sociology is fragmented in a plural and contradictory net of possible 
sociologies" (1979:36). 
Taking this view into account, we must choose very carefully the 
specific techniques that we are going to use in our research and ponder from 
the beginning the reasons for our choice directed by the goal of a maximum 
presence of the data and a minimum of the researcher in the final output. It is 
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also convenient to consider that any particular technique constrains the object 
of the research and will have specific effects on the resulting analysis6. 
Each technique has its characteristic pros and cons. The use of open 
self-expression techniques such as essays, for obtaining relevant information 
about the subjects of a research like this, show some advantages when 
compared to other techniques more widely used (questionnaires, interviews or 
direct observation). In the first place, by using the essay technique, the 
subjects themselves are the ones who decide on the content of the information 
they provide as well, as on the form of its expression. When using this method 
-and to some extent with any method- the specific frame, the occasion and the 
motive of the interaction between the researcher and the subjects is imposed 
by the researcher. It should be observed however that in this case the specific 
motive, the topic proposed for the essays, is very general and allows an almost 
total freedom for the subjects' self-expression. Apart from this topic, the 
students were given no further instructions concerning which aspects of their 
lives they have to refer to in the essays. In this technique, information is 
elicited, by provoking its spontaneous production by the subjects; information 
is not prefigured —'prepackaged' so to speak— in the form of specific 
questions, as is the case in a questionnaire. In this way the researcher only 
minimally conditions the response of the subjects with her own self-
perception, unlike other techniques. In contrast to the higher capability of 
analytical discrimination which is the main advantage of questionnaires, a 
technique like this, which consists in analyzing the content of individual 
essays, is valuable because of its capability of holistic discrimination, in other 
words: of the detection of coherent totalities. This type of discrimination is 
especially valuable for research which tries to explore the self-perception 
models present in a group of individuals. 
The essay technique shares some of the characteristics that are typical 
of other qualitative techniques; for instance, it resembles the open interview 
technique, which in Morin's words has the following features: 
"The open question, the spontaneous answer allow (mainly in deep 
analysis) the elaboration, the true sensibility, a richness of meanings, all at 
the same time: but the maximum risk of mistake is on the side of the 
researcher, of her/his aptitude to decode the message of the interviewed (in 
our case, the writer) of her/his possibility to establishing comparisons, to 
reduce and transform a raw human document in scientific data" 
(1984:185). 
Essays on a topic similar to the one proposed in this research have 
been used in sociology by several authors interested in understanding the 
attitudes of young people. Perez Diaz (1969), Enrique Gaston (1978) and Diaz 
Martinez (1983) in Spain; Bernot and Blanchard in France (1952) have used 
an almost identical topic in different researches. In Britain J. Harding also 
used the same topic to obtain essays written by students in their teens, but she 
worded the topic from a different temporal point of view: "Pretend you are 
now 80 years old. Describe your life from your teens until your old age". 
4.4.2. Essays/Discussion groups/Questionnaires: A comparative view. 
Discussion groups, essays and other projective techniques have been 
used in market research to a greater extent than in academic research, both in 
England and Spain (R. Walker 1985; J. Ibarlez 1979; K. Young 1980)7. 
Ibanez (1979: 262 and passim) draws a comparison between two very 
different techniques of research: the discussion group and the questionnaire. 
This comparison may be extended to include a third technique: the use of 
essays as is proposed in the present research. I will follow Ibafiez's steps in 
explaining this comparison. He considers discussion groups and questionnaires 
in three particular aspects: (i) the selection of the sample, (ii) the performance 
of the subjects (their production of the discourse) and, (iii) the analysis of the 
results. 
(i) Selection of the sample. Ibanez distinguishes two basic techniques 
for selecting the sample of a research: statistical and structural. Statistical 
selection is used in questionnaires; it takes separate unities (individuals) who 
are related to each other only through the algebraic relations established a 
posteriori, in the interpretation of the questionnaire's results. For instance, 
individual X can choose response A and just for this reason she is included in 
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a set of individuals (those who have also chosen answer A) with whom she has 
is not necessarily connected in any other way. Besides, the units are selected 
according to the general criterion of 'including in the sample a part of 
everything and more of the most abundant'. The selection criterion used in a 
discussion group is structural: individuals are selected according to their 
(expected) capability to interact in such a way that they produce related 
discourses in the 'controlled' interactive situation of the discussion group. 
Now, that situation in a way mirrors possible interactions and structural 
relations characteristic of the 'non-controlled' situations of ordinary life. 
Regarding the essay technique, the selection of the sample shares 
characteristics of the two previous techniques. On the one hand, the essays 
technique tries to select a part of everything, (schools having a different social 
background), as the statistical selection does. But on the other hand, although 
there is no interaction between the students (all write their own essay without 
interacting with the group to which they belong), their spontaneous discourses 
necessarily reflect their structural relations: the information provided by these 
discourses is organic, holistic, instead of piecemeal and forcibly extracted 
from the outside (by the researcher), as is the case in questionnaires. lbaiiez 
compares the discussion group to a hologram: in an optic hologram, the object 
is generated by means of an interference pattern of light beams. In the 
discussion group the interaction between the participants also generates an 
'interference pattern' which generates a structured object of a social kind. 
Similarly, the analysis of essays that I propose can be compared to the 
working of an optical-neural computer. This type of computer (based on 
processes of interference between different holograms) can 'recognize' a given 
image among other images which contain that image among others. The input 
image (for instance, part of a human face) is projected by a laser beam, into a 
system composed by a beam splitter, a threshold device, several lenses and 
mirrors, a pinhole array, and two holograms that contain the whole input face 
among several other faces. After a number of iterations consisting in optical-
feedback loops, the system selects the whole input face, as a result of 
processes of optical interference between the input (part of that face) and the 
holograms (containing the whole of that face among others) (Abu-Mostafa and 
Psaltis, 1987). 
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It may be argued that although each essay only contains partial 
information about the self-perception system of the corresponding individual, 
the 'resonance' between those essays and similar essays allows the 
reconstruction, in holistic terms, of those self-perception systems, or more 
exactly, of abstract models of them. This 'resonance' is instrumented by means 
of the technique of 'sociosemantic analysis', which will be explained in the 
next chapter. In a way, this methodological outlook allows distinct fragments 
of information to interact and construct concurrently characteristic universes 
of meaning, which represent different types of self-perception systems. In a 
sociosemantic analysis, concepts interact ('resonate') with concepts through 
individuals, and individuals interact ('resonate') with individuals through 
concepts. In this way the meaning of each concept and the information 
provided by each individual is completed by the meaning of other concepts 
and the information provided by other individuals. The technique of 
multidimensional scaling makes it possible to visualize those interactions. 
Thus, from a set of fragmentary information we can produce a holistic view (a 
map) of the semantic and social structure of a given group. 
(ii) The performance of the subjects. With regard to the role played 
by the subjects of the research, the essays are closer to the discussion group 
than to the questionnaire, in spite of their written form. In the essays technique 
the discourse is provoked by the moderator8 by means of the proposal of the 
topic, as is the case in the discussion group. From that moment the subjects 
express themselves 'freely'9 in both cases. On the contrary, in the case of 
questionnaires the researcher strongly frames the subject's discourse by 
selecting and wording the questions to be answered as well as the range of 
admissible replies. 
I have used the word 'free' between inverted commas because neither 
the participants in a discussion group not the writer of an essay is absolutely 
free. The participants in a group see their freedom of expression hampered by 
the other participants (A. Branthwaite & T. Lunn 1985:108 and passim): A 
participant cannot risk any opinion in a group, she must avoid subjects that 
may be touchy for other participants. Her opinions may be influenced by other 
participant's opinions and so on. Similarly the writer of an essay probably 
takes into account who is asking her to write it, who can read it, etc., and this 
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clearly modulates her self-expression. But all in all these two techniques 
generate a much more 'authentic' kind of information than questionnaires, 
although the referred influences must be taken into account by the researcher. 
In both the discussion group and the essay technique the 
moderator/researcher does not control the specific topics to be dealt with, 
neither the limits not the order in which the discourse is produced: the 
participant in a group and the essay writer determine what they say, how it is 
said and in which order. In the case of questionnaires, the interest, the frame of 
mind, the interpretation of reality of the researcher are inevitably translated 
into the selection of questions and their formulation. In contrast the essay as 
well as the discussion group allows the subjects to directly express their views 
and interests in their own words making their own selection of topics. 
For example, if I design a questionnaire about the topic that I proposed 
to the subjects of this research, I would have to formulate a specific set of 
questions which would force the participants to follow my line of discourse in 
answering them. Most probably there would be aspects that some of the 
subjects would not find relevant at all, that they would never think to talk 
about if they were not obliged to by the questionnaire. At the same time there 
would be others aspects that they would like to talk about if they had the 
opportunity to do so. In this way the questionnaire alienates the respondents 
from their personal discourses. When the researcher proposes the referred 
topic for a discussion group or an essay, things develop in a very different 
way. The participant subjects decide which aspects of their foreseen future 
they want to talk about (hence to think about), and in which way they choose 
to express it. Their self-expression is 'free' to produce the kind of discourse 
they want. 
(iii) Analysis and Interpretation. The interpretation of the discourse 
produced in a discussion group is done 'in real-timer' by the participants in 
the group. That 'real-time' interpretation works in a feedback and feed-forward 
mode, and steers the process of discussion. Of course the researcher 
additionally interprets the discourse produced by the group, but this discourse 
is already the outcome of a fluid process of group self-interpretation. The 
moderator and the participants in a group interpret the situation at every 
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moment and react in consequence. On the contrary, in the case of essays and 
questionnaire techniques there is no possible feedback; the researcher just 
works with a final output which cannot be modify. In this respect, the 
difference between essays and questionnaires lies in the fact that essays (as 
discussion groups) allow an open, 'creative' 1 interpretation, whereas the 
interpretation of questionnaires is closed (it exists a priori, and is done when 
the researcher designs the questionnaire; if the interpretation were not a priori 
and closed, the addition of the answers and their further statistical treatment 
would be meaningless. In a public-opinion poll or in an interview with 
questionnaire the meaning must be prepackaged, in such a way that any 
answer is literally and semantically equivalent to any other identical answer. In 
order to do this a detailed plan of treatment of the information to be obtained 
must be established in the process of designing the questionnaire. In the design 
of a questionnaire the meaning of the answers is imposed by the researcher, as 
S.R. Brown (1980:3) has argued, 
" By defining ahead of time what a response is to mean, the observer is 
imposing his will on reality, exacting hostages of innocent responses 
scheduled for future occurrence." 
This is impossible in the case of open techniques; here the researcher 
does not have the possibility of fixing and knowing in advance what the 
subjects are going to say, how the information structure is going to look or any 
other thing about the content. The line of interpretation and analysis of 
discussion groups and written essays is not known beforehand12. It is based on 
a content analysis of the discourse produced by the subjects. This content 
analysis operates on the texts generated by those subjects and produces an a 
posteriori information structure which must be further interpreted. I shall detail 
now the concrete process of content analysis done in the present research 
which constitutes the first stage of my empiric research. 
4.5. Conceptual and attitudinal content analysis. 
The kind of content analysis which I am going to develop is rather 
different from other methods which also bear the name of content analysis. 
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Frequently content analysis is understood to be a study of the literal expression 
of meaning; more exactly as an analysis of the semantic nuances that different 
forms of expression give to meaning. In a nutshell: some kinds of content 
analysis study meaning at the level of grammatical meaning rather than at the 
level of lexical and conceptual meaning13. Grammar works following its own 
rules, and hence it is possible to study a text from the point of view of those 
rules. But I am interested in another sort of content analysis: an analysis 
primarily made from the point of view of semantics. Consequently I shall 
assume that the basic content of a text lies in the concepts and attitudes which 
it expresses. From this point of view, the same concept/attitude may be 
expressed in different ways; therefore with different connotations. But still the 
basic concept/attitude remains essentially identical through all those different 
ways of expressing it. This kind of content analysis that assumes as its tasks 
the detection of the conceptual/attitudinal references underlying texts, is 
necessary in order to implement the technique of sociosemantic analysis which 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
The objective of this kind of content analysis, as implemented in the 
following pages is to abstract the conceptual and attitudinal content of the 
texts (the essays) produced by the students, as a first step to understanding 
their self-perception systems. The relevance of analyzing the language 
explicitly used by a person as a means to understand that person's perception 
of her/himself and of the world is pointed out by Coxon (1979:2): 
"Usually we gain access to conceptions by means of language. When we 
communicate with others we select concepts (which are component aspects 
of our models of the world)". 
In accordance with that conception of content analysis, the formal 
aspects of the essays (such as extension, vocabulary, style, etc.) as well as 
other strictly linguistic aspects (to be indicated in section 7.1) will not be 
considered in our analysis. Certainly a concept or an attitude can only be 
separated from its linguistic expression at the cost of losing some information 
in the process. Nevertheless the kind of attitudinal/conceptual analysis that I 
am proposing disregards those aspects of the text that are 'purely linguistic' 
(for instance, the use of specific verbal moods, the specificity in the use of 
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adjectives, etc.), in order to produce adequate data for the referred 
sociosemantic analysis, which should follow the stage of content analysis. By 
taking that methodological option I am not suggesting that those linguistic 
aspects are not significant. In fact there are no 'purely' linguistic aspects at all, 
because all the features of a text portray the cognitive strategies (the way of 
conceiving reality) of its author14. Analyses stressing these aspects have 
already been developed in the field of sociology of education, by several 
authors (Bernstein 1970, 1971a, 1971b; Adlam 1977; Turner and Mohan 1970; 
Labov, 1969,1972). 
The methodological option15 that chooses to focus on the purely 
attitudinal conceptual content of the subjects self-expression responds not only 
to the need to implement the sociosemantic technique, but also to the general 
purpose of this research, which is to abstract the models of self-perception 
present among those subjects. If my purpose had been to study individual self-
perception systems following, for instance, a case study methodology, refering 
primarily to the literal expressions of the text would have been unavoidable. 
But I do not intend to use a case study methodology, although in chapter six I 
shall refer to specific cases in order to exemplify the self-perception models 
that I shall postulate. 
4.6. Epistemological problems posed by the essays technique. 
In this section I shall discuss some general problems, of an 
epistemological kind, which specifically arise from the use of the essays 
technique as an instrument of research. 
4.6.1 Content analysis and intuitive analysis. 
An analysis of the content of a text (especially, of its conceptual and 
attitudinal content) may be done in a purely intuitive way. The researcher can 
just try to understand intuitively the similarities and differences between 
different texts. This can provide a basis for the classification of those texts. 
However a purely intuitive analysis depends exclusively on the researchers' 
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social insight. This insight is, on the one hand, necessary and extremely 
valuable; the bulk of social research hinges in that insight, and no 'objective' 
technique can compete with it in terms of flexibility and depth16. But on the 
other hand the researcher's insight imposes on the information that she 
scrutinizes her own limitations and blind spots in understanding. Our social 
insight —that of ordinary social subjects as well as that of social researchers—
is at the same time very powerful and very biased17. 
An 'objective' method of content analysis can discipline the 
researcher's intuition, guide her insight, alert her about her blind spots, and act 
as a general heuristic tool. It can be said that 'objective' methods can only work 
as heuristic tools and control mechanisms of the sociologist's insight. Certainly 
any 'objective' method of analysis is also a construction of the researcher, it 
does not exist in itself. As Krippendorff says "in content analysis the content 
of a text always is the analyst's construction" (K. Krippendorff 1991:128). 
Both objective and intuitive methods show their 'goodness of fit' with respect 
to reality by locking into each other and being mutually consistent in their 
results. 
When a researcher faces a content analysis, by using a method such as 
the essays technique she does not only makes a 'translation' (U.Eco, 1975) of 
the texts; she locates herself at a meta-level in relation to the texts. Placed at 
that meta-level, the researcher can establish several 'frames' (G. Bateson, 1972: 
184-192) from which she can read a given message in different ways, 
depending on the frame in which she locates that message. From that meta-
communicational level the researcher can place each individual text within the 
frame of the whole sample of texts (the one hundred essays), operating as a 
'model reader' (U.Eco, 1979), and covering the empty spaces of the texts. 
4.6.2. The Problem of homogeneity. 
A fundamental presupposition behind the use of textual data such as 
those provided by essays in this investigation, is that each individual does 
express critical aspects of her self-perception system in those essays. The use 
of this method assumes that in fact individuals are going to express 
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spontaneously at least some of these critical aspects. There is no way a priori 
to ensure that it is going to be so, the researcher must just look at the results 
(the essays). Nevertheless the framing of the essays by the researcher —and 
above all— the proposal of an adequate topic should increase the chances of 
getting a textual outcome that provides a deep insight into those critical 
aspects. 
However, at this point the essays technique is exposed to an apparent 
shortcoming: probably, each individual is going to express different aspects of 
her self-perception system, and with different degrees of candour, and that 
entails an additional difficulty in analyzing the whole set of texts in a coherent 
way. I shall deal with the problem of frankness afterwards. Regarding the 
problem of diversity between the essays' content, it should be noted that such 
an apparent lack of homogeneity, instead of posing a problem constitutes the 
basic frame which gives sense to the meanings embodied in the texts: meaning 
is built not only in what a subject says, but also on what that subject does not 
say. In the essays technique the deeper differences in the meanings expressed 
by two subjects are not in their different opinions about the same things, but in 
the fact that they choose to give their opinion on different things. 
Other methods of gathering information, like for example 
questionnaires, ensure the homogenization of the expressivity of the 
individuals (the content that they express) to whom information is requested 
(the content that they express) by strongly framing that expressivity (for 
example, through specific questions which elicit answers of equivalent 
specificity). The price for this homogeneity is always a curtailment of the 
individual's expressivity. To some extent, a questionnaire gives information 
about what some people (those who answer the questionnaire) think about 
other people's (the authors of the questionnaire) thinking. On the contrary, 
weakly framed methods of information gathering like essays and discussion 
groups allow a much freer expression of the individuals: they do not just give 
their opinion on something, but choose about what to give an opinion. 
Homogeneity is not the aim of qualitative research as R. Walker (1985:3) 
points out : 
"whereas the quantitative approach necessitates standardized data 
collection, qualitative researchers exploit the context of data gathering 
to enhance the value of the data". 
4.6.3 The problem of relevance. 
The advantages of strongly framed methods of information gathering 
come from the fact that the homogeneity which they impose on the 
expressivity of the subjects who are the sources of information, automatically 
focuses that information on the very process of its generation. This focusing 
power means, on the one hand, that a very specific sort of information can be 
generated (ex.:'Do you agree with the Maastrich Treaty?); and on the other 
hand, it means that the interpretation of that information seems to be direct and 
unequivocal. Thus, a strong frame provides a sort of built-in capability to 
focus information. On the contrary, weakly framed or open methods cannot 
provide such built-in capability to focus the information to be gathered. 
In strongly framed methods, the relevance of the obtained information 
is guaranteed by the focusing power of the frame. What then is the guarantee 
of the relevance of the information obtained by a weakly framed method? 
Well, there is no a priori guarantee; in weakly structured techniques the 
relevance of the information gathered is not guaranteed beforehand by the 
frame, but only facilitated by that frame. The actual relevance of the obtained 
information would be discovered by the researcher in an a posteriori 
interpretative process. Hence, the information gathered through a weakly 
framed technique made relevant by the researcher using some specific process 
of interpretation. It is that process which creates its own criterion of 
relevance18. 
But if the information gathered by means of weakly framed methods is 
not automatically relevant, certainly it should include elements apt to become 
relevant through adequate interpretation. Why should it be expected that the 
generated information includes those relevant elements at all? Specifically, 
why should the essays express significant aspects of the students 
self-perception? The answer is very simple: because the weak frame imposed 
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by the researcher —and above all— the topic of the essay is sufficiently 
general and, at the same time, deep enough to provoke a global reviewing by 
the individual of his/her self-perception system as a whole. The fact that the 
contents of that reviewing are not homogeneous does not diminishe their 
relevance, so far as they illuminate central aspects of the individuals 
self-perception system. On the contrary, it is just this lack of homogeneity that 
gives those contents a special relevance, because it indicates the existence of 
qualitative differences between the self-perception models underlying those 
contents. In fact, whereas in closed methods it is the convergent aspect of 
information that is relevant, in open methods it is the divergent aspect of 
information that is relevant. 
4.6.4. The problem of reliability. 
Certainly, neither the answers to a questionnaire nor the expressions 
within an essay, should always be considered sincere. People can prevaricate 
in an essay, as they can prevaricate with a questionnaire. Also, in an essay 
they can express themselves in a more or less reserved manner, as they can 
choose not to answer some questions in a questionnaire or in an interview 
—however in this case to deny information requires explicitly to say 'no', and 
that usually implies some psychological stress—. Consequently every method 
should face the problem of the reliability of the data that it generates. 
Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between strongly framed and weakly 
framed methods: it is more difficult to prevaricate in an essay than to 
prevaricate with a questionnaire; the reason for this is that in the first case you 
have to construct your own prevarication, by creating the context in which it is 
going to look coherent —which is not so easy—, whereas in the second case 
the lie is already at hand —the context is created, you only have to chose the 
untruthful answer. As a result of that, it is easier to detect incoherences in a 
context of open expressivity than to do so in a context of strongly framed 
expressivity. In reality the students who wrote the essays showed a remarkable 
candour; there are 'objective' incoherences (mismatch between actual reality 
and expectations) in their texts, but no pretenses. 
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4.6.5. Open and synergetic, versus closed and analytyc meaning. 
To summarize the previous remarks on the characteristics of open 
methods in general, and the of the essays technique in particular, these 
methods may be describe as synergetic. Strongly framed methods are lacking 
in synergetic capabilities, because of the analytical outlook. For instance, a set 
of answers to a closed questionnaire does not add any meaning to any other set 
of answers (the meanings of different sets of answers do not interact). On the 
contrary, open methods work in a holistic, synergetic way. In these methods 
the individual meanings do interact; in other words, meaning is interpreted as a 
whole reality, through a synergetic relationship between individual meanings. 
That holistic conception of information when gathered through weakly 
framed methods, poses additional problems. Because if the information 
provided by an individual should be related in the process of interpretation to 
the information provided by other individuals, it is necessary to relate through 
some specific technique the informative content of the individuals' essays. The 
relationship of the informative content of the answers to a questionnaire is a 
priori determined by the constraints imposed by the questions and the 
permissible answers (any answer says strictly the same as any other answer 
that says the same). In contrast, when open methods are used, that relationship 
has to be constructed a posteriori through some processes of interpretation of 
that content (that is the aim of sociosemantic analysis). And the researcher 
should not forget in this process that 
"in content analysis the context of a text always is the analyst's 
construction. It is created within an operational discourse and ultimately 
directs the network of arguments and computations of an analysis" (K. 
Krippendorff, 1991:128). 
4. 7. Methodological problems of the essays technique. 
Besides those epistemological problems, the essays technique poses 
more specific problems of a methodological kind. The researcher confronts 
texts which must be analyzed following procedures as explicit as possible. In 
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this section I shall detail the methodological presuppositions and specific 
procedures that I have followed in the content analysis of the texts. 
4.7.1. Linguistic and conceptual approaches. 
The essays' informative content is embodied in its literal content. 
Therefore, in order to determine that informative content we must start from 
the consideration of that literal content. Such content can be approached from 
two basic perspectives, to which I have previously referred when speaking of 
the level of grammatical meaning and the level of lexical meaning in a text 
(see section five of this chapter). The grammatical level roughly corresponds 
to the literal, 'linguistic' level of a text19, whereas the semantic level would 
correspond to the underlying 'conceptual' structure of it. 
As I intend to reach that underlying conceptual level, I should face, as 
a first methodological question, the problem of the relationships that exist 
between such conceptual level and the literal, strictly linguistic level of the 
texts —which is the reality immediately given to the researcher. 
From a linguistic standpoint, the information carried by the literal 
content of the essays would consist in the specific patterns of use of the 
language revealed through that literal content. For this approach, the presence 
of certain lexical, morphologic and syntactic traits in the language of some 
individual would be the relevant (and revealing) aspect of that individual's 
literal expressions. From a conceptual viewpoint, the relevant information 
expressed by the literal content of the essays would rather be the concrete 
conceptual frame portrayed through that literal content. Both approaches are 
quite legitimate, and may be attempted separately by abstracting one aspect 
(linguistic or conceptual) of the literal content of any text. 
As already noted a 'linguistic approach' has been applied in the 
specific field of the sociology of education since the 1950's and with 
considerable success20. The basic assumption of that approach has usually 
been the conception of linguistic differences as indicating social differences on 
the one hand, and cognitive differences on the other. Those cognitive 
differences are frequently understood as diverse cognitive styles. It is an 
145 
approach that tries to distinguish the formal traits of cognition (or at least, of 
the linguistic expression of cognition) in order to reveal different ways in 
which those traits are systematically combined. Those diverse forms of 
knowing would be the different cognitive styles which are relevant to 
sociology in so far as it can be shown that they are distributed among a given 
population in accordance with some of the social characteristics of that 
population. Undoubtedly the discovery of different cognitive/linguistic styles 
and that of their diverse distribution in society has been an important, although 
polemic, theoretic finding21. 
However the linguistic approach has limitations which originate in 
some of its basic assumptions. The problem is that this approach, by trying to 
infer from just the linguistic features of some subjects' expressions not only the 
cognitive characteristics of those subjects, but also its social standing, misses 
out another essential aspects also revealed by those expressions22. The 
linguistic outlook is built upon a double process of abstraction. First, it 
abstracts cognition from other aspects that determine human behaviour 
(affective and emotional aspects). Second, that viewpoint abstracts the form of 
cognition from its content. Certainly, this double abstraction, when executed 
upon human expressions, leaves out of consideration fundamental aspects of 
those expressions. The specific sort of behaviour that characterizes human 
beings is human action. Now, cognition is only one aspect of human action; 
besides having a cognitive aspect, human action has a volitive (hence 
attitudinal and, in the last analysis, affective and emotional) and a social aspect 
(the concrete social process of interaction entailed by a certain action). It is in 
action where those cognitive, volitive and social aspects interact and mutually 
determine the development of each other. It is in action that all those aspects, 
cognitive, volitive and social generate (produce and reproduce) themselves, in 
a relationship of reciprocal causality23. 
Furthermore, cognitive, volitive and social aspects are related in action 
concretely, through their specific contents. A purely linguistic approach to 
cognition, through the referred double abstraction, on the one hand 
understands the notion of cognition out of the action stage, in isolation from its 
relation to volitive and social aspects. And on the other hand, that approach 
considers the concept of cognition in a formal way, and as a result it overlooks 
146 
the contents that are present in any act of cognition. Due to this double 
disregard of both the action context and the contents of cognition, the 
linguistic approach to cognition cannot give a satisfactory genetic account of 
the many-sided reality of social cognition by itself. That approach is capable it 
describing how cognitive styles are different, but it does not explicate how 
those different styles are related to characteristic concrete contents and to 
specific volitive styles, nor does it indicate, other than in generic terms, how 
those cognitive and volitive styles generate and evolve in society. 
The 'conceptual approach' to the content of the essays, which in a way 
is complementary to the linguistic approach, is not primarily interested in the 
specific traits of language usage expressed in those essays, nor is it chiefly 
concerned with the formal cognitive styles revealed by that content. It is 
fundamentally interested in the specific self-perception systems exemplified 
by that content. 
Now, a self-perception system is a concrete conceptual reality; it is 
made up of particular concepts which are coherently related. Probably 
self-perception systems have characteristic cognitive forms, but they are not 
those forms, but realities in which any form is embodied in a concrete content: 
self-perception systems are meaningful systems only through that content, and 
consequently the abstraction of it amounts to the destruction of the meaning 
and hence of the very essence of those systems. Accordingly, a self-perception 
system is not a cognitive style. It integrates cognitive, volitive and social 
aspects, and it does so in a concrete way: the cognitive aspect, has a concrete 
content, as this is also the case for the other aspects. 
To sum up, when assuming a conceptual point of view, the relevant 
contents of the essays are the specific concepts expressed in them, concepts 
which are not only of a cognitive type, but also of a pragmatic and volitive 
nature: concepts about things, but also about actions and desires. 
4.7.2. The reading of the texts. 
The purpose of this content analysis that I am proposing is twofold: 
first, to understand each text, its characteristic internal coherence, in the 
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context of the whole set of texts and in contrast with the other texts. Second, 
to discover the type or model of self-perception system of the student who 
wrote it. A particular text is viewed as a concrete manifestation which 
indicates the author's system of (social) self-perception. The comprehension of 
texts' content should be done by means of a feed-back loop: individual text—* 
whole of the texts-4individual text... A first reading of an individual text 
provides an initial holistic picture of the author's self-perception. When all of 
the texts have been read once, the researcher should start a second reading. 
Now the meaning of each individual text is redefined by the researcher as she 
takes into account the content of the other texts which she has already read. It 
is a process that must be repeated as many times as necessary, in order to 
refine the particular meanings of the texts through their synergetic 
relationships. This stage of the process of content analysis is purely intuitive, 
though fundamental: the researcher needs to have a detailed knowledge of the 
texts before she tries to pass on to the subsequent stages of the analysis. 
4.7.3. From expressions to concepts. 
In the second stage of the analysis, the researcher must 'translate' the 
expressions which make up the texts into concepts. This translation represents 
a major methodological problem. Concepts are embodied in literal expressions 
but obviously the relation between the concepts and their literal expressions is 
not a univocal: different literal expressions can represent the same concept, 
and the same literal expression can represent different concepts. Homonymy 
and synonymy are wide spread phenomena in natural language. 
On the other hand an expression can include several concepts, located 
at different levels within that expression, for instance the expression " One of 
my sons should be un upholster" includes, at least, the concepts "wanting to 
have sons", and "wanting to be an upholster". The second concept is referred 
to and qualifies the first (one of the sons). Consequently, we can understand 
the whole expression as a single concept ('wanting that one of his sons 
becomes an upholster'), or as a combination of concepts located at a lower 
level. Therefore a specific expression can be 'read' in different ways from a 
conceptual point of view, and there is not automatic correspondence between 
expressions and concepts. This lack of automatism becomes more evident 
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when one considers that the type of information making up the basis of the 
analysis in this research is of a weakly framed type. Strongly framed methods 
can avoid many of the pitfalls of homonymy/synonymy by controlling the 
wording of the information to be analyzed. This possibility hardly exists in the 
case of weakly framed techniques. When using these techniques it is not 
possible to achieve, through the imposition of an a priori standard, a direct and 
unequivocal equivalence between expressions and concepts. Besides, that 
equivalence cannot be thought of as being established just within each 
individual essay, independently from the contents of the other essays: as 
already stated, in this research the information spontaneously produced by 
each individual is going to be interpreted through its synergetic relation with 
the information generated by other individuals; as a result, the difficulties 
originated in the phenomena of homonymy/synonymy, which are a feature of 
natural language, are going to be compounded by the difficulties arising from 
individual differences in expressiveness. 
4.7.3.1. Identification of conceptual expressions.  
Although an automatic translation from expressions to concepts is not 
possible, some criteria to guide the researcher's insight along that translation 
seem necessary. Some kind of conceptual reduction of the expressions 
constituting the literal content of the texts is required in order to determine 
their conceptual content. First of all, it is necessary to establish a criterium to 
select the kind of expressions which are going to be considered as 
conceptually significant. In very general terms, an expression may be defined 
as anything that carries some meaning; in other words, an expression is 
something that somebody can understand as referring to some other thing. I 
can understand that something is an expression (that something has some 
meaning) and yet I can be unable to decipher such meaning. For example I can 
consider a Chinese ideogram knowing that it is an expression but being unable 
to attach any meaning to it. In that case I am considering or mentioning that 
expression, but I am not effectively using it. A meaningful expression is an 
expression which is effectively used (to which a specific meaning is attached). 
All the expressions that appear in the essays are meaningful expression in this 
sense: all of them are used (and not just mentioned) by their authors. 
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A meaningful expression always refers (albeit in an implicit manner) 
to some subjects who understand it. From a social point of view (with 
reference to a given social group) an expression has a social meaning when at 
least one of the subjects belonging to the reference group somewhat 
understands that expression. Hence, the (social) meaning of an expression 
depends on the reference group that we are considering (the meaning of the 
word 'job' is not the same in Whitehall as in Soweto). Obviously, the reference 
group which constitutes the backcloth of (social) meaning in this research is 
the set of students who authored the essays. 
As all the expressions in the texts are effectively used (and not just 
mentioned), the starting presupposition of the analysis will be that all those 
expressions have a meaning, at least for their authors. But from an operational 
point of view this analysis will consider as an individual (meaningful) 
expression any string of text that carries a minimally definite meaning, 
detectable by the researcher. From that perspective the smallest, atomic, 
expressions are words. But larger strings of text, like phrases, clauses, 
sentences, groups of sentences and whole essays may also be considered as 
expressions of a molecular kind. The criterium that allow us to consider all 
those strings of texts as individual expressions is the same: effective use; any 
effectively used word has some meaning, and therefore is an (individual) 
expression. Similarly, every effectively used phrase, sentence, etc., has some 
meaning, and therefore is an (individual) expression as well. 
4.7.3.2. Identification of significant words.  
I shall examine first the problems involved in the determination of the 
meaning of individual words. Not all words are equally significant from the 
point of view of conceptual meaning (J. Lyons, 1977:3-7; 49-55; 167-216)24. 
There are two basic kinds of words: words which refer to an extra-linguistic 
reality (categorematic), and words which represent a purely linguistic 
relationship (sincategorematic). Categorematic words are mainly nouns, verbs, 
and adverbs. An example of sincategorematic words are the conjunctions 
which link sentences through an interpretation of the subject declarative 
attitude, —concessive, adversative, etc. The subject's declarative attitude can 
be expressed not only through sincategorematic terms but also 
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morphologically by means of the use of the appropriate verbal tense and mood. 
A grammatical analysis of these matters may be highly revealing. However I 
am interested in the conceptual content of the texts, and this content is 
embodied in the categorematic words. Consequently, in this analysis, 
sincategorematic words will be discarded as autonomous meaningful units. 
The categorematic terms, on which I shall focus may be classified 
according to the role that they play in the sentence. There are categorematic 
terms whose meaning refers to very general relationship between any kind of 
objects, they are the prepositions. As they have this very general character and 
in spite of the fact that an analysis of them may clarify important aspects of the 
cognitive style of the reference individuals, I shall not consider them as 
autonomous meaningful units. The meaning of adverbs is not as general as that 
of the prepositions. Nevertheless, in a sense adverbs lack independent meaning 
and for this reason they will not be considered as meaningful autonomous 
units either. 
There are three kind of categorematic words left: substantives (which 
would include articles and pronouns), adjectives and verbs. Clearly they have 
some sort of autonomous, extralinguistic meaning, and therefore they are the 
best candidates to be considered as the basic units in a process of conceptual 
content analysis. However the meaning of these words can be more or less 
generic. Verbs such as 'to go', adjectives such as 'independent', substantives 
such as 'thing' are very general (they can be used to express very different 
realities which have no relation between them). Their specific meanings 
depend on the context. Besides, the words that have a more general conceptual 
content are more widely used, and because of that their use has less 
contrasting power from a social point of view: everybody uses the word and 
the generic concept 'thing'. Therefore not all nouns and verbs can be 
effectively used as autonomous units of meaning. Those which are too generic 
should be discarded for that purpose. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
words that carry too specific a meaning (for instance, some proper names) 
often have a use which is very narrow (frequently they are used by just one 
individual in the group of reference). For that reason they also lack in 
contrasting power, and consequently they will not be considered as 
autonomous units of meaning either. 
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In sum, the words that the researcher must select initially as 
autonomous meaningful units are nouns and verbs that refer to concepts which 
are neither too generic, nor too restrictive (for instance 'disco', 'fiancee', 
'university', 'studying' ...). 
4.7.3.3 Identification of significant clauses.  
The selection of these words provides a first view of the meaning 
structure of the texts. However the meaning of individual words often becomes 
specified and clarified by the clause to which those words belong. For 
instance, the word 'maths.' is further specified in sentences such as 'I love 
maths', or in the correspondent clause 'to love maths'. Clauses constitute 
molecular units of meaning within which the separate meanings of the 
component words interact and produce a specific total meaning. Because of 
that the initial selection of words should be further specified by a second 
selection made of by the clauses to which those words belong. In this second 
selection (of clauses) some words that were initially disregarded will appear, 
as components of clauses nucleated around words belonging to the first 
selection (of words). For instance, if the word 'disco' has being included in the 
first (word) selection, the second (clause) selection will include the clause 
'going to the disco', one of which components is the verb 'to go' that was not 
included in the first (word) selection. Therefore as the analysis progresses 
from the word level to the clause level, words which were initially ignored are 
rescued and integrated into molecular units of meaning. Obviously the selected 
clauses have as implicit subject the author of the text, and in this sense they 
are equivalent to sentences. 
The clauses selected from each text compose an individual's list, and 
the whole of those lists make up a general list of clauses. 
4.7.3.4. The relationship between concepts and attitudes.  
Each individual clause relates (at least) a verb to (at least) an object, 
now this combination verb-object not only expresses an objective concept but 
also a subjective attitude. Therefore it is at the clause level where conceptual 
content analysis and attitudinal content analysis interlock in a single reality. 
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For instance "not liking to be taken to an old people's home" (a clause 
corresponding to the literal sentence "I don't like to be taken to an old people's 
home"), is a clause which combines a conceptual content ("to be taken to an 
old people's home") and an attitude expressed by the author of the text ("not 
liking... "). In fact, concepts and attitudes are not separate things, but two 
aspects of a single expressive act. An attitude is intentionally directed towards 
an object which is perceived and expressed by means of a concept; and the use 
of a concept automatically relates a certain attitude to it (this attitude can be 
rather detached from an emotional point of view, as when one says "suppose 
that... " or "in fact..." ; these are hypothetical or declarative attitudes. 
When student number 61 says "I want to be a doctor and specialize as 
a gynaecologist" (the corresponding clause would be "wanting to be a doctor 
and specialize as a gynaecologist"), she is not only using the concepts 'doctor' 
and 'gynaecologist', but at the same time she is relating to those concepts 
through an attitude ("to want to be"). Consequently I shall not consider 
attitudes and concepts separately in my analysis, but as two aspects of a single 
reality (two aspects that interlock at the clause level). Properly speaking each 
of those single realities should be called an attitudinal concept —for instance, 
"to want to be a doctor"—, but for the sake of brevity I shall simply call them 
concepts. Henceforth, when I speak about 'concepts' I am referring to 
'attitudinal concepts'. (In reality, clauses are not concepts but expressions of 
them; they are, so to speak, 'names' of concepts. However to introduce that 
distinction would be quite cumbersome, and for this reason I shall directly 
consider the refer clauses as concepts in the indicated sense). 
4.7.3.5. Constructing a list of concepts from a list of clauses.  
I have tried to show that clauses express (attitudinal) concepts. 
However, some clauses do not include in an explicit manner the attitudinal 
verb. To be able to 'read' comfortably the clauses as concepts, the researcher 
has to complete them, adding the missing elements. For instance, the sentence 
"I see myself helping my father" and the corresponding clause "to see oneself 
helping his/her father" are lacking in any explicit attitudinal verb. But the 
context clearly indicates that the attitude that the author attaches to the 
sentence is a positive one ("I'm prepared and expect to help my father"). 
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Consequently, many of the selected clauses that compose the individuals' and 
general lists have to be worded in a new form in order to make their attitudinal 
components explicit. When the attitudinal component of a clause has been 
reformulated it will be written between squared brackets. 
An analysis along this line of the one hundred essays, produce a list of 
clauses representing concepts with nearly two thousand entries. I call this list 
the general list of concepts. 
4.7.4. From concepts to categories. 
The general list of concepts has a variegated aspect. However many 
concepts that appear in the list may be considered as different versions of the 
same basic conceptual content. For example the concepts "wife" and "spouse" 
(in Spanish 'mujer' and 'esposa') are terms which refer to slightly different 
concepts; but those two concepts share, to a large extent, a common core. In 
order to make explicit the common conceptual core underlying similar 
concepts a process of interpretation is required. This process in which the 
researcher should use her linguistic and sociological insight carefully, seeks 
the grouping of homologous concepts belonging to the same 'semantic family'. 
For instance '(wanting) to help (economically) own children' and 'not liking to 
see own children lacking in anything' are obviously homologous concepts. 
This process of conceptual homologation can be done by the 
researcher herself, who may use capabilities of linguistic and social intuition, 
or it can be done by any other social agent who belongs to the reference 
culture. In fact, these social agents might be a sample of the very reference 
subjects, in which case (part of) these subjects would act as interpreters of 
their own texts. This technique of self-interpretation would provide the 
research process with a reflexive basis25. However to implement that 
technique of self-interpretation would pose further methodological problems, 
adding a great deal of complexity to this research. Therefore I have opted for a 
more traditional technique: I have done the interpretation by myself, trying to 
work as if I were in the students' shoes. In any case the process of 
interpretation that I call 'conceptual homologation' is a reflexive process26: 
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some social subjects produce a discourse that is homologated by other social 
subjects who can be some of the former, but in any case belong to the same 
reference culture or are familiar with it. 
Key words can connect homologous concepts, which are express by 
different clauses. For example the word 'children' is one of those key words, 
and connect clauses such as 'wanting to take care of own children' and 'not 
wanting to see own children lacking of anything'. In this way the general 
concept list interacts with the initial word list. The analogous association of 
whichever two concepts with one or several other concepts in the texts is an 
evident indication of conceptual similitude. The conceptual homologation 
process must pay attention to the connections that the concepts show in the 
texts, in order to give each concept as much information of its context as 
possible. In fact 
"The chosen unity of analysis depends on the linguistic configuration in 
which the relevant content is included" (R. Mayntz, 1975, 204). 
The method of analysis that I am proposing is not analytic in the usual 
sense of the term. It is a nonreductive method of analysis. It involves two 
operations: first, a set of meaning units will be selected from the texts. These 
units must have an autonomous, partially context-free meaning. Second, the 
specification of the meaning of those units has to be redefined by looking at 
their contexts: a given unit can be located in different contexts and the 
interplay between those contexts must redefine the meaning of such a unit. In 
order to do that, we will place the single units (key words) opposite to the 
complex units (conceptual clauses) from which they are a part. As a 
consequence of this the list of general concepts becomes structured on two 
levels. Thus, the process of conceptual homologation works not only with the 
isolated meanings of the conceptual clauses but also, through the key words, 
with the concurrent meaning of different conceptual clauses. In other words by 
means of this method, specific concepts reciprocally define their meanings 
through the interplay between the diverse concepts in which they appear. 
The use of this type of non reductive analysis is justified on both 
theoretical and practical grounds. As I said before, a self-perception system is 
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made up not only of the cognitive structure of the individual, but also of her 
attitudinal, volitive, emotional, affective structures. A reductive analysis which 
would consider concepts from a context-free point of view, would offer an 
approximate image of the purely cognitive aspect of an individual, an image of 
the things she knows. But it will never be suitable to mirror the attitudinal 
aspects of her self-perception. The use of a reductive type of analysis would 
not enable the researcher to illuminate which is the volitive, affective, 
emotional dynamic in which the subject locates and makes sense of the things 
she is talking about. In order to capture these aspects it is necessary to have the 
ability to refer to the diverse context of each of the units of the analysis at any 
moment. The homologation process is not only an assimilation but a structural 
organization of concepts. In fact, concept homologation is produced by that 
structural organization. 
The examination of the general list of concepts and key words, allows 
the researcher to group families of similar concepts. Each of these families is 
called a category. Hence, a category is a general concept which underlies a 
family of specific concepts (by means of particular clauses). For instance "I 
see myself living in an old people's home" and "When I'm old my children will 
take care of me" are sentences whose underlying particular concepts which 
may be assimilated under the category "(contemplates) negative/dependent old 
age". 
This category is opposite to the category "(contemplates) 
positive/independent old age", which is exemplified by expressions such as: 
"When I'm old and retired, I'll travel a lot and enjoy all things I couldn't when I 
was working" or "When I'm an old women I shall travel a lot all around the 
world". This grouping of concepts into categories produces a general list of 
conceptual categories (categories for short). My first list had a total number of 
81 categories and the number of categories used by each student ranged from 
four to twenty four. 
This process of conceptual assimilation that I call 'homologation', has 
been defined by G.A. Miller, who uses also the word 'category', in the 
following terms: 
"In order to handle big collections of verbal material... it seems 
indispensable to reduce the, variety of alternatives... this can be done 
uniting in a single category a wide variety of structures of different words" 
(1951: 95). 
The categories used by each subject are specified in an individual list. 
These individual lists are the final outcome of the first stage of my analysis, 
the stage of content analysis, and provide the data for the second stage of this 
analysis. The idea is, in the first place, to use those data as the input for a 
Q-analysis (connectivity analysis). The connectivity or Q-analytic connection 
between individuals consists in the relationships of conceptual affinity that 
each individual maintains with the others, by means of the use of a common 
repertoire of categories. The strength of the connection between any two 
individuals is given by the number of categories that they share. In a similar 
way the connectivity between categories consists in the relationships of social 
affinity that each category maintains with the others on the basis of the fact 
that they are used by the same individuals. The strength of the connection 
between any two categories is given by the number of individuals who share 
them. 
I have not however done this connectivity analysis in the way in which 
Q-analysis contemplates it. The reason for this is that if I had attempted an 
orthodox Q-analysis I would have obtained data unsuitable to be treated by 
means of the mathematical technique (multidimensional scaling or MDS) 
which is the instrument of the sociosemantic analysis that constitutes the 
second stage of my analysis. An orthodox Q-analysis would have generated 
some zero value connections, as well as some 'full' connections; these values 
are unsuitable as proximity values, which are the input to any 
multidimensional scaling. 
Therefore as I shall explain in the next chapter, instead of a standard 
Q-analysis I have used a similarity coefficient (JACCARD) to compute the 
strength of the connections between concepts and between individuals. The 
similarity values produced by computing that coefficient are the proximity 
values which constitute the input to the MDS. The output of the MDS are two 
kind of plots which will be called sociosemantic plots. One of them represents 
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sociodistances between categories, and the other semantic or communicational 
distances between individuals. Those plots should be interpreted in order to 
find relevant configurations in them. Hopefully, these configurations may 
correspond to distinct self-perception models and self-perception social 
groups. 
The determination of those sociosemantic configurations lends an 
'objective' basis to the third stage of the research, the full interpretation of the 
texts by the researcher. This objective basis, as already indicated, provides 
heuristic hints for the researcher and at the same time controls and 
corroborates her interpretative intuition. Thus, intuition plays a key role at the 
beginning (determination of concepts and abstraction of categories) as well as 
the end (full hermeneutic analysis) of the whole process, whereas the 
sociosemantic stage provides the kind of information which transforms the 
researchers' spontaneous insight into a tutored insight. 
4.8. Examples of conceptual homologation. 
I shall translate into English some essays in order to use them as 
examples of the content analysis that I have carried out. In these examples I 
shall make explicit the process of conceptual homologation that I have 
followed step by step in each essay. With the 116 essays in Spanish, I shall try 
to keep the style and the tone of the original in the translation, even when that 
style is grammatically incorrect. 
Example 1 is an essay written by a 13 years old boy from Picasso 
School. His father is employed in an upholstery shop and his mother is a 
housewife. Both parents have attended only primary school. 
"When I leave school I'll probably learn the upholstery trade by helping my 
dad and going to evening classes in design. At about 9.00 pm, when I came 
out of class I'll go down the disco and pick up a girl, that is if I haven't got 
one already. Once I finish the design classes I'll carry on working with my 
dad while I save the money to get my own upholstery business in a good 
location. Everybody's going into computers now, so upholstery's a better 
bet. I'll still go to discos with my girl friend. When I'm 18 I'll get my 
driving license and when I got my own shop and my own car I'll get 
married. 
When, I'm an adult I'm going to enjoy myself and enjoy my job. I'll 
work hard, but on Sundays I'll go out to the country, the cinema, the disco 
or somewhere. If I can, I let my kids to do what they want as long as they 
don't get into drugs or booze. They have to watch out for themselves and 
get the best out of life they can. Maybe I'll have a son who's an upholsterer 
and if I have all girls they'll have to watch out for themselves too.If I live 
to be old, I'll try to help my kids if I can and no be a nuisance. I wouldn't 
like to go into an old people's home but it depends how things go. If I win 
the pools, I'll only keep a bit of the money for myself, I'll give most of it to 
my kids and some to poor people". 
A first list (list of words) selects the words that seem to carry 
































(old people's) home 
pools 
poor (people). 
This list includes not only single words but also units (nouns or verbs), 
that although composed by several words function as a single word. For 
instance 'old people's home' and 'driving license'. Three of the words are 
enclosed in brackets allude to concepts present in the topic of the essay. 
Because of that they cannot be considered as concepts spontaneously used by 
the student. 
It should be noticed that some of those words are used several times 
by the author: 'upholstery/upholsterer' (3 times), 'kids' (3 times), '(to) 
work/working', (2 times), 'disco/s' (3 times), 'dad' (2 times), etc. Obviously the 
number of times than an author uses a particular word, somehow indicates the 
importance that this author attaches to that word. In the case of this essay, the 
author clearly views as essential aspects of his life things such as his working 
future as an upholsterer, the relationship with his father, his role as a parent, 
etc. A conceptual content analysis might take into account the number of 
occurrences of specific conceptual contents in the text. However I have chosen 
not to consider this aspect, consequently the presence of a concept in a text 
will not be weighted according to. the number of occurrences of such concept 
in that text. 
The corresponding list of concepts (conceptual clauses) is this: 
(contemplates) to help (own) father (learning at he same time upholstery). 
to go to a design school 
to go to the disco (after school) 
to pick up a girl(friend) 
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(contemplates) to finish the design classes 
to carry on working (with own father) 
to save the money (to get own upholstery business) 
(considers) upholstery to be a better bet 
(avoids) to study computers 
(contemplates) to continue going to the disco (with girlfriend [fiancee]). 
	
11 	 to have a [fiancee] 
to get a driving license (when 18 years old) 
to get own shop 
to get own car 
to many 
to enjoy life 
	
If 	 to enjoy job 
to work hard 
to go out to the country 
to go to the cinema 
(to enjoy himself) on Sunday 
(to have) kids 
(considers) (to let) kids (to do what they want) 
(fears)(children) to get into drugs or booze 
(hopes) (children) to watch out (and get the best out of life they can) 
" (to have) sons 
" one of his sons (to become) an upholsterer 
(contemplates)(to have) girls [daughters] (in second place) 
(hopes) girls [daughters] to watch out (for themselves too) 
(doubts) to live to be old 
(fears) to be a nuisance (when old) 
(wants) to help (own) kids (when old) 
(fears/contemplates) to go to an old people's home 
(fantasizes) to win the pools 
(contemplates) to give most of (the money won in the pools to own) kids 
	
'I 	 to give money (won in the pools) to poor people. 
In these lists, words enclosed in squared brackets indicate translations 
of ambiguous words '(girls [daughters])'. Attitudes are indicated by verbs 
between brackets in front of the clauses '(contemplates)'. Frequently, the 
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understanding of the clause requires to making explicit its context; this context 
is indicated between round brackets. For instance, 'to go down the disco (after 
school)'. Obviously these rules cannot be applied too strictly. There are items 
particularly difficult to represent according to them. For example, when the 
main clause has some other clause embedded within. In those cases, some 
degree of change in the literality of the clauses seems admissible (e.g., the 
clause "(contemplates) to give most of (the money won in the pools to own) 
kids"). 
In this translation from literal text to conceptual clauses a considerable 
amount of information is lost. Clauses and sentences modulate their meaning 
as a result of their contextual relations. For instance, a highly revealing 
sentence such as 'if I win the pools, I'll only keep a bit of the money for 
myself, I'll give most of it to my kids and some to poor people', gets 
disarticulated when it is decomposed into several clauses. A substantial part of 
the sentence's meaning, which arises from the synergy that exists between its 
parts, is lost in the process of translation. However, as the process of analysis 
is nonreductive (as the researcher can and should go back to the text in the 
process of conceptual homologation, in order to refine and classify the 
meanings of specific concepts to generate categories) this loss of information 
is only apparent. In reality the process of extracting the conceptual clauses in 
each text extraordinarily enhances the perspicacity of the researcher. 
Producing the conceptual clauses forces the researcher to read each text in 
depth, capturing its semantic structure. 
Example 2 is an essay written by a 13 years old girl from Herrera 
School. Her father is a teacher and her mother a psychologist. 
"Next year I'm going to go to the Institute (6th Form College). After 
that I'll go to university. I'll do a degree in Sciences because I love 
Maths but I'd like to write books for teenagers' as well. I reckon I'd 
like to share a flat with my friends. Later on if I fancy living just with 
one boy, then I will. I don't reckon I ever get married but maybe I 
change my mind when I'm older. If my friends want, I'll live with them 
till I die (if I don't get fed up of them). As I said before I like maths a 
lot, but apart from that I don't know what career to choose (I don't 
know what job I could choose that I d' enjoy and that's related to 
maths.) I don't like physics much, well, I like it when I understand 
what I'm doing, but the fact is that I don't understand it properly. I'll 
really like to be a writer as well, but I don't know. I'll really like to be 
un actress, but I don't think I'd do very well at that. No chance! If I 
could I'll be 	 actress, paint pictures in my spare time (if I'll have 
any) and write stories for teenagers at night. I'll like to have a lot of 
pets too (apart from my friends, that is). 
When I'm an adult I'll carry on with the same career (most 
probably I won't get married but if I do I'd like to carry on with my 
own job, I don't fancy anyone else supporting me). I'll like to travel a 
lot, and go all over the world, but not on my own. 
I wouldn't like to be old, but when I am, I won't be like old 
women now. Oh! I forgot to say that I really like music (I could spend 
all day listening to music), (doesn't matter what sort). 
I'll live with someone right up to when I'm old, I wouldn't want to 
live alone for any reason. I'd like to die happy". 
The corresponding list of words is: 
'Institut& (6th form College) 
University 























The list of concepts is: 
(contemplates) to go to the 'Institute' 
to go to University 
to do a degree in Science 
loves maths 
(fantasizes) to write (books for teenagers) 
(would) like to share a flat (with friends) 
(contemplates) to live only with just one boy(friend) 
(contemplates/doubts) never to marry 
(contemplates) to live with friends till death 
likes maths a lot 
(contemplates) to study maths 
(doubts) which career to choose 
(doubts) which kind of job to choose 
(wants) a job that (would enjoy) (related to maths) 
doesn't like physics much 
likes to be a writer 
likes/(doubts) very much to be un actress 
(contemplates) painting pictures (in her spare time) 
(would) like to have a lots of pets 
would like to carry on with own job (if married) 
doesn't like to be supported by anyone 
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would like to travel a lot 
" like go all over the world 
doesn't like to be old 
it 
 want to be like old women now (when old) 
likes music (doesn't matter what sort) 
(contemplates) to live with someone right up to when she is old 
doesn't want to live alone 
would like to die happy 
Example 3 is an essay written by a 13 years old girl from Cortijo 
School. Her father is a cleaner and her mother is a housewife. Both attended 
only Primary School. 
"When I leave school I'll go out to work and I'll study Law or Medicine 
because most of all I'll like to follow one of those careers, or both of them 
if possible. 
As I said, while I'm studying I could see myself looking after children or 
working in a nursery because I really love children a lot even though 
sometimes they can be a bit of a nuisance. well all kids are, I was myself 
when I was little, but I don't mind. 
I can see myself working in one of the two careers that I choose, married 
to a really nice man and with three children. We'll have a big house, where 
I can have my office or surgery, so that I can see to my children and my 
home at the same time as any clients. As I'll be older by then, I'll get a 
young girl in as a nanny and to help around the house. 
When I'm an old woman I can imagine myself in a big house with my 
husband, my children and loads of grandchildren. I'll play with them and 
take them for walks. At lunch time we'll all sit together round a big table. 
the parents, the grandparents and the grandchildren. 
I wouldn't like to see my grandchildren go without if I have any, or my 
children either. If my husband and I don't have any children, our house will 
seem really sad because there's nothing nicer than having kids around. I 
really hope that doesn't happen". 


















to help (in the house chores) 
husband 
grandchildren 
(to go) without 
The list of concepts is: 
(contemplates) working and studying 
fl 	 studying Law or Medicine 
would like to follow one of those careers (Law or Medicine) 
(contemplates) working in a nursery (while studying) 
to look after children 
she loves (children) 
(considers) children a bit of a nuisance 
I/ 	 to work in one of the two careers (Law or Medicine 
(contemplates) to marry to a really nice man 
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(contemplates) (to have) three children 
(to have) a big house (having office or surgery in it) 
to see to own children, home and clients at the same time 
" clients at home 
would like (to have) a nanny (to help her with the house chores) 
(contemplates) (living) in a big house with husband (when old) 
(to be) surrounded by children and loads of grand children 
(when old) 
(to be) all together, parents children and grandchildren 
wouldn't like to see grand children and children to go without 
(fears) to have no children 
(considers) nothing nicer than having kids around 
When the researcher compares the list of the three essays, some 
contrasts stand out. For example, the list of words of Essay 1 contain a lot of 
key words (father, disco, money, fiancee, driving license, car, sons, 
children,...) which do not appear in Essay 2, and vice versa (university, to 
graduate, to write, shared flat, career, spare time, to travel). At first sight they 
seem to mirror very different, even incompatible self-perception systems. The 
researcher should use those contrasts as an Ariadne's thread in the process of 
homologation, assuming the motto '(socio)meaning is contrast (between 
social subjects)'. 
Progressively —and frequently through their connections via key 
words— some conceptual contents show their links with other similar 
conceptual contents. For instance "(wants) to help (own) children (when old)", 
used in Essay 1, has a semantic content which is very similar to 
"(contemplates) to give most of the money won in the pools to own children", 
also used in Essay 1, and both specific concepts have a semantic content very 
similar to "wouldn't like to see grandchildren and children lacking in 
anything", used in Essay 3. 
This grouping of similar specific concepts into families generates the 
conceptual categories that are going to provide the data for the next stage of 
the analysis. There is no rule to determine a priori how many categories should 
be produced. Two similar categories may be combined into a more general 
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one, and a given category may split into two different ones. The very process 
of homologation stabilizes a particular set of categories which combines a 
minimum loss of textual information and a maximum gain of inter-textual 
connectivity. In addition to the categories directly generated from families of 
conceptual clauses, the researcher may add general attitudinal categories, 
which refer to volitive, emotional or affective attitudes that pervade the whole 
essay. I am referring to attitudes such as 'optimistic', 'self-confident', or 
'unambitious'. No student explicitly says in the texts that she or he is 
optimistic, ambitious or self-confident, but there are essays where one of these 
attitudes —or others like 'lack of confidence' or 'idealism'— clearly are the 
backcloth in front of which the explicit concepts appear. 
I shall formulate each category using as few words as possible. The 
specific attitudinal aspect of each particular concept will be lost in the process, 
as well as the specific 'objective' content of each concept. For instance, the 
objective conceptual content 'to many' can have different attitudes attached to 
it, either positive ('contemplates', 'wants', 'supposes'...) or negative ('rejects', 
'does not like', 'doubts', ... ). Obviously all these attitudinal nuances must be 
reduced. I shall consider two basic attitudes attached to each concept, positive 
and negative. Frequently, the positive attitude will not be made explicit. For 
instance, the category 'marriage' includes all sort of positive attitudes towards 
marriage. The negative attitude towards a given conceptual content will be 
expressed by means of a negative adverb or using a specific attitudinal verb, 
for instance, 'not a housewife' or 'hesitates to have children'. 
Categories in Essay 1 
(contemplates) to help (own) father 	  
(contemplates) to carry on working with father 
	  
(hopes) one of his son (to become) an upholsterer 	  
(wants) to help (own) kids (when) old 
	  




(contemplates) to go to a design school 	  
(considers) upholstery to be a better bet 	 Vocational 
(avoids) to study computers 	 Studies 
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(contemplates) to go down the disco 	  
(contemplates) to go out to the county 
	  
(contemplates) to go to the cinema 	 Fun 
(contemplates) (to enjoy) himself on Sundays 
	  








to pick up a girl(friend) 
	  
going down the disco with girlfriend 
	
 
to have a [fiancee] 	  
to get own shop 	  
to get a driving license 
	  







(contemplates) to save money 	
 t Money 
(Through 
Work) 
(contemplates) to marry 	  1 Marriage 
(contemplates) (to have) kids 
(hopes) to have sons 
(contemplates) (to have) girls [daughters] in second 
place 	  
} Wants Children 
(considers) (to let) kids (to do what they want) 	  
(fears) (children) to get into drugs or booze 	  
(hopes) (children) to watch out 	  
(hopes) girls [daughters] to watch out too 
	  
(hopes) one of sons upholsterer 
	  
(wants) to help (own) children (when old) 
	  
(contemplates) to give most of (the money won in the 
pools too own) kids 	  
(fears/contemplates) to go to an old people's home ... 
(fears) to be a nuisance (when old) 	  









(fantasizes) to win the pools 
	  } Money (Through 
chance) 
(contemplates) to give money (won in the pools) 	 Social 
to poor people 	 Conscience 
Categories in Essay 2 
(contemplates) to go to the 'Institute' 
	
 1 Continue 
) Studies 
(contemplates) to go to University  	 Unversity 
(contemplates) to graduate in Sciences  	 Career 
likes very much maths 	 (Specified) 
(doubts) which career to choose 	  
(contemplates) to study maths 	
 1 To Study 
(fantasizes) to write (books for teenagers) 	  
likes/(doubts) very much to be an actress 
	  




(contemplates) to live with a boy (friend) 	
 ) Living 
(contemplates) to live with someone right up to 	 Together 
when she is old 	 Unmarried 
Hesitates 
(contemplates/doubts) neves marry 	 about 
marriage 
(contemplates) to have a lot of friends 	 1 Friends 
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(doubts) which kind of job to choose 	 Proffessional 
(wants) a job (to enjoy) related to maths 
	 Job 
(would) like to carry on with own job (if married) 
	
 I 
doesn't like to be supported by anyone 
	 Independent 
likes to be a writer 	  
(contemplates) painting pictures (in her spare time) ... 
	 Hobbies 
likes music (doesn't matter what sort) 	  
(would) like to have a lot of pets 	  
1 
Pets 
would like to travel a lot 	  
would like go all over the world 	  } Travel 
doesen't want to be like old women now (when old) 
	 Positive 
would like to die happy 	
 f Old Age 
Categories Essay 3 
(contemplates) working and studying 
	 I Continue 
Studies 
(contemplates) studyin Law or Medicine 
	 University 
would like to follow one of those careers (Law or Medicine) ... 
	 Career 
(Specified) 
(considers) to work in one of the two careers 
	  
(contemplates) to have a surgery or office 
	 Professional 
(contemplates) to see clients at home 	 Job 
(contemplates) to marry a really nice man 
	 1 Marriage 
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(contemplates) having three children 	 Wants 
(fears) to have no children 	 Children 
(contemplates) to have a big house (having office and 
surgery in it 	  
(contemplates) to see clients at home 	 Housework 
would like (to have) a manny top help with the house chores  	 & Career 
(contemplates) to see children, home and clientes 	 Family & Job 
at the same time 	 Fulfillment 
(contemplates) living in a big house when old 	  } House Important In Old Age 
(contemplates) living with husband when old 	 Independent 
Old Age 
(contemplates) (to be) surrounded by children 
and grand children 	  Family Ties 
(contemplates) to be all together, parents, children 	 In Old Age 
and grandchildren 	  
wouldn't like to see children and grand children to I Care Own 
go without 	 Children 
In the first list there are redundant concepts, they will be considered 
only once. With those criteria on mind through several stages of language 
normalization and conceptual homologation we produced the second list. We 
can see below a sample of how this second list comes from the first one 
looking at the 3 examples. Further below is the complete second list with 81 
concepts. 
The first list of the whole sample (100 students) has about 2000 
expressions. The second list is reduced to 81 conceptual expressions or 
categories. The 81 concepts list is the one that will be used to start the next 
stage of the analysis: the production of a matrix of binary data. We will 
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establish a relationship between each individual and all the 81 concepts one by 
one. Each individual is connected to those concepts she or he uses and also 
connected to other individuals through the shared concepts. 
At this point one can wonder if instead of the long work of analyzing 
the essays it would not be easier just to do a questionnaire with the 81 
questions and ask the students to answer it. In this respect I must say that the 
81 items included in the list are produced by the very subjects of the research. 
The selection is the responsibility of the researcher, but operating upon 
information produced, as freely as possible, by the students. The 81 concepts 
are the result of what these particular groups of students wanted to write about, 
it does not apply for other students necessarily. If we prepare a questionnaire 
with those 81 items and pass it to different groups of students, we will force 
them to answer other people's questions, they will not show their own worries 
or interests. 









9.Care of own children 
10.Self-confident 
11. Adventurous 
12.Sense of responsibility to parents 
13.University career (specified) 





19.Hesitates about marriage 
20.Social conscience 
21.Wealth 




26.Money (acquired through gambling) 
27.Money (acquired through work) 
28.Leisure 
29.Sophistication of ideas 
30.Wife at home 
31.To continue studies 
32.Study (career orientated) 
33.Study for own sake 
34.Lack of confidence 
35.Fantasy 
36.Vocational Studies 
37.To make one's will 
38.Wants children 







46.Living in the countryside 
47.Not a housewife 
48.Not to marry 








57.Family & job fulfillment 
58.Against conscription 
59.Military service 
60.Fear of unemployment 
61.Work for family 
62.Work (unspecified) 
63.Working life depending on children 
64.To leave work at marriage 
65.Professional job 
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66.Non professional job 
67.Housework & career 
68. Divorce 
69. University 
70.Active old age 
71.Continuing profession in old age 
72.House important in old age 
73.Dependent old age 
74.Independent old age 
75.Family ties in old age 
76.Negative old age 
77.Inactive old age 
78.Positive old age 
79.Peaceful old age 
80.Travel 
81. Willpower 
4.9. Reduction and Assimilation 
In fact, I started the next stage of the analysis with the list of the 81 
concepts, but when using Multidimensional Scaling the distribution of the 
variables among the population must be between some limits in order to get 
the appropriate 'goodness-of-fit' (it will be explained in more detail in chapter 
five). For that reason some of the concepts were combined with others 
semantically close, and some others eliminated. The criteria of eliminating 
concepts was their low frequency. We left out the concepts 'second marriage', 
'divorce', 'social conscience', 'against conscription', and 'military service', 'lack 
of confidence', and 'doesn't want children' because they have been used only 
by two, three or four individuals. Twenty five concepts remain the same as in 
the first list because they were assimilable with no other concept and used by a 
large number of students. The rest, 49, were assimilated or combined with 
others and reduced to 19. To do the assimilation we not only consider the 
expression of the list but the context of the essay in which that expression 
appears. For example, just by looking at the concepts it is not immediately 
evident why 'unambitious', '(to have) an unspecified home', and 'not continue 
studies' are together under the unique concept 'unambitious'. The whole 
meaning of the expressions is only understandable in its context: the essay. 
Following with our example the eight students who do not go on studying after 
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the compulsory period, it is because they find it boring, difficult, considered 
themselves not prepare for it, etc. Besides, their school records show that their 
lack of interest for the school come from long before. But if for example some 
one said something like she or he does not like to continue studies because she 
or he has better projects in life, and explains them, that student will never be 
included in that group. The other concept mentioned 'unspecified house' stands 
for expressions as 'I'll have a house', 'I'll be living in a flat' just as a fact, as a 
place of living, without any indication if she or he will buy or rent it or any 
detail about the house characteristics. The house is just a thing to have (here 
'to have' has not necessarily the sense of property) when one leaves the parents' 
house. 'Unspecified house' is a category well differentiated from others like 
'dream house', 'second house in the countryside' house with a garden (a luxury 
in Spain), a swimming pool, a bar along the swimming pool', which are 
included all three of them in the category 'properties'. The same criteria was 




properties  	 propierties 
ambitio-s 
mobility 
willpower 	 ambitious 
self-confident 
adventurous 
optimism 	  
sports 
leisure 	  







work (unspecified) 	  
active old age 
continue profession in old age 
independent in old age 
positive old age 	  
dependent in old age 
negative about old age 	  
not a housewife 
no marriage 	  
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1. work 




} not to marry 
sense of responsibility to parents 
family ties 	
 / family ties 
working life depending on children 
housework and career 	  
university career (specified) 
university career (unspecified) 
study (career oriented) 
university 	  
housewife 
to leave work at marriage 	  
1  housework and career 
university 
} housewife 
to take care of own children 





fun with friends 	
 } friends 
intellectual curiosity 
study for own sake 




not continue studies (unambitious) 	  1 unambitious 
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vocational studies 
non professional job 	  } vocational career 
hobbies 
pets 	  } hobbies/pets 
With these 19 combined categories and the 25 we kept from the 81 
categories list we have the final list with 44 categories that will be used in the 
MDS, it is the following: 
1. Marriage 
2. Hesitates about marriage 
3. Social conscience 
4. Living together (unmarried) 
5. Appearance/dress 
6. Money (worked for) 
7. Sophistication of ideas 
8. Fantasy 
9. To make one's will 
10. Wants children 
11. Hesitates to have children 
12. Idealism 
13. Independent 
14. Living in the countryside 
15. Fiance/fiancee 
16. Shared flat 
17. Job fulfillment 
18. Family & job fulfillment 
19. Fear of unemployment 
20. Work to support the family 
21. House important in old age 
22. Family ties in old age 
23. Inactive in old age 







30. Continue studies 
31. Work. 
32. Professional career. 
33. Positive/active old age. 
34. Negative/dependent old age. 
35. Not to marry. 
36. Family ties. 
37. Housework and career. 
38. Housewife. 
39. Family fulfillment. 
40. Friends. 
41. Intellectual interest. 
42. Unambitious. 
43. Vocational career. 
44. Hobbies and pets. 
In reality I reduced the list of 81 categories to a list of 46, the 44 
categories above plus additional two categories: 
45. Lack of confidence 
46. Unspecified university career. 
Both categories are excluded in the final plots for reasons to be explained 
in the next chapter. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1 Freud stresses the emotional aspect of these changes, whereas other authors such as J. 
Piaget and G.H. Mead mainly stress the cognitive and social aspects of those changes. 
2 See Piaget's concept of 'adaptation' which is based on the two concepts of 'assimilation' and 
'accommodation'. Children must assimilate the external world to their inner categories, 
although that process produces the accommodation of those categories to the requirements of 
the external world. 
"Piaget saw knowledge as providing 'self-regulating' symbolic structures, developed by 
processes of 'assimilation' and 'accommodation'... 'Assimilation' is the modification of 
perceptual inputs by existing knowledge-structures, while 'accommodation' is modification of 
the knowledge structures to adapt to the input". D.S. in The Oxford Companion to the Mind: 
621-622. 
3In September 1990 a new Education Act (LOGSE) was approved by the Spanish Parliament. 
It will be gradually introduced from 1992 to 2000. One of its innovations is the extension of 
the statutory period of schooling in two more years. Thus, in the coming future, Spanish 
students will be 16 years old when they confront decisions that until now they confronted at 
14. 
4 For a detailed exposition of the problems posed by the researcher's subjectivity and the 
'reality reconstruction business' in social sciences see Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) chapter 6 
"Reality Reconstruction: What's Wrong with it?:. 106-131. 
5 As a refutation to accusations put by some positivism about the subjectivism in qualitative 
social research Siedman says:..."few have questioned the inherent subjectivity of 
quantification which requires 'selection' of parameters and baseline data, the interpretation of 
findings, and the selection of facts and evidence. There is much to be gained by destroying the 
myth of objectivity since subjectivity is always intricately involved -but disallowed" 
(1977:415). 
6Ibanez (1979) argues that "There is not such a thing as an innocent technique ... the 
researcher must be predisposed to reckon the effects produced by the technique he or she 
uses". 
7 J. Ibanez was the introducer in Spain of the discussion group technique, first in market 
research and later from his chair as professor of Methods and Techniques of Social Research 
(1976-1992) in the first Spanish faculty of sociology. He had also worked at the beginning of 
his career in market research using quantitative techniques: "Within the distributive 
perspective, I have been importer of technology: I introduced in Spain the public-opinion poll 
—in parallel with Amando de Miguel" (J. Ibanez 1990:22). His academic work develops the 
epistemological foundations of qualitative techniques and at the same time connects what is 
known as critical sociology with many other fields of contemporary research, from Freud and 
Lacan to second order Cybernetics ( See J. Ibanez, 1979; 1985; 1991). 
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8 "The qualitative interviewer (or 'moderator' in the jargon of the trade)" A. Hedges "Group 
Interviewing" 1985:77. 
9 
 "People must be encouraged to chip in freely, and to talk to each other as well as to the 
moderator" (A. Hedges op. cit.: 81). 
10 I use 'real-time' in the sense that it is used in computer sciences to denote a data-processing 
system in which a computer receives constantly changing data, and processes it sufficiently 
rapidly to be able to control the source of data. 
11 
 "The 'discussion group' demands, on the other hand, an open design and a participation of 
the researchers, as concrete beings, as subjects in process, in the process of research: in 
contrast to the abstract technology of the questionnaire, it (the discussion group) implies a 
concrete technology. Precisely the design is open because the researcher intervenes in the 
process of research as a subject in process: the data produced by the process of research are 
'impressed' on the subject in process who undertakes the investigation, and hence they 
changing him". (Ibanez, 1979: 263). 
12 F. Steier, 1991: 7-8. 
13 L. Bardin (1977); Coulthard, M. (1977); M.A.K. Halliday (1978); K. Krippendorff 
(1980); M. Stubbs (1983); G. Brown and G. Yule (1983), among many others. 
14 "The concept does not acquire an independent and individual life unless it has found a 
linguistic wrapping". (Sapir, 1921: 24). (The pagination number corresponds to the Spanish 
edition of 1954). 
15 "A methodology is not merely a technique ... but a profound way of approaching nature". 
W. Stephenson (1967:31). 
16 "There are very few golden rules, and certainly no magic formulae for cutting through the 
Truth —if indeed there is any single monolithic truth, which is not typically the case. Human 
beings are complex, ambivalent, inconsistent creatures; and not even the brightest and best 
organized of us live in a sharp-edged world where we have consciously and consistently sorted 
out our attitudes and beliefs on all conceivable subjects. It is a mistake to assume that there is 
a pristine Platonic reality under the muddle of our public utterances to which really sharp 
research tools can cut unerringly through. Underneath the mess of language lies a mess of 
thought and a tangle of behaviour. If our research tools cannot recognize ambivalence and 
inconsistency as real and important they will not help us to a very profound understanding of 
human thought and behaviour". A. Hedges, op.cit: 85. 
17 
 Krippendorff, Bourdieu, Bardin and Ibafiez, amongst others have dealt with the problems 
posed by the relationship between the subjective intuition of the researcher and objectivity. 
Their positions will be fatherly examined in Chapter Five when dealing with the researcher's 
intuition problem. 
18 "The notion that distinctions are drawn rather than given, that researchers participate in the 
creation of data rather than finding them, that data are informed by theory rather than 
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informing it, is an anathema only for objectivist who are blinded again seeing the social or 
psychological foundation of their own reality". Krippendorff, 1991: 120-121. 
19 In theory at least, linguistic includes semantics; but the linguistic point of view 
predominantly attends to the more formal aspects of language: morphology and syntax. 
20 Bernstein (1971, 1973, 1975); Turner and Mohan (1970); Cook-Gumperz (1973). 
21  D. Lawton, (1968); H. Rosen (1972); W. Lavob (1973). 
22 The extra linguistic implications of linguistic communication are described by Bernstein 
(1959; 1964) and G. Bateson (1972:177-200). 
23 T. Winograd and F. Flores (1987:31-32) stress the fact that "language is action". 
24 The pages numbers correspond to the Spanish 1980 version. 
25 F. Steier, 1991: 165 et passim. 
26 Gergen and Gergen (1991); Krippendorff (1991); von Glaserfeld (1991). 
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Chapter 5. 
Sociosemantic Analysis of the Data 
5.1. The Concept of Sociosemantic Analysis. 
In the light of research conducted by Atkin and other authors, as well 
as the perceptions of writers like Wittgenstein, I have developed a technique 
for my principal analytical tool I shall call Sociosemantic Analysis. By 
sociosemantic analysis I mean a method which allows us to define the 
semantic connectivities and similarities, as well as the lack of connectivities 
and similarities, within a given social group. 
The sociosemantic method is neither intended to describe the concepts 
which we find present in a particular group (as sociolinguistics does), nor the 
quantitative strength of each of these concepts amongst the individuals of a 
given social group. 
The purpose of the method is to allow us to describe the social and 
semantic connectivities between individuals in that group as exemplified by 
these concepts. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein ([1958], (1984): 30, 41, 43, etc.), 
the socio-meaning of a concept can be described as the communication 
relationship that the users of that concept can establish between each other 
through it. In social terms a concept exists as a network of potential 
interactions through the use of that concept between the individuals who 
possess it and therefore are potential users of it. 
I shall introduce now a description of the steps followed in doing the 
sociosemantic analysis in order to show the relationships between the 
conceptual categories that were produced as a result of the content analysis of 
the texts. In the previous chapter I presented a general list of 46 conceptual 
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categories derived from the texts written by the sample of 100 pupils from the 
four schools. This will be the set of categories that I shall presuppose 
henceforth. Each individual of the sample is defined, in relation to that general 
set of categories, by the specific set of categories that he or she uses. I shall 
call these specific sets 'individual list' of categories. As I have already pointed 
out, these individual lists constitute the initial data of sociosemantic analysis. 
In this chapter my aim is to show the concept of sociosemantic 
analysis at work, by using the data produced through the previous content 
analysis in order to exemplified that concept. 
The mathematical procedures which implement the method of 
sociosemantic analysis have been derived from two sources: 
1. Q-Analysis or the analysis of connectivities developed by Atkin 
and other authors. 
2. Multidimensional Scaling as developed, amongst others, by 
Kruskal and 	 sh, Coxon, Jones, etc. 
The combination of these two sorts of procedures is on the origin of 
the sociosemantic analysis. I shall introduce some fundamental assumptions 
underlying that method, because it will provide the basis for a more accurate 
understanding of the data derived from the essays, and will help the researcher 
with a tool adequate to describe the social and semantic relationships which 
are present in the group of students who are the subject of this research. What 
I will call the socio-semantic method hinges on a few basic ideas, a brief 
account of which will be given in the next paragraphs. 
As the data derived from the essays show, individuals who share 
specific concepts can be considered as being socio-semantically connected: 
they have a similar social perception of reality and consequently are socially 
close (they are capable, in principle, of interacting strongly). In an analogous 
way, particular concepts can be considered as being socio-semantically 
connected through the individuals who possess those particular concepts and 
can use (produce and reproduce) them to communicate. 
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Logicians distinguish between the 'extension' of a concept and its 
'intension'. The extension of a concept is the collection of objects to which this 
concept may be applied. The intension of a concept is the set of characteristics 
or properties defining that concept. This distinction between the extension and 
intension of a concept may be applied to the analysis of social meanings. 
These may also be viewed from two perspectives: extensional and intensional. 
In seems convenient to coin some new terms capable of expressing the 
underlying ideas. The socio-extension of a concept would be the collection of 
individuals who possess (and consequently are potential users of) that concept. 
In contrast, the socio-intension of a concept would be the collection of 
concepts which are also possessed by the individuals having that concept. 
The socio-extension of a concept points to the configuration of the 
network of social interactions which can be realized through that concept. 
Whereas the socio-intension of a concept points to the potential content of (the 
interactions enabled by) that network. This potential (semantic) content is 
precisely the modulation of any actual interaction through other (semantic) 
contents. 
These concepts require some explanation: the interaction between 
individuals begins through at least one shared concept, but the development of 
that interaction requires other shared concepts. Consequently the intension of 
the concept which begins the interaction consists in the common presence of 
other concepts that would make it possible for this interaction to continue and 
succeed. 
Thus, the sociosemantic method seeks to analyze the relationships (the 
connectivities) between individuals through concepts and between concepts 
through individuals. Once these connectivities have been established, the 
social and semantic configurations that they define have a relevance of their 
own, to some extent independent from the concrete concepts and the particular 
individuals involved. These configurations can be considered as abstract 
realities showing the communication structure, and consequently the structure 
of potential interactions within a social group. 
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As stated before, the idea of sociosemantic analysis is built on the 
concepts put forward by Atkin's Q-analysis. The sociosemantic method 
provides the conceptual connectivities of Q-analysis with a sociological 
interpretation in order to make them more appropriate for the analysis of social 
realities. Q-analysis is designed for the depiction of connectivities between a 
fairly small number of elements. When we have to deal with a large number of 
connected elements, the form of the representation that Q-analysis furnishes to 
describe the connectivities between those elements becomes impossible to 
visualize, because of its multidimensionality. The connections cannot be 
represented visually one by one because there are too many and they become 
blurred, so to speak. Hence we need another technique which would enable us 
to depict the referred connectivities more clearly. 
It can be argued that Multidimensional Scaling (MDS as I will call it 
from now on) may be a technique suitable for that purpose. MDS can provide 
us with a way of depicting the connectivities in question clearly, by 
considering them as proximity measures which can be graphically represented 
as distances. Kruskal and Wish (1978: 10) have argued that 
"the amount of communication and interaction between individuals, groups 
and other entities can be regarded as a measure of their proximity. An 
MDS analysis of such data provides a sociometric map in which greater 
distances reflect less interaction between the associate entities". 
Forgas 1 has stressed the relevance of MDS as a tool of research, he 
advocates the use of MDS in social psychology for reasons that may also be 
applied to the field of sociology in general. I shall quote his words changing 
'psychological' to 'sociological'. He argues that 
"MDS main advantage is that it enables the investigator to quantify and 
describe extremely complex sociological phenomena which would not be 
accessible to quantitative analysis otherwise. In essence, this is 
accomplished by the application of powerful mathematical techniques such 
as matrix algebra and euclidean geometry to the understanding of 
sociological relationships. The central assumption underlying the 
sociological use of MDS techniques is that sociological distance or 
similarity (between concepts, constructs, persons, traits, social episodes, 
national stereotypes, etc.) can be represented and analyzed in terms of 
euclidean distances, 'we have gained enormously in the techniques we have 
at our disposal for analyzing and interpreting sociological data. We can 
approach with impunity some areas about which we are quite ignorant, 
armed with methods of great precision and power' [Jackson, 1969: 228]". 
Having pointed out above the necessity of supplementing Q-analysis 
with the technique of MDS, I shall now proceed to explaining how 
sociosemantic analysis relates and implements those two methodological 
elements. Starting with the data generated by the process of textual analysis, I 
have used the general and individual lists of categories (see chapter 4) to 
produce a two dimensional matrix, establishing the presence or absence of 
each category in each individual. The matrix is constructed with our two sets 
(categories and individuals), which represent, respectively the 44 categories as 
columns and the 100 individuals as rows. The resulting matrix contains a total 
of 4,400 values. These values allow us to produce two similarity coefficient 
matrices which relate individuals to individuals and categories to categories. 
The similarity coefficient that I have used for this purpose is JACARD. Both 
are triangular matrices, the first having 100 columns and 100 rows and the 
second 44 columns and 44 rows. The values of these two matrices are then 
interpreted as 'proximity values' in two separate processes of multidimensional 
scaling. The purpose of these two processes is to represent as well as possible 
each corresponding set of similarities as a set of distances. The possible 
mismatch between each set of similarities and the corresponding set of 
distances should be minimized. The function that measures that mismatch is 
called the STRESS-function: 
"the stress is intended to be a measure of how well the configuration 
matches the data"(Kruskal J.B. 1964: 84). "Each stress value results from 
an iterative computational procedure, i.e., a procedure in which the 
configuration is modified step by step to bring it into closer agreement 
with the data" (Kruskal & 9fish, 1978: 50). 
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The dimensionality chosen to analyze our set of data ('dimensionality' 
here means the number of coordinate axes of the configuration or, which is the 
same, the number of coordinate values used to define a point representing an 
object in the space of representation) should be the one which is most helpful 
in analyzing these data. With n objects present, (n-1) dimensions are sufficient 
to perfectly represent the similarities between those objects. However the 
main reason for using MDS, is that we want to represent the similarities in a 
space of low dimensionality. It is often the case that the relations between 
objects, i.e., their similarities, can be satisfactorily represented in two 
dimensions. The more dimensions used to represent the similarities, the less 
clear the interpretation will be. So, in general, a low dimensionality should be 
chosen. After attempting to work with three dimensions with ALSCAL and 
ANACOR and in view of the difficulties which arose when trying to find a 
meaningful interpretation of the resulting configurations, I chose to work with 
two-dimensional scaling. Hence the result of the scaling that I shall consider is 
a configuration in two dimensions in which each item (categories for the first 
scaling, individuals for the second one) is represented by a point that has two 
coordinates. In this way the proximity between items can be directly visualized 
as distances between them. The resulting configurations may then be 
qualitatively interpreted. 
The first similarity matrix (corresponding to similarities between 
categories), will be called the sociosemantic similarity matrix of categories; 
as indicated, it provides the proximity values —which may be conceived as 
values of social proximity between categories— for the first scaling. In the 
same way, the second similarity matrix (corresponding to similarities between 
individuals) will be called sociosemantic similarity matrix of individuals; as 
indicated, it provides the proximity values —which may be conceived as 
values of semantic proximity between individuals— for the second scaling. 
The values resulting from the first scaling are then interpreted as social 
distances between categories, and the values resulting from the second scaling 
are interpreted as semantic distances between individuals. Semantic 
similarities, proximities and distances are conceived, respectively, as indexes 
of communicational similarities, proximities and distances. It seems sensible 
to think that the possibility of communication depends on the conceptual 
similarity between the people who communicate. The configurations resulting 
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from each scaling can be presented in numerical form or as plots. The scaling 
of the sociosemantic similarity matrix of categories produces a plot which I 
will henceforth denote as categories plot, and the scaling of the sociosemantic 
matrix of individuals generates a plot which I will denote as individuals plot. 
The process of scaling may be refined by doing separate analyses, grouping 
the students according to their school, gender or social background. This 
refinement produces a whole set of plots (categories plots and individuals 
plots) each of which can be compared to the others in order to draw 
interpretative conclusions. When interpreting the configurations I will assume 
Borg and Guttman's point of view: 
"...the only criterion would be plausibility. Thus, one would have to try 
various interpretations based on dimensions, clusters, regions, etc., and 
then decide which one or which combination of different approaches would 
make the most sense. "The blind empirical results of the computer cannot 
by themselves show a substantive law of formation; they give only 
dimensionality and distance" [Guttman,1964, p.331."2 
The technique of multidimensional scaling has been used in social 
analysis by a number of authors, although still as Coxon says 
"Sociology is missing important opportunities to use a family of MDS 
models that are uniquely well-suited to its data needs" (Coxon, A. 
1982:2). 
However I must point out, that I use MDS in a rather special manner. I 
use MDS as a tool in a particular stage of a process of sociosemantic analysis. 
Nevertheless, in my case the basic concepts and objectives were not produced 
beforehand, as is the case with the quoted authors. Coxon (1979), for instance, 
in his analyses of the social meaning of occupations, uses as input for the 
process of MDS matrixes which have as values an evaluation (according to a 
scale) of the similarity between pairs of concepts. This evaluation is done by 
subjects who answer a questionnaire. In this sort of analysis the individuals 
(who answer a questionnaire provided with a scale) directly generate similarity 
values ascribed to pairs of concepts. In a process of sociosemantic analysis the 
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individuals, do not evaluate concepts, they produce/use them. It is that use and 
more specifically, the connectivities revealed by it, which is the factor that 
generates the similarities between those concepts. Besides in a process of 
sociosemantic analysis the subjects are also objects of the analysis. This 
produces similarities not only between objects (concepts), but also between 
subjects (individuals). 
The categories plots and the individuals plots are two faces of the 
same sociosemantic coin. They are conjugate realities and there is a deep 
symmetry between them. Now, plots are purely formal entities (they are just a 
configuration of points), and their interpretation requires us to give a material 
content to them. This can only be done by 'importing' information from the 
outside of the purely mathematical process which has generated those plots: 
the points must have a meaning. But this imported information required for 
interpreting the plots is qualitatively different in the case of categories plots 
from that in the case of individuals plots. 
For categories plots such imported information is the meaning that the 
researcher attaches to the categories (that is to the names of the points). For 
individuals plots the imported information is what I will call the social insight 
of the researcher about the individuals also represented as points. That social 
insight or social intuition helps the researcher to consider the individuals plots 
from different points of view, filtering their configurations according to 
variables such as gender, social background, etc. I shall use the term 'semantic 
insight' as the application in the context of sociosemantic analysis of what 
some sociologists call 'researcher's intuition' (Bourdieu, 1977:16-85; Ibanez, 
1979:320) 
The external information required for the interpretation of the 
categories plots is basically the semantic insight of the researcher. This insight 
allows the researcher to find the "family resemblances" (Wittgenstein) which 
exist among the categories (Coxon, 1982: 116). These family resemblances 
define several groups of points in the plot. In this respect it is important to 
stress that those family resemblances can neither be arbitrarily imposed, nor 
mechanically inferred from the purely formal configuration of the plot. They 
cannot be arbitrarily imposed because the groups of points must include at 
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least a nucleus of contiguous points. They cannot be mechanically inferred 
because in general the boundaries between different groups of points are not 
clear cut; they overlap with each other to some extent. Hence, the researcher's 
semantic insight is essential in order to define the structure underlying each 
plot, but it is an insight constrained and restrained (in a sense 'controlled') by 
that very plot. 
The use of the social insight of the investigator has been questioned by 
empiricists and structuralists, but some authors such as the above mentioned, 
defend it as the means to overcome the fragmentation of other analytical 
techniques (distributive techniques.) 
"Chomsky has been accused of coming back to intuitionism, but outside of 
intuitionism only a taxonomic type of science is possible (as the one that, 
in the field of social sciences, is produced by distributive techniques)"(J. 
Ibanez, 1979: 327). 
The insight of the researcher is central to the process of analysis, but 
this insight is not of a wild or spontaneous kind, it is based on the professional 
knowledge of the sociologist and it must fulfill the requirements (reliability 
and reproducibility) demanded by the scientific method. By means of her 
sociological insight, this researcher is able to give a coherent meaning to the 
data she is considering, by applying in the process all her scientific knowledge 
and all her experience of the field. This is a creative process and there are no 
written rules for it, but it must produced as an outcome of its very creativity, 
its own standards of objectivity and validity (Krippendorff 1980:chap.13). 
Bourdieu refers to the concept of social intuition by means of the idea of 
habitus. This idea consists of the assumption by the sociologist of the 
principles of the theory of sociological knowledge in order to apply it (not in a 
mechanistic way) to the understanding of society. Bourdieu defends the use of 
social insight as a way to find the hidden analogies that the sociologist must 
detect in social phenomena, and as a means of epistemological control of 
social analysis. This is so because the social insight helps to rebuild the unity 
of the object of research from analytical atomization (Bourdieu, 1977:16, 85). 
Ibanez (1979:320) gives a full explanation about the place of intuition in the 
process of social analysis: 
"The researcher faces a discourse which represents an enormous amount 
of data and he must reduce it to unity: there is no algorithm (as the ones 
used by computers) capable to produce that unity; only the human body is 
able to produce that unity (by means of an interpretation), but this intuition 
must be validated later. The sociologist cannot find, in any place or time, 
the a priori rules that may decide on his behalf how to proceed. These rules 
are produced in himself, as a subject in process, all through the research 
process. This posses two problems: one of a psychological and/or 
anthropological nature, how those rules appear in him (how he discovers 
them); other of a methodological and/or epistemological nature, how to go 
from the subjective evidence to the objective knowledge". 
As stated before, the external information required to interpret the 
individuals plots is of a social nature. It consists in the a priori data that the 
researcher has concerning those individuals (gender, age, school, family 
background, etc). The projection of those a priori data onto the individuals 
plots may also generate meaningful configurations, and consequently it can 
lend an interpretative structure to those plots. 
There is a third type of information which the researcher can use to 
illuminate the interpretation of both kinds of plots: the mutual information that 
each sort of plot can provide for the other. In fact the information that each 
kind of plot yields can be used to interpret the other plot, and vice versa. In 
that way the interpretation of a categories plot may enhance the interpretation 
of an individuals plot, and vice versa. Of course, this mutual interpretation is 
only possible after both kinds of plots have been interpreted by the use of 
semantic and social insight; but it considerably refines that previous 
interpretation. 
Hence, the interpretation of the plots, using the method I have 
outlined, will be used as a heuristic tool as well as a corroborating reference to 
the full intuitive interpretation of the texts, which will be developed in the next 
chapter. As I have tentatively indicated in Chapter 4, the informative content 
of those texts is much higher than that of any set of data abstracted from them. 
However, the similarities which have been abstracted from the texts and their 
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sociosemantic analysis, on the one hand, help to reveal hidden relationships 
underlying the whole of the texts —in this sense, the sociosemantic analysis 
plays a heuristic role. On the other hand, the results of this analysis constitute 
a backcloth against which the researcher can corroborate or contrast her 
intuitive interpretation of the texts. 
5.2. Mathematical processing of the data. 
The object of the mathematical procedures that I have used when 
processing the data is to find an easy way to represent the sociosemantic 
similarities between concepts/individuals. An appropriate representation will 
be instrumental in a good interpretation of those similarities (or the lack of 
them) which are based, as said before, on the connectivities between concepts 
(categories) through individuals, and between individuals through concepts 
(categories). 
The starting point for the mathematical processing of the data obtained 
through the analysis of the conceptual content of the texts, is the initial matrix 
which specifies the categories that are used by each individual, and the 
individuals who use each category. This matrix contains just binary values:'1' 
means that a particular individual uses a particular category, and '0' means that 
a particular individual does not use a particular category. On the basis of this 
set of binary values, it is possible to calculate similarity values, on the one 
hand, between each pair of categories, and on the other hand, between each 
pair of individuals. 
To generate those similarity values I used the procedure 
PROXIMITIES provided by the package SPSSx. As the initial matrix only 
contains binary values I used the facilities provided by PROXIMITIES for 
binary data. These facilities include matching coefficients, among them the 
JACCARD similarity measure. Those coefficients act on a 2x2 contingency 
table, computed for each pair of items (in our case those items are either 
categories or individuals). Each of these contingency tables which are 
computed by PROXIMITIES, produces four values: 'a' (characteristics which 
are present in item 1 and in item 2 as well), 'b' (characteristics which are 
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present in item 1, and are absent in item 2), 'c' (characteristics which are 
absent in item 1 and are present in item 2), 'd' (characteristics which are absent 
in both item 1 and item 2). 
The JACCARD similarity coefficient excludes joint absences (value 'd' 
in the contingency table) and ascribes equal weight to matches (joint presence, 
value 'a' in the contingency table) and non matches (value 'b' plus value 'c' in 
the contingency table). The formula of the JACCARD coefficient measure is 
JACCARD (x,y) — a 
a+b+c 
It should be noted that value 'a' is identical to the Q-analytical 
connections between the two items composing the pair which similarity is 
being computed. 
By applying this procedure two matrixes were obtained, one giving a 
JACCARD similarity measure for each pair of categories, and the other giving 
the same kind of similarity measure for each pair of the initial set of 116 
individuals. My purpose was to use those two matrixes (the category similarity 
matrix and the individuals similarity matrix) as inputs to two corresponding 
processes of MDS. 
In order to do this I attempted to use the procedure ALSCAL, but 
unfortunately this procedure (also available in SPSS) only operates with rather 
small data sets (a maximum of 100 cases or variables). Consequently I needed 
to reduce the 116 individuals to 100. The criterion which I followed for this 
reduction was to equalize each school group to 25 individuals (the original 
numbers ranged from 25 to 31), keeping the balance between girls and boys. 
Once having determined how many boys and girls I needed to take out of each 
group I chose the particular individuals to be excluded by means of a random 
procedure. With this new sample of 100 individuals and 46 concepts it was 
possible to obtain two JACCARD similarity matrices of a size acceptable for 
ALSCAL. This procedure finds distances between stimuli that represent the 
similarity values of matrix as well as possible (Kruskal and Wish, op. cit.: 50). 
These distances are defined by determining the coordinates of each stimulus in 
a multidimensional space. The output provided by ALSCAL is both a list of 
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those stimulus coordinates and a plot (a configuration of points each of which 
represents a particular stimulus). A two dimensional scaling was produced for 
each matrix and the result was two different configuration of points (figures 1 
and 2), a plot of categories and a plot of individuals. Each of these 
configurations locates points which represent individual items (respectively, 
categories and individuals) on a plane. In these configurations the set of points 
is located in such a way that their mutual distances represent the similarities 
between them as well as possible (i.e., in a such a manner that the stress is as 
low as possible). Small distances between any two points represent that there 
is a strong similarity between them; and large distances between any pair of 
points represent a weak similarity between them. In this way the thousands of 
similarity values required to express the similarities between the items in 
question, are represented as geometric distances between these items. This is a 
form of representation much easier to grasp intuitively than the similarity 
values themselves. The whole point of MDS is to make a large number of 
abstract relations between objects intuitively accessible to us. In fact, the 
number of similarity relations is quite large even for fairly small numbers of 
objects because each object is related to all the other objects. Because of this 
large number of relations the structure of these relations is hidden from our 
insight, just like the jumbled pieces of a huge puzzle. MDS geometrically 
represents these relations, as relative locations between the objects. Thus the 
relations between these objects may be inferred, by simply looking at their 
relative locations. 
An initial attempt to use a set of 81 categories (see appendix 1), and 
the referred set of 100 individuals, to make a two dimensional MDS by means 
of ALSCAL did not succeed. The reason for this was that apparently a set of 
81 categories in a sample such as ours in which the connections between items 
are rather weak, produces an 'ill-conditioned' set of data. This ill-conditioning 
appears in the MDS output as a very high 'stress' value. The STRESS can take 
any value between zero and 1. A stress of zero means 'perfect fit'. A stress of 1 
means that there is no structure in the data. Stress value is approximately the 
percentage of explained variance. Its formula is 
D5 ii-i2+02  Stress - 
04, 	 E 
ifAnominator = 0 	 stress = 0; 5 ij = dij for each i, j. 
When stress goes up the difference 8 ij - dij increases which means 
that more similarities are imperfectly represented by the corresponding 
distances. In our case when using 81 categories, stress value was near 1, and 
Alscal stopped the procedure because it could not make anything reasonable 
out of it. The problem is, that when considering the relationship of any two 
objects through a given characteristic, at least one of the objects must posses 
this characteristic, otherwise the Jaccard index will be undefined (because the 
denominator will be zero) and if this occurs, the MDS procedure breaks 
down3. 
In the initial matrix that I have used (the one relating individuals to 
categories), most of the values are zero values. As indicated already, 
individuals only use between 4 and 24 categories each from a total of 81 (and 
it was very often the case that the denominator of the Jaccard index was zero, 
because many of the concepts were not present in many pairs of individuals). 
I considered that a sensible way of attempting to improve the working of the 
MDS procedure was to diminish the set of categories by assimilating groups of 
them. Through this assimilation I reduced the number of categories from 81 to 
46 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9). This type of data reduction is a common 
procedure in non-metric, qualitative analysis: 
"Although data reduction can be done at any point of the research project, 
it is related mainly with the ease of the calculations, and it tries to adapt 
the shape of the available data to the one required by the analytical 
technique" (Krippendorff, op. cit: 79). 
The resulting reduced list of 46 categories is the one presented in the 
previous Chapter (4.9). The stress of the scaling made on the bases of that set 
of 46 categories was 0,248, which seems sufficiently adequate for our purpose. 
However this reduced list also posed two kinds of problems when handle by 
means of MDS. First, this kind of category sets frequently seems to have 'freak 
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items'. For example, in the case of the indicated 46 category list there was one 
of those items —category 'lack of confidence'—. It consistently appears (not 
only in ALSCAL plots but also in plots produced by other procedures that I 
have used, as I shall explain later) isolated from all the others at a very distant 
point: it is an 'outlier'. In order to improve the 'expressivity' of the plot, I have 
eliminated that category. There is another category which I have also 
discarded: the category 'unspecified university career'. The problem with this 
category is that it is too close to another category: 'specified university career'. 
That small distances between them shows that their socio-meaning is very 
similar. In order to avoid cramming the plot with too many conceptual tags, 
specially when they are almost identical, I have decided not to include the 
category in question. Therefore I use 44 categories in the final categories plots. 
However this reduced list still faces a second sort of problem. It still 
includes items with a connectivity that is too weak (in the case of categories, 
they are used by too few people; in the case of individuals, some of them use 
too few concepts). Here we face a dilemma, because the concepts which are 
less frequent (and the individuals who appear as 'freaks') usually are the more 
'significant' in an interpretative sense, because they represent potentialities 
which are hidden in 'normal' items, and jet exist in the social milieu in 
question. These potentialities might point to future developments within that 
milieu. Here we confront a basic paradox4 of the sociosemantic method which 
I use: the smaller the socio-extension of a concept, the higher its meaning 
(because this concept should intensionally be related to other concepts also 
very unusual and therefore has a highly specific meaning, which is likely to be 
most revealing). But just because of the improbability of such unusual items, 
they seem to 'destabilize' the plot. To fit these freak points adequately, we 
would need more dimensions, because each of those points seems to define a 
dimension for itself. 
In order to determine the consequences of discarding the most unusual 
items, I decided to eliminate the categories used by only six or less 
individuals. The discarded categories were 'hesitates to have children', 'family 
and job fulfillmene(used by six students each of them), 'housewife' (used by 5 
individuals) and 'not to have children' (used by four students only). The plot 
resulting from this further reduced list of categories shows no significant 
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differences with respect to the 44 categories plot. Consequently I decided to 
consider the 44 categories set as an adequate base for generating the plots. 
There are several different approaches to MDS. One of them was 
initiated by Shepard, who in 1952 created a program which is substantially 
non-metric in practice. His ideas have been furthered and perfected by many 
others (Kruskal, Lingoes, Roskam, etc.) I have used one of the most available 
and widely used computer program, ALSCAL, which is a development of 
Shepard approach. ALSCAL (Alternating Least-squares SCALing) was created 
by Takane, Young and De Leeuw. It is currently available in SPSS (Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences). 
I have also used two other computer programs for MDS, both of them 
recently developed by the Data Theory Department of Leiden University in 
The Netherlands. These two programs are ANACOR and HOMALS. They 
offer some advantages over ALSCAL; the main advantage, from the point of 
view of this research, is that these two new programs accept more than 100 
cases. Consequently by using them, I need not reduce the initial number of 
individuals (116). I have tried ANACOR and HOMALS with 116 individuals 
and 46 and 42 categories, respectively. 
These configurations are consistent 
with those produced by ALSCAL and the gains with the extra 16 students are 
not substantial. Thus, I decided to use ALSCAL due to the fact that at the time 
when the mathematical analysis was done, ANACOR and HOMALS were not 
available in the markets. 
5.3. Interpretation of the sociosemantic plots. 
In this section I shall propose an interpretation of the graphic 
configurations generated, as described, by means of the use of MDS. 
Considering the notion of interpretation, Ibafiez argues that: "The 
interpretation is only a moment in the process of analysis (the moment that 
corresponds to the analogical intuition of the researcher), a moment that is 
reabsorbed later on in the process"(Ibafiez, J. 1979:318). It has been said in 
section 1 of this chapter that in order to interpret a configuration it is necessary 
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for the researcher to 'import' background information, so as to guide the 
analogical insight of the researcher with some external (to the configuration), 
meaningful data. In the case of sociosemantic plots of categories this 
information is just the intuitive meaning that the researcher ascribes to each 
concept. This intuitive meaning must be confronted with the purely formal, 
mathematical reality of the configuration (specifically with the distances 
between points representing concepts). In the case of sociosemantic plots of 
individuals that external information is the background knowledge which the 
researcher has about the individuals (gender, school, social background, etc.). 
It is impossible to interpret the meaning of a configuration of points if we do 
not know what those points stand for and this knowledge obviously is not 
given by the plot itself, but is projected onto it by the researcher. 
5.3.1 Interpretation of the configurations generated through ALSCAL. 
Figure 1 is a two dimensional configuration of 44 categories used by 
100 students. It represents a sociosemantic plot of categories computed 
through the JACCARD and ALSCAL algorithms. The most relevant aspect of 
the configuration is the set of distances between the points which represent 
concepts which it embodies. Another relevant feature is the location of these 
points with respect to the two main axes6. Distances between points will be 
conceived as sociosemantic distances; according to this interpretation they 
would measure the strength of the socio-connection between each pair of 
concepts. The word socio-connection denotes the fact that a particular number 
of individuals share the use of a given pair of concepts. The higher the number 
of individuals sharing the use of a pair of concepts, the stronger the socio-
connection between these concepts. This strength is represented7 in the plot 
by the relative distances between those concepts. According to this way of 
representation, the smaller the distance, the stronger the socio-connection 
between concepts or, alternatively, the larger the distance, the weaker the 
socio-connection between them. Here we face a problem about the ontology 
which we are dealing with: small distances between concepts may be 
interpreted as an index of social affinity between those concepts; but large 
distances between concepts may also be interpreted as strong social 
incompatibility between those concepts. Is there just one force at work (social 
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affinity or alternatively social incompatibility?) Or, are there two forces 
(social affinity and social incompatibility) working together? Of course, to 
decide that there is just one force (either attractive or repulsive) would make 
the analysis much easier. However, our intuitive guess is that some concepts 
attract each other whereas some other concepts repel each other. We will deal 
with this problem later. 
5.3.1.1  The patterning of the configuration (figure 21 
In the first place we should pay attention to the purely perceptual, 
Gestalt-like, appearance of the configuration, which is known in MDS jargon 
as patterning: "Patterning refers to the way in which points are located and 
related quite independently of what they may 'mean' (A. Coxon, 1982: 95). 
Figure 2 distinguishes in the same plot a region of a higher density of points, 
and a configuration of a lower density around this region, that I will call a 
halo. This halo has a crescent-like shape. I call a core the higher density area 
of the graph. The mean distance between concepts in this core is much smaller 
than the mean distance between the concepts in the halo. The mean distance 
from the concepts in the core to the socio-semantic center of gravity (the point 
0.0 at which the two coordinates cross each other) is also substantially smaller 
than the mean distance between the concepts in the halo and the socio-
semantic center. (In these type of plots the orientation of the axes is arbitrary 
and therefore has no special meaning in itself —although given a particular 
orientation, the researcher can fmd an interpretation for the two dimensions 
that these axes indicate. One can rotate the axes freely because the distances 
between points remain invariant under any rotation, and in the plot only these 
distances are intrinsically meaningful. The absolute values defining the 
coordinates of a point are arbitrary as well, in the sense that they could be 
several times bigger or smaller; and again under that transformation the 
proportion between different distances in the plot would remain the same) 
(Coxon, A. 1982a:93-94). The mean distance between the concepts in the halo 
is also bigger than the mean distance between the categories of the halo and 
the categories in the core. This fact seems to suggest that the socio-connection 
between the categories in particular regions of the halo and the categories in 

















regions of the halo (for instance, the region on the far left and the region on 
the far right.) 
The core appears to have a strong self-affinity (the socio-distances 
between its categories are very small which would mean that they are strongly 
coherent between them). On the contrary, the halo seems to be, in a way, self-
incompatible (the socio-distances between some of its categories are large 
which suggests that they strongly repel each other; in fact, some categories 
seem to run away to the outer regions of the plot in order to avoid the 
proximity of other categories.) Thus, the core seems to include highly socio-
compatible categories, and in this sense it seems to have some sort of self-
coherence. On the contrary, the halo seems to include highly socio-
incompatible concepts; it seems to have some sort of intrinsic incoherence. 
5.3.1.2. Interpretation of the main axes. (figure 11 
Figure 3 shows the same socio-semantic plot of categories with the 
conceptual labels corresponding to each point. When the meaning of the points 
is taken into account (when we name them, ascribing to them the categories 
which they stand for), the previous, purely Gestalt-like interpretation of the 
configuration showed in figure 2 is confirmed. At this new level of 
interpretation, our semantic insight (both that of the researcher and that of the 
reader) has necessarily to play a role. This semantic insight must now consider 
the plausibility of the sociosemantic distances given by the plot, which as 
stated before must be interpreted as measures of social affinity or social 
incompatibility. As Coxon puts it: 
"The 'meaning' of the configuration is a more complex matter (than that of 
patterning). Once labels are attached to the points we bring all sorts of 
other information into play—what we know about the objects, what 
connotations they have for us, what subjects said about them and so on. As 
these meanings are put together we begin to recognize more subtle 
relationships. In fortunate circumstances, hitherto unsuspected 

















We start this 'meaning interpretation' of the configuration by looking at 
the location and distances between categories in relation to each of the main 
axes, first to the abscissa or horizontal axis and afterwards to the ordinate or 
vertical axis. Once the axes interpretation is done, we shall look at the 
sociosemantic distances between the categories trying to find a possible 
semantic structure in the plot. This structure embodies the communicational 
constraints which are present within the sample. 
5.3.1.2.1. The horizontal axis 
The interpretation of the main axes is central to the interpretation of 
this plot (with the reservation that we are talking just about the axes 
represented in the figure, though we know they might be rotated in any 
direction; in this case the axes would suggest, a different but not incompatible 
interpretation). We should look to the projections of the points (categories) on 
the horizontal axis first, as this axis represents the main dimension of the 
scaling. Starting from the extreme left towards the right (the abscissa axis goes 
from -2.5 to +2.5), this horizontal axis can be interpreted as measuring a very 
deep personal attitude: what we call the independent/dependent way of self-
perception. The best way to define this attitude is just to consider how specific 
categories are distributed along this axis. The first two categories on to the left 
are 'living together unmarried' (-2.52)8, and 'independent' (-2.23). Both 
categories come from students' textual expressions and they appear in more 
elaborate ways in several essays. Nevertheless I think it is not necessary to add 
more specific wordings to understand that individuals who use these 
expressions value their independence (from parents, partners and children) as 
an important element of their personal fulfillment. It is important to point out 
that the category 'independent' is used by nine students, all of them girls. Are 
boys not appealed to by the idea of being independent? Of course, they are. 
What happens is that boys implicitly include the idea of being independent as 
an obvious, 'natural' component of the concept of being an adult male. In fact 
the idea of personal independence and autonomy is part and parcel of the 
generic self-perception of young men in our society, as boys' essays make 
abundantly clear. For them, there is no fear of not reaching independence in 
the transition from living with their parents to being married or living with a 
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partner. For boys independence is just presupposed. For girls this question 
appears in a different light. As said, only girls —some of them— 'want to be 
independent', first from their parents and later, in adult life, from husbands, 
partners and children. Specifically they want to remain independent from their 
potential husbands/partners. In the case of girls, the idea of independence 
appears as an aspiration and a project, and it is reflected in different degrees 
along the horizontal axis as we will see. The categories which follow on this 
axis are 'intellectual interests' (-1.66) and 'not to marry' (-1.54). This last 
category is used by six students, four of them girls. Further to the right, the 
categories job fulfillment' (- 1.14), 'shared flat' (-1.08) and 'sophistication of 
ideas' (-0.98) appear. 'Shared flat' is used by nineteen students: seventeen girls 
and only two boys. The latent idea/desire for independence (both in economic 
and personal terms) is clearly present in most of the categories referred. 
The progression on the independence/dependence axis, goes on 
towards the center of this axis through other categories which specifically refer 
to some prerequisite and to the content of that independence. They are 
categories such as 'ambitious' (-0.96), 'self-confident' (-0.81), 'professional 
career' (-0.82), 'positive old age' (-0.51) (this category includes an old category 
from the initial list of 81 categories: 'independent old age', which has been 
assimilated to it), 'money' (-0.22) , 'properties' (-0.49), and 'to continue studies' 
(-0.29). To have a self-perception system defined by these categories (among 
others), means to have not only a generic desire for independence, but an 
elaborated comprehension of the factors that can make this personal 
independence possible. The resulting view on life appears as highly 
'personalized': it is centred on individual self-fulfillment. In sum, the 
individuals who use categories located in the two left quadrants of the plot are 
the kind of people that later on we will describe as belonging to the 
'profession-centred self-perception pattern'. 
From point 0.0 rightwards the level of family and/or spouse/partner 
dependence increases reaching its maximum on the extreme right area of the 
plot. The first category which appears starting on the right quadrants (the 
'dependence quadrants') is 'friends' (0.17). The location of this category shows 
that the relation with friends represents a minimum level of interpersonal 
dependence (it must be noticed here that in the essays 'friends' is mainly 
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mentioned when the students talk about their youth; in adult and old life 
'friends' seldom appears). From this nearly neutral category —in relation to the 
independence/ dependence attitude—, the level of interpersonal dependence 
progressively increases, and it becomes family dependence, as we will see. 
Next category is 'family ties in old age' (0.37). This category shows the desire 
of being close to children and grand-children in old age, but only occasionally 
(weekends, Christmas...). Categories as significant as 'to have children' (0.49) 
and 'to marry' (0.68) follow. Their importance is reinforced by the fact that 
they are the most used categories of the whole repertoire: twenty seven girls 
and thirty two boys want to have children and thirty girls and thirty seven boys 
want to marry (in a sample of forty eight girls and fifty two boys). Therefore 
most of the students in the sample (more than 60%) include 'to marry' and 'to 
have children' in their repertoire. 
The categories representing maximum family dependence are located 
on the extreme right quarter of the axis. The category 'negative and dependent 
old age' is located at point 1.18, the category 'family ties with parents' is at 
point 1.50 and at the same point is 'family fulfillment'. The category 'family 
ties with parents' stands for longer expressions produced by those individuals 
who see themselves as being cared for or caring for their parents all their lives. 
Here again gender plays a part. Seven girls and one boy share the idea of 
strong family ties through all their lives. In general, those categories which 
appear on both extremes of the axis are used predominantly by girls. The 
category 'fiance' (1.75), used by fifteen students can be interpreted as opposite 
of 'living together unmarried' (which is one used by a smaller number of 
students, just seven). The former category stands for the traditional type of 
relation, which is explicitly aimed at marriage. The latter category points to a 
relationship which explicitly circumvents marriage and avoids legal ties that 
would hamper the independence of the partners. 
The two last categories on the abscissa axis, are 'legal will' (2.03) and 
'housewife' (2,05). Apparently 'legal will' has no obvious connection with the 
idea of dependence, but looking to the way in which the students put it, a clear 
relation comes out. The students who use that category seem to be willing to 
keep their family ties even after death, and in some cases in a melodramatic 
way. The category 'housewife' has an evident connotation of dependence: 
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probably is the most dependent status imaginable in modern society. No 
wonder it appears on the far right of the plot, keeping a maximum distance 
with the first ('living together unmarried') and the second ('independence') 
categories on the left. 
In conclusion, considering the projections on the first axis of the 
categories analyzed, this axis seems to represent a continuum from great 
independence (key category 'independent') to great dependence (key category: 
'housewife'). 
5.3.1.2.2. The vertical axis. 
The second dimension of the scaling, the vertical axis, seems related 
to a different attitude of the students, an attitude which will be called 'money 
expectancy'. This money expectancy is at the basis of the consumerist/non 
consumerist attitudes shown by the students. Therefore the axis can be viewed 
in both ways: as a money expectancy dimension or as a consumerist/non 
consumerist dimension. The categories spread along this axis according to the 
degree of money expectancy (alternatively of the consumerist/non consumerist 
attitude). Here consumerism means individual self-fulfillment through the 
access to goods and properties. 
The upper half of the axis corresponds to the consumerist attitude 
whereas its lower half represents the non consumerist attitude. 
In the plot, the values of this axis go from +2.00 to -2.00. Going from 
top to bottom, the first category on the vertical axis is 'appearance and dress' 
(1.09) It is predominantly used by girls. Ten girls and two boys express this 
category. The 'consumerist' implications of the category are obvious. The last 
categories at the bottom are 'idealism' (-1.63) and 'work for family' (-1.55). 
The 'non consumerist' connotations of the category 'idealism' are clear. 'Work 
for family' represents the 'non consumerist' attitude in a more subtle way: It is 
an altruistic, traditional attitude opposed to the egocentric, individualistic 
outlook of the 'consumerist subject'. If consumerism is related to a modern 
individualistic outlook and non consumerism is equated with a traditional, 
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family-centred outlook, the category 'work for family' (which is used 
exclusively by boys), clearly belongs to the latter. 
The upper half of the axis (the 'positive money expectancy' half) 
includes categories such as 'house important in old age' (0.95), 'properties' 
(0.80), country life' (0.79), 'money' (0.78), 'ambitious' (0.75) and 'professional 
career' (0.58). On the other hand, the lower half of the axis (the 'negative 
money expectancy half) includes, apart from the two categories already 
mentioned — 'idealism' and 'work for family'—, categories such as 'fear of 
unemployment' (-1.55), 'unambitious' (-0.96), 'negative/dependent old age (-
0.86), 'social conscience' (-0.58). Some categories have no obvious 
interpretation in terms of this dimension of money expectancy. For instance, 
'housework and career' (0.39) belongs to the 'positive money expectancy' half. 
This category is used exclusively by girls who want to work (in order to earn 
money and to have a professional life) but also want to assume at the same 
time the role of housewife. Therefore the relation of some categories with this 
dimension is strongly mediated through the other dimension, the 
independence/dependence dimension. Consequently a full account of the 
ordering of categories along this axis is only possible when the two axes are 
considered together in their mutual relationship. 
After this preliminary interpretation of the two axes of the plot we 
should look into their combined effect, that is to say the actual location of the 
points and their mutual distances, which are the most important features of an 
MDS configuration. 
consumerism 




    
non-consumerism 
5.3.1.3. Sociosemantic distances in the plot (figure 
We shall start by considering, in an initial approach, the biggest socio-
semantic distance in the plot, that between 'living together unmarried', in the 
far left, and 'housewife', in the lower right corner. These are the two more 
distant categories in the plot. It is clear, at least to the semantic insight of this 
researcher, that this largest distance in the plot fits the strong incompatibility 
that we intuitively perceive between those two intentional categories. We feel 
that in fact those two categories repel each other; practically, they are opposite 
categories. Of course this intuitive judgement presupposes a huge background 
knowledge about the society and the culture in which those categories have 
been used. This background knowledge is very difficult to formalize as the 
experts in Artificial Intelligence know9. However this lack of formalization 
does not mean that the judgements based on that knowledge should not be 
taken into account as legitimate. Now, when these judgements coincide with 
the 'objective' data produced by sociosemantic analysis, this coincidence 
strongly confirms and furthers our semantic insight. 
It is possible to find, in the plot, other examples of distant points, 
which correspond to intuitively opposite categories. I have linked in the plot 
some of them (figure 4). For instance, consider the distance, also very large, 
between the category 'housewife' and categories 'independent' and 'not to 
marry'. Again this large distance seems in accordance with our semantic 
insight. It is evident (within our social and cultural frame of mind) that 'being a 
housewife' and 'being independent' are concepts which repel each other to the 
point of incompatibility. The same occurs with the categories 'not to many' 
and 'housewife'. We can find another examples which fit into this pattern. For 
example, the category 4 'living together unmarried' relates through very large 
distances to categories such as '(contemplating to have a) fiance' and 'family 
fulfillment'. This is also consistent with our semantic insight. However the 
sociosemantic distances in the plot are not always so well tuned to that insight. 
For instance, it is not obvious why, according to their very large distances, the 
categories 'living together unmarried' and '(interested in) appearance and dress' 
must repel each other so strongly. One can only guess that expressing interest 
in 'appearance and dress' (which amounts to not merely having a moderate 
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perception) indicates an externally dominated image of oneself (an image 
defined by its external, rather than its internal, ways of recognition). That 
outlook would be, de facto, incompatible with the purpose, still pretty 
heterodox in Spanish society, of 'living together unmarried'. That purpose 
implies a remarkable independence with respect to the pressure of social 
dogmata, and this indicates a personality in a way opposite to the externally 
dominated personality which is characteristic of those who express interest in 
'appearance and dress'. 
A feature of some of these socio-distances is particularly puzzling at 
first sight: sometimes, two categories which are literally opposed are closer 
together than they are with respect to other categories which are only 
intuitively opposed. For instance, the sociosemantic distance between the 
categories 'not to many' and 'to marry', which are categories literally opposed, 
is smaller than the sociosemantic distance between the categories 'living 
together unmarried' and 'to marry' (which are only intuitively opposed). This 
strange fact has two levels of explanation. In the first place it is necessary to 
remember that proximity to the center of gravity, which for the categories of 
the halo, roughly coincides with proximity to the core, indicates wider use of 
those categories and the other way around: the farther out one category is from 
the center or from the core, the less widely used it is. Now, the categories 'to 
many' and 'not to marry' although considerably further apart, are closer than, 
respectively, 'to many' is from 'living together unmarried' and 'not to many' is 
from 'housewife', for instance. This is so just because 'to marry'/'not to marry' 
is more widely used than 'housewife'/'living together unmarried'. At first sight 
this 'failure' of sociosemantic analysis to represent literal opposites as being 
separated by distances bigger than just intuitive opposites may be considered 
as an essential shortcomingl° of the type of analysis which I am proposing. 
But, on the contrary, the apparent shortcoming accounted for by the previous 
explanation provides, in reality, the basis for a deeper level of analysis. 
For a category, the closer its proximity to the sociosemantic center, the 
larger its socio-extension. This fact means that categories closer to the 
sociosemantic center have less socio-meaning (are more common and hence 
less socio-specific) than categories located farther from that center. In that 
sense central categories are socio-generic categories, while peripheral 
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categories are socio-specific ones. For instance the categories, 'continue 
studies', '(having) friends' and '(having) family ties in old age' are very socio-
generic: a lot of the individuals want those things. Just because of that, they 
have very little discriminating power from a sociosemantic point of view and 
in this sense they have very little socio-meaning. 
Now, the socio-specific categories should be viewed as explanations 
or potential developments of the socio-generic ones. These explanations 
through socio-specific categories reveal the hidden meaning (sometimes 
different hidden meanings) of the socio-generic categories. For instance the 
literal opposites 'to marry'/'not to many' are categories more socio-generic 
(closer to the sociosemantic center) than the related intuitive opposites 
'housewife'/'living together unmarried'. The latter are more socio-specific 
(farther from the center), but they explain the former: the radical decision 'not 
to many' expressed by some individuals (only girls in our sample), seems to be 
taken as the result of a strong rejection of the possibility of becoming a 
housewife. Thus, 'distant' categories can hint at the reasons underlying the use 
of more common ones. 
The semantic relations between categories in the core is, in general, 
much more intuitively self-evident. Those categories constitute a fairly 
accurate description of the middle class ideal of self-realization and happiness, 
with money predictably at the center. However in a Spanish context there are 
some slightly surprising items, for instance the presence of categories like 
'(contemplating to have a) country life' and 'hobbies and pets'. Traditionally 
Spanish culture has predominantly considered city life in positive terms and 
country life in negative terms. The increase in the appreciation of country life, 
as well as the presence of hobbies and pets, suggests a change towards a more 
ecological way of life and a consciousness of the degenerated living conditions 
in the cities, amongst the new generation. 
5.3.1.4. Self-perception patterns in the categories plot (figure 51 
In the previous interpretation of the sociosemantic distances in the plot 
some groups of categories, with small distances and large semantic similarities 
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regions containing categories which intuitively seem to have a semantic 
similarity. These regions are drawn in figure 5. Such regions would tentatively 
correspond to outlooks representing different self-perception patterns. From 
that point of view I distinguish three main regions, enclosed in different type 
of lines, which correspond to three basic patterns. On the left side of the plot 
lies what I call the 'Profession Centred Pattern'; on the right side lies the 
'Family Centred Pattern'; and between both of them, what I call the 'Dual 
Pattern'. 
A full explanation of those patterns will only be possible in the 
interpretative analysis which will be developed in Chapter 6. However it is 
possible just on the basis of the plot to show some of the features defining 
those patterns. The profession centred pattern in a way, is defmed in contrast 
to the family centred pattern and vice versa; although both patterns overlap 
just on the area occupied by very socio-generic categories: to many, children, 
friends, etc. The contrast between these two patterns appears in two ways. In 
the overlapping part of the profession centred pattern, family life is positively 
represented. In the central area of this pattern, family life is simply ignored, 
and in the extreme left area of this pattern, traditional family life is explicitly 
negated, or at least questioned (see categories 'living together unmarried', 'not 
to marry' and 'hesitates to many'). Thus, the profession centred pattern 
includes two different perspectives —surrounded by different sort of lines in 
figure 6—, the one that is denoted as 'Yuppie Subpattern', which includes 
very many of the core categories and is defined by an active, pushy and 
optimist attitude; and the one that is denoted as 'Progressive Subpattern', 
defmed by a reactive, reflective, critical outlook. 
In contrast the family centred pattern seems dominated by an attitude 
of conformity and defensiveness towards the outside world. This pattern 
mirrors a strongly traditional view of reality: a view in which the interests of 
the person are focussed on her immediate social reality, the family, which 
seems to occupy most of the semantic space available. The outside world only 
seems to exist as a necessary, but rather uncomfortable environment to which 
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The dual pattern does not have a profile as clear as that of the other 
patterns and subpatterns. Apparently it is almost as close to the core as the 
yuppie subpattern, and much closer to the core than both the family oriented 
pattern and the progressive subpattern. In this sense it seems to be connected 
to the yuppie subpattern more strongly than to the others. But on the other 
hand, the conceptual contents of the dual pattern strongly relate it to the family 
centred pattern. The word 'dual' tries to express this double, conflictive 
attachment. As a matter of fact things look clearer when some information 
external to the plot is taken into account. By looking to the concrete students 
who use the most characteristic categories in a given area, we can see that 
those patterns and subpatterns are strongly coloured by gender. The dual 
pattern is predominantly a girls' pattern. No wonder it reflects the tension 
between family responsibilities and professional self-realization. 
The yuppie subpattern and the family centred pattern are 
predominantly boys' areas; the progressive subpattern is predominantly a girls' 
one. The dominance of the girls in their two spaces is stronger than that of the 
boys in their respective areas. 
The consideration of the topological relations (relations of 
continuity/discontinuity) between patterns and subpatterns can be revealing. 
From that point of view the category 'continue studies' plays a key role. This 
category is, on the one hand, the bridge between the two predominantly girls' 
areas —the dual pattern and the progressive subpattern—. It is through the 
continuation of their studies that the resolution of the conflict which —as it 
will be shown in the following chapter—characterizes the dual pattern is 
resolved and girls can contemplate life from a nontraditional, progressive 
stance. At the same time this bridge between the two girls' areas constitutes a 
barrier between the two predominantly boys' areas -the family centred pattern 
and the yuppie subpattern. Academic achievement, an aspiration which is 
doubtfully formulated through the vague category 'to continue studies' is 
almost the only way through which the boys located in the family centred 
pattern could jump to the yuppie subpattern; but characteristically those boys 
do not contemplate that possibility. Incidentally, people in the profession 
centred pattern —both yuppie and progressive— tend not to use the vague 
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concept 'to continue studies' just because they take it for granted they will do 
so. They talk in more specific terms about their academic future. 
5.3.2. Interpretation of the plot of individuals (figure 7) . 
Figure 7 is another two-dimensional sociosemantic plot of individuals 
generated through ALSCAL. One hundred individuals are represented in it, 25 
from each of the four schools considered in this research. As was the case in 
the previous plot, the relevant features are the distances between the points as 
well as the location of those points with respect to the two axes. In this plot 
each point represents an individual. The distances between points should be 
considered as sociosemantic distances; they measure the strength of the 
semantic connection between each pair of individuals. This semantic 
connection consists of the relationship which exists between individuals 
through the use of common concepts. The higher the number of concepts 
shared by any pair of individuals, the stronger their semantic connection and 
thus, the smaller their distance on the plot. Individuals are close when there is 
a strong semantic connection linking them; distant individuals are linked by a 
weak (perhaps, non-existent) semantic connection. In other words, small 
distances between individuals should be interpreted as representing a high 
semantic or conceptual affinity between those individuals, and large distances 
between individuals should be viewed as representing a weak (perhaps, non-
existent) semantic or conceptual affinity between those individuals. 
Alternatively, the proximity between individuals may be considered as a 
measure of their semantic compatibility and their remoteness can be 
interpreted as a measure of their semantic incompatibility. 
As was the case when dealing with categories plots, here we face a 
problem about the ontology which we are presupposing. Is there just one force 
at work, either socio affinity or socio incompatibility? Or, are there two forces 
(socio-affinity and socio-incompatibility? By looking at the pattern of the 
configuration we are tempted to guess that some individuals somehow attract 
each other whereas some other individuals repel each other. This problem will 
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5.3.2.1  The patterning of the configuration of the individuals' plot.  
When we look at the general shape of the configuration of points 
(representing individuals) in the plot, we see that most of these points are 
concentrated as a fairly symmetric, open arc from one to the other side of the 
vertical axis, from point -0.50,-2.00 on the left side, up until point 1.00 of the 
vertical axis and then down to the right to point -0.50, 2.20. Eighty two of the 
one hundred individuals composing the sample are concentrated in that arc. 
The rest of the individuals are scattered in a loose configuration at the bottom 
of the plot. In total there is a collection of nineteen individuals outside the arc; 
twelve of them concentrate near the bottom of the vertical axis, and the rest of 
them are scattered in the plot between the central bottom and both sides of the 
arc. These nineteen individuals cannot be classified easily and will be dealt 
with later. Here I shall concentrate on the individuals composing the indicated 
arc. The density of points inside this arc is pretty high; there are two specially 
dense subregions: one of them is located on the extreme right of the arc and 
the other is just to the right of the vertical axis. There is an empty space 
between both regions. The density of the second of these regions progressively 
diminishes towards the left and then, another dense group, but with a density 
lower than that of the previous two, appears at the extreme left side of the arc. 
This configuration suggests that the individuals belonging to each of these 
three regions, share a characteristic combination of key concepts which is 
different to that of the individuals belonging to the other regions. To the left of 
the vertical axis, the arc becomes more evenly distributed, whilst to the right 
of the vertical axis the density is higher in the two groups aforementioned. 
Nevertheless, the total number of individuals within the arc is almost identical 
to both sides of the vertical axis (forty two to the right and forty to the left). . 
The arc may be interpreted as a discontinuous 'sociosemantic 
spectrum' occupied by loose subgroups of individuals defined by a higher 
degree of semantic similarities. The gaps which appear between those 
subgroups would indicate some sort of incompatibility between their 
respective members. Obviously individuals located on both extremes of the 
arc, are more dissimilar, more socio-semantically incompatible than 
individuals belonging to adjacent groups who, specially when their groups are 
separated in a rather smooth way, seems to be able to support a substantial 
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amount of communicational traffic among them (Gould, P.,1980:181). 
Undoubtedly this traffic is constrained by the gap, but in any case the 
distances between adjacent groups are rather small, when compared with most 
of the distances in the plot; consequently, we can guess that there will be some 
communication across each gap. Specifically, the several clusters of 
individuals located along most of the left region must have a high semantic 
compatibility between them, a compatibility which they do not share with the 
other regions located on the right side of the plot. 
5.3.2.2. Interpretation of the configuration according to the individuals' list of 
concepts (figure 8).  
In order to interpret a plot like this, trying to extract a maximum of 
meaningful information, as Coxon proposes 
"first we look for significant patterns in the configuration, i.e. detect 
structure, and secondly we ascribe a meaning or interpretation to those 
patterns or structures" (Coxon, A. 1982a:93). 
In the previous section, concerning the patterning of the configuration, 
we have seen a basic structure: the open arc shaped by the concentration of 
most of the individuals along the horizontal axis. Those individuals are 
distributed in a way which strongly resembles the distribution of the concepts 
in figure 1; even the isolated individuals along the bottom of the plot are 
mirrored by a scattered group of concepts in that graphic. 
The next step is to ascribe to each point the number of the student it 
stands for and to look at every student list of concepts to see if we fmd 
significant information capable of justifying' their relative location in the 
configuration, hence giving a sociosemantic meaning to that location. By 
doing so, and if we are fortunate enough, we can discover hitherto unsuspected 
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It has been said before that the categories plot and the individuals' plot 
are the two faces of the same sociosemantic coin. It seems to be so in a literal 
sense, at least with respect to the horizontal axis. In fact, it seems as if each 
plot is the mirror image of the other: the right hand side of one plot becomes 
the left hand side of the other. The horizontal axis —corresponding to the 
main dimension—, which in the case of the categories plot was interpreted as 
the independence/dependence dimension, can be interpreted in the individuals' 
plot as representing the same independence/ dependence dimension, but in an 
inverted way: here maximum independence is placed on the far right and 
maximum dependence on the far left. 
We will start, as was the case in dealing with the categories plot, by 
interpreting the 'independence side' of the axis. Student number 1511 is at the 
end of the right hand side. When we look to her repertoire of categories, we 
find that it is a paradigmatic collection of categories allocated on the left hand 
side of the categories plot. She uses 11 categories; this implies a rather high 
dimensionality and, in principle, high possibilities of semantic connectivities 
with other individuals (therefore, considering just this aspect, she should not 
be in such far away position). But her concepts are: 'living together unmarried 
(as an adult)', 'independent','not to have children (a concept assimilated to the 
category 'hesitates to have children'), 'intellectual interests', 'to share a flat 
(with friends, as a university student)', job fulfillment', 'ambitious', 
'sophistication of ideas', 'specified professional career (assimilated to the 
category 'professional career'), self-confident', 'active and positive old age' 
(assimilated to the category 'positive old age'). So she has a radically 
'independent' outlook. These eleven concepts almost totally coincide with the 
first eleven categories located on the upper 'independent region' of the 
horizontal axis in the categories plot (figure 3). This student provides a first 
example of the symmetry that exists between the two plots. 
The concepts used by student 15 coincide with what most people 
understand by the idea of individual independence. From a professional point 
of view, she wants to have a specified university degree and a job in that 
specialty; so it is reasonable to think that this job, if attained, will make her 
economically independent. From a personal point of view, she wants to share a 
flat with friends while being at the university, (although she is living only 30 
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minutes away from Madrid's two main universities); so she wants to be 
physically independent from her parents as soon as possible. If she eventually 
has a partner, she sees herself as merely living with him, without marriage and 
without children. From a psychological and intellectual standpoint, her self-
confidence, the sophisticated expressions she uses and her intellectual interests 
are remarkable. Everything in her essay allows us to think that she has the 
elements necessary to face life from an independent, individualistic, 'modern', 
stance. 
The extreme 'independence region' of the main (horizontal) axis -from 
point 2.24 (individual 15) to point 1.49 (individual 54), includes fourteen 
individuals: nine girls and five boys. In this respect, the categories plot and the 
individuals' plot are symmetric too. 'Independence' is an outlook elaborated 
mainly by girls, and it defines a predominantly feminine area (see figure 11). 
The rest of the individuals of the region in question (63, 5, 22, 72, 7, 
83, 94, 25, 24, 12, 62 and 23) share with individual 15 most of their concepts, 
a circumstance which is reflected by their small mutual sociosemantic 
distances. All of them belong to what we call the profession centred self-
perception pattern (see figure 5). Most of them come from middle class 
backgrounds (8 from Herrera School, 4 from Cortijo School) and only 2 from 
one of the two working class schools (Picasso School, see figure 9). 
Just to the left of the 'independence region', there is a gap (between 
points 1.49 and 1.21), and at point 1.21 (individual number 10) the arc 
continues without a significant interruption towards the left until individual 43, 
at point -0.27. Here another gap appears until individual 41, at point -0.53. 
The arc continues to the left until individual 53, at point -0.92, where another 
gap appears, until individual 68, at point -1.23. The similar magnitude of these 
three gaps (0.28, 0.26, and 0.29, respectively) is remarkable. The intermediate 
region between the first and second gaps is mainly located on the positive side 
of the main axes, although there are seven individuals placed at the beginning 
of the negative side of the abscissa. According to our interpretation, this 
region would show a progressive decrease in the levels of independence, 
corresponding to a progressive decreasing in the socioeconomic level of the 
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students represented. This tendency turns out to be accompanied by a less 
noticeable, but still present, decrease in the number of girls. 
As indicated already, the density of individuals is higher immediately 
to the right of the vertical axis. There is a compact group made up of twenty 
eight students who are divided into two subgroups: the one to the right has 
fifteen individuals, all of them, except two, belonging to a profession centred 
self-perception pattern. In the group to the left ten individuals clearly belong to 
the dual or mixed self-perception pattern, whereas there are 3 more individuals 
who are difficult to classify (see figure 8). 
Looking to the facts from the theoretical perspective provided by the 
idea of the self-perception patterns, the gap between the two regions on the 
right somewhat disappears because on both sides of the gap there are 
profession-oriented students. The difference between individuals in each side 
lies in their level of individual independence, their relatively conventional/ 
unconventional outlook, and the different gender composition. Profession 
centred students of the second group are semantically connected with the 
'independence group' through the concepts of professional life, but they differ 
in their concepts about family life, which are pretty conventional. Most of the 
profession centred students of the second group use concepts such as 'I want to 
be married' and 'I want children' while the independence group reject both 
concepts or hesitate about them. A typical example of the students belonging 
to this second group is student 74 (0.63). The categories he uses are: 'to 
marry','children', 'money', 'properties', 'continue studies', 'university career', 
'country life', 'sports', 'appearance and dress', 'independent old age' and 
'peaceful old age'. He is quite in the middle of the group and as said a very 
representative example of it. 
Highly connected with these profession oriented students, having 
minimal distances with respect to them, the dual or mixed students start to 
appear. The semantic connectivity with the near profession-oriented students is 
established through two types of concepts. Categories such as 'marry' and 
'children' and concepts related to studies and career. The dual group includes 
11 students all of them girls; the appearance of a substantial subregion like 
this, surrounded by profession centred students and exclusively occupied by 
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girls is quite remarkable. The level of individual independence represented by 
these girls decreases in comparison with the level which is characteristic of 
typical profession centred students, because the former are prepared to share 
their professional life with motherhood. By looking at the categories used by 
student 99 (0.10) we can see the 'flavour' of a paradigmatic dual student. This 
is her repertoire: 'continue studies', 'sports', 'university career', 'to marry', 
'children', 'housework and career', 'family and job fulfillment', 'money', 'legal 
will' and 'family ties in old age'. Apart from the categories 'housework and 
career' and 'family and job fulfillment', which are exclusive of the dual pattern, 
the rest of her categories are shared by most of the profession centred students. 
Besides these eleven 'dual' girls, there is a boy, student 13 (0.97), in 
their vicinity, who is connected to them through the concept 'family and job 
fulfillment' (on top of the concepts related to studies and career). He is not 
included in the dual self-perception pattern because even though he is prepared 
to enjoy family life, he does not contemplate this family life as interfering with 
his working life. There are one or two more boys with a similar attitude along 
the horizontal axis. They would like to take care of their children after the 
working hours and at the week-ends. One of them words his attitude in this 
terms: "At the end of the day I'll come home very happy because my children 
will be waiting for me and I'll help them with their homework". 
The vertical axis approximately coincides with the division line 
between two self-perception patterns. To the right —and just at the beginning 
of the left side of the horizontal axis— we fmd the students who belong to the 
profession centred and dual patterns; and to the left —starting from individual 
35 (-0.26)— we predominantly fmd students belonging to the family centred 
pattern. There is a fringe of profession centred students (five individuals in 
total) along the top half of the vertical axis. These individuals, although 
primarily characterized as profession centred, share with family centred 
students, some concepts such as 'family fulfillment', (student 8, -0.19), 'work 
for family' (student 71, -0.17), 'inactive old age' (student 4, -0.09), and 
'dependent old age', (students 67, -0.13, and 90 -0.09). The use of such 
concepts by those students explains the fact that they are a little to the left with 
respect to the vertical axis, as they have a specific concept through which to 
establish an important semantic connection with their neighbors in the 'family 
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region'. What progressively characterizes the individuals to the left of the 
vertical axis is their dependence on their families (parents, spouse, and 
children), and less interest in their studies and their working life. One can also 
perceive a pessimistic general attitude in some of them. Their level of 
dependence on family life increases as they approach the end of the horizontal 
axis. Let us see some examples. For instance, student 49 (-0.67), is located 
near the beginning of this group. Her categories are: 'friends', 'appearance and 
dress', 'to marry', 'children', 'housewife', 'family ties in old age', 'house 
important in old age', 'country life', 'positive old age' and 'travel'. This student 
has a fairly high level of connections with the people located to the right of the 
vertical axis: consisting of categories relative to old age, on top of the 
customary references as 'to marry', 'children', etc. But a very significant 
concept strongly connects her with the students located to the left: 'housewife'. 
Clearly this is the concept that presupposes the highest level of family 
dependence. The fact that all categories related to studies or work in adult life 
have disappeared from her repertoire, is also remarkable: this lack of 
professional expectations radically separate this student from the profession 
centred and dual patterns, including her within family centred pattern. Another 
instructive example may be student number 92 (-1.80). This student is located 
near the left end of both the family centred group and the axis. She can be 
considered as an extreme representative of family centred students. Her set of 
concepts is revealing: 'friends', 'not to continue studies', 'fiancee', 'marry', 
'children', 'housewife', 'passive, negative and dependent old age', 'family 
fulfillment' and 'unambitious'. This case clearly shows an almost total lack of 
aspirations to personal independence. She is prepared to transit quietly from 
her family's 'protection' to her fiance's, to her husband's and to her sons and 
daughters'. No intention of continuing studies, no professional ambitions of 
any kind. For our student a happy life apparently consists in being a family 
defined individual, from cradle to coffin. 
There are some dual students (eight in total) scattered throughout the 
family centred region, mostly to the right side of it. These students (all of them 
girls) belong to what might be called 'voluntaristic dual sub-pattern'. They are 
students who show most of the features of which are characteristic of family 
centred individuals, but refer to some sort of vocational/professional 
expectations. However, these expectations —specially among the students of 
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this subgroup who are located on the extreme left— appear as swamped by the 
family centred categories, and hence they seem rather unrealistic. 
The family centred region has a number of points (students) lower 
than the profession centred area (35 versus 47). In the family centred region 
boys are dominant, although not much, 19 versus 16 (see figure 10). Students 
from the middle class schools practically disappear (3 from Herrera School 
and 6 from Cortijo School); most of them belong to Zaragueta School (16), 
and Picasso School (8), (see figure 9). 
5.3.2.3 Interpretation of the configuration according to backgrounds of the 
students (figure 9).  
In figure 9 the individuals belonging to a each school are represented 
in a different colour. Individuals from 1 to 25 belong to Herrera School 
(middle class professional families), individuals 26 to 50 belong to Zaragueta 
School (working class families), individuals 51 to 75 belong to Cortijo School 
(lower middle class families) and individuals 76 to 100 belong to Picasso 
School (working class families). Figures 9a, 9b, 9c, and 9d show the location 
in the plot of the individuals belonging to the four schools. It is convenient to 
remember that, as was explained in chapter four, I shall here use the school as 
a loose indicator of social background. The few cases in which the family 
background does not correspond with the general background attributed to the 
school will be individually explained in detail. In reality, when individuals are 
distinguished according to their corresponding school, the presence of 
different patterns of social backgrounds in each of those schools becomes too 
patent to dismiss. The clumping together of individuals belonging to the same 
school/same social background is easily noticeable. By coloring every school 
with a specific colour their different ways of distribution become clear. 
From this point of view, the arc is a display, from the most 
underprivileged social background, located to the left, to the most privileged, 
which are placed to the right. Tables I to IV show the jobs of the fathers and 
mothers for each school; the level of these jobs is a good indicator of the social 
background to which the individuals of each school belong. These tables are 
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mirroring the way in which individuals are located within the arc (compare 
tables I and IV with figure 9). The students located further to the left in figure 
9 are those from Zaragueta school. The students from Picasso school appear 
more evenly distributed throughout of the whole of the arc; in general they are 
located to the right to Zaragueta's students. In a way this seems to be 
inconsistent with the fact that generally speaking the social background of 
Picasso's parents is a little lower than that of Zaragueta's parents. However, on 
closer inspection some interesting differences between the backgrounds 
corresponding to both schools appear. The working class background of 
Zaragueta school, in a way, is more 'conservative' than the working class 
background corresponding to Picasso school. A full account of these 
differences will be given in the next chapter. 
The predominance of the two middle class schools starts in the 
proximity of the vertical axis. These two schools keep increasing their weight 
towards the right; on the extreme right we fmd a clear majority of Herrera's 
students, therefore, inside the arc the larger semantic distances in general 
correspond to students from the socially more distant school/areas. Besides, 
the proximity between students from the same school is not uniform in the arc. 
The highest level of dispersion corresponds to Picasso school, and the highest 
level of concentration corresponds to Herrera school. For instance, the extreme 
right area has 14 individuals. Eight of them belong to Herrera School, four to 
Cortijo School and two to Picasso School. Later on, we will take into account 
specific information related to some of those individuals, information about 
their family background, the concepts they use and share and to which pattern 
of self-perception system they should be assigned. 
This different pattern of distribution of the students depending on 
which school they belong to requires careful consideration. Students from the 
schools in the two social extremes (Herrera and Picasso), are not only located 
in different areas of the plot, but also show the most different distribution 
patterns. Herrera's students are highly concentrated on the right half of the arc 
(see picture 17a). The semantic distances between most of those students are 
really small, they clearly dominate that region in the arc, the most populated 
one. This suggests a communicational similarity and consistency between the 
individuals of the group. Eighteen out of the twenty five Herrera's students are 
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in the right half of the arc. This half of the arc concentrates forty two 
individuals in total. More important, all of them except two (who belong to the 
dual pattern) are profession centred students. 
In contrast, Picasso's students show the most scattered pattern of the 
four schools. Their dispersion easily stands out, they are present almost all 
around the plot. Certainly, eleven of them are on the left half of the plot (the 
region corresponding to the family centred individuals), and eight of them on 
the right half of the arc (mainly in the region corresponding to the dual 
individuals), this suggests a little predominance of family centred students 
among the group. This predominance becomes clearer when the substantial 
cluster (six individuals) on the far left is considered. It seems that students 
from this specific type of underprivileged social background do not have a 
very high level of communicational coherence between them. They are clearly 
fragmented in their views and expectations. In general these views are 
strikingly dissonant with respect to the realities of their immediate social 
environment. Apparently we cannot talk about the Picasso School as a 
homogeneous social group. They are the least homogeneous of the four 
schools. Even though the social backgrounds and the students' environment are 
very similar (see tables II and III), the self-perception systems of some of those 
individuals appear as substantially independent from the supposed 'material 
conditions' of their lives. This remarkable fact will be explained in the next 
chapter. Nevertheless it seems coherent with our conception of individuals as 
autonomous and self-organizing systems already explained in chapters 1 and 3. 
The two schools, which are in an intermediate social position are 
Cortijo (lower middle class) and Zaragueta (upper working class). Cortijo 
school (figure 10c) shows a configuration that is more evenly distributed than 
that of Zaragueta school (figure 10b). The former has thirteen of its students in 
the right half and eight students on the left half. Zaragueta School has sixteen 
students on the left half and just three on the right half. There is a remarkable 
scarcity of profession centred students in Zaragueta school, just two. There are 
only two dual students as well, and they are located in the limit between the 
dual and family regions. A substantial amount of Zaragueta's students are 
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have a family centred general outlook, but composed with some sort of 
professional expectations. 
5.3.2.4. Gender in the plot (figure 11).  
Figure 1 lshows the points of the configuration according to gender. At 
the first glance the distribution of girls and boys in the plot seems rather 
similar. However, on closer inspection some differences stand out. There are 
three regions in the arc clearly dominated by girls. The two extremes and an 
area near the middle, a little to the tight. The six girls on the extreme left 
represent a maximum degree of dependence. The key category in this respect 
is 'housewife'. Four of those six girls view themselves as housewives. Other 
common categories which appear as characteristic of this group are 'family 
fulfillment' and negative/dependent old age'. 
The second important cluster of girls is the one located slightly to the 
right of the vertical axis. This nine girls are prototypical of what is called the 
dual self-perception pattern. 
The key categories here are 'housework and career' and job and family 
fulfillment' (they are used by eight and four, respectively, of the nine girls). 
The presence of these girls in the middle area of the dependence/independence 
axis shows the conflictive balance they try to keep between their family and 
professional expectations. 
The third significant cluster of girls is located at the extreme right of 
the arc. There we find a group of thirteen individuals, nine of then girls. These 
girls represent attitudes of maximum independence and open rejection of some 
of the tenets of traditional family life. They make up what is called the 
progressive subpattern. The key category defining this group seems to be 
'independent', which is explicitly used by five of the nine girls. However some 
other categories are more widely used: 'shared flat' (seven girls), 'hesitates to 
have children' (six girls). In addition this group of girls share many of the 
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When we look at the boys distribution, we find that they are more 
evenly placed through the arc. However two main regions mainly occupied by 
boys can be detected in the arc. The first of these areas is adjacent to the first 
cluster of girls in the family region. There are nine boys there which somehow 
represent the extreme masculine version of the family centred pattern. The key 
categories seems to be 'family fulfillment'; other categories widely used in this 
group are: 'negative old age' (seven boys), 'vocational career' and 'fiancee' (five 
boys). 
A second region dominated by boys (forming a group of eleven) is 
also just to the right of the feminine region whose individuals were described 
as typical representatives of the dual pattern. In turn these boys are typical 
examples of the yuppie subpattern. They foresee a life focussed on their 
profession, but they also contemplate, in a secondary place, to have a standard 
family life. They see themselves as successful professionals, provided with all 
the trappings of a consumerist style of life. The key category seems to be 
'professional career', which is used by eight of the eleven boys. Other 
categories also widely used are: 'continue studies' (nine boys), 'positive old 
age' (eight boys), 'money' (six boys) and job fulfillment' (six boys). 
5.3.2.5. Distribution of self-perception patterns in the plot.  
This section intends to be a recapitulation of the previous analyses. As 
a result of them we can attempt a classification of the students according to the 
self-perception pattern to which they are closer, by comparing their individual 
lists of categories to the set of categories which are characteristic of each self-
perception pattern. This comparison should be done carefully and does not 
always produce clear cut results. Some individuals have a repertoire of 
categories that makes them difficult to classify. In this respect some decisions 
should be taken on an intuitive bases. But in general this process of 
classification produces definite results. 
In figure 8 the individuals are coloured depending on the self-
perception pattern assigned to them. At the first glance, the space is clearly 
divided: profession centred students to the right, family centred to the left and 
dual students in between. The right half of the arc is mainly occupied by 
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profession centred students or 'professionals'. They are the only occupants of 
the extreme right area, share the rest of the right half with students with a dual 
self-perception pattern, and are also present in the left half of the arc, although 
they progressively diminish towards the left end of it. 
Dual students dominate the central area of the arc, a little to the right 
of the vertical axis. They define an area of transition between the left and the 
right of the arc, that is to say, roughly speaking, between middle class and 
working class schools. In the right side of the arc, twenty eight individuals out 
of a total of 42, have a profession centred self-perception system; 11 
individuals have a dual self-perception system, and 3 are difficult to classify. 
No family centred individual appears in this side of the arc. 
Family centred students, 'family individuals' for short, are 
concentrated in the left half of the arc. In this side twenty out of a total of forty 
students are family individuals; they share this left half of the arc with 8 dual 
individuals, 9 professional individuals and 2 individuals difficult to classify. 
Four of those dual individuals in the left half area have small distances with 
the main dual area to the right; in fact they enlarge the dual area towards the 
left. The rest of the dual students in the left half, and the nine professional 
students who appear on this area, have a peculiar semantic repertoire which is 
responsible for their location so far away from the other students included in 
the same self-perception pattern. They will be analyzed individually, further 
down. The eighteen students scattered around the plot outside the arc do not 
make up a significant pattern in relation to their individual self-perception 
systems. 
Basically, the initial hypothesis about the existence of three 
fundamental patterns of self-perception is confirmed by this sociosemantic plot 
of individuals. In general there is a remarkable semantic proximity between 
individuals sharing the same self-perception system. Typical family centred 
and profession centred students keep the longest distances in the plot. Students 
provided with a dual self-perception system, as they share some of the most 
characteristic categories of the family centred and profession centred patterns, 
are close to both of them. In reality they are between them, but a little bit 
closer to the profession centred students than to the family centred students. In 
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this plot, the fact of the proximity between individuals with similar self-
perception systems define three basic communicational environments: the 
family environment, the professional environment, and the particular 
combination of the previous two which is called dual. Potentially, family and 
professional centred students can communicate and interact with dual students, 
due to their semantic proximity. On the contrary those two groups keep larger 
distances between them, and presumably the students belonging to such distant 
groups would have more difficulties in communicating and interacting with 
each other. 
Now, let us see who are the students outside their 'natural' semantic 
space. They are freak students referred to above as belonging to a specific 
pattern of self-perception, in accordance with our classification, but located in 
an are dominated by a different pattern. We shall concentrate on students 
number 9, 68, 69 and 70. Student number 9 is a 13 years old boy, from Herrera 
School. His father is a business man, his mother is, in his own words "studying 
because she is on the dole" (she is registered in further education). He was 
very enthusiastic about the essay and asked for more time to finish it. His 
essay is quite different from most of the others. It is a very fantastic and 
optimistic essay, in the style of Star Wars. He see himself in a futuristic 
science-fiction world. He feels very much identified with his job -pilot- and 
the concepts he uses in relation to his job belong to a fantasized world. At the 
same time he see himself as a family man, therefore, it is not so surprising to 
fmd him in the area of family centred students, since his professional concept 
are so idiosyncratic and the categories he shares with other students are related 
to family life. 
Student number 68 is a 14 years old boy from Cortijo school. His 
father is a film director and his mother is a film actress. His aim is to achieve a 
balance between all aspects of life (a rather mature, even philosophical point 
of view, which is totally uncommon among the students of the sample). He 
contemplates job and family as complementary and important both for 
happiness and fulfillment. He looks for "a wife who thinks like me, 
understands and likes my job (actor and something else)". He is concerned 
about the role of ethics in life "I'll try to resolve all my business in a clean and 
proper way". Although he is very much concerned with his professional future, 
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his approach to it is not common; that means that he has not many categories 
to share with professional students, but he has nearly all the categories relative 
to the family sphere to share with family centred students. Consequently he 
has been attracted to the family area in the plot. 
Student 69 is a 13 years old boy, from Cortijo school; his father is a 
civil engineer, his mother a housewife. He wants to be a professional football 
player, an army officer and a surgeon. He sees his jobs as a means of 
providing money for his family —this conception of the own job is typical of 
family centred students. He contemplates himself in his old age surrounded by 
grand children, nephews and nieces. In a way he has a self-perception system 
which is similar to the dual self-perception pattern; consequently, he is 
topologically close to dual students and attracted towards the family area. 
Student number 70 is a 14 years old boy from Cortijo school; his 
father is a draughtsman, his mother is a housewife. He gives a great 
importance to his future job, but "mainly as a means of maintaining social 
relationships and as a place where he will be helped as a junior worker and he 
will help others as a senior. This perception of the job place is unusual in our 
sample. Family life also has a great importance for him: "At the end of the day 
I'll come back home very happy because my children are waiting for me, and 
I'll help them with their homework". He views himself, in his old age, living 
with one of his sons, happy to be surrounded by grandchildren. All these 
characteristics give us, again, the image of a boy who shares concepts with 
both family centred and profession centred students. As his concepts related to 
profession are not common, whereas those related to family are shared with 
the family centred students, he is located in the family area. 
5.4. Social-class in the categories plot 
References to social class background —although they can be 
misleading because as argued in chapters 1 and 3, they tend to reify the 
individual who in fact is a self-organizing, 'novelty' producing reality, are also 
useful to substantiate the patterns. 
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Using a reductionist two fold (middle/working class) split, it can be 
said that the family centred pattern is a self-perception pattern which is typical 
of working-class backgrounds. Whereas the profession centred pattern 
typically is a middle class one, although some students coming from 
unprivileged backgrounds are located in it. The dual pattern includes middle 
class girls but it also includes working class girls, reflecting the tensions of a 
substantial upwardly mobile sector of this class. From the point of view of 
class background there is no obvious difference between yuppie and 
progressive subpatterns; both are composed mainly by students having a 
privileged background. 
In the analysis I avoid the categorization of individuals by social class, 
but the social categories naturally appeared from the subjects. Without 
entering here in the debate about "emic or indigenenous rather than etic or 
imposed" (Krippendorf (1980: 157) or in the challenge presented by Coxon et 
others in Images of Social Stratification, it can be argued that some sort of 
social classification comes out of the "mental map of the social scene"12 of the 
students when they try to portray for us their view of their own future. In fact 
relating students' social backgrounds and students' self-perceptions systems, it 
is possible not only to refer to social class but also to social mobility. 
5.4.1. Self-perception patterns and social backgrounds. 
As argued above, in a rather simplistic way, specific patterns of self-
perception are more likely to be prevalent among individuals having certain 
social backgrounds. However these obvious connections require a careful 
interpretation in order to avoid the sort of misplaced causal thinking that 
understands social processes in a reductionistic, 'objectivistic' way. Chapter 3 
dealt with some of these issues from a general theoretic perspective. Here, and 
before I comment on the relationships between the subjects of this research 
and their respective social backgrounds, I shall point to some presuppositions 
that will guide the interpretation of those relationships. 
It can be argued that any individual self-perception system develops 
within a social frame which exists a priori with respect to that system. Now 
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the relationships between individual self-perception systems and their peculiar 
social backgrounds, are to some extent, similar to the relations that an 
organism maintains with the ecological system to which it belongs13. It must 
be noted that ecological systems and organisms are both dynamical systems, 
they change in time. Individual self-perception systems and their social 
backgrounds are also dynamic realities. 
As in the case of the relationship between organisms and the 
ecological systems to which they belong, self-perception systems and their 
respective social backgrounds enter into a complex relation of co-evolution. 
The evolution of an organism is constrained by the ecological system which it 
inhabits. But this ecological environment does not determine such evolution. 
An organism (it's species if not the individual organism) can always fmd 
creative, innovative pathways of survival within its environment —which may 
change in unpredictable directions also. If the characteristics of organisms 
were determined by the environment, there would be no evolution as we know 
it: bacteria would still be the highest form of life on Earth. In fact, ecological 
systems are, to a large extent, the product of the evolution of organisms. These 
do not just inhabit such systems, they creatively constitute them. 
What I call the social background appears to be a sort of substantive 
reality, existing on its own. But in fact that reality is the emergent effect of the 
concurrent activity of individuals, as an ecological system is the emergent 
effect of the concurrent activity of organisms. Individuals are the base of the 
constitution of different social backgrounds, and individuals change them. 
Certainly, for any particular individual her social background appears as 
something given a priori, although that background is the dynamic reality that 
emerges from the activity of many particular individuals. That a priori 
appearance of social reality is an effect of considering the behaviour of a 
single individual, from the outside. When on the contrary we assume a holistic 
standpoint and take heed of the synergetic effects of the actions of many 
individuals, social backgrounds do appear as an a posteriori outcome of those 
actions. 
The social background of an individual certainly constrains that 
individual's self-perception system; but that background does not determine 
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that system of self-perception. This is a personal creation based upon the 
individual's requirements and capabilities of self-coherent interaction with the 
world: constraints do not prevent novelty, but guide it. It would be too easy 
just to point to the correlations that undoubtedly exist between the social 
backgrounds of the individuals that we study, and their specific modes of self-
perception. Of course those correlations do exist; but the presence of a 
correlation does not mean that a causal, necessary connection between the 
entities involved, must be taken for granted. For instance, wearing punk outfits 
might be positively correlated with having a working class background 
(whatever the definition of this may be); but trying to establish a causal 
connection —in any reasonable sense of the concept 'causal connection'—
between that background and the use of punk paraphernalia would seem a little 
far fetched. Because in all probability no imaginable defmition of 'working 
class background' would have been able to imply, a priori, a propensity to 
wear punk outfits. More likely, punk style is the outcome of a pure act of 
creation, initiated and processed in —hence, constrained by— a given social 
milieu. We can understand why punk style was originated in a particular 
milieu, but any attempt to explain causally its appearance would be 
desperately pedantic, unless we just equate the concept of causal connection to 
the concept of statistical correlation. But this would mean a complete 
dissolution a la Hume" of the very concept of causality. 
Therefore, the correlations that undoubtedly exist between social 
backgrounds and modes of self-perception do not entail that those backgrounds 
act as the cause of such modes. Rather, such backgrounds are a part (a 
substantial part) of the raw materials that the individuals use to create their 
self-coherent vision of reality. In general, but specifically within our society, 
individuals have the capability, in principle, of jumping out of their immediate 
social frame. Humans are always trying to enlarge their landscape of 
meanings. Anything strange can be perceived as a danger but also as a 
challenge and an opportunity. Individuals belonging to a specific social group 
are always looking to the others —privileged groups look askance at 
unprivileged ones, the latter peep at the grand life style of their betters. That is 
the way, for instance, that the luxury world of some soap operas becomes a 
part of the 'weltanschauung' of countless unprivileged people around the 
world. 
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Although the 'objective' situation of a social group, remains apparently 
unchanged, the very fact of that group accessing to new 'subjective' situations 
—in other words, to new information— dramatically modifies that 'objective' 
situation. For instance, Western T.V images reaching the countries of Eastern 
Europe have probably done more to annihilate the 'soviet style of life' than all 
the diplomatic skirmishes of the cold war15. 
The purpose of this thesis is to find some patterns of self-perception 
which are present among a group of individuals; it is not to find alleged causal 
correlations between those patterns and more or less well defined types of 
social backgrounds. The reason why this research does not try to establish 
cause-effect relationships between those social backgrounds and the 
corresponding individuals relies on an skeptical view about the 
epistemological legitimacy of any attempt to relate causally 'objective' social 
backgrounds —definitions which are, always debatable— with social 
phenomena occurring at the individual's level (Gambetta, 1987: 4). 
In sociological research the status of the so called 'cause-effect 
analysis' is usually regarded as higher than that of 'descriptive analysis'. But 
this stance is the result of assuming an epistemological paradigm which may 
be termed 'classic'; it is the nomothetic paradigm represented by classical 
physics. Often this paradigm does seem to work. But it works on the basis of a 
fundamental opacity: its main tools are statistical correlations which relate 
indexes supposedly representing conceptual variables. This outlook faces at 
least two kind of problems: first, the conexion between the indexes and the 
theoretic variables is always debatable. Second, those variables —and the 
corresponding indexes which implement them— must remain unchanged all 
throughout the analysis, otherwise the statistical treatment of the data becomes 
impossible. This means that new variables cannot appear, initial variables 
cannot disappear, and no variable can develop new meanings16. In sum, this 
classic outlook assume the postulate of distinctional closure. Hence, the 
qualitative change in contents and relations which is a basic feature of social 
processes is utterly missed. 
In the light of the heuristic model proposed, neither individuals nor 
social backgrounds are distinctionally closed systems. On the contrary, they 
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are informationally open systems —a concept put forward in chapter 3. 
Consequently the classical, nomothetic paradigm of social research, seems 
—from the perspective presented here— rather inadequate to mirror social 
processes characterized by qualitative dynamics in which new meanings are in 
the making. Due to the fact that cause-effect analyses are usually framed 
within that nomothetic paradigm, they are as questionable as the latter: such 
analyses would explain everything, except how novelty arises in social 
realities. Therefore I shall avoid any attempt to causally relate the available 
individuals' background information that is to the specific self-perception 
patterns shown by these individuals. 
However although I feel rather skeptical about the possibility of 
establishing causal relationships —in a classical sense of the word 'causal'—
between social backgrounds and self-perception systems, I believe that some 
other sort of relation does exist: I call structural coupling this relation'7. 
Structural coupling may be considered as a weak, non classical variety of 
causal relationship. The presence of a condition of structural coupling between 
two or more realities does not imply the existence of a causal relationship 
between these realities, at least in the strong, classical sense. For instance, 
there can be a predator/prey structural coupling between foxes and hens, but 
this coupling does not mean that hens cause foxes. Suppose hens disappear: 
foxes would probably find an alternative way of survival, say becoming 
scavengers. Certainly one can say that hens 'cause' foxes, in a particularly 
weak sense of the word 'cause'. Now this weak sense of causality does not lend 
itself to nomothetic treatment. 
The relation between self-perception systems and social backgrounds 
can be considered through the epistemological model of structural coupling, 
and not through the classical cause-effect paradigm. From this point of view 
the self-perception systems are somehow structurally coupled with their social 
backgrounds; these backgrounds constrain the corresponding self-perception 
systems, but the latter creatively navigate through those constraints and 
generate a renewed world of meanings beyond them. This is the way in which 
social meanings evolve, by means of the individuals continuously transcending 
their own backgrounds 18. 
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The constraints that social background impose upon the self-
perception system of the individuals becomes manifest when we considered 
some data: in the two middle class schools there are 19 and 16 students 
belonging to the professional patterns respectively, whereas in each of the two 
working class schools there are only 5 and 6 professional students. In the most 
privileged school (Herrera), no student shows a family centred self-perception 
system; in this school, even the few students with a working class background, 
have a dual self-perception system. On the contrary, in the two working class 
schools (Zaragueta and Picasso) there are 13 and 7 students respectively with a 
family centred self-perception system. Although these figures strongly support 
the idea that environment constrains the process of generation by the 
individuals of their social self-perception system, they also point to the ability 
of some individuals to produce a self-perception system which goes beyond 
the immediate horizon of those environments. There are four individuals in 
each working class school who face life from a professional outlook (and only 
one of them in each school have one parent with a university degree). Most 
important, 15 students from the two working class schools have a dual self-
perception system (five of them from Zaragueta school and 10 from Picasso 
school). 
5.4.2. Students' social background 
In this research I have considered as background information the 
following data: the level of studies of the students' parents (only for two of the 
four schools), their occupations, and some general characteristics of the area in 
which they live (house prices and level of social equipment). Information 
about their parents' occupation was requested from the students. This 
information was compared with the school records and it was coincident in 
most cases; differences were attributable to occupational mobility. Only two of 
the four schools kept records about parental level of education. Regarding 
those two schools (Herrera and Picasso) which kept records on this issue, a 
strong correlation could be established between the educational level of the 
parents and their occupations. This correlation is more difficult to establish in 
the case of mothers whose occupation is housewife. On the one hand, most 
housewife mothers from Picasso School (in the most unpriviledged area) have 
just primary studies, some of them incomplete. On the other hand, most 

















housewife mothers from Herrera School (in the most privileged area) had 
attend secondary school; three of them have university degrees and only two 
had attended just primary school. 
5.4.3. Parental occupations 
Table I 
PICASSO SCHOOL 
H G PROF LG PROF CLER-SER SELF-EMP TECHNI SKILMAN SEMISKIL HOUSEWIFE 
.• 	 I MOTHERS 
	 FATHERS 
In this analysis I shall assume the views held by Halsey, Health and 
Ridge in relation to occupational classification (Halsey et al. 1980:17). Halsey 
et al. follow the schema used by Goldthorpe in his Social Mobility and Class 
Structure, with some differences. I shall follow Halsey's schema introducing 
some changes as well, in order to adapt it to the characteristics of the Spanish 
occupational activities and to the fact that I consider mothers as well as fathers 
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I keep the three main classes classification (service, intermediate and 
working), as Halsey et al. do. I have modified the three categories of working 
class proposed by Halsey et al. As all parents in my sample are urban we can 
discard the category 'agricultural workers and smallholder'. However due to 
the nature of our sample we need to include the category 'unemployed' and the 
category 'housewife' for mothers. Therefore the social-class classification that 
will be used in this research appears as follows: 
CORTIJO SCHOOL 
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1. SERVICE CLASS 
I. Higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers and 
proprietors. 
II. Lower-grade professionals, administrators and managers. 
Supervisors, and higher-grade technicians. 
2. INTERMEDIATE CLASS 
III. Clerical, sales and rank-and-file service workers. 
IV. Small proprietors and self-employed artisans. 
V. Lower-grade technicians and foremen. 
3. WORKING CLASS 
VI. Skilled manual workers in industry. 









NUMBER OF PARENTS 	
mothers/fathers' jobs 











N / 4 H K  // 
2 / , 
	 \ 	 Kim
; 
  
//N. I// 7--7 
0 
H G PROF L.G.PROF CLER-SER 	 SELF-EMP 	 TECHNI 	 SKILMAN SEMISKIL HOUSEWIFE 
MOTHERS 	 ‘,J FATHERS 
The range of parental occupations varies from a majority of manual 
workers (unskilled and skilled) among fathers in Picasso and Zaragueta 
schools, to a majority of fathers belonging to the service class in Cortijo and 
Herrera schools. See tables I to V). Mothers' occupations are dominated by the 
category 'housewife' in the four schools, although in Cortijo and Herrera 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1 Joseph P. Forgas Multidimensional Scaling: a discovery method in social psychology in 
G.P. Ginsburg (ed), "Emerging Strategies in Social Psychological Research", 1979, pg. 253, 
reprinted in P.M.Davies & A.P.M.Coxon "Key Texts in Multidimensional Scaling" pg. 144. 





Jaccard index measures the similarity relationship between pairs of objects 
with respect to a set of characteristics. When we consider the relationship between any two 
objects through just one characteristic, a = b = c = 0 that neither of the two objects posses 
that characteristic. In that case a+b+c = 0 and consequently the value of the Jaccard index will 
be 0/0, that is it will be undefined. 
4 It must be noted that the paradox is not in the ALSCAL procedure, it arises from the 
characteristics of the connectivities established previously. 
5 I must express my gratitude to Dr. Rian Vogelesang from Leiden University, who introduce 
me to the developers of Anacord and Homals programs, who offer me the use of these 
programs before being marketed. 
6 It must be taken into account that the actual disposition of the two axes is arbitrary. They 
only provide a convenient framework to locate the points. However the axes may have an 
interpretation in qualitative terms, as they reflect some sort of symmetry on the plot which 
points to some structure in reality. 
7 The representation should not be taken as the fact itself. In this case the facts (the socio-
connection between concepts) are represented, by convention, through the JACCARD and 
ALSCAL algorithms. Any representation should show, through a convention, and always in 
an approximate way, some essential structure of the facts, but it is not that structure. 
8 In this analysis when a category is mentioned for the first time, its abscissa/ordinate value 
will be added between brackets. Each item is given only one value because we are describing 
one axis at a time. 
9 See Roger Penrose (1989) arguments about the non-algorithmic nature of believing and 
thinking. 
10 There is an extensive literature about the interpretation of plots according to the 
characteristics of their shapes and the distances between their points (Kendal, 1971 describes 
the 'horseshoe' shape; Shepard 1974, describes C-shape and S-shape). However, we shall 
leave the interpretation at the present level, which is as significant and stable as necessary for 
the aims of this research. 
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11 
 As was done when analyzing the categories plot. the notation for the coordinates of a point 
it written (in this case the abscissa value only), between brackets, after the number of the 
corresponding student. 
12 F.M. Martin (1954: 58-9) quoted by Coxon et a/. 1986: 7. 
13 This ecological metaphor is quite different from the organismic metaphor used by Spencer 
and Parsons among others. In fact Ecology is the science that transcends the organismic 
outlook in biology. 
14 According to Hume the idea of causally implies that "two objects are necessarily connected 
together" (1987: 155). 
15 See Hegel's explanation of the formation of the self-conscience. (1973: 120). 
16 It can be explained through Heylighen's notion of 'relational closure' that he understands as 
an internal criterion of stability of a system. He argues: "The relational closure of a system 
can be defined as the internal invariance of a distinction (or distinction system) defining the 
system" (1990: 6). 
17 Although the concept of structural coupling was first defined by Maturana (Maturana, 
1974:319-320), here it will be quoted Varela's development of the concept: "the continued 
interactions of a structurally plastic system in an environment with recurrent 
perturbations will produce a continual selection of the system's structure. This structure 
will determine, on the one hand, the state of the system and its domain of allowable 
perturbations, and on the other hand will allow the system to operate in an environment 
without disintegration. We refer to this process as structural coupling (Maturana 1975). If 
we can consider the system's environment also as a structurally plastic system, then the system 
and the environment will have an interlocked history of structural transformations, selecting 
each other's trajectories". VARELA, F. (1979:33). 
18 The relation between individual' self-perception systems and individual' social background 
presented here is similar to that established by W. Hollway (1984: 227) when she studies the 
production of subjectivity related to gender difference. For her "every practice is a 
production". She distinguishes between 'reproduction' (without the hyphen): the social 
practice is so constrained that serves to the maintenance of gender difference and 're-
production': the production of new meanings leading to changed practices. In her view this 
personal, subjective production of new meanings explains why "femininity and masculinity 




The sociosemantic analysis developed in the last two chapters involves 
a process of deconstruction/reconstruction' of the information provided by the 
students in their essays. The deconstruction phase was done by means of the 
content analysis which isolated at a fairly high level of abstraction, the 
conceptual components of those essays. 
The reconstruction phase is represented by the process leading to 
obtaining the sociosemantic plots. However, that reconstruction cannot 
reproduce all the information present in the original source of data (the es-
says), because such information has been drastically reduced through the 
conceptual homologation that the phase of content analysis entails. Any direct, 
textual, self-expression is always richer in meaning than any homogenizing 
translation of that expression. On the other hand, only the loss of some aspects 
of the original information makes it possible to reconstruct the other, deeper 
aspects, in a revealing way. 
However, once sociosemantic analysis has implemented that 
reconstruction of a part of the original information embodied in the essays, it 
is possible to go back to this full information in order to establish a second and 
more detailed level of interpretation. In reality those two levels of 
interpretation (sociosemantic plots/individual essays) should clarify each other 
through a cyclic process of a hermeneutic kind. 
In general, the sociosemantic level of analysis reveals macro-structures 
which are implicit in the total information provided by the whole set of texts. 
Those structures are not detectable in any of the individual texts, but appear as 
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a result of the cooperative interaction between those texts. The sociosemantic 
level of analysis guides and justifies, through those macro-structures which it 
reveals, the intuitive interpretation of the original texts; in turn that 
interpretation helps to make full sense of the stylized information that the 
sociosemantic plots represent2. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a full interpretive analysis of 
the texts. This analysis will be guided and justified by the previous 
sociosemantic analysis, which in turn will be clarified by the intuitive, 
interpretive, reading of the texts. 
6.1. A General view of the three Self-perception patterns. 
The sociosemantic analysis outlined in the previous chapter detected 
three self-perception patterns: a profession-centred self-perception pattern 
(professional pattern for short), a family-centred self-perception pattern 
(family pattern) and a dual (family and profession) self-perception pattern 
(dual pattern) (see figures 5 and 9). When we go back to the students' 
individual texts, these patterns are both confirmed and semantically enriched: 
i) a large group of students appear to have their self-perception 
centred in on their future career life3 and the issues related to or derived from 
that expected future. 
ii) another group of students appear to focus their expectations on 
family related issues; they have a self-perception according to which their self-
fulfillment depends on their future family life. 
iii) finally, there is a third group of students who show a bi-polar field 
of interests; they have a self-perception organized around both profession and 
family expectations. For them, family life and professional life are equally 
important domains of their self-perception systems. The profession-centred 
pattern can be further divided into two subpattems or subgroups, as suggested 
in Chapter 5: the yuppie subpattern (which includes the possibility of having 
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an average-size family) and the progressive subpattern (which rejects the 
possibility of having a family of the standard type) (see figure 6). 
When we look at the whole of the essays from a comprehensive 
perspective, we find that the discourse of the students reveal that their self-
perception turns around two main poles of attraction4: family life and 
professional life. The majority of students see their life as related to those two 
poles of attraction with a different degree of attachment towards one or the 
other; some of them seem to be positioned at an equidistant point between 
both of them. I consider the general notions of 'family life' and 'professional 
life' as poles of attraction because it can be argued that they function like the 
centroids identified in catastrophe theory, which attract around them most of 
the other categories used by the students. In fact the tension between 'family 
life' and 'professional life' influences the relationship between most of the 
other categories used by each individual subject. 
The boundaries between the three patterns are permeable and unclear, 
with respect to both their conceptual definition (the set of categories 
describing the patterns, see figure 5) and their social definition (the individuals 
belonging to each pattern, see figure 8). An individual can be considered as 
belonging to a pattern but at the same time she can share some elements 
(categories) characteristic of the others. When we describe each self-
perception pattern in terms of the categories to which the individuals' 
discourse was compressed in order to implement the sociosemantic analysis, 
we can define these three patterns as three intersecting sets (see figure 5). The 
intersection areas are composed of those concepts shared by several patterns. 
In general, each individual essay appears closer to one of those 
patterns than to the others. The difficulty of attaching individual essays to one 
particular pattern appears only in a few cases, although most essays do not 
show all the traits which characterize their respective pattern. 
This does not come as a surprise: when we try to classify empirical 
entities, the limits of the groupings become unclear sometimes, even 
paradoxical. In our sample, most of the students are oriented towards one of 
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the two main symbolic attractors (family and profession), —or towards both of 
them—, but at the same time they possess other intentional dimensions too. 
This fact, enriches each self-perception system, but on the other hand, 
makes any attempt to classify those systems more complex. This is why we 
would prefer to describe the patterns as fuzzy sets, as understood in fuzzy sets 
theory, better than as clear cut, intersecting sets. This characteristic lack of 
clear cut limits can be visualized in the coloured sociosemantic plot of 
individuals (figure 8). In this plot some green points (corresponding to students 
of the professional pattern) are closer to some purple points (students of the 
dual pattern), or even to red points (students of the family pattern), than to 
other green points. In fact some green points are located in the red area, and 
there are transitions or fuzzy regions between the three areas occupied 
respectively by green, purple and red points. Clearly the patterns overlap, to 
some extent, both socially and semantically. A particular pattern cannot fully 
include, nor represent all the facets of a person. Patterns are just abstract 
representations of the commonality of a group of subjects, and the students as 
multidimensional individuals, although predominantly attracted by a particular 
sociosemantic dimension, are multidimensional individuals, who also perceive 
themselves through some other facets that modulate the influence of that main 
attractor. 
When trying to assign patterns to students, the researcher faces a 
dilemma. On the one hand, the professional self-perception pattern seems to 
attract more students than any other (see details in the next section). But on the 
other hand, 'family life' appears as the most powerful pole of attraction. The 
notion of 'family life' does not correspond to any particular category. It may be 
viewed as a super-category, which include several specific categories, and 
above all the categories 'marriage' and 'to have children'. These two categories 
function as the hallmark of the super-category 'family life'. Significantly, they 
are the most widely used categories: 77 students want to many (two of them 
twice), and 71 want to have children. 
There is a third category, strongly related to those two: 'to have family 
ties in old age'. It is used by 47 students. The number of students using this 
category is very large, considering the fact that only five categories are used 
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by more that 50 students. However those three 'family related categories', 
although essential to detect a family-centred self-perception, neither exhaust-
ively define the family pattern nor are exclusive of it. They are used by 
individuals belonging to the three patterns. 
There is some evidence to suggest that what defines the kind of self-
perception system of an individual is not merely the fact of having a family, 
being married and having children. It is the individuals' relationship to their 
family life, their role in it, or maybe their rejection of it. 
The important aspect is the relation that the individual establishes 
between family-related concepts and work-related concepts, and between these 
two sorts of concepts and any other kind of concepts (studies, leisure, etc.). 
This relation defines the sort of self-perception that each individual has, and 
therefore it determines the pattern to which each individual belongs. In this 
respect, what matters is the structure of the relationship between all 
meaningful concepts present in the discourse of any individual subject. 
In order to include a student in a pattern it is necessary not only to 
consider her particular list of categories, but also to study her whole essay 
carefully looking for the relations between those categories, order to establish 
the symbolic attractors at work. Only after that careful consideration is the 
researcher in a position to classify each student, reducing to a minimum the 
possibilities of misjudgment. In this process the researcher may find students 
who use nearly the same list of concepts but belong to different patterns. In 
such cases the lists of concepts of those students are almost equal; they only 
differ in one or two categories but this is enough for the structure of the 
relationship between the categories to change from one subject to the other, 
hence defining different systems. This phenomenon is also represented in the 
sociosemantic plot of individuals (figure 8). For instance the green points that 
'invade' the red area, stand for students who share most of their categories with 
individuals belonging to the family pattern. However those students 
contemplate their future life as centred around their job. Their family related 
concepts, formally equal to those used by family-centred students, take on a 
different meaning when they are seen in their personal context (the individual 
essay)5. 
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This holistic kind of semantic interpretation cannot be done by the 
computer procedure; the reconstruction of meaning needs to be done by the 
researcher herself, who should go back to the original information (the texts), 
hence closing the hermeneutic cycle. 
Systems of self-perception are dynamic: they change by necessity (as 
any other kind of organizationally closed and informationally open system) 
along the time due to their interaction with other individuals, and due to their 
own self-reflexion (Pask, G. 1981). The fuzzy boundaries between the patterns 
—the fact that there are concepts shared by several of them—, make possible 
the movement of individuals from one pattern to another. This is specially so 
when the subjects are in a dynamic period of their lives such as adolescence 
(Erickson, E. 1959; Asubel, 1971, 1977). Any person is, —to some extent—
subject to the influence of her environment of social interaction, and 
adolescents are in general more open to change (Havighurst and Taba, 1963) 
—they are less constrained by past experiences— than adult people. A great 
deal of the contents they use to construct an image of their present and future 
life is acquired through a second hand experience: the way they see those 
contents is strongly influenced by the attitudes of their parents, other refer-
ence adults or their peers. Very often this experience is quite restricted, and 
the youngsters' self-perception can evolve in unexpected directions, as their 
social knowledge (second hand knowledge, practical or theoretical) becomes 
enlarged. Nowadays, immediate interaction —centred on family life— is only 
a part of the interaction environment: the mass media and the education system 
itself provide additional sources of social information. 
Considering the recent changes in Spanish society6, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the shift from one pattern to another is not equally 
probable in all directions. The family pattern is the most traditional of all, for 
that reason we should not be surprised that the students assigned to this pattern 
seem incapable of envisaging other patterns in their social horizon. On the 
contrary, dual and professional students include the family pattern in their 
horizon of social experience: they know it, but they are not specially attached 
to it, and some of them clearly reject it. This fact suggest that, in general, it is 
easier to change from a family self-perception pattern to any of the other two 
than the other way round. 
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In Spain the percentage of women having a family and a paid job is 
still relatively low, when compared to other Western countries7. Therefore 
maybe it is too early to detect the presence of this reluctance of women to 
assume an unmitigated professional outlook. Consequently, in the short term at 
least, we can foresee more youngsters moving from the family pattern either to 
the professional or dual patterns, than the other way round. 
The characteristic openness of the individuals' self-perception systems 
is the fact that makes the investigation of those systems so relevant for 
educational purposes. In reality the very idea of education presupposes some 
sort of openness in the subjects to be educated. If the subjects of education 
lacked in internal potentialities and remained closed to any external influence 
capable of triggering some of those potentialities, education would be a vain 
endeavour. When we consider a self-perception system as informationally 
open and yet organizationally closed, we are assuming that there are internal 
constraints —individuals are never a tabula rasa— but also possibilities of 
innovation and change. Education must foster and guide the individual's 
innovation space always bearing in mind the constraints (both social and 
biological) which are operating on that individual. From that point of view the 
aims of education could be threefold: 
First to identify the patterns of self-perception which are present 
among the students. 
Second, to design development patterns for those self-perception 
patterns. This development patterns would allow the students to make sense of 
a corresponding educational offer, carefully designed to fit both social 
demands and students' characteristics. Of course such development patterns 
would have connections between them allowing the students 'to change track'. 
Third, the educational environment must provide new ways of 
socialization (of social interaction), which should be introduced in the school 
practices in order to enable the students to share views about their future in a 
constructive way (thus giving plausibility to alternative patterns of that future). 
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6.2. A Comparative analysis of several related studies. 
In Spain and over the last three decades, several authors carried out 
studies on the basis of essays prompted by a question equal or similar to the 
one I used in the present research. 
In 1969 Victor Perez Diaz published, as a part of a wider research, an 
analysis of 36 essays collected in the mid-sixties and written by children aged 
8 to 14 years old, under the title "Write in approximately two pages, how 
you see your future from now on, what you expect from it, how you wish it 
to be, which are your projects. Start in the immediate future and go on 
writing about successive periods of your adult life, your middle age and 
your old age. Imagine you are going to live until you are 70 years old" 
(Perez Diaz V., 1969: 201-212). These children were students from a purely 
rural area of Old Castile. (The second author to be considered, Enrique Gaston 
(1978:56) characterizes this area as 'economically backwards'). The aim of 
Perez Diaz's study was regional planning, and specifically to establish the 
relationship between emigration and social change in that particular part of 
Spain, Tierra de Campos. 
In 1973 Enrique Gaston conducted a research, on the scale of a whole 
province, on adolescents' expectations. The subjects of the survey were 13-14 
years old students from state and private schools of the province of Zaragoza. 
He obtained 1302 essays, written about the same topic as the one used by 
Perez Diaz, but adding a further question to it: "Where are you thinking to 
live?". As in the case of Perez Diaz's survey, the main purpose of this research 
was regional planning, and consequently Gaston was particularly interested in 
the phenomenon of emigration. 
In 1983 I carried out a small research (Diaz Martinez, C., 1983: 127-
129) on the basis of 31 essays on the same topic as Gaston's survey. They were 
written by a group of 31 students aged 11 to 14 from Ponferrada (Leon 
province). The aim of the research was to define the expectations of the 
adolescents of the area, focusing on their work expectations and family life. 
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Some prior remarks will be useful in order to compare meaningfully 
the results of these three studies with those of the present research. First of all 
the pragmatic aim of the surveys carried out by Perez Diaz and Gaston studies 
focuses on the phenomenon of emigration. In fact the importance of this 
phenomenon was paramount during the 1960's and early 1970's, as I shall 
explain later. Additionally and on a theoretical level, both studies use the 
concepts of expectations/aspirations as primitive notions, which are not 
submitted to further analysis, whereas the present research integrates those 
concepts within a wider theoretical construct, the notion of self-perception 
system. 
With respect to the universe of each study there are also significant 
differences. Perez Diaz's survey considers a typically rural, backwards area (he 
obtained his data from the schools of two small villages). Gaston's research 
covered a mixed population, both rural and urban. He collected essays from 
schools in villages, small towns, and the capital of the province. My own 
research in 1983 also refered to a mixed population, because although the 
essays came from an urban school, the catchment area of this school includes 
not only its immediately urban surroundings but also some rural villages 
around. 
Last, but not least, these four studies which we are about to compare, 
belong to quite different stages of the recent evolution of Spanish society, 
ranging from the mid 1960's to the late 1980's. As we shall see, the social 
attitudes of Spanish society underwent substantial changes over that period of 
time. By comparing these three studies and the present one, we can follow 
some of the basic trends of this evolution. In a way, the older studies help to 
explain the newer developments and the more recent studies allow us to 
reinterpret the older ones with the benefit of hindsight. 
6.3. The hermeneutic circle: concrete and abstract levels of interpretation. 
The aim of any interpretive analysis is to understand the concrete 
realities that it examines. However in order to achieve this aim a process of 
interpretation must use abstraction as a tool. Specific realities must be related 
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in order to become mutually intelligible, and this relationship can only be 
effectively achieved through abstraction. 
When considered as an individual self-perception system, each 
individual subject is a world, a coherent universe of intentional contents. 
Those universes are unique, no one is identical to another. And yet, they can 
communicate. The phenomenon of communication (see Chap. 2.7) entails a 
disturbing paradox: to make up sense, a subject must close her world of 
meanings8 in an idiosyncratic way; but in order to communicate with other 
people an individual subject must develop her peculiar universe of meaning in 
resonance9 with other people's universes. Strictly speaking individual subjects 
cannot directly communicate the 'inner sense' underlying their use of 
meanings. That inner sense provides each specific concept used by the 
individual, with a peculiar, 'internal', meaning. The specification of that 
internal or subjective meaning of each concept is given by the other concepts 
used by the individual. As in the case of a phonological system each element 
of an individual's subjective system of meanings defines its meaning in 
contrast with the other elements. For instance, suppose these two sets of 
meanings correspond to two different individuals. 
Individual A: 'work', 'continue studies', 'specified university career', 
Job fulfillment'. 
Individual B: 'work', 'fear of unemployment', 'family fulfillment', 
'dependent old age'. 
Clearly the 'subjective meaning' of the concept work is very different 
in these two cases. Because the contrasting concepts are completely different. 
This 'subjective meaning' can be referred to, in more technical terms, as the 
'subjective connotation' or 'subjective intension' of each concept. 
There is evidence to suggest that individuals are unique self-
perception systems, even after the process of content analysis which reduces 
their specific meanings to a general list of categories. This evidence becomes 
clear when we compare the particular sets of such categories that they use: in 
our sample each one is different. This fact shows that —according to the 
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previous definition of 'subjective meaning'— each concept has a different 
subjective meaning for each of its users. 
The paradox of communication lies in the fact that individuals have 
different subjective meanings and yet they can usually understand each other. 
People achieve that difficult task of understanding each other, starting from 
their idiosyncratic worlds of meanings, by representing the others' set of 
meanings in their own semantic universes (See Chap. 2.7). These mutual 
mappings of individual subjective meanings into the specific world of 
meanings of each individual, generates a new dimension of meaning which I 
shall call intersubjective meaning. For instance consider concepts such as 'to 
have a good job', and 'to have fun'. Clearly we all have specific, subjective, 
personal meanings attached to these concepts. Probably my personal ideas of 
job' and 'fun' are substantially different from my neighbour's personal ideas 
about those concepts. In that sense such concepts have different subjective 
(personal) meanings. Now suppose I know that my neighbour is looking for a 
good job; automatically I develop a representation of what a good job can be 
for my neighbour. In this way I construct an intersubjective meaning of the 
concept 'good job', a meaning which I can communicate with my neighbour. 
Intersubjective meaning arises from that hypothetical representation of other 
people's meanings in our own universe of meaning. Of course the process can 
only work because it is a reciprocal one. 
It can be argued that viable interaction between individuals 
presupposes a common basis of intersubjective meanings, that is to say, each 
individual involved in a process of interaction must reproduce an adequate 
version of the relevant subjective meanings corresponding to the other 
individuals engaged in that interaction. Thus intersubjective meaning is created 
in this process of 'resonance' between mutual representations of individual 
subjective meanings. 
Consequently, there is no transmigration of meaning between souls, 
but reciprocal construction of meaning; mutual development of mutual 
representations of the subjectivities involved in a process of interaction. In that 
way we do not communicate with the other, but with our representation of the 
other, and this communication is effective when such representation generates 
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viable behavioural couplings with this other. In Maturana words languaging 
becomes "consensual coordination of consensual coordination of actions" 
(Maturana, H., 1991:46-47). 
From this point of view, subjective meaning and intersubjective 
meaning are not separate realities, they produce and reproduce each other: 
subjective meaning is at the basis of our intersubjective constructions of 
meaning; but also the intersubjective meanings that we develop modify our 
own subjective meanings. In other words, the relationship between subjective 
and intersubjective meaning is dialectical: we would only be able to think our 
own subjective meanings against a background of intersubjective meanings. 
According to this outlook meaning is an intrinsically relational, social 
concept; we should not write, in general, of the meaning of concept A, but of 
the meaning of concept A to base {x,y,...}, (being x,y,... individuals who share 
—and in this sharing constitute— an specific intersubjective meaning of 
concept A). For instance, the meaning of the word 'friendship' (or better, the 
meaning of the concept evoked by that word) is different depending on the 
specific people who are communicating through that word (the meaning of 
friendship is different when the people who communicate are twelve years old, 
and when these people are a couple of devious politicians). From a social 
perspective, a word primarily refers to the behavioural coupling that we are 
prepared to assume in order to realize its intersubjective meaning, and this 
behavioural coupling varies according to the specific people involved in itio. 
According to von Foerster's view (1991a:63-75) in a process of social 
research, meaning is produced in the relationship established between the 
researcher and the subjects whom this researcher examines. Thus meaning is 
generated to base a,x, being a an interpretative constant corresponding to the 
researcher, and x a variable representing any subject of the research. Of 
course, the researcher can consider her relationship to the subjects not just one 
by one, but in groups; for instance, she may contemplate meanings to base 
{a,x,y,z,...}. When the researcher considers the subjects of the present 
research individually (to base a,x), they will appear as individual self-
perception systems. And when the researcher contemplates groups of 
individuals, these individuals will appear as specific self-perception patterns. 
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When assuming an hermeneutic outlook, the researcher must tune her 
sociological insight to the data, trying to structure those data by means of 
different and yet coherent levels of analysis. For the researcher the notion of 
self-perception pattern is a way to make sense of the relations between 
individual data provided by a group of different subjects. This activity of 
'making sense' defines the group. One may be tempted to think that there could 
be, in principle, as many patterns of self-perception as groupings of subjects 
are possible, but in fact only a few of those groupings 'make sense'; that is to 
say, only some of them offer a meaningful Gestalt to the researcher. 
Patterns can be considered as abstract entities. It is the researcher who 
abstracts these entities from the data; but this abstraction cannot be done in 
any possible way, haphazardly. It presupposes an underlying meaningful 
gestalt (we cannot select data from a wider sample unless we have some sort 
of meaningful criterium to do the selection). 
What kind of Gestalten defines our self-perception patterns? It is not 
an analytical criterion; we are not interested in grouping people by looking at 
their features, considered one by one. This criterion would generate as many 
groups as features are considered; this is the characteristic criterion of the 
'distributive paradigm' (Ibanez, J., 1985:203-206) of social research. Our 
criterion would rather be a synthetic, structural one: it is based on the 'family 
resemblances' of whole individual sets of data —this point of view was at the 
basis of the previous sociosemantic analysis—. The researcher contemplates 
those individual sets of data as coherent unities and tries to sort them, 
preserving that coherence at a higher level of abstraction. This requirement of 
coherence drastically reduces the number of abstract patterns that the 
researcher can generate from the individual sets of data. 
In that sense the abstract entities that I call self-perception patterns act 
as ideal attractors (Gleik, J., 1987) of the individual self-perception systems. In 
a sense they are sorting procedures. But they are more than that, they provide a 
frame of reinterpreting individual self-perception systems synergetically, 
because each individual system clarifies the others belonging to the same 
pattern, specially those closer to it. 
264 
The relation between individual self-perception systems and patterns 
of self-perception generates several, interrelated, hermeneutic circles. 
First, the interpretative circle connecting each individual system and 
its corresponding pattern: the system validates/invalidates the pattern and the 
pattern clarifies the system. 
Second, the interpretative circle which connects the individual systems 
belonging to a pattern, through that pattern: the systems clarify each other as 
specific realizations of the pattern. 
And third, the interpretative circle connecting different patterns 
through individual systems: in fact systems, specifically those that do not fit 
easily into any of the proposed patterns, act as destabilizing elements which 
force a reformulation of those patterns. The researcher, by interacting with the 
data, should connect these hermeneutic circles, which should interact in the 
course of the interpretative analysis, refining or changing the initial 
assumptions of the researcher. 
6.4. The professional pattern. 
The most distinctive characteristic of the individuals included in this 
pattern is the outstanding importance in their self-perception systems of their 
professional self-realization. This fact shapes all the other aspects of their 
conceptual and intentional world: studies, family life, etc. 
The profession oriented pattern is the most numerous: it includes 42 
students out of a sample of 100. The categories that define the essence of the 
pattern, such as 'professional career', 'positive old age',' properties', 'hobbies 
and pets', 'job fulfillment', 'ambitious' and 'self-confident' are the most common 
concepts —after the three previously mentioned, 'many', 'children', and 'family 
ties in old age'— because some of them are shared by students having other 
self-perception patterns. The fact that the same set of concepts is so frequently 
used implies that many individuals use most of the concepts of this set, which 
entails a great similarity between those individuals, or equivalently a strong 
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socio-connexion and small socio-distances between them. The concentrated 
location of those categories can be appreciated in figure 5. In reality they make 
up most of the 'core' as defined in figure 2. 
In this section I shall describe the general features of the pattern, as 
well as the characteristics of its two subpatterns, yuppie and progressive. 
Finally, I shall draw some conclusions about the general attitude towards life 
that this pattern implies. 
6.4.1 Towards profession through academic achievement. 
All the students included in this pattern view themselves as highly 
qualified professionals: doctors, journalists, lawyers, pilots, mathematicians, 
etc. To reach that status they intend to get —at least— an university degree. 
They are confident about their abilities to do so. Certainly some of the subjects 
fantasize about less conventional professions: prima ballerina, basketball 
player, writer, prime minister, etc. But in all this cases there is a second, more 
realistic prospect which contemplates obtaining an university degree and 
working in a more conventional profession. 
The students belonging to this pattern organize their goals well in 
advance. They foresee the development of their academic achievements in a 
pretty accurate way. They have a substantial knowledge of the stages and 
options of the education system: 
"when I'm doing BUP I'll take (the) letters (option) because I want to study 
journalism" (student 10[7] 11). 
Obviously, these students have committed a great deal of their interest 
and thinking to such issues. As said before their idea of professional life 
dominates all the other activities, and for this reason I shall analyze different 
aspects of their professional outlook when discussing other aspects of their 
self-perception. 
6.4.2. The invisibility of the family. 
The individuals who adopt the professional pattern show a surprising 
autonomy with respect to their parents. The students of the professional 
pattern do not mention their parents at all, in contrast to the individuals of the 
family pattern, whose essays are full of references to their parents. The 
invisibility of parents among students of the professional pattern does not 
mean that their family environment is unsatisfactory. Nor does it mean that 
their families do not influence the self-perception of those students. Most 
probably this influence shows itself in the importance attached by these 
students to academic and professional achievement. Apparently the family 
environment of those students seems to further their autonomy as individuals. 
Although a good proportion of profession-centred individuals see 
themselves married and with children, their family life appears to be detached 
from their objectives of personal self-realization, constituting a secondary 
domain in relation to their professional life. There are few cases with explicit 
references to family life; these references appear in essays corresponding to 
students included in the yuppie subpattern. In those cases family life is 
conceived of as a feature of old age, when the time of professional life has 
gone. Usually they mention their family in relation to their grandchildren. 
They imagine themselves old and being visited by their children and 
grandchildren or visiting them. This family relationship appears in the plot 
under the category 'family ties in old age' which was referred to in a previous 
section as one of the most used categories. They express it as follows: 
"I see myself as an old man, with a life behind me, enjoying the money I 
earned, living a quiet life, seeing my children married, and my grand 
children coming to my house every day" (student 1); 
"When I'm old and my children are already independent, I'll live a quiet life 
with my wife, without worries. If I cannot visit my children, I hope they 
will visit me" (student 110). 
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Therefore one can assume that family life is accepted by many of 
those students as something natural and satisfactory. But it is not the central 
problem of their lives. 
6.4.3. Yuppie subpattern. 
All the individuals of the professional pattern share those two 
characteristics: the centrality of professional life and the invisibility of their 
parents. However other aspects of their personal outlook differ according to 
the two basic attitudes, 'yuppie' and 'progressive', that can be detected among 
them. 
The categories constituting the basis of the yuppie subpattern are 
those composing the core shown in figure 2. All students in this subpattern 
want to continue their studies and expect to have highly qualified jobs. Some 
examples will make it easier to understand the ethos of this subpattern. For 
instance student 31[25] says: 
"I have a wonderful job because I like it. and you can get good money and 
have a very good life with it, besides you only work 4 days per week 
creating computer programs", 
or student 45[39] who has no doubts about his professional future: 
"In my job I'll try to be at the top, that is to become the manager of a big 
factory or firm". 
Nevertheless the importance given to qualification and the high status 
of the job is not enough to include an individual in the yuppie subpattern; there 
are some students who also want to have an university degree and a good job, 
but they see their job just as a means to earn money in order to guarantee high 
standards of living for their families. Their reference is the family, not the job; 
hence they are included in the family pattern. Student 29[23] provides a good 
example of this 
"I'll go to university, when I finish I'll work in an office. I imagine myself 
when adult with a family at home, working in the same office, but in a 
higher position. The most interesting thing for me is to give everything to 
my family, love, money, education... everything". 
More than half of the profession-centred students may be considered 
as belonging to the yuppie subpattern, and all but three are boys. This 
subpattern fits the male stereotype that defines men by their occupational 
roles, having a family as a complement which comes second in his social self-
definition. For a girl (at least in our sample) to perceive herself as a 
professional through that pattern is very difficult. Most girls consider that 
having a family implies some unavoidable duties, such as caring for the 
children, which will be a handicap to a fully dedicated professional career. As 
a consequence a majority of girls develop a different sort of discourse and 
attach themselves to other self-perception patterns. 
6.4.4. Progressive subpattern. 
The progressive self-perception subpattern is a version of the 
profession-centred self-perception pattern in which girls are predominantu. 
This subpattern has a reactive character, in a precise sense: those students, 
mostly girls, who are included in this subpattern strongly react against the 
feminine stereotype of our cultural tradition. Clearly, these do not want to 
become like the typical housewife and mother so sympathetically described by 
girl number 88 —a typical feminine representative of the family pattern—: 
"When you're more than 20 years old, you marry, you can have a family 
and you live like a queen. Your husband goes to work, the kids go to 
school and you doing the house chores, it's wonderful". 
'Progressive' girls not only reject the role of traditional housewife but 
also the possibility of combining a professional activity with any responsibility 
as housewife and mother. In fact, this tentative combination is the hallmark of 
the dual pattern. Significantly most of the mothers of the 'progressive' girls 
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would belong to the dual pattern: they combine a profession with their family 
responsibilities. Therefore 'progressive' girls seem to react against this dual 
pattern that their mothers exemplify. 
'Progressive' girls, like the students included in the yuppie subpattern, 
want to study, go to university and have a profession; but shun marriage and 
do not contemplate having children or at least they show hesitation about it. 
They reject, in a explicit manner, the roles of married woman, mother, 
housewife and passive old lady. All those roles appear to them as incompatible 
with their more basic attitude to life and with fulfilling of their professional 
ambitions. Some textual examples speak for themselves: 
"... I see myself managing a very active job, being a free woman, without 
any ties. Maybe I'd have a partner, but I'll keep the distances very clear. I'll 
not give to him any account of my life. I don't want to have kids or 
anything of the sort, they'll take away my freedom...." (student 13[18]), 
"...I think I'll do business studies at the university in order to have fashion 
shops in several parts of Spain later. I don't think I'll marry, that business 
of preparing lunch, dinner, ironing, sewing buttons... doesn't match my 
personality, except if it is for my own. I'll do my own things and my 
partner his own. I don't want to have kids either...I don't know if I'd like to 
marry because I don't want to finish like a cleaner, scrubbing floors and 
taking care of my kids... (in old age) I don't think I'll remain seated in a 
chair watching TV, dressed in black..." (student 19[25]), 
"I'll be working in my profession (biologist or lawyer), I'll earn my money 
and do whatever I want... I'll not marry and if I do I'll not have kids... In 
my old age I'll not stay seated at home, I'll be a dynamic old woman" 
(student 60). 
The specific categories of this subpattern are: 'independent', 'not to 
many', 'hesitates about marriage', 'hesitates to have children', 'living together 
unmarried', 'intellectual interests', and 'social conscience'. In addition to these 
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specific categories, the students of the progressive subpattern share other 
concepts with the yuppie subpattern. The key category of the progressive 
subpattern is 'to be independent'; this category makes it a subpattern dominated 
by girls. In Spanish culture, boys are supposed to be independent as a matter 
of principle, and in reality, they perceive themselves as such. Only girls view 
independence as a goal to be achieved through personal effort. In our society 
independence is not something given to women. On the contrary, there are 
forces at work which tend to keep women in a position of dependence with 
respect to their male counterparts. That is why the 'progressive' girls have to 
stress the category 'independence', first to make explicit their main aim in life, 
and second as a code word which express their rejection of traditional 
feminine roles. The negative attitude regarding these roles, especially those of 
housewife and mother, is sometimes expressed in strong terms. For example 
student 18[13] says that 
"I don't like to have children, nothing of the sort, they would kill me, they 
would steal my freedom". 
And student 71[62] writes 
"I'll be a vet, I'll have my house and the things I like and as I like them. I'll 
have what I want without anybody giving me orders. Maybe I'll live with 
two friends (girls), we have planned it. I'll not marry for anything in the 
World, because if you do you cannot have the kind of life you like, 
because men do not allow you". 
6.4.5. Friends, marriage and divorce. 
The most salient difference between the yuppie and the progressive 
subpatterns is in their respective attitudes towards marriage and intimate 
personal relationships. In general, students attach a considerable importance to 
friendship, especially when they see themselves as youngsters (J.C. Coleman, 
1980; H. Katchadourian, 1977). Friends tend to diminish in importance in 
adulthood and old ages. However in this respect there are significant 
differences between the students belonging to the progressive subpattern and 
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the rest. The girls belonging to the progressive subpattern seem to give 
friendship an especially relevant role in their lives. Most of those progressive 
girls who decide not to married see themselves as living with friends. Others 
will live on their own but travel with friends, even in old age. These students 
seem to look for an environment of intimate personal relationships different 
from that of traditional family life which they conceive of as too constraining. 
The students of the yuppie subpattern have a more traditional view on 
friendship: whereas the inner circle of personal relationship is defined by 
family life, friends are conceived of as an outer circle of sociability —in the 
work place, to have fun, etc—. 
The percentage of profession-centred students thinking to marry is 
smaller than in the two other patterns. However it is just in the yuppie 
subpattern where we find students who consider the prospect of divorce and 
second marriages. Clearly, the rejection of marriage by progressive students 
makes it nonsensical for them to contemplate divorce and the relapse that 
second marriage means, whereas family-centred students do not dare to 
consider the breakdown of family ties that divorce represents. 
Three yuppie students, two boys and a girl, contemplate divorce as a 
prospect, and these two boys also contemplate to marry for a second time. For 
example, one of them writes: 
"I'll marry a terrific woman..., now I'm 44 and I have six kids, and I 
divorce getting rid of kids and I start to visit the whole world, in Sweden I 
met a woman and I marry her, and I have the time to have to more kids". 
Apart from his reproductive overcharge —which is not typical at 
all—, this boy shows a nonchalant, even frivolous attitude towards divorce 
which is not absent in the other two students. 
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6.4.6. Money and consumerism. 
Adding to the categories related to family and professional life, some 
other categories define the characteristic outlook of the profession-centred 
pattern. Among these categories are those related to money, properties and the 
quality of life. Although the girls of the progressive subpattern envisaged as a 
prospect having a good standard of living, they do not consider this as a 
predominant goal in life. On the contrary, for the students belonging to the 
yupppie subpattern these matters seem to be at the forefront of their concerns. 
The most common categories expressing these concerns are widely used: 
'money' (used by 27 students), 'country life' (by 24), 'ambitious' (by 28) and 
'sports, hobbies and pets' (by 24), 'properties' (by 41). As stated in the previous 
chapter categories which are frequently used are more socio-specific in their 
meanings and consequently they have more information content, developing 
the meaning of more general categories in a specific way. The five 
aforementioned categories are used by almost the totality of yuppie students 
providing an outline of the style of life those students expect to have. The level 
of their ambitions varies from the student who imagine being the owner of two 
factories, two real states in two of the most exclusive areas around Madrid, a 
Porsche 44, a smashing wife with blonde hair, tanned skin and blue eyes 
(student 16[11]), to the one who imagine he has bike, a job with a big salary, 
and lives with a terrific girl in a house in the countryside with 5 dogs taking 
care of it (student 8). Only boys belonging to this subpattern describe in detail 
the physical appearance of their future wives or partners. On the contrary, the 
few girls who show an explicit interest in the looks of their future husbands 
belong to the family pattern. 
6.4. 7. Free time and hobbies. 
Most students of any pattern think of free time during their youth in 
similar terms: participating in sports, going out with friends, dancing, going to 
the cinema, etc. The few differences between professional students and the 
rest lie in the fact that the former show special interest in traveling, and having 
pets. Professional students also are more specific about hobbies such as having 
a motorcycle, cycling, playing chess or playing a musical instrument. The 
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interest in pets is typical of the professional pattern, no student belonging to 
the other patterns shows any similar interest. This difference is quite 
surprising, and may indicate a significant psychological gap between the 
individuals belonging to the professional pattern and the rest. Maybe 
professional students use pets as a way to assert their own autonomy as 
individuals, whereas the other types of students are too absorbed by family ties 
to contemplate any alternative affective attachment. The specificity and 
relative sophistication of the hobbies referred to by profession-centred students 
may also be interpreted as an index of their individualistic outlook. 
It is during adulthood and old age periods of life where the use of free 
time differs more clearly between distinct patterns. Whereas family students, 
when adults, see themselves devoting their free time to family life, almost 
exclusively, profession-centred students fill that time with individualistic 
activities which are frequently related to their professional life. For instance 
student 30[24], who wants to be a biologist writes: 
"I get a job in a lab and I go out with my video camera to film animals on 
weekends", 
student 9[6] who wants to become a vet, also wants to take care of her 
own animals; student 2[1] who wants to be a graphic journalist will spend his 
free time drawing: 
"I'll never be bored. I like very much drawing, I'll draw". 
Other students like more than one subject and see themselves working 
in one and using their free time to cultivate the other. For instance student 
28[22] writes: 
"I like maths, I'll take a degree in Science, but I also like writing... I'd like 
to be a writer, I don't know... In my free time (if I have any) I'll paint and 
at night I'll write books for children... I'll travel, I'll visit the whole world 
with some company". 
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There is a gender difference in relation to sports which affects all 
patterns: girls show a lower interest in sports. There are 17 boys and 5 girls out 
the whole sample who foresee themselves practicing sports; boys usually 
specify the sport they will play: tennis, basket, football, golf, etc.; girls will 
just take exercise (unspecified) in order to keep fit. 
6.4.8. Positive and active old age. 
A distinctive characteristic of the profession-centred pattern is its 
positive and optimistic vision of old age. Typically, profession-centred 
students see old age as a time 
"of retirement, spending the money saved along your life... living your last 
years as a king, enjoying the work realized through all your life" (student 
86[75]). 
But this comfortable situation does not exclude activity; old age is 
viewed as the period in which they will be able to do all those things that they 
did not have time to do during their working life: 
"I'll retire, but I'll not stop my activities because I'll study new things and 
do some research about criminals... I'll live more quietly, I'll travel a lot 
and study about other civilizations. Being the active woman I am, I could 
only do this once retired" (student 18[13]). 
In fact, traveling is one of the most common activities that 
professional students contemplate in their old age. Girls are specially keen on 
this: 
"When I become old I'll travel a lot, all over the world, I'll go to the Moon 
on weekends (it will be possible then), I don't think to die without having 
seen the world" (student 26[20]); 
"I'll travel a lot, I'll see the whole world in the company of my friends" 
(student 28[22]). 
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There are others who conceive of their retirement as a complement of 
their past working life: 
"After I retire, I'll write some books about the researches I did when I was 
a scientist, and I'll write a bibliography13. I'll live with the money from the 
patents on my inventions and with my pension" (student 83[72]). 
In the professional pattern those students who do not intend to travel 
or being so active in their old years, contemplate themselves living a quiet life 
surrounded by grand children: 
"I'll take exercise to keep fit, I'll live with my wife, I'll visit my grand 
children and rest after all the work I have in my life" (student 85[74]); 
"(I live) at a cosy house with my wife. I'd like to be a granddad and have 
nice grand children. To have a quiet life and die happy" (student 63). 
These students who want to have family ties in old age, generally 
include their spouses as a part of the warm and quiet life they wish in their last 
years. Among the students of the professional pattern, only two boys and one 
girl contemplate themselves as widowers and widow, respectively, in their old 
age. However this fact does not make their last years less exciting than in the 
case of other students. 
6.4.9 Control of action by goals. 
One of the deepest psychological characteristics of the subjects 
included in the profession-centred pattern is their clear conscience that their 
goal in life is 'to be somebody', 'to realize their personal ambitions as an 
individual'. Of course, in a sense everybody is somebody; a housewife, for 
instance, is undoubtedly somebody, and in a way she may realize her personal 
ambitions as an individual by being a housewife (Berk, R.A. & Berk, S.F., 
1979; Ehrenreich, B., 1982; Gerson, K. 1985). To become a house wife 
instead of anything else is a happy decision for some girls (in the next section 
we shall see some girls that express themselves in that direction). But in our 
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society what is generally understood by the expression 'to be somebody', 'to 
realize oneself is the development and projection of one's personal capabilities 
beyond the domain of short distance interactions (family, neighbours, personal 
friends, etc). In that sense it may be said that whereas the subjects of the 
family pattern hardly have a need 'to realize their ambitions as individuals', 
because they perceive themselves as members of primary groups in which their 
individuality is immediately realized, the subjects of the professional pattern 
adopt a clear imperative of self-realization, of being somebody in life, 
independently from their belonging to any primary group. The adoption of this 
imperative generates a tension towards the future which usually lends a 
characteristic dynamism to their self-perception systems. In those individuals 
such systems appear structured as a plan to achieve personal goals. The two 
following examples give an idea of this dynamic tension: 
"when I finish my university career which would be that of veterinary 
surgeon, I'll go to the USA or Canada to learn more advanced techniques 
and I'll open a clinic in Madrid..." (student 7[5]), 
"...I reckon that first of all I'll be a ballet dancer in the Spanish National 
Ballet... later, as an adult I'll be the Ballet director for some years and later 
on I'll have my own ballet school... I'll have a child, but only after leaving 
dance..." (student 18[13]). 
A striking feature of this pattern is the absence of any moral judgments 
about the subjects' own behaviour. Whereas, as I shall show later, the subjects 
of the family pattern frequently used moral maxims which seem to play a 
central role in controlling their personal social behaviour, the subjects of the 
professional pattern seem to use a different mechanism to control their actions. 
I shall call this mechanism 'Mode of Control of Action through Goals'. The 
differences between the type social behaviour generated by a 'mode of control 
by maxims', which is characteristic of the family pattern, and a type of social 
behaviour produced by a 'mode of control by goals', which is typical of the 
professional pattern, probably has important sociological consequences. 
Authors such as Weber and Parsons have proposed ideas which are 
akin to this distinction between control of actions through maxims and control 
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of actions through goals. I am referring to Weber's concept of 'rationality in 
conexion with the ends' and 'rationality in conexion with values', and Parsons' 
notion of 'instrumental rationality'. 
The mode of control of behaviour by goals appears to be less fragile 
than the mode of control by maxims. Although a particular plan of goals can 
fail, if the subject who decided that plan possesses the general 'technique' of 
planning goals and organizing her action in relation to these goals, quite 
probably she will be able to generate a new scheme of goals to substitute the 
previous one. Control of behaviour by personal goals is a more individualized 
mechanism than control of behaviour by moral maxims. Probably this fact 
makes such mechanism more flexible than any set of moral rules. By 
structuring their personal goals in life, subjects define their individuality as a 
person beyond the emotional ties which link them with their family. The 
apparent detachment from their families that professional students show is 
only superficial though; quite clearly the assumption of the family values lies 
underneath the goals structure (Walkerdine, V. & Lucey, H., 1989: 1-16). The 
point is that there are families whose ethos consists precisely in imbuing in 
their young members the value of becoming a self-realized person, instead of 
merely considering them as members of the family group. The idea of 
responsibility that the families of profession-centred students seem to instil in 
their children, primarily refers to themselves more than to their family 
obligations. In this sense, control of action by goals reinforces an 
individualistic form of self-control, whereas control of action by maxims has 
as a result that the individuals conceive of their responsibilities on the affective 
background defined by family ties. 
6.5. The Family pattern. 
6.5.1. Belonging to a family. 
The most distinctive and striking feature of the students included in 
this pattern is that they have a perception of themselves which is highly 
dependent on the central fact of their membership of their families. Family 
students strongly feel that they belong to a family. They seem to see the world 
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and themselves through a personal consciousness defined by the family 
horizon. When one of these students says 'myself, the meaning that she 
attaches to this word, quite clearly, is 'myself-in-my-family'. This 
identification with the family environment occurs not only with respect to their 
present family (parents and siblings) but also with respect to the family that 
they expect to form later in life. 
Student 73 gives as a typical example of this attitude. Talking about 
herself as a youngster, she says: 
give the money from my job to my parents, for them to buy a new 
lorry... (as an adult, she adds,) I'll invite my parents, brothers and sisters 
for dinner very often... I'll marry a hard working man who likes kids, my 
husband and I will care that our kids grow up properly... my parents, 
brothers and sisters will lack nothing if I win the pools, they'll not need to 
work any more...". 
The individuals with a family-centred self-perception use concepts 
such as: to live near their parents, 
buy a flat near my parents' place to be close to them just in case they 
are ill or I need some help..." (student 91[78]) 
and to work for sustaining their family (in the case of boys): 
"...when you are an adult you need to work to earn a salary, to have 
something to eat and to feed your family..." (student 92[79]), 
"...I see myself with kids and a wife to feed" (student 98[85]). 
Some girls manifest their preoccupation for the welfare of their 
husbands and kids. The aforementioned student 73 says: 
"... when I'm old I'll buy Christmas presents for my grandchildren, I'll look 
after my parents, visit my brothers and sisters... I'll prepare lunch and 
dinner for my husband...". 
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These girls specially stress their dedication to the care of their 
children: 
"I think that to have a child is the most beautiful thing in your life. You... 
enjoy the time spent with your children" (student 64[56]); 
"I'll have several children, I'll leave my work and devote myself to my 
children completely" (student 74[64]). 
6.5.2. Being a housewife. 
Some girls, placed in extreme opposition to the progressive girls, 
perceive themselves as housewives and living in complete dependence on their 
husbands14. This dependence is not only economic; it implies the acceptance 
of the husband as the person who takes the decisions in family life. As we can 
see in the following example, this dependence involves other relatives: 
"I'll marry and leave my job. I'll take my children shopping to buy cloths, 
shoes, etc. On Sundays my husband will take us out for lunch. From time 
to time we'll leave the children with my mother or my husband's mother 
and we'll go out for dinner to a Chinese restaurant" (student 55[49]). 
The number of girls who see themselves as housewives fully dedicated 
to their families is really small, only six out of a total of forty eight. This small 
percentage of intended housewives is in contrast to the fact that most of these 
girls' mothers are housewives (33 from 52). To be a housewife clearly is not a 
popular prospect for today adolescents. Five of the six girls who perceive 
themselves as housewives come from a low economic and cultural 
background, although it is not lower than that of other girls included in the 
dual or even in the profession pattern. In figure 11 this group of girls cluster on 
the extreme left of the plot. 
On the part of the boys, only three of them conceive of their future 
wives as traditional housewives; one says it explicitly and the other two 
suggest it by means of expressions such as: 
"When I arrive home from my work, my wife will serve me dinner..." 
(student 5[3]). 
Other boys are surely thinking of having a housewife as it can be 
inferred from expressions such as: 
"I'll earn money from my job to sustain my family well enough" (student 
82[71]). 
No boy refers to a working spouse or partner, whereas many girls do. 
Although many boys, specially those belonging to the family-centred pattern, 
see themselves as married men and fathers, no one refers to the care of his 
children neither to the housework as an assumed responsibility. 
To see oneself as a housewife almost necessarily implies a family-
centred self-perception system. In fact all but one of the seven girls included in 
the family pattern, see themselves as housewives. As there is a total of 27 
students included in the family-centred pattern, the number of girls in it is 
substantially smaller than that of boys, (respectively, seven and twenty). It 
seems that boys feel more comfortable than girls within the frame of the 
family-centred pattern, and although many girls want to have a family, they 
tend to see family life on a less traditional perspective, and try to make 
compatible their family responsibilities with a professional career, as we will 
see in section 6.6. 
6.5.3. Marriage is boring but I'll marry. 
Some of the family-centred students, especially boys, feel that 
marriage reduces their possibilities of having fun. In this respect there is a 
gradation from the students who say: 
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"you'll not go out so often" 
to those who see marriage and its responsibilities as a boring condition 
and a hard time though, somehow inevitable. The underlying idea is that one is 
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suppose to marry, in spite of all the inconvenient attached to marriage. A few 
examples may show this fatalistic outlook: 
"As I've a family I cannot go out for a good time because I need to look 
after my children" (student 88[76]). 
Student 52[46] further elaborates this idea: 
"To be an adult is very boring, you feel old, you have a safe job. When 
you've a family it's really boring because you cannot enjoy yourself, you 
cannot go out for fun and you become old. When I'm aged I'll be at home, 
sewing or crocheting. I'll be tired of living". 
Student 92[79] goes so far in his negative view of marriage that it is 
not easy to understand why he still contemplates marrying: 
"I don't like marriage because you feel a bit of a prisoner because you need 
to go home with your wife and yOu cannot go out to have a good time with 
your pals. You do not have as many friends as before because you get up 
earlier to go to work to earn a salary to feed a family... when I become old 
I'll be living with my children and grand children". 
The last sentence discovers the underlying assumption that makes 
sense of that otherwise puzzling contradiction; for these students family is the 
central, unquestionable fact of life in all of its stages. 
6.5.4. School, leaving or staying? 
Generally speaking, the job expectation of family-centred students are 
only marginally related to education. Some of them openly declare their dislike 
of study, and others would be satisfied in obtaining the School Graduation 
(Graduado Escolar) at fourteen. The relation of most of the subjects included 
in this pattern with the educational system frequently appears as a source of 
suffering, a bitter pill to swallow as soon as possible. Student 94[81] expresses 
it clearly 
" . I'd like instead of going to school as usual, I'd like to go to a police 
academy or to a 'guardia civil' (paramilitary police) academy, or even to a 
firemen school... the School Graduation is what I need to enrol in one of 
those places which I like... because I don't like to study... , when I'm 
studying I become very tired... I don't like to sit and do nothing but to learn 
and learn, I'd like to have a safe salary and to live without worrying about 
studies...". 
In less dramatic terms, student 97[84] also shows her lack of 
enthusiasm for studying: 
"After this year I see myself working in something, not wasting my time, 
maybe I'll study but some craft, not for many years. I want to finish my 
studies as soon as possible, without wasting my time in a long career". 
In the two schools (Picasso and Zaragueta) located in a lower 
socioeconomic environment, there are more girls than boys who intend to 
continue studies. These girls see further education as the bridge to cross in 
order to move from their unpriviledged backgrounds to higher positions in the 
social ladder. Further education is also contemplated by these girls as the path 
to move away from the traditional pattern of woman offered to them by their 
mothers (in these two schools, 42 mothers out of 50 are housewives, and 3 of 
the 8 who working outside home cleaners). The intention of so many girls to 
continue their studies is not just a desire; it is a reality in today Spain. In the 
academic year 1988-89, when the essays were written, there were 1.027.018 
university students in Spain. The number of girls and that of boys was nearly 
the same, respectively 513.441 and 513.577. This apparent balance between 
genders in the total number of registered students, hides a higher proportion of 
graduated girls, because more girls than boys get their degrees (respectively, 
61.724 and 44.383 in the academic year 1987-88)15. 
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6.5.5. Money by gambling and making own's will. 
It is highly symptomatic that some of the family-centred students see 
in gambling the only hope of escaping from a future that looms rather bleak. 
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Although recent statistics show that Spain is the EEC country which spends 
more money on gambling, it is remarkable that this escape route is only 
present among family-centred students. Apparently these subjects find no 
realistic, goal-directed way to reach the standards of life that they perceive as 
desirable. Hence, they develop a mild version of the 'cargo cult' attitude 
(Giddens, A. 1989: 63 and passim) by attaching to games of chance a 
thaumaturgic role. 
Another revealing characteristic of family-centred students appears in 
their insistence in making their own will. A total of eight students contemplate 
making their own will. Six of them belong to the family-centred pattern. Some 
of these think to make their will because they had become millionaires as a 
consequence of their luck in games of chance. But significantly there are 
others who having no fortune are still preoccupied about their inheritance. 
There seems to be a direct relationship between the importance given to one's 
inheritance and the level of psychological involvement in family life. 
6.5.6. Free Time. 
When they see themselves as youngsters, family-centred students 
think of their free time in terms of fun time, in a rather conventional way: 
going out with friends, going to discos, doing sports, etc. Certainly these sort 
of activities are also present among other types of students. Nevertheless in the 
case of family-centred individuals no alternative free time activities appear: 
there are no hobbies, no individual ways of enjoying oneself —writing, 
playing an instrument, etc—, no link between working activities and free time 
self-realization. In all cases, family-centred students see fun from a group 
perspective. 
On the other hand, when they see themselves as adults, they 
drastically reduce their expectations of having fun, inasmuch as family life 
implies relinquishing those forms of group fun —which seem to have no 
substitute in individual forms of enjoyment—. This is the reason for the 
recurrent complain of marriage, which limits their freedom to go out as they 
used to do when single. In adult life, free time is absorbed by family life. In 
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this context having fun means to do so with the family: going to the 
countryside on weekends with their spouses and children, visiting their parents 
(mostly the girls), going out for a meal, etc. 
6.5.7. Negative and passive old age. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of family-centred students 
is their pessimistic and negative view of old age. They contemplate themselves 
in old age as passive, without anything to do apart from visiting their children 
and grand children, and being visited by them. Some of these students see 
themselves bent down on a walking stick, or staying the whole day at home, 
sitting on an armchair, being afraid to go out just in case they catch a cold or 
fall down and break a bone: 
"it is boring, the whole day with the walking stick, locked at home because 
you are afraid to go out, just in case you fall down and you die" (student 
102[88]). 
They see themselves in old age tired and waiting for death to come: 
"to be an old person is a misfortune because many problems start, you lose 
your sports abilities, friends, relatives... to think about it gives me the 
creeps...You just wait for death to come, you are bored the whole day, 
playing cards, going for a walk,..." (student 32[26]). 
There is a substantial number of students (15 of them) who do not feel 
that they would be able to manage on their own in old age, and they think they 
will need the support, financial or otherwise, of their children: 
"I'll retire, I'll have my pension, my children will be working to give me a 
part of their earnings" (student 107 [92]). 
Some of them see this help as a moral duty: 
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"my children will take care of me, they will treat me very well, as a mother 
should be treated. They will not send me to an old people's home" (student 
101[87]). 
The students who have a negative view on old age, also think that 
during old age all interesting activity comes to an end; thee few activities they 
mention (playing cards or domino, going for a walk, etc.) are not considered as 
exciting, but as ways of concealing the emptiness of that stage of life. There 
are few family-centred students who have a positive view of the old age, and 
they see it, in a way closer to professional students, as a time to enjoy other 
styles of living; for instance, student 91[78] says: 
"I'm old, I cannot go to discos, but I can go more to the cinema, I retire 
and have a good pension to live the rest of my life... I sell my flat in 
Madrid and buy a house in the country". 
The relation with grand-children appears as the most positive aspect of 
old age for a majority of family-centred students. On this score the examples 
are numerous: 
"When I get old I'd like to be in contact with children and be happy with 
them, I'd like to have grand children and I'd like that they were nice to me" 
(student 58[51]); 
"I'll spend a lot of time with my grand children" (student 35[29]); 
"Old age is the most boring stage of your life, there is a bit of happiness 
when your children and grand children visit you, you feel happy and enjoy 
them, and when they leave you feel sad and bad" (student 40[34]). 
6.5.8. Control of action by maxims. 
The students included in the family-centred pattern frequently adopt 
moral attitudes in relation to behaviour and manners: 
"If I can, I'll let my kids do what they want as long as they don't get into 
drugs or booze, they have to watch out for themselves" (student 89[77]); 
"I'd like to be happy like any other woman. I'd never have arguments with 
my husband" (student 106); 
"If the kids have everything they want, they'll not have the same motivation 
to try their best because they'll think that it is enough to ask for what they 
want and they'll get it..." (student 1 13 [98 I). 
Apparently, these students adopt the moral maxims that they hear from 
their parents as their own moral standards. These maxims resound in their 
essays. The fact that family-centred subjects adopt such maxims not only 
shows the "ethos" that hold the family together but appears as a fundamental 
element in the process of giving a sense to their actions. This way of 
justification of action is what I shall call Mode of Control of Action by 
Maxims. 
Control by maxims indicates a self-perception directly influenced by 
parents attitudes and affectively dependent on such attitudes. In fact, maxims 
look like being the result of an emotional communion between the members of 
the family through a common 'ethos'. Now this kind of self-perception is in 
danger of not being able to survive the crisis of family control characteristic of 
the transitional stage that adolescence is in our societies. The result of the 
possible breakdown of that parental control is frequently the questioning of the 
moral maxims which have acted as the fundamental control mechanism of the 
individual's behaviour. This situation can lead to anomy as an outcome, 
inasmuch as a substitutive mechanism of control of the behaviour (for instance 
by means of goals) may not be available to the individual at the critical period. 
In a way the 'mode of control of action by maxims' is akin to the 
attitude that Max Weber (1977) calls 'traditionalism'. Whereas the 'mode of 
control of action by goals' with the 'capitalist's ethics'. Traditionalist 
individuals, in Weber's view, have a phlegmatic attitude towards their 
occupations; they try to live as they have always lived, they work just to keep 
on going. The students here included in the family-centred pattern share this 
attitude, and 'to go on living' as their parents did, is probably one of the most 
pregnant maxims that govern their actions. Of course, considering our sample 
we cannot discriminate, as Weber does, between catholic and protestant 
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attitudes, because only one student is a Protestant (incidentally he shows a 
strong capitalistic ethos). The rest of the students probably are Catholic or 
indifferent in religious matters. 
6.6. The Dual or Conflictive pattern. 
This pattern applies to those subjects —all of them girls in our 
sample— who try to make compatible, when viewing their future, family life 
and professional life16. For these subjects, career and family do not appear as 
independent spheres —which is the case for the professional pattern— nor in a 
relation of means to ends —as it is the case for the family pattern—, in which 
working life is mainly understood as a means to support family life. Within the 
frame of the dual pattern, career and family are understood as equally 
important aspects of life, both essential in order to achieve personal 
fulfillment. This attempt to make these two aspects of life compatible is often 
a source of conflict, and because of that the 'dual pattern' may also be named 
'conflictive pattern'17. 
By using the expression 'dual pattern' or 'dual girl' we referred to those 
girls who see themselves as committed to the roles of mother-wife and career 
woman, but do not necessarily expect that their partners are going to share a 
part of the household labour. In this sense the notion of dual pattern should not 
be confused with the concept of 'dual-career family', as proposed by the 
Rapoports in 1971. 
The Rapoports refer to couples with children in which both spouses 
"successfully combine careers and family life". Although dual girls want to 
combine both spheres and in general they presuppose that their husbands will 
have a professional job, they do not indicate that they expect their husbands to 
assume a significant part of housework. Consequently, in the case of dual girls 
the break of the sexual division of labour in its traditional form, —by having a 
paid work outside home— does not imply a demand for a re-assignment of the 
household labour. When dual girls write about their future husbands they refer 
just to their professions, not to any possible housework or care of the children. 
An example is girl 52 who says: 
"I want that my husband has university studies like me, so he'd have a 
good job like mine. When married well live in a big house in Madrid. If 
I've kids I'll be good to them, I'll treat them well... I'll care that they study a 
lot". 
The transition from 'we' to 'I' indicates the different sexual roles that 
this girl is assuming. 
The conflicts that many women face in dealing with the two spheres 
(family and profession) which they try to embrace, are a decisive factor in 
these womens' self-perception and give rise to different sort of strategies (K. 
Gerson op. cit.). We saw that progressive girls seem unable to see themselves 
at the same time as professionals and family women. The perceived difficulty 
in matching both activities, which goes hand in hand with their fear of 
depending on a man, keep those progressive girls away from marriage and 
motherhood. They perceive that there is a basic conflict between family 
responsibilities and professional self-realization, and they prefer to follow the 
professional path, renouncing motherhood18 if necessary, in order to get rid of 
that conflict. This is the most radical option of the many adopted by the girls 
of our sample. The referred conflict is also perceived by family-centred girls. 
However they choose to give up their jobs, devoting themselves to their 
families. In a way they consider marriage and motherhood as their personal 
career. 
In contrast to both progressive and family-centred girls, dual girls do 
not solve the conflict by negating one of its poles. They are ready to navigate 
their way through that conflict, trying to keep the balance between both 
profession and family life by means of different strategies; but in any case they 
accept that double burden. 
Dual girls perceive the conflict between their two roles with several 
degrees of consciousness, and consequently they develop different strategies to 
deal with that conflict. There are girls who apparently minimize the problem; 
others propose diverse solutions to solve the conflict and limit its negative 
consequences. In this respect three main types of solution appear: compromise, 
postponement and inconsistent solution. 
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6.6.1. Solution of the conflict by compromise. 
Some girls are aware of the conflict between motherhood and 
career but they are not prepared to renounce either of these two roles. Their 
strategy consists then in reducing the tensions between both domains of self-
realization by opting for a type of career which would allow a relative 
compatibility with family responsibilities. Some of these girls also look for 
support in housework in the form of domestic helpers (in contrast, family-
centred girls would ask for help from their mothers and mothers-in-law). In 
this specific option the practice of the chosen career is somehow subordinated 
to the care of the kids: 
"We'll have a big house, where I can have my office or surgery, so that I 
can see to my children and my home at the same time than any clients...as 
I'll be older by then, I'll get a young girl in as a nanny and to help around 
the house..." (student 68, whose essay was already transcribed); 
"...married, both of us working, I'll work at a nursery and my husband at a 
paper factory. My daughter will be with me at the nursery..." (student 
112[97]). 
In these cases the conflict is solved by a compromise that is in fact a 
subordination of the career to the requirements of family life, which is 
contemplated in a rather traditional way. This strategy to dodge the conflict 
will be called solution by compromise. Student 77[41] writes along the same 
lines, but emphasizing even more the importance of her family responsibilities: 
"I'll like to marry, to have a family, because I love children. I can see 
myself preparing breakfast in the mornings, saying goodby to my children 
as they get on the school bus, making lunch in a hurry, dressing myself up, 
combing my hair and going to work." 
This girl views her paid job as a kind of secondary activity, just as 
professional people conceive of family life: something in the background 
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which does not intrude into foreground. The order of the sequence described 
by student [41] is not only temporal, is also hierarchical: she goes to work 
after she has done all her duties as a mother and as a housewife. These girls 
find very difficult to think of their profession and family responsibilities as 
separate domains. For instance, students 108[93] and 116[100] contemplate 
being a nursery nurse and a teacher respectively, in order to take their children 
with them to their work places. So, the price of the compromise most often is a 
drastic reduction of professional prospects. 
6.6.2. Solution of the conflict by postponement. 
There are other girls who are not prepared to frustrate their 
professional opportunities in order to look after their family. However they do 
not want to renounce marriage and motherhood. So they plan to separate both 
roles in time. This separation indicates a clearer conscience of the difficulties 
that doing both activities simultaneously entail. For example, student 18[13] 
contemplates postponing having a child until the end of her career as a ballet 
dancer; she provides a typical example of this delaying option. I call this 
option solution by postponement to it tries to avoid the conflict between the 
two roles in question by deferring the undertaking of family responsibilities. 
This solution is closer in spirit to the outlook of typical 'professional' girls, 
whilst the solution by compromise is closer to the attitudes of family-centred 
girls. The postponement of maternity presupposes that professional 
achievement is the primary aim in life. Children come second, when the 
professional career has been consolidated and motherhood can hardly interfere 
with it. 
Other girls not only think of postponing marriage and motherhood for 
professional reasons. They also want to take full advantage of their 
opportunities to increase their culture, their social relations, to enjoy life when 
young. Student 48[42] points to the reasons why she thinks of postponing 
motherhood: 
"At eighteen I'll start to study for a degree. The idea of marrying soon is 
not in my mind. I want to travel, to know other cultures, to know other 
people, etc. I think than when I'm 37 or nearly, I'll think it again because I 
like children and I'll like to have a family''. 
6.6.3. The inconsistent solution. 
Finally, there is a third group of girls who in spite of the fact that they 
see that there is a conflict between housework-motherhood and professional 
life, try to go along with both activities without any strategy to make them 
compatible. The result is a discourse full of contradictions and inconsistences. 
Student 114[99] words this attitude as follows: 
"... I do not want to be a housewife or anything like that, I want to be a 
gymnastics teacher and I'll get it at any price... when I have my husband 
and my three children I'll take care of them and I'll buy everything they ask 
for because I'm working and my husband as well (I reckon he'll work 
too)... and my family will grow up in that way". 
On the one hand this student categorically says that she does not want 
to be a housewife because she wants to have a career; but on the other hand 
she assumes the responsibility for the care of her children and husband. This 
type of thinking in which the perception of the conflict, however blurred, does 
not find a clear solution, shall be called inconsistent solution. 
In the last example the contradiction underlying the situation produces 
an emotional imbalance which must be counteracted through the idea of 
earning enough money to satisfy every little demand of the children. One 
would say that the conflict implicit in the situation that the girl contemplates, 
generates a feeling of guilt for not being a full time mother. Thus, the latent 
contradiction between her role as a gymnastics teacher and her role as a 
mother —between being a full time teacher and a part time mother— generates 
anxiety: the 'guilty' career mother tries to compensate that feeling by satisfying 
all the whims of her children, to whom she cannot provide full time attention. 
In general this conscience of a looming conflict which menace the future of 
these girls can produce a lack of confidence which undermines the stamina 
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require to keep their dual aspirations. This is the cause of the characteristic 
anxiety that these girls show when writing about their professional future, 
through expressions such as: 
"... I wouldn't like to renounce to my job for anything...", "... I'll keep my 
job in spite of...", etc. 
Apart from those girls who have some degree of consciousness about 
the conflictive character of a dual profile, there are others girls who 
contemplate having a dual activity (career and marriage) and who do not seem 
aware of facing any conflict. Perhaps they really see both activities as 
compatible or maybe they simply do not elaborate the question further. In fact 
they do not specify their prospects too much: 
"To finish my degree, to work in my profession, to marry and have 
children" (student 23 [ 17]); 
"I'll study pharmacy... When I finish my studies, I'll like marry, and have 
children. I'll be working but at the same time I'll take care of them" 
(student 24(181). 
6.6.4. No boys in a dual position. 
As suggested above, the dual/conflictive pattern only includes girls (in 
our sample). No boy contemplates the possibility that his paternal/domestic 
responsibilities can put his career at risk. Boys do not see themselves involved 
in the conflict analyzed above; hence they do not show the lack of confidence 
and the anxiety which this conflict generates. Some boys in the professional 
pattern show more interest in their children than others, but this interest is 
reduced playing with them when they come back home in the evening, or 
helping them with their homework. Although family-centred boys they feel 
responsible for earning money for their children, they do not feel that they 
must look after them; just playing with them or taking them out on week-ends 
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seems to be enough. No boy in any pattern mentions housework nor the 
possibility of being a househusband. 
6.6.5. The dual pattern as a pattern between two extremes. 
Apparently girls included in the dual pattern adopt (as girls and boys 
in the professional pattern do), a mode of action controlled by goals. However 
those girls whose explicit "ethos" can be considered as "modern" —in contrast 
to the traditional mode of control by maxims—suffer the constant pressure of 
an underlying, more traditional "ethos". This "ethos", arising from the sexual 
division of labour, is at the basis of the referred conflict inasmuch as it 
prescribes some ways of behaviour and some stereotyped responsibilities 
(motherhood, housework, etc.) to women, independently of their professional 
jobs and their dedication to other fields. 
These girls want what has been called by some "the best of both 
worlds" —and by others "the worst of both worlds". In fact they are in the 
middle of the road, demanding to live in both worlds; whether they have the 
best of both worlds, the worst or a balance between them, will depend on 
diverse factors, such as the evolution of their self-perception (to postpone 
maternity until their career is consolidated is not the same as to be prepared to 
share both roles whatever happens), and the partners they find (See K. Gerson 
op. cit.). This middle of the road position shows in the concepts they use. 
Apart from the two distinctive concepts "housework and career" and "family 
and job fulfillment", they share other concepts with the other two patterns, but 
always avoiding the most extreme ones. The specific concepts shared with the 
other patterns depend on each girl in particular, because this is not a clear cut 
pattern (no pattern is, but this is even less so). However categories such as 
"marry", "children", "continue studies" and "family ties in old age" are in 
nearly all dual subjects. All dual pattern girls show a great conceptual 
similarity when they refer to old age. Again, in this respect they are located in 
the middle; they do not see old age as the active and positive time that the 
professionals conceive of, nor as the boring, passive time of family-centred 
students. Dual girls, in general, see this period of life as a time of rest, quiet 
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life and close contact with their children and grand children. Neither too much 
activity, nor passivity. 
In figure 5 the intermediate position of dual pattern girls appears 
clearly; they define a specific area, which interestingly enough coincides with 
the biggest concentration of girls in the plot, as it can be seen in figure 8. In 
the sociosemantic plot of concepts there is also a specific, although not 
exclusive area corresponding to the categories characteristic of the dual pattern 
(see figure 5). The majority of girls with a dual self-perception pattern appear 
closer to the professional pattern than to the family pattern in the 
sociosemantic plot of individuals, probably due to their professional 
attachment to studies, and their modern explicit ethos. However there are few 
girls who lean towards the family pattern. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1 Our method of deconstruction/reconstruction is however very different from Derrida's. The 
sociosemantic approach introduces an intrinsic element of self-interpretation in the text: this 
element consists in the relationship between the different, contrasting subjects who compose 
that text (as a sum of individual texts). Therefore interpretation is not merely a relation 
between the object (the text) and the subject (the interpreter). The object also interprets itself 
through the different subjects inhabiting it. 
2 Interpretation inevitably generates sense, and in doing so it productively reproduces 
meaning; the meaning of a text changes in its process of decoding by the receiver (Eco, H. 
1975; Lotman, L. 1979). 
3 We follow here Rapoport definition of career "in its more precise meaning it designates 
those types of job sequences that require a high degree of commitment and that have a 
continuous developmental character" Rapoport, R. and Rapoport R.N., 1976: 9. 
4 These poles of attraction may be viewed as an 'intentional basin of attraction' in a model of 
catastrophe theory. Gleik, J.,(1988). 
5 In the reconstruction phase of the analysis the context in which a concept is used is more 
relevant than the concept itself. In this respect we will assume that "all linguistic production 
are indexical" (Garkinkel H. and Sacks, H. 1970), that is the reference depends on the context. 
6 The number of university students in Spain is rapidly increasing in the last years, and is 
nothing to suggest a change in this tendency. In 1980-1981 they were 649,098 students 
registered in Spanish universities; in 1990-1991 the students were 1,137,228. (Sources: 
Ministry of Education and Science and Consejo de Universidades-Secretaria General). 
Women employment rates can be also an indicator of the trend of Spanish women towards a 
paid job: In 1978 the rate of employment of women between 25 and 54 years old was 29.3%, 
whereas in 1992 the rate was 51.2%. In the same period the employment rate of men was 
95.5% in 1978 and 92.9 in 1992 (Source: INE -National Statistics Institute-, 1993). 
7 Lacking of more precise statistics about working married women, it is interesting to know 
that in Spain the women activity rate is 33.1% and the feminine unemployment rate is 23.1%. 
8"Meaning... can be defined (tautologously) as the significance of the information to the 
system processing it." Wilden, A. (1972, pp. 233). 
9 Physicists say that two systems may become resonant when they share some natural 
frequencies. 
10 For a deeper analysis of intersubjective meaning see Searle, J. (1969); Austin, J.L. (1962), 
which have been used in this short presentation of the concept. 
11 
 As explained previously, the computer programs available to implement multidimensional 
scaling, only accept 100 variables and as a consequence I reduced to 100 the initial list of 116 
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students. There was no need to reduce the number of students at the content analysis stage, 
therefore some of the examples correspond to students discarded in that reduction. The 
students who are in both lists have two numbers. The first corresponds to the 116 individuals 
list; the second, which goes between square brackets, corresponds to the 100 individuals list. 
Students who are only in the 116 individuals list are identified just by their numbers in that 
list. 
12 This pattern roughly coincides with what K. Gerson calls Veering away from domesticity. 
She defines the women in this pattern as: "Vering away from childbearing, child rearing, and 
domesticity and toward strong work commitments in adulthood". (K. Gerson., 1985:69). 
13 I guess that he means 'biography' instead of 'bibliography'. 
14 See K. Gerson op. cit.: 93-122; 127-132. 
15 Source: I.N.E (Spanish National Institute of Statistics). "Estadistica de la Ensefianza en 
Esparia, curso 1988-89". 
16 This group has many similarities with the group defined by K. Gerson as combining 
cornmited work with parenthood. (See Genson op. cit.: 158-190) 
17 VARELA, J. points out this conflictive aspect of what we call the dual model: "The triple 
role of mother, 'educator, and good professional —which substitutes the role of mother, virgin 
and housewife-- puts the "new" woman in an uncomfortable situation because she needs to 
reconcile her autonomy and her liberation with new forms of servitude and dependence" 
(1990: 230). 
18 I will not discus here the actual viability of the options considered by the students, neither 
the degree of freedom that they have to choose between options. As said in chapter four I take 
the words of the students at face value: if someone says "I'll not marry", I accept this as her 
present, actual option, which is determining her present actual action. Of course that option 
can change in the real future, but that real, 'objective' future is not determining present actions. 
Only intended 'subjective' future determines present actions. The aim of this research is to 
illuminate the self-perception of some adolescents, not to determine the possibilities they have 




The purpose of this thesis was to define, analyze and operationalise 
what I have called self-perception systems using a cohort of Spanish 
adolescents between the ages of 13 and 14. The relationship between the 
personal self-perception systems that define how individuals view themselves 
and the world around them, and the educational performance of these 
individuals, are at the heart of self-perception systems. 
As a result of my research I proposed a methodological approach 
which represents an attempt to bridge the gap between the qualitative and the 
quantitative traditions in social research. This approach hinges on a technique 
which I have called sociosemantic analysis which uses the instruments of 
content analysis and non-metric multidimensional scaling. 
The concept of 'self-perception' was presented as embracing the self-
images, attitudes, motivations, expectations, and views of reality, which define 
the horizon of meanings of social individuals, and are used to make sense of 
their actions. In the light of this conception, the self-perception patterns of the 
students were considered crucial with respect to laying out their futures and 
hence thereby affecting their attitude towards education and, I suspected 
performance as well, although this thesis was not specifically concerned to 
look in depth at individual elements of their overall weltanschauung. 
In order to substantiate the concept of 'self-perception pattern' (and its 
pragmatic counterpart. the concept of 'socio-educational motivation') I defined 
first the problem in relation to the main theoretic traditions of the sociology of 
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education (Chapter 1). Second, I put forward the specific theoretical 
framework in relation to which the concept of self-perception system is 
conceptually constructed (Chapter 2). This theoretical framework is based on a 
plurality of theoretic traditions, among which concepts about systems theory 
and second order cybernetics play a central role. I developed the concept of 
self-perception system and that of self-perception pattern, which constituted 
the theoretical backbone of the research (Chapter 3). Subsequently, I 
developed a specific methodology, sociosemantic analysis, in order to deal 
with the empirical evidence on which this research was based (Chapters 4 and 
5). The interpretation of the data processed through that methodology was 
provided in Chapters 5 and 6. This interpretation defined the characteristics of 
the self-perception patterns at the empirical level. 
1. The Problem. 
Sociologists of education have been for a long time aware of the 
influence that variables such as social class, gender, race, type of family, type 
of school, peers, etc., have on the students' attitudes towards education. 
Studies convincingly linking such variables to academic performance have 
been produced. However, those analyses have been, in general, less successful 
when it comes to giving a plausible account of how those variables would 
coalesce at the individual's level. 
Arguably, individuals can act according to some variables, but they 
do not act because of such variables. They do that because of their internal, 
idiosyncratic, personal, motives and reasons. 
When the sociology of education, in addition to establishing some 
useful correlations between 'objective' facts, has to confront its subject from a 
pragmatic —not just theoretical— standpoint, such as providing answers 
about public concerns on education, a more concrete perspective, focussing on 
the individual's actions could well be needed. 
At this pragmatic level it is important to look critically at the 
theoretical model of the individual subject that many studies have taken for 
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granted, in order to reformulate that model in a way that would make it 
possible to address properly the pragmatic issue of socio-educational 
motivation. The concepts of self-perception system and self-perception pattern 
should be understood from this perspective. 
The sociology of education has generated a number of theories to 
explain the basic cause of concern of modern educational systems: their 
inability to accomplish efficiently the fundamental aim postulated by the ideal 
of universal education, namely the equalization of social opportunities for all 
citizens. 
Universal education, a well established fact in today's developed 
societies, has not guaranteed equal opportunities for the underprivileged 
sectors of these societies. The theories that have tried to explain this relative 
failure may be grouped in relation to three main outlooks: 'cultural deprivation 
theories', 'reproduction theories', and 'cultural relativism theories'. 
It was argued that these three perspectives have in common what was 
described as a 'reified' conception of the culture, and an understanding of the 
individual subject as a rather passive actor in relation to her cultural 
environment. From this point of view culture is conceived of as something that 
would externally determine the subject in a cause-effect relationship. Another 
conception of culture was presented in the course of this work: culture as an 
inner phenomenon, embodied at the individual's level. I have argued that 
individuals are cultural systems in themselves; but they are living cultural 
systems, not reified ones. Certainly, those systems interact with each other, 
and that interaction produces as a result the parallel evolution of such systems. 
From this standpoint it is possible to argue that the culture of a group 
is the outcome of the concurrent evolution of individuals which can be called 
'structural coupling'. 
I have developed this argument in a heuristic model leading to the 
formulation of the concept of self-perception system. In the light of this model, 
I argued that individuals relate to their social milieu as coherent, self-
producing, cultural actors. Only individuals as individuals can explore new 
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ways of cultural realization. Indeed it can be argued that in the light of a 
rapidly changing social environment they are constrained to do so. In this case, 
individuals in the process of becoming a person, are likely to run into conflict 
with the constraints of their socio-cultural background. The result of that 
conflict will be cultural innovation. Underlying processes of cultural 
innovation are then the realities of the individuals as cultural systems 
dynamically self-constructing themselves. It is to refer to these individual 
systems that I have proposed and developed the concept of self-perception 
systems. Similar self-perception systems can be viewed as instances of a 
common self-perception pattern. 
The analysis of these self-perception patterns in the case of Spanish 
students belonging to the last year of their compulsory education has been the 
specific subject of this thesis. 
2. The conceptual framework. 
This thesis has drawn on a set of concepts, most of them belonging to 
the field of system theory and cybernetics, which have been recast in a 
psycho-social context in order to flesh out the concept of self-perception 
system. 
The use of those concepts had a tentative and heuristic character. 
Concepts like 'classical' and 'nonclassical systems', 'organizationally closed 
systems', 'action systems', 'informationally open systems', 'structural coupling', 
'reflectivity', 'communication' and 'complexity', presented in Chapter 2, were 
not conceived of as empirical concepts, but as notions instrumental to the 
spelling out of a set of heuristic hypotheses. The connection of these 
hypotheses took the form of a heuristic model built around the concept of self-
perception systems. 
The use of this conceptual framework introduces a epistemological 
perspective which leads to the consideration of: i) social science as an 
observer-dependent activity; and ii) individuals as autonomous entities who 
produce and reproduce themselves in an open process of continuous 
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interaction with their environment. This epistemological position has been 
assumed and developed in this thesis. 
3. The heuristic model. 
I have developed a heuristic model, the concept of 'self-perception 
system' set out in detail in Chapter 3. This heuristic model, as all similar ones, 
was not intended to be proved in itself, as a set of testable hypothesis. Its role 
was to lead to the production of empirical data as well as the generation of 
testable empirical hypothesis. 
The heuristic model that considers individuals as self-perception 
systems was based on three main postulates: 
i) Social individuals have idiosyncratic outlooks from which they 
understand themselves as well as the social reality around them. 
ii) Social individuals are autonomous, self-coherent systems, which 
have a characteristic inner logic due to the fact that they are organizationally 
closed systems of a psychosocial, conceptual/intentional kind. 
iii) Social individuals produce and reproduce their autonomous 
outlooks as a consequence of their need to maintain their coherence as 
organizationally closed systems. 
The proposed concept of self-perception system was characterized in 
the following terms: 
a) A self-perception system is an organizationally closed system made 
up of the cognitive and motivational schemata through which the individual 
perceives herself and the world, and acts in that perceived world. 
b) At a given moment, each individual agent has only one basic self-
perception system. 
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c) An individual's self-perception system is constituted as a self-
coherent and dynamic network made up of concepts, evaluations, aims, 
expectations, attitudes, wishes, etc. It is composed of both 'objective' 
(cognitive, conceptual) and 'subjective' (attitudes, volitions, etc.) elements. 
d) A self-perception system does not only refer to individuals' 
perceptions of themselves; it also include those individuals' perceptions of the 
world around them, and specifically of the social world that makes up their 
environment of interactions. 
e) A self-perception system comprises all the knowledge/attitudes of 
an individual about reality. Hence, any knowledge or attitude that a person 
has, would be a part of her identity as a self. 
0 An individual's self-perception system is neither a purely 
'psychological', nor 'sociological' entity. It is an intrinsically psycho-social 
entity in which both elements, psychological and social, are only aspects of a 
unified self-productive system. 
g) A self-perception system changes without loss of its defining 
character and its internal coherence. Consequently, it changes according to its 
inner logic. Hence, it cannot be properly conceived of as being only the result 
of the individual's internalization of a set of external social norms. 
4. The methodology. 
The empirical sections of this research were built upon the heuristic 
model. The empirical sections were designed to produce testable hypotheses 
based on a corpus of data, produced and interpreted by means of a specific 
methodology. 
The methodology employed in this thesis combined several 
techniques: 'Text Production' (the technique of inducing the production of a 
relevant text by the subjects investigated), 'Content Analysis' (of those texts), 
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and 'Sociosemantic Analysis' (which used content analysis for examining the 
data and made use of Multidimensional Scaling). 
The 'text production technique' was based on 116 essays written by 
the students who participated in this research. As indicated, the analysis of 
those texts went through two successive stages, first that of content analysis 
(Chapter 4), and second that of sociosemantic analysis (Chapter 5). Finally, a 
third stage consisted of the full interpretive analysis of all the information 
gathered (including the results of the previous content and sociosemantic 
analyses). 
Thus, this combination of techniques produced several levels of data. 
The most basic level was that of the corpus of data itself, namely the collection 
of essays. The second level of data was generated through the content analysis 
of this corpus, which determined a set of conceptual categories ensconced in 
the essays. This analysis gave a general picture of the cognitive, volitive, 
attitudinal, etc., characteristics of the set of individuals analyzed. As a 
consequence it supplied the researcher with a first view of the location of each 
individual's self-perception system (with respect to those of the other 
individuals). The formulation of some provisional hypotheses about patterns of 
self-perception suggested by the data, was already possible at this level. 
A third level of data was produced by means of the subsequent 
sociosemantic analysis. This socio-semantic analysis graphically expressed (by 
means of multidimensional scaling) the structure of conexions between 
categories (through the individuals using them) as well as the structure of 
conexions between the individuals (through the categories used by them). In 
short, the stage of sociosemantic analysis showed, by means of sociosemantic 
plots, the relative social distance between the meanings present in the sample, 
as well as the relative semantic distance between the individuals composing it. 
Finally, the interpretive analysis was based on the concurrent use of 
these three levels of data (the corpus of texts, content analysis, and 
sociosemantic analysis). The determination and characterization of three main 
self-perception patterns among the individuals of the sample emerged through 
a process of abstraction. 
304 
An interpretive analysis of this kind cannot be done in a mechanical, 
and/or linear way. It must be done by examining many times the different 
levels of data, making numerous hypothetical connexions between data in each 
level and across levels, and trying to corroborate them. This work began in 
Chapter 5 and was completed in Chapter 6. 
When the aim is to investigate the inner logic of individuals as self-
perception systems, such a methodology seems appropriate. The researcher 
must 'let those individuals speak for themselves', and, even more importantly, 
she must 'let the data speak for themselves'. If the research would had been 
undertaken presupposing a set of empirical hypotheses to be tested by means 
of their implementation through variables, the methodology would have been 
more conventional. But my purpose in this thesis has been to produce a 
'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1984), a theory not 
entailed by an a priori framework of empirical hypotheses, but entailed by the 
structures a posteriori discovered in the data. 
5. Patterns of self-perception 
Although each person has her own idiosyncratic self-perception 
system, it was possible by using the methodology described above, to locate 
similarities between individual self-perception systems. Those similarities 
allowed the grouping of analogous self-perception systems into different 
patterns of self-perception. The self-perception patterns emerged as groupings 
of similar self-perception systems. 
The different levels of data analysis that were used in this research 
produced sufficient evidence to be able to detect three main self-perception 
patterns and two sub-patterns. They were called: family oriented self-
perception pattern, profession oriented self-perception pattern and dual 
pattern. 
The two sub-patterns were found within the professionally oriented or 
professional self-perception pattern; they were called the progressive sub-
pattern and the yuppie sub-pattern. 
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5.1 The profession oriented pattern. 
A group of students appeared to have their self-perception based on 
their future career life and the issues related to or derived from that expected 
future. Their professional self-realization seemed to shape all other aspects of 
their conceptual and intentional world: studies, family life, habits, etc. 
Predictably all the subjects included in this pattern view themselves as 
highly qualified professionals: doctors, journalists, lawyers, pilots, 
mathematicians, etc. To reach that status they intended to get —at least— a 
university degree 
The profession-oriented students organize their goals well in advance. 
They attempt to plan the development of their academic achievements in a 
pretty accurate way. They have a substantial knowledge of the stages and 
options of the education system. 
Other features of this self-perception pattern are less predictable, and 
hence more interesting theoretically. The individuals who adopt the 
professional pattern show a surprising autonomy with respect to their parents. 
These are literally invisible —so far as their presence in the texts is concerned. 
Their present family life does not directly appear, and their future family life 
seems to be quite detached from their objectives of personal self-realization, 
constituting no more than a secondary domain in relation to their professional 
life. 
Strict individualism appears to be the hallmark of this pattern. The 
world of meanings of these students appears to be centred on themselves as 
individuals. Their belonging to primary groups (first and foremost their 
family) seems to be felt by them as somewhat circumstantial. 
Thus, the individuals who conform to this pattern seem to decide and 
control their actions by carefully structuring their lives as a chain of successive 
(sometimes, parallel) goals. For that reason they 'control their actions by 
goals'. Typically, the extent of this scheduling by goals encompasses their 
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whole lives even old age, which it self is viewed in active, positive terms. In 
this pattern goals seem to give sense to their lives. 
It is possible to distinguish two subgroups among the students with a 
professional self-perception pattern: they were included in two sub-patterns, 
the yuppie and the progressive. The critical feature which differentiates those 
two sub-patterns is the conception and attitude towards future family life. 
Students within the yuppie sub-pattern accept the possibility of having a 
conventional family (including, without qualms, the possibility of divorce), 
—although it must be stressed, this future family life plays a secondary role in 
their concerns. On the contrary, students belonging to the progressive sub-
pattern reject conventional forms of future family life. They do not accept 
marriage and/or having children. It is important to stress that the totality of 
students included in this sub-pattern are girls. 
5.2. The family oriented pattern. 
In contrast to the previous pattern, another set of students appear to 
focus their expectations on family related issues, and seem to understand their 
personal self-fulfillment in relation to their family life. These students feel 
strongly that they are an integral part of a family. They seem to see the world 
and themselves through a personal consciousness defined only through and by 
the family. The presence of their parents in their essays is very substantial. 
Their expectations are also largely defined in relation to their future family. 
'Marriage' is a central category in their repertoire. Not only family but other 
primary groups seem to be essential to their social lives. Their individuality 
appears as defined with respect to such groups (for instance, in all cases, 
family-centred students see having fun from a group perspective). They have 
no hobbies, no individual ways of enjoying oneself —writing, playing an 
instrument, etc—, no link between working activities and free-time self-
realization. 
Generally speaking, the job expectations of family-centred students 
are only marginally related to education. They want to work as soon as 
possible, and only accept further education as a painful price that they are 
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likely to pay in order to get a semi-skilled job. An outstanding feature of this 
pattern is the instrumental conception of work. This is not understood as a 
means of personal fulfillment but as merely as a means to sustain the family. 
The individuals belonging to this pattern seem to define, decide and 
control their actions through short term goals, but also by means of moral 
maxims. Their horizon of goals only reach their first proper job, marriage and 
children. Goals do not play a strategic role in the organization of their lives, 
they seem to depend more on moral maxims of a general kind to make sense of 
their actions. This mode of controlling action was named 'control of action by 
maxims'. 
The moral maxims that these individuals use or presuppose in their 
essays seem to be a direct reproduction or echo of the maxims that they hear 
from their parents, and apparently play a critical role in the reproduction of the 
moral cohesiveness of family life. 
The lack of long term goals beyond child rearing seems to have as a 
consequence a passive and negative view of old age. 
5.3. The dual pattern. 
This pattern describes those subjects —all of them girls in our 
sample— who tried to make compatible, when viewing their future, family life 
and professional life. For these subjects, career and family do not appear as 
independent spheres —which is the case for the professional pattern— nor as 
means to ends —as it is the case of the family pattern, in which working life is 
mainly understood as a means of supporting family life. 
Within the frame of the dual pattern career and family are understood 
as equally important aspects of life, both essential in order to achieve personal 
fulfillment. This attempt to make these two aspects of life compatible is often 
a source of conflict, and because of that the 'dual pattern' may also be called 
the 'conflictive pattern'. For that reason it could be argued that the girls of our 
sample give evidence of being partially aware of this conflict and elaborate 
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several strategies to deal with it: postponing having children, working from 
home or finding a supposedly compatible job, etc. 
5.4. The two basic sociosemantic dimensions. 
An interesting feature of the sociosemantic analysis was that the bi-
dimensional plots generated in it, allowed a clear representation of these three 
models in terms of just two dimensions. The first and main dimension, 
represented as the horizontal axis, was interpretable as the 'individualism 
dimension'. It orders categories and individuals according to this notion, (from 
maximum to minimum individualism). The second dimension, represented by 
the vertical axis, was interpretable as the 'consumerism (expectancy) 
dimension'. It also orders categories and individuals according to this notion 
(from maximum to minimum consumerism expectancy). 
According to this view, the progressive sub-pattern would be defined 
by the highest level of individualism and a low-medium level of consumerism 
expectancy. Whereas the yuppie sub-pattern would be defined by the highest 
level of consumerism expectancy and a high-medium level of individualism. 
The family oriented pattern appeared defined by the lowest level of 
individualism and the lowest level of consumerism expectancy; whereas the 
dual pattern would be defined as a low-medium level of individualism and a 
moderately high level of consumerism expectancy. 
6. Gender and self-perception patterns. 
The analysis of the students' essays made clear that girls and boys 
show substantial differences in relation to their self-perception systems. These 
differences appeared as an unequal distributions of girls and boys across the 
self-perception patterns which have just been summarized. First, there is a 
pattern, the dual pattern, with includes girls exclusively. Second, girls occupy 
the extreme positions in the other two patterns: as a matter of fact, the extreme 
area of the professional pattern, which make up the progressive sub-pattern, is 
also constituted exclusively of girls. On the other side of the sociosemantic 
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plots, girls occupy the extreme area of the family oriented pattern. This fact 
suggests that for some girls the option between patterns of self-perception 
appears in particularly radical terms. In sum, girls tend to be concentrated in 
three clusters, one in each extreme of the plots and the third near the middle. 
Boys tend to be more homogeneously distributed although they are 
conspicuously absent from the progressive sub-pattern (however some of them 
are present in the area that in the plots would correspond to the dual pattern). 
The analyses have also shown that the life strategies of girls in the 
main are different from those of boys. Girls on the whole seem to be more 
conscious of the professional difficulties that they are likely to face. Girls also 
feel that the private and the public spheres of their lives are interconnected, 
whereas boys do not seem to perceive a strong relation between both domains 
and see no conflict between them. 
7. Self-perception patterns and social class. 
This thesis has avoided an a priori classification of the students in this 
sample into distinct social classes. That is why no attempt was made to 
establish a strict, quantitative correlation between social class and self-
perception patterns. It can be argued, from an epistemological point of view, 
that in order to establish a qualitative correlation between the two phenomena, 
it is necessary to have an adequate definition (both theoretical and operational) 
of social class. However, within sociology the definitions of social class seem 
to be problematic. This is why, instead of trying to establish the quantitative 
relationship between unclear concepts (through debatable and merely 
approximative indicators), I postponed a defmition of social class as such until 
it become possible to define it in the light of findings made available through 
my use of self-perception systems. 
Arguably, the conventional account of social stratification pays an 
insufficient attention to the way people look at themselves (it is the 'objective/ 
subjective dilemma of social sciences', as P.M. Davies et al. put it). Very 
often, some 'objective' categories of sociological thought are imposed on 
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people regardless of how they identify themselves socially. The phenomenon 
of social stratification appears in this light as something external, that 'occurs' 
to the subjects who are being analyzed in this respect. 
In this sense my research show several coincidences, for instance, with 
Davies, Coxon and Jones' work Images of Social Stratification, inasmuch as 
it attempts to produce some resonance between the accounts that sociologists 
give about people and the images that these people have about themselves. 
The analysis of the students' perception of themselves and their future 
suggested that specific patterns of self-perception are more likely to be 
prevalent among individuals having certain social backgrounds. In general, the 
students who see their future oriented to family life, in the role of breadwinner 
or housewife, came from working-class families. But the difference between 
the expectations of the students with a working class background and the 
reality of their parents' lives is outstanding. The desire to have a career, the 
belief both in the meritocratic ideology and in the possibility of upward 
mobility are common among students with a working-class background. 
Arguably, this difference with respect to their parents' social reality is 
the fact that needs an explanation. The concept of self-perception system, 
which implies that of informational openness, creativity and change, provides 
a framework to find that explanation, as this thesis has tried to argue. 
8. Final reflections and suggestions for further research. 
I wish to mention what I will call the limits to this research. 
In the first chapter I did not fully develop the themes concerned with 
areas such as compensatory education and cultural relativism because such an 
exegesis and discussion would have been lengthy and my purpose was only 
one of referring to sections of those theories which were important in terms of 
my problematic. 
311 
Secondly, I did not discuss the research in terms of the generation of 
new educational policies. Whilst the motivation of the research was derived 
from my concern with the differences between ability and educational 
performance, as my work progressed I become more concerned with the 
development of an adequate instrument of analysis which would allow us to 
look at this area with grater precision. Hopefully, once the method is more 
refilled, work could be undertaken in this area. 
The theoretical background of this research presented in an abridged 
form in Chapter two, cannot be considered to be a complete, self-contained 
presentation of systems theory and second order cybernetics because, again 
and by necessity my presentation was governed but the fact that I was looking 
for elements to construct an adequate instrument of analysis rather than 
attempting a rigorous and systematic critique of approaches and schools. 
Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the sociology of education has in the 
past been far too concerned with approaches and not concerned enough with 
problems and problem solving. 
The heuristic model presented in Chapter 3 could have been expanded 
to include a much wider discussion of the psychological literature, especially 
of those areas concerned with personality and developmental psychology. 
Equally, the concept of self-perception system was presented without 
a thorough-going development of its genetic and evolutionary dimensions. The 
sociological projection of this concept, that is to say the way in which 
individual self-perception systems interact through a process of parallel 
evolution influence each other and produce a cultural environment which, in 
some aspects, also appears to be a collective self-perception system, will need 
more work in the future. 
Looking at the empirical sections of the thesis, I feel that the sample of 
students selected cannot be taken to be a quantitative representation of the 
entire student population. Sometime in the future it could be useful to take a 
larger sample to deal with this important matter. 
312 
The essay technique which I used to produce the basic data has 
limitations some of which I discussed in Chapter 4. Because it is what I 
described as a: weakly framed technique, it cannot be as specific as a strongly 
framed techniques. The fact that students expressing themselves through their 
written essays whilst in the school environment could also have given rise to a 
bias. 
The kind of content analysis I used was just one of many forms 
available. The strictly grammatical aspects of the text were disregarded, 
although those aspects were obviously relevant to illuminate the existence of 
different cognitive styles of the students. Some classical techniques of content 
analysis i.e., the frequencies of key words, occurrences of words, etc. were 
also not used although it is possible that they can provided us with some 
further information about the semantic structure of the texts. 
It can be said that i did not supply sufficient information about the 
academic performance and social background of the students. Firstly, official 
accounts of academic performance were not available. Secondly, my concern 
was not to use established concepts of social class initially but only to look at 
them once I had collected the data and analyzed it by sociosemantic analysis. 
It can also, perhaps, be argued that the patterns which emerged are 
closely dependent on the sample I used and that if a different i.e., more varied 
sample was used it could have produced different data which would have had 
to be organized in a different form. Again this is something which will have to 
be tested. 
It would have perhaps been possible to have described even with the 
present data a different typology of self-perception patterns. The problem is 
not that different typologies are possible, but the consistency between them. 
Different typologies can be not only self-consistent but reciprocally consistent 
inasmuch as their patterns do not contradict each other. For instance, it could 
have been possible to detect two sorts of traditional patterns, masculine and 
feminine. This further differentiation would have not been contradictory with 
the analysis proposed, which considers a single traditional pattern. 
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